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This thesis is the product of three years of research, funded by the Felix Trust and housed by the 
department of history, School of Oriental and African Studies, London University.
Professor David Arnold has supervised the thesis, from the very beginning when it 
seemed as if ‘time’ as a problematic could never become a viable historical project. Not only has 
he given an enormous amount of time and energy in the details of the writing, he has also 
relentlessly provided counter-arguments and counter-factuals, without which I could never have 
convinced myself of my own thoughts. He has also shared his own published and published 
works, frequently prevented my confidence from sagging, and unleashed a freedom of thought 
from the many constructed categories, which I had unwittingly ‘normalised’ myself into. Much of 
this work belongs to him.
The best way to preface my thesis is perhaps to admit that it is nothing if not a collective 
exercise. The errors are solely mine, but the ideas and the questions have always emerged in 
everyday conversations with my friends and colleagues. Special thanks are due to Dipesh 
Chakravarty, who demonstrated, amongst other things, how one’s own past and biography must 
be relocated if one has to problematise temporality and history. Gautam Bhadra very kindly 
shared his insights about popular consciousness and his political enthusiasm, and remains an 
ideal of intellectual and personal emulation for me. Romilla Thapar directed me towards 
understanding pre-colonial Indian philosophies of time, which I was hitherto unaware of. 
Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, who had also taught me in my M. A. days, shared his experiences of 
‘tribal’ practices in the Birbhum area.
Sruti Kapila and Kriti Kapila have been friends, confidantes and colleagues in one. 
Vinayak Chaturvedi, Veena Naregal, Anish Ahluwalia, Daud A!i, Javed Majid and many others 
have offered crucial suggestions in course of these three years. My work would have been 
impossible without help from Ananda Bhattacharya of the West Bengal State Archives, Asim 
Mukhopadhyay of the National Library, India, the staff of the Centre for Studies in Social Sciences 
in Calcutta, the staff of the Old Records Room, Dumka, Santal Parganas and those of the India 
Office Library, London.
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At home, Javed, Jitendra, J. N. Singh, Pankaj, Uma, Sanjay and others have always 
given me perspective. Lata-di and Naga gave given unconditional affection and hope. Debu-da, 
perhaps my oldest and best friend, Aiay-da and Julte-da, who supplied me with many Bengali 
texts and provoked me with their extraordinary thoughts and lifestyles, and others have always 
welcomed me back from my detours. Without Mala-di, I would never have had the luxury of 
undisturbed days of study- Dadu and dida have demonstrated what resilience can mean.
I must also remember my friends and comrades from the earlier days of political activism. 
Though we have had some differences, they still remain an intrinsic part of my thoughts and 
research. It is my duty to especially remember my debt to Chandrashekhar, who died before his 
time, in a struggle and at a place where we should have all been there with him.
My father, among other things, taught me to read Marx. I wish he was here to share in 
my thoughts. Clem Alford has given me a home away from home, constantly reminded me that 
without music no language is complete and that it is not impossible to maintain a certain 
radicalism in the most despairing of days.
Jayasri Banerjee -  musician, thinker, incorrigible enthusiast, and luckily for me, also my 
mother -  reminds me that origins and beginnings occur more than once in life. She keeps up 
hope for better days, not only for herself but also on my behalf, and on behalf of strangers whom I 
still hope to meet. Without her, this work could not have been conceived.
And of course, Shailendra, even though so far away, offers me surprising proximities. 




The future is what is not grasped, what befalls us and 
lays hotet-of us. The other is the future.
-  Emmanuel Levinas1
This thesis seeks to understand what can be called the ‘temporal politics’ of colonial modernity. It 
begins from the premise that modernity -  and colonialism, which was both the precondition and the 
supplement of modernity -  changed the world first and foremost by re-deploying time and the idea of 
time. Of course, the notion of modernity as an-attribute of society and of the thinking subject has 
multiple usages. The term ‘modern’ may be an adjective of technology, or of an individual who defies 
'tradition’ and professes ‘freedom’ of choice. Modernisation may indicate processes of institutional 
and economic development of a society towards greater complexity. It may also imply a history 
thematised and generated through the state-civil society binary. The ’modern man’ may intend to 
mean a secular subject, or the ideal of the pure homo economicus. It may indicate a psychology, 
which is aware of itself and its own internal contradictions. Or it may indicate a being a la Descartes 
who cogitates and thinks about the reason to be. Or even a being a la Kant who differentiates 
between reason and intuition, rationality and aesthetics. Modernity may also be taken to characterise 
a self-conscious vanguard of self-propelled change. Or it may even be an oblique comment on the 
breakdown of morality, of gender-roles, of peace and leisure. However, underlying these multiple and 
everyday usages of the term 'modern1, lies a common sensibility of time -  the sensibility that despite 
some social costs, what comes later is generally an improvement on what came earlier.
This evaluation of the passing of time might seem truistic to us today. However, it must be 
remembered that this temporal assessment was by no means common to all times and all places. To 
rationalise the contemporary as both morally and practically better than the past, or to nostalgically 
see the past, the pastoral and the ancestral as the ethical and aesthetic inversion of the present, is an 
eminently specific and modern attitude. For, as Bruno Latour shows us, modernity was the effect of a 
process of back-projection, through which the present made itself into a unity -  by bracketing and
1 Time and the Other, Pittsburgh, 1987, pp. 76-7.
stabilising an ‘archaic’ past and by historicising itself through periodisations and temporal hierarchies. 
Modernity was thus not so much a historical period as a reconfiguration of time itself, which is why no 
dateable rupture can be identified as the beginning of modernity in Europe.2 With the rise of 
capitalism, as time seemed to accumulate like money, it appeared as if the more advanced a society, 
the greater the pile of time, experience and value that accrued to it. Therefore, modernity appeared to 
itself primarily as a temporal competence, an advantage that the posterior possessed over the prior, 
exclusively because of the former’s advanced position in time. This temporal competence was that of 
the monumental accumulation of time as in production and in evolution, and at the same time that of 
the advantage of hindsight, as in history and ethnology.
With the rise of capitalism, the West appeared to control time itself, as capital shaped, to use 
Lyotard’s phrase, the ‘sequence of moments in such a way that it accepted a high rate of 
contingency.’3 In other words, through capital, the modern subject owned up to the risks and 
vicissitudes of even temporality, seizing time, as it were, by putting interest and profit on its 
accumulation, deferral and return.4 Capital even claimed the capacity to explode all ‘autarchies’, to 
translate all kinds of local and social labour into quantifiable and therefore commensurable labour­
time units. Time -  which was conceptualised in non-modern philosophies as the limit to thought5 -  
became in colonial modernity the possession of the rational and thinking subject, who henceforth 
could judge others in terms of their lack and lag of temporality. Time thus itself became the ‘universal’ 
parameter of judgement, as colonised people became constituted as ‘primitive’ or ‘archaic’ or 
timeless. The secular time of natural history, and later of ethnology, classified the world into separate 
categories, species and locations.6 As Johannes Fabian shows us, this was fundamentally different 
from earlier sacred and theological time-senses, which sought to battle, convert and win over non­
believers and ‘barbarians’ rather than categorise them as another time. This secular time, later 
supplemented by the evolutionary law of Darwinian biology, socialised the law of Newtonian physics, 
the law that two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time. In order to usurp the 
colonised’s world therefore, the Enlightenment West transposed Others to the time of the past.7
In course of this process, time was itself conceptualised as the Other of space. As O. Harris 
says, this allowed Europe to reproduce itself as a singular homogeneous presence, banishing its 
internal differences and its own antagonistic temporalities to distant and ethnologised lands.8 The 
exile of convicts and riff-raff to ‘empty’ or ‘aboriginal’ islands was the most literal instance of this 
export of uncivilised and non-modern temporalities. Once others were wished away to another time, 
their alterity could be nullified and they could safely be made to reappear on the stage of history
2 Bruno-Latour, We Have Never Been Modem-, Hemel Hempstead-, 1-9937 ^ 4 7 .
3 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, Oxford, 1991, p. 68.
4 Eric Alliez, Capital Times: Tales from the Conquest o f Time, Minneapolis, t996.
5 Time has been the most radical irresoluble in Western philosophy since St Augustine, who is routinely quoted as having 
‘confessed’ that though he ‘knew’ what time was, he could never ‘say’ it. See H. Gadamer, ‘The Western View of the Inner 
Experience of Time and the Limits of Thought', in Time and the Philosophies, intro. Paul Ricoeur, London, 1977, p. 35.
6 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, London, 1970. For a discussion on the emergence of a secular, historical time of 
politics in Europe, see Reinhardt Koselleck, Futures Past, Cambridge (Mass.), 1985.
Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Oblects, New York, 1983, pp. 26-9.
8 ‘Time and Difference in Anthropological Writing', in Honzons of Understanding, eds., Jan Bremen et al., Leiden, 1996, p. 143.
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through the technique of representation of other countries and societies. The Other, even as s/he 
remained temporally anachronistic and non-present, was contained within the representational space 
of history, seen by modern thinkers like Hegel as co-terminous to the globe. The presence of the 
non-contemporary and the colonised thus became exclusively dependent on their reproduction and 
depiction by the modern subject. The ‘past’ and the ‘primitive’ came to be re-presented in an abstract 
empty time that, precisely for being abstract, remained free from any contamination, even as 
‘primitive’ labour and products were harnessed to the metropolitan location of capital.
Location of time: colonial Bengal
Based on the above perspective, this thesis seeks to analyse temporal politics by taking up the 
particular location of colonial Bengal. Partha Chatterjee, Ranajit Guha and Sudipta Kaviraj have 
definitively shown how middle-class Bengalis, accused of lacking progressive temporality, responded 
to colonialism with resonant claims to historicity.9 However, while the ‘historical’ was the primary site 
where the colonised staked their claim to contemporaneity with the coloniser, Bengali historiography 
itself was founded on a counterpoise with the figure of the ‘primitive’. This could very well have been 
a duplication of the trajectory of Western historiography, but for the fact that the colonised, while 
counterpoising itself to the ‘primitive’, also had to admit the ‘primitive’ within its own time and space. 
In Bengal, while the adjective ‘primitive’ was used to denote any person, practice or object which 
seemed inconvenient and irreconcilable to the unitary time of progress, the real problem was the 
proximal presence of peoples who seemed literally to be ‘survivals’ of another time. These real-life, 
extant ‘primitives’ -  ‘tribes’ like Santals and Paharias -  were indubitably part of the nation, who could 
not quite be expelled and who were in fact necessary for Bengali society and economy. This thesis 
argues that the historical claim of the colonised nation was founded on the thematisation of this 
problem of the ‘primitive within’. The argument proceeds by setting off Bengali historical texts against 
Bengali texts of geography, economics, poetry and philosophy on the one hand, and against Santal 
notions of everyday time, rebellious time, narrative time and debt-time on the other. In this sense, the 
thesis is neither a comprehensive account of Santal life, nor a complete analysis of colonial Bengali 
discourse. Rather it is a work about the Santal-Bengali counterpoise, a counterpoise that became the 
radical clue for the effecting of difference and for the ‘thinking’ of temporality by the colonised 
intellectual.
Before proceeding further a clarificatory word becomes necessary. It might seem from the 
way the thesis is formulated that I am proposing the Bengali middle-classes as a single,
9 Ranajit Guha, An Indian Historiography of India: A Nineteenth-century Agenda and its Implication, Calcutta, 1988; Partha 
Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments, Princeton, 1993; Sudipta Kaviraj, The Unhappy Consciousness, Bankimchandra 
Chattopadhyay and the Formation of Nationalist Discourse in India, Delhi, 1995.
homogeneous group. Needless to say, this was not the case with nineteenth-century Bengal, just as 
it is not the case with today’s India. In fact, recent historiography has clearly shown that the group of 
educated Bengalis, who claimed a bhadrolok or gentrified status and who claimed to lead Bengal as a 
whole in its social reform project, was itself internally stratified in terms of wealth, cultural status and 
social habits. Sumit Sarkar’s work particularly has shown how the lower middle classes, who 
constituted the third and fourth grade clerical staff in colonial offices, displayed social preferences and 
reading habits quite different from the more elite sections of the middle classes. The literature of 
kaliyuga, which formulated the colonial present as an already anticipated evil epoch, was consumed 
more amongst these lower middle classes than amongst the more consciously ‘historical’, and 
“liberal’, upper middle classes.10 In fact, my first chapter intends to show how the emergence of 
'history', as a specific genre of consciousness that could articulate the nation as a totality^ was a 
process in deep disjuncture with the epochal and ironic sensibilities of these lower sections of the 
Bengali bhadrolok. Sarkar’s work also points to an urban-rural divide, which seems to cut across 
purely economic class analysis. The kaliyug discourse as operative amongst the rural upper and 
middle-upper castes of Vikrampur, Sarkar shows, demonstrated an articulation with ideas of gender 
and femininity which was not quite the same as the ‘reformist’ discourse on women, domesticity and 
nation that Calcutta middle classes partook in.11 It is as a constant reminder of these internal 
stratifications, that l use the term middle classes in the plural all through the thesis. Also, the thesis 
does not rest solely on a reading of high ‘literary’ texts of the nineteenth century. It deliberately reads 
people like Bankimchandra on the one hand, and a mass of ‘smaller’ texts, essays and booklets, on 
the other, written from different social positions. The latter could be produced by middle-castes as 
their caste-histories, or they could be produced by individuals in small towns like Andul or Burdwan, 
keen to make their voice heard through the new technique of mass communication, the print. They 
could be produced by pandits, written in the tradition of earlier purankatha and of the scholastic 
mimamsa tradition, Brahmans who felt they had lost their place to the new genre of school-books in 
the project of instructing the masses. They could also be the mass of ‘plays’ being produced in what 
was seen by the gentry as ‘vulgar’ and adirasatmak Bengali. In this, the thesis takes Sumanta 
Banerjee’s lesson seriously -  that even within Calcutta, Bengali middle classes were shaping 
themselves through the confrontation of ‘literary and moral’ positions with ‘popular and vulgar ones’, 
through the confrontation of texts published by presses like Budhodoy Press, Sanskrit Press, Victoria 
Press, Girish Vidyaratna Press etc with texts published by the well-known battala presses.12 Despite 
these differences, however, there seem to be one unifying feature common to these discourses. 
Almost all the texts I came across, even when written before the 1850s, distinguished the Bengali ja ti 
from the asabhya or uncivilised jatis like the Santal. Of course, in the earlier discourses, the term ja ti 
did not unequivocally mean the ‘nation’, it could be caste, community (e.g. Hindu jati) or even regional 
or linguistic grouping (e.g. the Bengali). In that sense, the boundary between the sabhya and the 
asabhya jatis would probably have been negotiable, according to the context of the distinction being
10 Sumit Sarkar, ‘Colonial Times: Ciocks-and-Ka/iyt^fa^ papep presented at the South Asia History Seminar, SOAS, London 
University, 20 June 1996,
11 Sumit Sarkar, The Kalki-Avatar of Vikrampur’, in Subaltern Studies VI, ed. Ranajit Guha, Delhi, 1992,
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made. The asabhya in one context might signify the ‘tribes’ speaking Kolarian languages, it might 
signify in another context the Bengali-speaking chasha or 'rustic boor’. Yet whatever the ja ti claimed 
as its context or referent, it was seen in the nineteenth century as counterpoised not only to the 
coloniser, but also to the immoral, uncivilised, ‘primitive’, from which even the lowliest peasant or 
sudra had to be distinguished.
The issue becomes all the more complex, and perhaps telling, if we problematise the idea of 
the middle classes in terms of gender politics. We now know and agree that the construction of the 
Bengali bhadrolok's own identity depended on his subordination and ‘education’ of the woman-at- 
home.13 In fact, a complete nineteenth-century history of Bengal can and should be written in terms of 
what Partha Chatterjee had revealingly called 'the nationalist resolution of the women’s question’ -  i.e. 
in terms of the attempts by the Bengali bhadrolok to make the interior of the home into a pure, 
‘spiritual’ and uncolonised site, which contrasted with the colonised and ‘materialistic’ public space, 
the space that the Bengali man could never quite seem to master.14 Recent historiography has also 
moved on from here to show that a history of Bengali middle-class women cannot be written by 
constructing them as victims or as objects of social and discursive violence, that ‘victim’ and agent 
cannot be seen as mutually exclusive categories from a feminist perspective. Attempts at recovering 
the Bengali woman’s voice have thus indelibly fractured the apparently unitary project of middle-class 
history.15 However, instead of going against my main characterisisation -  that Bengali nationalist 
discourse depended on the counterpoise of ‘historical’ time with the time of the ‘primordial’ -  gender 
studies helps me to make the point more forcefully. After all, in the discourse of patriarchy, ‘woman’ 
comes across clearly as an ethnological category -  i.e. as a category determined more by biology 
than by culture. Just like the ‘tribe’, the ‘woman’ is pushed into the realm of nature. Nature is not only 
the uncultured, uncontrived ground, the counter-reason so to speak, for man’s ‘civilisation’, nature is 
also primarily that with which man has always tried to establish an extractive, non-reciprocal object- 
relation. ‘Primordial’ nature also frightens man with her reprisals, with her fickleness and must be 
worshipped, aestheticised and indulged. In this paradigm, history appears as the story of man’s 
struggle against and emancipation from nature -  or in other words, the story of man’s struggle against
12 Sumanta Banerjee, The Parlour and-the- Streets-: EUteandPopuiar Culture ^Nineteenth century Calcutta-, Calcutta, Seagull 
Books,. 1989.
13 Sumit Sarkar, ‘The Women’s Question in Nineteenth Century Bengal', in Women and Culture, eds. Kumkum Sangari and 
Sudesh Vaid, Bombay, SNDT University, 1985; J. Krishnamurti ed., Women in Colonial India: Essays on Survival, Work and 
State, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1989. For general reference, also see Dagmar Engels, Beyond Purdah: Women in 
Bengal 1890-1939, Delhi, OUP, 1996; Meredith Borthwick, The Changing Role of Women in Bengal 1849-1905, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1984; Sonia Nishat Amin, The World of Muslim Women in Colonial Bengal 1876-1939, Leiden, E. J. 
Brill, 1996.
14 Partha Chatterjee, The Nationalist Resolution of the Women’s Question', in Recasting Women: Essays in Indian Colonial 
History, eds. Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1990, pp. 233-254; Dipesh 
Chakravarty, The Difference-Defferrat of Coloniai Modernity: Public Debates on Domesticity in British Bengal', in Tensions of 
Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World, eds. Ann Stoler and Frederick Cooper, Berkeley and London, University of 
California Press, 1997, pp. 373-405.
15 Gayatri Chakravarty Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak? Speculations on Widow Sacrifice', Wedge, Winter/Spring 1985, pp. 
120-30; Malavika Karlekar, Voices from Within: Early Personal Narratives of Bengali Women, Delhi, OUP, 1989; Rajeshwari 
Sundar Rajan, Real and Imagined Women: Gender, Culture and Post-Colonialism, London, Routledge, 1993; Lata Mani, The  
Female Subject, the Colonial Gaze: Reading Eye-witness Accounts of Widow Burning', in Interrogating Modernity, Culture and 
Colonialism in India, eds. Tejaswini Niranjana, P. Sudhir, Vivek Dhareswar, Calcutta, Seagull, 1993; Janaki Nair, Women and 
Law in Colonial India: A Social History, New Delhi, Kali for Women, 1996.
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the ‘primitive’ and/or ‘feminine’ forces which threaten to jeopardise ‘civilisational’ time, in fact, in a 
remarkable book called Women: the Last Colony, Maria Mies, Veronika Bennholdt-Thomson and 
Claudia von Werlhof demonstrates this ethnologisation of the category ‘woman’ by the capitalist world 
order.16 in this sense, the category ‘primitive’ -  that was variously used in the enunciation of historical 
time by the Bengali, male, upper-caste, educated bhadrolok -  could be taken to signify women, 
peasants or ‘real, extant tribes’, according to the context of its utterance. Not surprisingly then, a 
Bengali traveller like Bholanath Chunder could openly desire, in the 1860s, the Santal woman as 
representative of all that was unavailable to the bhadrolok in his ‘domesticated’ wife. Or the process 
of ‘civilisation’ and perhaps ‘Hinduisation’ of the Chotanagpur ‘tribe’ of the Kherwars could also mean 
a progressive fall in the status of the ‘aboriginal’ widow, from a woman with a right to her own land to 
a woman with a right to only a maintenance plot and then to a woman entitled only to minimal 
maintenance by the husband’s family.17 This is not to say that amongst the so-called ‘tribes’, there 
was no gender politics in earlier times -  that would be to speak like the nationalist who claimed that in 
Vedic times women were equal to men in education and public rights, in fact, we know that amongst 
Santals, women were prevented from touching the plough, from roofing the house, from worshipping 
the household abge bongas, from eating the best part of the ceremonial meat, the head. They were 
also hunted down as witches.18 This, however, does not take away from the fact that Bengali men -  
often irrespective of their class and caste -  perceived ‘primitives’ as practising frighteningly 
uninhibited and ‘free’ sexuality. And that this perception is not uncommon amongst Bengalis even 
today. A feminist deconstruction of nationalist and patriarchal discourse, thus, exposes the all­
pervasiveness of the ethnological category of the ‘primitive’ in the construction of knowledge and of 
the nation -  whoever or whatever the term’s immediate referent was.
It was, therefore, not incidental that, in nineteenth-century Bengal, the first event of national 
history was imagined as the defeat of the non-Aryans by the Aryans. This battle was textualised as 
the foundational battle between the ‘primordial’ and the ‘civilisational’, the ‘originary’ battle which 
generated the time of history, as it were.19 This antagonism was then brought forward into the 
present, through analyses of caste, disunity, immorality, and economic incompetence of sections of 
the nation’s population. The problem of lower caste mobility depended on the shudra distinguishing 
himself from the 'fifth order’ of society, the asabhya Nisadas. The question of Brahmanical morality, 
which easily slipped into a Victorian mould, was problematised in reference to the overtly sexual and 
omnivorous ‘tribes’. The question of disunity was posed as the impossible schism between the two 
‘lineages' that existed in India, the arya and the anarya. And economic incompetence was embodied 
in the ‘primitives’ who did not know how to count and who were perpetually in debt to Bengali 
mahajuns. It was as if the ‘primitive’ continued to exist in all times, even in modernity, as a concrete,
16 London, Zed, 1988, pp. 89 ,110 ,180 .
17 Govind Kelkar and Devnathan, Gender and Tribe: Women, Land and Forests in Jharkhand, New Delhi, Kali for Women,
1991, pp. 90, 103.
18 Ibid., p. 98.
19 Thomas Trautman, Aryans and British India, Berkeley & London, 1997, p.194.
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eternal and demonstrable condition which justified and called for history and civilisation. The first 
question of Bengali history, thus, was formulated not in terms of the national-colonial dichotomy, nor 
in terms of the Hindu-Muslim binary, but as the question of the subordination of the ‘primitive’ to the 
subject of history. By virtue of its very origin, therefore, the historical time of the nation seemed 
permanently split into two -  into ‘civilisational’ time and ‘primordial’ time. These contradictory times, 
evidently, could neither be resolved in historical practice nor be structured into a single narrative 
temporality. These times therefore had to be gathered spatially into a singular nationhood. This 
thesis tries to show how the Bengali middle classes constituted the act of travelling the nation into a 
necessary surrogate of history writing -  as if spatial tracing integrated the time which historicisation 
bifurcated. This mode of travelling the nation was in turn supplemented by the forced circulation of 
‘primitive’ or jungli bodies as migrant labour -  such that peoples like the Santals who supposedly fell 
outside historical time, could be made to internalise the nation as a spatialised and integrated 
expanse. And through this forced transportationL ‘primitives’ were constituted as nothing but body- 
commodities, with no time other than that of circulation. Deprived of uses of time and culture, the 
‘primitive’ thus seemed to lose some of its threatening alterity.
However, the self-aware spatial proximity of ‘historical’ and ‘primitive’ times foregrounded and 
emphasised their incommensurability and contradiction. The undeniable contiguity of these two 
temporalities therefore had to be punctuated and neutralised by inserting money, the universal 
translator and re-presenter, between them. Bengali middle classes openly argued that it were 
primarily moneylenders and merchants who could take civilisation to the ‘primitive’. It was Bengali 
moneylenders who could teach the Santals the virtue of long-term and future-oriented saving and 
investment. Allegedly, the definitional trait of the ‘primitive’ was their ‘immoral’ and immediate 
extravagance, which disabled them from thinking of the future, either historically or financially. It 
seemed as if only through the enforcement of money-rationality could ‘primitives’ be made to simulate 
the future-oriented sensibility which historicity (an d  nationalism) called for. In this paradigm, the 
Santal rebellion -  instead of being acknowledged as an ‘act’ of resistance against the abstraction of 
time into debt-money and interest -  was represented as an ‘event’ in that very abstract time of 
historical chronology. This thesis argues that it was precisely this which was the critical move of 
nineteenth-century Bengali discourse -  the move of denying the time of practice itself and of 
constituting practice in the structure of knowledge. This was done, as will become evident from the 
perspective of the Santal rebellion, by historicisinq rebellious acts as causated and predicted events in 
a universal and uninterrupted empty temporality.20
In colonial Bengal, history was formulated not only as identity and knowledge of that identity; 
history was also enunciated as the only valid mode of practice for the colonised. This was done by 
structuring practice in the epistemological modes of causality (karma) and discipline (anusilan).2i At
20 About the centrality of the ‘event’ in history, see Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative I, Chicago, 1984, pp. 209-11.
21 Karma and anusilan donot unproblematic&Uy. translate as_causaliLy and. discipline. The point being asserted in the thesis is 
that the educated Bengali middle classes attempted to constitute these terms as historical causality and discipline, by
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the same time, this was done by reproducing, the 'primitive’ as an unthinking, practical and sensual 
mode of being. Time, which was allegedly absent in the ‘primitive’ condition, thus became a concept 
monopolised not just by history, but through the epistemologising of historical practice, by the field of 
knowledge. The historical subject, aware of time as repetition and causality, could synoptically grasp 
at a single moment of enlightenment all that unfolded in practice and in tim e22 It was only through 
this synchronic vision of knowledge that the colonised subject could grasp the nation as a totality, 
precisely because the nation was configured as an agglomeration of non-contemporaneous 
existences, which did not appear in and at the same time. In abandoning itself to ‘history’ -  as the 
practical mode of salvation from simultaneous ‘pre-modernity’ and colonialism -  the colonised 
therefore paradoxically abandoned time in favour of knowledge. As the Bengali middle classes 
ascribed to themselves the status of a pedagogical leadership, thought-knowledge was made into the 
a priori of practice. Instead of thought being temporalised as one kind of practice, practice was de- 
temporalised as the lesser other of thought. Practice became the application of thought. The 
accuracy of thought was autonomously and theoretically verified, and thought was allowed in the a 
posteriori mode to be contaminated by the immediacy, if not contingency, of everyday time of practice. 
Bengali historiography, which imagined the nation as a historical practice, thus, ironically, displaced 
practice from its own domain -  that of time -  to the realm of the Other of time. It was this, which 
compelled the colonial intellectuals to make education the primary historical agenda. Even when 
Bengalis critiqued the state-centricity of Western historiography and suggested a samajik or social 
history, they still read history, not in social practices, but in the textual genres of ‘popular1 narratives 
and art. The nation was thus constructed, not as a created and practical solidarity, but as an 
encompassing knowledge of pre-determined identity. If this identity seemed to fall apart in practice, 
as during communal riots or ‘primitive’ rebellions against Bengali moneylenders, this was ascribed to 
the necessarily erroneous nature of unthinking practice. Once the nation was accepted as historical, 
i.e. as always-already present in time, the modern subject could no longer admit, except at the 
‘secondary’ level of strategy and tactics, that the lack of practical solidarity could effectively disrupt 
identity and repetition across time.
The central point of this work is thus to show that ‘primitiveness’, as embodied in so-called 
‘tribes’ like the Santals, stood in colonial-modernity as the Other of thought. It was often repeated in 
Bengal, and elsewhere, that the ‘primitive’ was definitionally incapable of abstract conceptualisations. 
The Santal could not comprehend infinite abstract time and had to put knots on a thread to count days 
and years. In other words, s/he was incapable of conguering time -  either by putting interest on 
accumulating temporal units, or by accelerating the arrival of modernity, or for that matter, by 
assuming the permanent presence of the thinking subject. Of course, the Bengali middle classes 
themselves faced time as a disadvantage. They seemed to lag behind the West in a state of 
perpetual ‘backwardness’. They even seemed to lack enough time of their own, as their life became
translations and conceptual n e g ot iati ons.so as-to fit- them-into-1he new epistemologioal paradigm being forged in late 
nineteenth century Bengal.
22 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge, 1977, p. 82.
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increasingly controlled by the routine of salaried office work or chakuri.23 Time itself thus came across 
as the threatening Other in colonial modernity, and not just because life was finite and death 
inevitable. It was precisely in response to time as the Other, that the Bengali middle-classes advised 
a withdrawal into gnyan (knowledge), in contrast to what they conceptualised as the ‘primordial’ 
modes of being, constrained by everyday practice and mired in the colonial present. And it was as 
part of the very same response, that Bengali nationalists argued in favour of trade as a substitute for 
salaried work. After all, as Lyotard convincingly shows, monetary exchange constituted the future 
(payment) as a precondition to the present (sale).24 Trade thus appeared as the supreme conquest 
of time-the-Other, in a coming together of perfect-information (knowledge) and the perfect translator 
(money). Not surprisingly then, the ‘primordial’ was written into modernity as a counterpoise to both 
knowledge-sense and money-sense -  that is, as a counterpoise to infinite, cumulative, abstract time.
This thesis, in other words, tries to demonstrate the mutual complicity of two seemingly non- 
convergent processes in colonial Bengal. On the one hand, was the disciplining of historical 
knowledge and historical practice by the Bengali middle classes. On the other hand, was the making 
of the Santals of Bengal Presidency into the ideal ‘primitive’, who became the best land-reclaiming 
labour, the best migrating bodies, the most ‘aesthetic’ entity and the most sexualised, rebellious 
people in the perception of the historically-conscious Bengali bhadrolok. These two processes were 
supposed to have produced two subjectivities. As the nation, the Bengali became the subject of 
history and historiography; and as the ’primitive’, the Santal became the subject of anthropology, 
history’s counter-discipline, so to speak. Yet, it can be shown that in colonial Bengal, anthropology 
emerged as the shadowy underside of history itself. Evidently for the colonised, anthropology could 
not have been an unproblematic mode of knowledge. As early twentieth-century Bengali discourse 
shows, the ethnologised figure of the ‘primordial’ became more relevant in the field of a certain poetics 
than in the field of ethnology as a discipline. This poetics sought to reclaim a sense of practice, by 
invoking the ‘primordiatity’ of the time of creation and destruction -  a time beyond the limits of history, 
a time which could not be captured by knowledge but only invoked in imaginative acts. Yet, however 
‘originary’ and productive it was, this creative time nonetheless was generated by the colonial context 
of unfreedom. The Bengali middle classes therefore felt compelled to distinguish this time of poetics 
from their everyday time of mainstream colonial experience. The Bengali poet and his favourite figure 
of the sensuous and valorous Santal therefore remained marginal to the historical time of 
modernisation and reform, which promised progress by eternally postponing, in the face of the 
improvement of the present, the creative time of the unprecedented future. The poetic insight that the 
‘primordial’ was the only location that was definitionally inappropriable by the coloniser, thus, could 
never become a political lesson, nor could it become even a persuasive and public rhetoric.
23 Sumit Sarkar, ‘Colonial Times: Cloeks-afKf KaHyuga'.
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Location of time: the modern West
In order to unpack the full implications of the temporal politics of colonial modernity, it is necessary to 
refer back to Western metaphysics. It is necessary to rewrite Western modernity in terms of its own 
temporal politics, such that it becomes evident how the colonial condition organically informed and 
constituted the concepts and the telos of European philosophy. One side of this project must be what 
Dipesh Chakravarty tellingly names the ‘provincialisation’ of Europe, the explosion of Western 
history’s universal claims by showing up its local nature.25 The other side of this project must be the 
exposure of the non-autonomous nature of Western philosophy, which, dependent on its 
reconnaissance of other worlds, was framed primarily in reckoning with peoples it called ‘primitive’. 
Thus, Hegel -  responsible for defining modernity as that which is historically conscious, of and by 
itself -  founded his Philosophy of History on his ‘knowledge’ of Oriental and ‘savage’ lands. 
‘Savagery’ to Hegel represented that stage of human consciousness where the ‘difference’ between 
the cognising subject and the natural world was yet to emerge, where time appeared as an 
imprisoning and endless present, where the mind could not comprehend abstraction and was 
therefore incapable of religion, art and philosophy. The Orient in turn represented a relatively evolved 
consciousness, but capable only of a metaphorical apprehension of reality. It was inspired by an 
inarticulate sense of ‘difference’ between the familiar and the unfamiliar, and was based on a relation 
of faith and obedience to what seemed to be an incomprehensible spiritual reality to the metaphorical 
mind. To Hegel, thus, Indian civilisation was founded on an unsynthesised and harsh antithesis, 
between the purely abstract unity of God and the purely sensual power of nature.26 It is needless to 
emphasise how these ideas were repeated in contexts of colonial administration and education. Or in 
contexts where the Bengali middle-class intellectual felt compelled to differentiate himself, by virtue of 
his own tradition of ‘high philosophy and religion’ from the neighbouring ‘primitive’ Santal and the 
African ‘Negro’.
What is significant for us, however, is not just the fact that Hegel constructed historical 
subjectivity by contrasting it with ‘savage’ and ‘Oriental’ modes of existence. Or that he made the 
trajectory of the Geist concurrent and coterminous with a specific and local phase of European 
history. Or even that Hegel made this theoretical sleight of hand seem logical and chronological by 
putting ‘history’ retroactively to effect, in a direction opposite to what he claimed to be the momentum
24 Lyotard, The Inhuman, pp. 65-6.
25 Dipesh Chakravarty, ‘Post-coloniality and the Artifice of History: who speaks for "Indian” pasts’, Representations, XXXII, 
winter, 1992, pp. 1-26.
28 This summary of Hegei draws on Hayden White, Metahistory: the Historical Imagination of Nineteenth Century Europe, 
Baltimore, 1973. Also see, G .W . F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, 1822, reprint, Cambridge, 1975, pp. 
56-7, 180-1.
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of history itself. What is most significant for us, is the fact that to do all this, Hegel had to reconstitute 
the very nature of temporality. This he did on the one hand, by making time into the symmetrical and 
graphic Other of space, by arguing that history was the development of the Spirit in time, as nature 
was the development of the Idea in space. This reconstructed time allowed Hegel to harness to 
Europe ‘other’ lands, to which ‘other’ times from the West could be trans-located in a stereotypically 
anthropological/colonial mode. On the other hand, he reconstituted time by spatialising temporality 
itself. Hegel conceptualised time as the negative dialectical moment through which undifferentiated 
space became differentiated. He sought to express time by placing it in the relation of the point to 
space -  the point was that which had position but no magnitude and which punctuated the relation of 
space/extension to itself.27 Derrida deconstructs Hegel on this notion of time. He shows how, when 
Hegel named time as ‘the negative unity of self-externality’, he subsumed his sense of differentiation 
under his sense of spatial gradation -  thus making time into a presence, which was, paradoxically, 
identical to the non-temporal in time.28 However, what Derrida stops short of saying is that this hiding 
of difference and deferral, which Hegel effected in his articulation of temporality vis a vis territoriality, 
was itself the founding moment of colonialism -  and of the historical concurrence of colonialism with 
the ‘rational/universal’ West.
Hegel’s position vis a vis Western historicism and the absolutist state is of course well known. 
It is significant, however, that a century later, even Heidegger, despite his radical critique of Western 
philosophy, had to depend on the deployment of the 'primordial’ for a phenomenology of time. 
Heidegger, in his efforts to de-construct the metaphysics of presence and to bring back temporality to 
Being, counterpoised the ‘primordial’ to what he called ‘tradition’. Heidegger argued that tradition 
mastered thought by concealing its own origins, i.e. by delivering things to self-evidence. It was in 
tradition that Dasein, the Being for whom being was an issue, forgot its own ‘primordiality’. It then 
proceeded via historiography and the sciences of objectivity to find the ‘primordial’ in ‘exotic and alien 
cultures’ 29 To Heidegger, this ‘primordiality’ was a mode of being which must be phenomenologically 
reclaimed, because it was more ‘authentic’ than even the ‘originary’. ‘Primordiality’ was non-deducible; 
it could not be derived from anything else, neither historically nor logically. It was a condition that 
could not be thematised even by anthropology, which studied ‘primitives’, not in their ‘primordial purity’ 
but in their everydayness.30 This phenomenological ‘primordiality’, which even the best ethnographer 
could not reach, was characterised by what he called ‘mineness’ or ‘ownness’. This ‘mineness’ 
through which the ‘primordial’ must be repossessed was the Other of other-ing, as it were. And this 
‘primordiality’, to Heidegger, was nothing other than temporality itself -  authentic temporality, which 
was forgotten when Dasein ‘fell’ into everydayness, forgetting its own being for the sake of being-in- 
the-world.31
27 Herman Rapaport, Heidegger and Derrida: Reflections on Time and Language, Lincoln, 1989, p. 72.
28 Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, Chicago, 1982, p. 44.
29 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 1927, reprint, Oxford, 1995, p. 43.
30 Ibid., p. 76.
31 Ibid., p. 383.
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This face of Heidegger is crucial to us because of his paradoxical position in German history 
of the 1920s-30s. It is impossible to impute a simplistic evolutionary sensibility to Heidegger or to say 
that he participated unconditionally in Western historicism, in the march of the Hegelian spirit, as it 
were. Yet there was a telling ambiguity in Heidegger’s simultaneous use and rebuttal of the 
metaphysics of Spirit. In 1935, Heidegger argued for the absolute privilege of the German language 
precisely in terms of its spiritual quality. Less than a decade after publishing his Being and Time, in 
his Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger invoked the ‘historical mission of our people’ and 
celebrated Spirit as a ‘resolution which accords with the tone of the origin and which is knowledge’.32 
Evidently, he was trying to identify the question of Being with the question of Spirit, in an impossible 
reconciliation of Western rationalist epistemology with his critical phenomenology of temporality. In 
this, we see the irresoluble antagonism between aggressive nationalism and commitment to time, the 
antagonism which produced both critique and complicity in the same textual move, as in a figure like 
that of Martin Heidegger. It can be said, at the cost of being accused of over-interpretation, that this 
was the European location of the temporal politics of colonial modernity, which produced at and out of 
the same (historical) time both a militant nation and a claim to universality. Despite his disavowal of 
ethnology, Heidegger’s harking back to the ‘originary’ and his alignment of German with Greek were 
efforts at this impossible marriage -  between the ‘primordial’ time of being and the national-historical 
time of conquering progress. And this was the contradiction that was ironically reproduced within anti­
colonial nationalisms. Derrida deconstructs Heidegger’s 1953 engagement with the German poet 
Trakl to show how Heidegger thought temporality in terms of the annual return of the origin and the 
natural return of the morning. In an implicit critique of the idea of the Hegelian spirit returning to the 
future, Heidegger proposed the poetic spirit returning to the earlier, to the ‘primordial’. To Heidegger, 
this returning time was more originary than the rising and setting of the sun, the Orient and the 
Occident, the rise and decline of history; it was the time before interpretations of time even began with 
Aristotle.33 It is not surprising that a similar invocation of ‘primordial’ time was performed in early 
twentieth century colonial Bengal by poets like Rabindranath and by philosophers of articulation 
(abhivyakti) like Pramatha Mukhopadhyay. This is not to ignore differences -  evidently, Bengalis and 
Heidegger never read each other. Rather, this is to argue that as much as the colonised, Heidegger 
too was marked by the antagonisms and the ambience of imperialism. Both Heidegger and sections 
of the Bengali middle classes confronted the irony of having to both harness and refute the force of 
temporality -  of having to effect both change and sameness, both contradiction and identity in the 
same cognitive act and epistemological move. This thesis will try to show that this ironic unfolding of 
historical time in the time of colonialism was possible only through the deployment and exclusion of 
the figure of the ‘primitive’ and through a poetic, perhaps Heidegger-ian, disavowal of ‘everydayness’ 
as, paradoxically, the Other of time.
This configuration of temporal politics becomes all the more potent if we mention Marx here. 
From an entirely different perspective, Marx too returned to the deployment of the ‘primitive’ in his
32 Quoted in Jacques Derrida, Of Spirit, Chieagor 1-9S&-r pf^ 68-67,
33 Ibid., pp. 89-91.
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radical critique of capitalism. If Heidegger found the everyday to be the ‘inauthentic’ temporality of 
Being, Marx named the pre-revolutionary duration of history as the as yet unfulfilled ‘pre-history’ of 
humankind. Though for Marx history was materialist history, he had to theorise transformative 
temporality without the comfort of a historical instance, without the illustration of an egalitarian society 
available in the historical past, in other words, unlike Heidegger who finally took recourse to Greek 
antiquity as did most Western philosophers, Marx had to function with the knowledge that his 
exemplary moment (of revolution) was uncompromisingly in the future. It was not a moment of 
identity through repetition, nor of return to the ‘originary’, but a moment of absolute, almost 
inconceivable, novelty. This lack of a paradigmatic past must have raised an unbreachable wall 
before his praxiological imagination. And Marx sought to circumvent this wall by invoking, in the logic 
of his times, the idea of the ‘primitive’. Marx argued that if eighteenth-century socialists had found the 
‘primitive’ to be an approximation of their utopian ideals of freedom and equality, they were yet to fully 
realise the temporal implications of this insight. Marx showed that to comprehend what was ‘newest’ 
in what was ‘oldest’, in a way ‘which would have made [even] Proudhon shudder’, was to harness 
time for the purpose of change.34 Writing to Vera Zasulich, Marx categorically stated that 
transcendence into communism could not be a transition or succession from capitalism to socialism, 
but a temporal leap from the ‘archaic formation’ -  the Russian commune -  into the society of the 
unprecedented future.35
Marx’s marginal notes on Maine, Lubbock, Phear etc show that this theoretical harnessing of 
the ‘primordial’ was more than a comment on the local and specific nature of Russian society.36 Late 
in his life, Marx found it imperative to delve into empirical anthropology, in order to deploy the 
‘primordial’ itself against the conservative time of scientific evolutionism. Still-existing ‘primitives’ in 
the modern world demonstrated that transitions were not genealogical, but mediated by the 
abstraction of social formations -  their alienation from concrete life and their ossification in 
hierarchical relations. Social conditions thus passed not from one particular to the next but existed as 
separate concretions, without historical connection.37 Change was thus produced, not by 
chronological succession in time, which presumed that the antecedent was annihilated before the 
future materialised. Rather, change was produced by the confrontation of different social conditions, 
by the confrontation of the ‘primordial’ with the ‘historical’, a confrontation both of metaphors and of 
temporalities. If I seem to be stretching the point too much in the name of Marx, it is because his 
1880-2 texts are immensely suggestive of this interpretation. It must be remembered that Marx's 
analysis of the transition from feudalism to capitalism too was not a matter of the latter logically or 
genealogically succeeding the former. The contingency of colonial exploitation mediated the two and 
allowed for the primary accumulation of capital. And it was not accidental that Marx called this 
necessary event ‘primitive’ accumulation. In the last instance then, Marx’s anthropological thoughts,
34 Marx, letter to Engels, 25 March 1868, in Marx, Pre-Capitalist-Economic Formations, ed. E. J. Hobsbawm, London, 1964, p. 
141.
35 Marx, letter to Zasulich, 8 March 1881, in Marx, Pre-Capitalist, p. 143. This point was explained to me by Professor Diptendra 
Banerjee, who died before his time and before he could finish his own work.
36 The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx, ed. Lawrence Krader, Assen, 1974.
37 ibid., introduction, pp. 15-16.
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which are either disowned by traditional Marxists or seen as the least significant part of his oeuvre, 
emerge as the basis of his own radicality. In order to imagine a radical transformative temporality, 
Marx had to take recourse to a foregrounding of the ‘primitive1, even as he foregrounded the struggle 
over (labour) time as the central feature of capitalism.
The two irreconcilable paradigms -  of Heidegger and of Marx -  thus shared a radical 
problematisation of time through the invocation of the ‘primordial’. The ‘primitive’ thus seems to 
emerge as the indissociable ‘supplement’, in the Derridean sense, to modernity’s imagination of time. 
Here it becomes necessary to briefly mention Christopher Herbert's remarkable book on ethnographic 
imagination and anomie in the modern West. Herbert shows that in the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth century, the idea of the ‘primitive’ threw its shadow over most of Western thought. John 
Wesley and his Protestant ethics formulated the virtues of Puritanism, disciplined labour and 
civilisation, in counterpoise to the motif of infinite ‘primordial’ desires. Mill, Comte, Spencer and later 
Freud all harnessed the metaphor of the ‘primordial’ dark forces ‘suppressed at one place surging up 
hydraulically at another’ 38 This explains the widespread public approval in England of the hanging of 
Jamaican rebels in 1865 and of Santal rebels in 1856. It also explains the anxious attempts by early 
anthropology to prove that ‘primitives’ were after all not enviably free in their articulation of desires, but 
controlled by rigid, unchanging customs -  the first major essay of evolutionary cultural anthropology 
was thus Henry Maine’s 1861 Ancient Law. It even explains why Jean Itard, James Prichard and later 
Durkheim redefined untrammeled ‘primordial’ desire as the madness of anomic individuals unable to 
conform to the structure of society. And above all, it explains the ethnological basis of European 
political economic thought. Herbert shows how Bagehot's Economic Studies (1880) often ran into the 
study of ‘savage tribes’ and how Malthus’s Principle of Political Economy (1820) rested on the idea of 
unlimited animalistic sexual desires. Political economy -  by causally connecting money-price and 
desire -  offered the assurance that representation (of one thing by another, of things by money, of 
object by subject, of the past/primitive by the present/modern) was the basis for all knowledge. At the 
same time political economy offered the assurance that representation contained and nullified 
subversive, ‘primordial’ desires. In fact, once desire was productively channeled through its 
representation by money, it became the political economic concept of demand, a positive force for the 
prosperity of society, rather than a negative, ‘primordial’ force generating immorality and conflict.39 It 
is in this context, that Marx and Heidegger, and their irreconcilability itself, can be read together, in 
terms of their dependence on the ‘primordial’ and in terms of the critical temporal politics of colonial
modernity.
By referring to Marx and Heidegger I am not only trying to argue that temporality was centrally 
predicated on the notion of the ‘primordial’ and the ‘primitive’. I am also trying to say that the time of 
modernity required for its very perpetuation, the co-presence of the ‘primitive’, in a necessary denial
3B Christopher Herbert, Culture and Anomi*, Chicago W94-, p= Herbert- ateo-offers a reading of George Eliot, Shelley,
Wordsworth, Hardy and Lawrence in terms of their invocations of the ‘primitive’. . Can#.-monfc.
39 See Herbert’s discussion of texts like Adam Smith's ’The History of Astronomy’ and The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759),
in Culture and Anomie, pp. 95-8.
of, or perhaps in a necessary complement to, its own apparent evolutionism. It was precisely in order 
to allow this co-staging of antagonistic, non-contemporary times that temporality itself was re­
constituted as a non-substantial and non-qualitative unity. This temporality, conceptualised as 
anterior and abstract, remained untainted by the entities, the events and the practices placed in it. 
And being marked by numbers, this temporality accumulated like money, as capital harnessed 
different social times and labours to itself. The metaphor of organism, on which evolutionary time was 
founded, was itself less an imagination of time, more an epistemological strategy -  by which 
apparently autonomous and disjointed parts/organs of the social/global whole could be projected and 
deduced from the sense of the totality, despite the lack of direct knowledge about them. Evolution 
functioned less as a time in which everybody could progress, more as a paradigm in which the past, 
the future and the colonised Other -  beyond perception and experience -  could be represented, 
despite lack of present and presentable instances. The temporal politics of colonial modernity was 
based on the politics of representation -  representation of the definitional^ past in the realm of the 
present. Though the ‘primordial’ was conceptualised as temporally absent from modernity and 
spatially absent from Europe, it remained re-presented within the regime of knowledge, providing both 
the perspective and the prospective of European modernity.
Time and the Other: the practice of re-presentation
Once colonial modernity is thematised in terms of temporal politics, the question of the Other and the 
question of difference have to be rearticulated.40 Foucault’s work has already demonstrated that the 
force of ‘construction’ cannot be grasped if it is seen as proper only to the field of discourse. One 
must expose the practices and techniques of disciplining and construction by which the self not only 
appears in a certain image, but also conforms to its own construction.41 Though Foucault does not 
quite address the question of the Other and colonialism,42 his work has informed south Asian 
historiography, which strongly emphasises the practices and technologies of othering. Thus, David 
Arnold shows how medicine and clinical technologies other-ed the colonised body and anatomy as a 
time-less, ‘natural-spatial’ presence, and how this practice determined the history of Western 
medicine and race-theory.43 Homi Bhaba shows how in both textual and everyday life-practices, the 
colonised effected irrevocable changes in the modernist discourse, which no longer remained what it 
had set out to be, rational, modern and righteous, in the mocking face of hybrid modes of existence.44 
At the same time, Ranajit Guha shows the limits of discourses of colonial modernity, which remained
40 Needless-to say, my understanding of the Othering force- of solonralisnvbegan with the study of Edward Said, Orientalism, 
New York, 1978.
41 'Intellectuals and Power: Conversation between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze’, in Foucault Live, ed. Sylvere Lotringer, 
New York, 1996, pp. 74-5.
42 Homi Bhaba, 'In a Spirit of Calm Violence’ in After colonialism, ed. Gyan Prakash, Princeton, 1995, pp.326-344; Ann Laura 
Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire, London, 1995.
43 David Arnold, The Problem of Nature, Oxford, 1996; 'India's Place in the Tropical World', Journal of imperial and 
Commonwealth History, XXVI: 1,1998. For a critical discussion of how absolutely opposite versions of the Other could 
practically effect the same positioning of the colonised, see David Arnold, 'Hunger in the Garden of Plenty: The Bengal Famine 
of 1770', Disaster in the Eighteenth Century: Cultural Responses to Natural Catastrophe, ed. Alessa Johns, New York, 
forthcoming.
44 Homi Bhaba, Location of Culture, London, 1994.
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to a significant extent, external to and untranslatable into local worlds and languages, thus making the 
hegemonic manufacture of consent to colonial rule incomplete and fragmentary.45 To be sure, these 
newer perspectives on history and historiography restore political agency to the colonised and the 
subaltern, and show up cracks in the seemingly monolithic structure of capitalism and imperialism.
However, the question still remains -  why post-colonial societies remain vulnerable to neo­
colonialism; why collective practice and revolutionary change still seem either hyperbolic or illusory in 
discourses of freedom and liberation; why despite imaginative and subversive literature and poetry, 
despite an explosion of modernist realism, colonised societies still remain unable to produce a critique 
of the modern state and its biography. This thesis tries to explore this post-colonial predicament. The 
basic conclusion is that the temporal politics of colonial modernity caused the other-ing -  not just of 
entities like the Orient, the ‘primitive1 and the ‘tropical’ -  but of practice itself. This is because in 
modernity, the presence of the (modern) subject was theoretically ensured by counterpoising him to 
peoples, 'primitive', ‘traditional’, ‘archaic’ or merely ‘backward’, who were literally absent from the site 
of the present. In other words, the practices of other-ing, which founded colonial modernity, produced 
an unprecedented world where Others were not just different, exotic, inimical or threatening, they 
were literally an absence, an-other time. It was this othering of time itself which fundamentally 
disabled practice, by disallowing co-presence and simultaneity, the necessary ground for the practical 
creation of solidarity. It was this temporal politics which left ‘post-colonial’ nations helpless in the face 
of global capitalism on the one hand, and of internal identity-conflicts, the logical extreme of 
nationalism, on the other.
in colonial modernity, where the ‘primitive’ and the ‘backward’ lived in another time, the 
question of difference and therefore the question of translation and re-presentation emerged as the 
question, literally, of temporal negotiation. When the educated middle classes of Bengal engaged in 
the politics of representation, speaking for yet not as the ‘primitive’ and the ‘backward’ that constituted 
the body of the nation, they had to mediate between two incommensurable and non-contemporary 
times, times which though co-existent were not co-eval. That is, the practice of nation building 
became, inevitably, the practice of re-presentation of those not quite present in time. The practice of 
history thus became exclusively the practice of knowledge. After all, the universal claim of rationality 
was another way of saying that it was only knowledge -  and money -  which could effect exchange 
and travels across times, which could resist being eroded by time-shifts, which remained 
uncontaminated and unsubverted in contact with other times, products and worlds which were extant, 
utilisable yet irrevocably past. It is here that one must refer to Tejaswini Niranjana’s critical insight, 
that in colonial modernity, the colonised subject lives always-already in a condition of translation 46 I 
would use this insight to say rather that in colonial modernity, the subject lives in a mode of constant 
re-presentation -  where both translation and exchange appear as the temporal act of re-presenting
45 Ranajit Guha, 'Dominance without Hegemony and-its-Historiography1, Subaltern Studies VI, ed. Ranajit Guha, Delhi-, 1989, 
pp. 210-309.
Tejaswini Niranjana, Siting Translation: History, Post-Structuralism and the Colonial Question, Berkeley, 1992, p. 6.
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the non-present. It was this necessary representation which made both money and the middle- 
classes acquire the status of mediators in the nation. If the idea of knowledge or gnyan that Bengali 
middle classes celebrated and the idea of trade that captured the imagination of national self- 
sufficiency still fuel the statist discourse of post-colonial India, it is not just because colonialism was 
the ultimate lesson that scientific knowledge and aggressive commerce can simultaneously generate 
unlimited power. It is also because the mediating and trans-valuating regimes of reason and money 
seem indispensable in exchange across the non-contemporary times of the ‘modern’ and the 
‘backward’. Dipesh Chakravarty articulates this difference effected by colonialism with great 
exactitude, when he writes that non-colonial translations ‘take barter for their model of exchange 
rather than that of a generalised exchange of commodities which always needs the mediation of a 
universal, homogenising middle term’.47 The need for this arbitrating middle term was precisely 
because translation had to be done across times, and not just across languages and worlds.
This thesis therefore seeks to demonstrate the mutual articulation of knowledge and monetary 
rationality in colonial Bengal, the articulation which reproduced time as the time of re-presentation, as 
a time that was singular, abstract and cumulative, where inequivalent entities and life-practices could 
be placed in exchange, communication and aggregation. George Simmel captured this very 
paradigm of colonial modernity, without perhaps intending to do so, when he formulated money as the 
epitome of modern European rationality. At the very moment when knowledge proposed different 
worlds to be different times, money emerged as the abstract mediator, which produced a practical 
equilibrium between antagonistic products and acts. According to Simmel, who drew extensively from 
ethnographic examples, mediators like money (and reason) were not matters of knowledge per se, 
but tools for ordering practice by replacing substance with abstraction.48 It is significant that Simmel 
distinguished the abstract nature of money as a sign from what he called mythological and ‘primitive’ 
symbols. It was after all precisely in the name of symbols that in the West, the Romantic critique of 
modernity emerged. Paul de Man says that through the use of symbols, European Romantics of the 
nineteenth century made an attempt to make sign and meaning co-terminous. This was an attempt to 
undo the tyranny of the autonomous sign by making it refer to the substantive and the sensuous. In a 
way, this might as well have been a description of the early twentieth-century Bengali middle classes, 
trying to harness time and the figure of the ‘primitive’ body, in the same textual and poetic move. 
Seemingly an attempt to defy the abstract time of the circulating money/sign, which emptied the mind 
of metaphor and imagination, this symbolic temporalisation invoked the ‘originary’, the ‘natural’ and 
the ‘primordial’, in a defence against what de Man calls the modern ‘temporal predicament’ of the 
author-subject.49
It must, however, be emphasised that de Man’s reconstruction of the Romantic tradition is 
highly insufficient when placed in the context of the temporal politics of colonial modernity. A
47 Dipesh-Chakravarty, ‘The Time of Historyandthe Time of Gods? , in-Th& PoUties of Culture in the Shadow of Capital, eds.
Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd, London, 1997, p._47.
48 Georg Simmel, Philosophy of Money, 1900, reprint, London, 1990, p. 149-51.
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superficial reading of Bengali poetics might make it seem as if Bengali poets like Rabindranath or 
sculptors like Ramkinkar, who figured originary time through symbols of the ‘primordial1 and of 
‘nature’, were posing an internal critique of urban alienation in the way that European Romantics did. 
Such a reading would however completely miss the displacement effected by colonialism on the 
temporal concept of the ‘originary1. In the West, the ideas of origin and of authorship appeared 
together, in the Biblical tradition as well as in the tradition of modernity. In pre-colonial India however 
the question of authorship, even of God’s word, was subordinate. In the darshan tradition of 
philosophy, sabda or the word was taken as an epistemoiogical proof, not because of the authority of 
the utterer, but because in realms like that of morality, it was through interpreting linguistic discourse, 
rather than through the possibility of empirical verification, that one could determine what to do. As 
Jitendra Mohanty argues, it was through intertextuality, rather than through a return to basic texts, that 
philosophy proceeded in pre-colonial India, in a tradition where it was impossible to find ‘anything but 
the text ... anything but texts behind texts’. This was not only because no one could claim to have 
grasped the author’s mind. This was also because the author could not claim an intellectual property 
right over the words of apaureseyasruti (the heard but not composed text); the author himself was 
also the interpreter of his own words.50 With colonialism, however, the authenticity of early Indian 
texts had to be proved in terms of how ancient they were. The matter of contention was no longer the 
presently active and potent nature of texts, but the historical ancientness of their ‘original’ authors. 
Successive interpretations through time were rejected as interpolations. In the politics of reform like 
that of Arya Samaj, texts were fixed as law and scripture to which all times and contexts must 
conform. In the politics of knowledge like that of Bankimchandra, texts became the ‘source’ and 
‘evidence’ of history from which all later accretions must be eliminated. The impossible predicament 
of historians like Bankim -  trying to fix the singular and original authorship of texts like Mahabharata, 
which necessarily grew through progressive interpretations, additions and transformations -  is evident 
in the nineteenth century.51 In colonial modernity, therefore, the time of textualisation as a practice 
became irrelevant before the time of the original author as the subject. The poetic quest for the 
‘originary’ and ‘primordial’ time in early-twentieth century Bengal, therefore, was marred by this 
anxiety of having to prove the original as authorial and authoritative. Though the poetic, non- 
chronological time of creation and destruction was articulated as superscribing the secondary 
temporality of progress, yet in the typical mode of colonial-modernity, the nation had to claim to be the 
author/owner of this time and this temporal insight. This caused the subordination of the critical poetic 
temporality to the cumulative time of history, of the time of creation and destruction to the neutralised 
time of accumulating knowledge.
The Santals, constituted in the nineteenth century as the ‘primitive’ Other of thought, 
performed a critique on precisely this authorial and authorised time of history. It is a difficult task to 
reconstruct this critique from within the parameters of history writing, for history acquired its
49 Paul de Man, ‘The Rhetoric of Temporality’, in Blindness and-Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, 
London, 1993, pp. 187-92.
50 Jitendra Mohanty, Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought, Oxford, 1992, pp. 272-4, 277.
51 Kaviraj, The Unhappy Consciousness, p. 84.
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disciplinary status precisely by excluding and opposing the ‘primordial’. Therefore, one cannot really 
expect to find ‘historical evidence1 on Santal uses of memories and pasts, or on Santal modes of 
social and practical temporalisations. Naturally, ‘historical’ studies on Santals have mostly been 
studies of their rebellions, because rebellions could be seen to simulate the traits of the ideal-typical 
historical event, in a way in which ‘primitive’ everydayness could not.52 Of course, many of these 
historical studies have taught us much; they have even exploded the myth of ‘tribal’ exceptionalism 
and autarchy, by showing that Santals lived and rebelled together with other peasants and subaltern 
groups. However, these works do not explore the historiographical predicament of antagonistic 
temporalities and therefore of contending practices. There have also been recent historical studies of 
‘tribal’ peoples, which have shown the category ‘tribe’ to be a colonial construction, which singularised 
and essentialised an arbitrary distinction between castes/peasants and ‘primitives’/ ’tribes’.53 
However, to see the constructedness of the category is not to adequately expose the materiality and 
the effectivity with which the ‘primitive’ was deployed, literally and metaphorically, in the production of 
modernity and in the ordering of the world. Anthropology on the other hand, has tried to reconstruct 
autonomous social temporalities.54 But different temporalities have been neutralised in this field by 
their spatialisation as coterminous to other lands. Of course, anthropological works, which study 
performance, rituals, and speech-acts, have tried to reconstruct the time of acts rather than the time of 
compartmentalised ‘cultures’.55 But even these are mostly silent about the politics of time, by which 
the anthropologist denies temporal coevalness to the object-society being studied.56 A reconstruction 
of temporal contests between Santals and mainstream, ‘modernising’ society is constrained by these 
disciplinary limits. However, this thesis tries to read through all sorts of ‘sources’ in search of clues to 
contesting uses of time -  revenue papers, files on emigration of labour, judicial files on Bengal, land 
settlement cases in Santal Parganas, Santal folk-tales recorded in late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries by missionaries, currently circulating Santal poems and songs, and contemporary Santal 
reconstructions of the Santals’ own pasts. If read in relation to Bengali tracts and colonial 
ethnographies, certain moments of contest are illuminated, which expose to a significant extent, the 
temporal politics of colonial modernity.
This thesis argues that Santal rebellions and Santal narrations can be best understood if they 
are seen to be operating in the time of practice, in contrast to the time of knowledge and history 
which, in so far as the Bengali middle classes were concerned, defined the nation. In other words, 
this thesis tries to question the historiographical explication of the Santal-Bengali difference, as the
52 Dhirendranath Baske, Saontal Ganasamgramer-ltihas^ Calcutta, 1976; Tanika Sarkar, 'Jitu Santal's Movement in-Malda, 
1924-32' in Subaltern Studies IV, ed. Ranajit Guha, Delhi,. 1985;. Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency, 
Delhi, 1983; Michael Adas, Prophets of Rebellion .Cambridge, 1979.
53 Nandini Sundar, Subalterns and Sovereigns: an Anthropological History of Bastar, Delhi, 1997; Ajay Skaria,‘Shades of 
Wildness: Tribe, Caste and Gender in Western India', Journal of Asian Studies, LVl: 3, 1997.
54 The agenda of anthropology has been to neutralise contesting time-senses by enclosing temporalities within relativised 
culture-gardens. This is true as much of Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer, Oxford, 1940 as of Clifford Geertz, ‘Person, Time and 
Conduct in Bali’, The Interpretation of Culture, New York, 1973. This is true of comparative sociology as well, as much of 
Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return, London, 1954 as of Akos Ostor, Vessels of Time, Delhi, 1993.
55 G. Gurvitch, The Spectrum of Social Time, Dordrecht, 1964; Jack Goody, The Time of Telling and the Telling of Time in 
Written and Oral Cultures' in Chronotypes, eds. John Bender et at., Stanford, 1991; Elizabeth Tonkin, Narrating Our Pasts, 
Cambridge, 1992.
50 Fabian, Time and the Other, p. 151.
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difference between myth and history, and as the difference between oral and literate traditions. 
Admittedly, both these distinctions can generate powerful criticisms in certain contexts. Ranajit 
Guha’s emphasis on the cyclic time of Munda rebellion can indeed be a potent interrogation of the 
linearity of the modernist telos. Yet when Guha sees ‘mythical’ and ‘oral’ utterances as what he calls 
residues of ‘the long night of early feudalism’, he willy nilly admits the ‘transition’ (primitive 
communism -  feudalism -  capitalism) narrative, which stands ‘true’ only when colonialism can be 
historicised, like in Europe, as an event in another country.57 Historians have indeed admitted that in 
the colonial context, the historiography of the glorious Indian past can be called historical as much as 
mythical.58 That Gandhi’s historicisation of the nation as a popular agenda can be called literate 
tradition as much as performance and orality.59 This is because these antinomies fall through, when 
used in reference to the experiences of colonialism. Colonialism itself was a phenomenon of rupture 
in the narrative of transition, transition being the paradigm, which gave rise to these categories of 
succession, of myth-history, literacy-orality. It is more fruitful therefore, if we must take colonialism 
seriously, to recognise the mutual authentication and the practical confrontations of these seemingly 
neat and oppositional categories, which were supposed to stand in for mutually exclusive temporal 
stages. These co-existences and confrontations were the part of the practices of a present, which 
could not be placed in a continuous narrative precisely because of the externality and contingency of 
colonialism. And which implied that the present could not be formulated either as literate or as oral, 
either as mythical or as historical. In this sense, it is inadequate to try to understand Santal modes of 
temporalisation as either mythical or oral. The argument of this thesis is that if the Bengali middle 
classes perceived the Santal as their practical and sensuous Other, it is most meaningful to 
acknowledge the Santal as offering a practical interrogation of the nation, as the nation was sought to 
be generalised and legalised as an uninterrupted and common ‘idea’.
The operative distinction in nineteenth-century Bengal was, therefore, not that between an 
oral and a literate tradition, nor that between a mythical and a historical consciousness. It was 
between practical and theoretical uses of the past -  between an active temporalisation of pasts and 
times as contingent and irrevocable, and a stabilising historicisation of pasts and chronologies as 
‘factual’ and ‘finished’. That the Santals reclaimed their pasts as part of everyday activities, rather 
than in a state of suspension from the time of the everyday, made memory itself into a practice, 
dependent on work and not on knowledge/information. The Santal pasts therefore were not 
necessarily ordered into a narrative form, but existed often as almost free-floating, un-authorised 
insights, amenable to changing configurations in changing times. It is significant that, when the 
Santals rebelled, their act was re-presented by Bengali authors as resulting from a lack of ‘rational’ 
comprehension of the present -  Santals failed to grasp the logical, chronological, fully explicable and 
inexorable triumph of the colonial regime.60 The rebellion therefore seemed a kind of ‘madness’ that
57 Dominance without Hegemony: History and-Power m-Geieniat India-; Cambridge (Mass.), 1997, p. 155.
58 Indira Choudhury, ‘Colonialism and Cultural Identity: The Making of a Hindu Discourse, Bengal 1867-1905', Ph D thesis, 
SOAS, London University, 1993.
59 Shahid Amin, Event, Metaphor, Memory: Chauri Chaura 1922-1992, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1995.
60 Digambar Chakravarty, History of the Santal Hool, 1895-96, reprinted in Paschimbanga , XXIX: 2-6,1995, p. 8.
resulted from the lack of knowledge, understanding and patience. In contrast to this historicist 
position, it may be said, the Santals found rebellion to be a viable option. This was because, to the 
Santals, the past was as unknown or as known, as the future -  the past had no particular privilege in 
terms of knowability, as it did for the self-aware historical subject. The Santal rebellion therefore 
sought, not to bring back a golden past, as national history sought to do, nor to effect a millennial end 
of history, as ‘primitives’ were supposed to do. The Santal rebellion sought to invoke the imperative of 
time itself. In other words, Santals articulated time as that in which the unimaginable and the 
unpredictable occurred. The Santal rebellion thus signified that the future, like the past, was neither 
logically nor genealogically connected to the present. Both the past and the future had to be 
temporalised in portentous and perhaps risky practice.
I argue that in the nineteenth-century, Santals constituted a crucial instance of how difference 
itself could be mobilised in terms of temporality -  a mobilisation, which needed neither the de- 
temporalised Othering nor the progressive homogenisation that marked the time of history. The 
Santals enunciated their time as an increasing and contingent differentiation and scattering of 
peoples. If ‘others’ emerged as ‘outsiders’, they did so only in the course of time -  as the Santals 
remembered, only when Bengalis turned into moneylenders, did they become inimical dikus. For the 
Santal, no difference was ‘original’ -  Santals called themselves hor or just ‘men’. For the Santal 
therefore the Other was neither an essential/original being, nor an unbreachable theoretical category, 
nor another location in time and space. Neither was the past another time, more originary and more 
‘authentic’ than the colonial present. The past might have been better than the present time of 
inexorable indebtedness, but it was a sad time too. Concomitantly, the past was neither glorious nor 
determining. It was a time when people were practically and inexorably separated and other-ed from 
each other. It was a time that could not be an absolute ideal, because a return to a lost and sad time 
was neither possible nor particularly advantageous. As the Santals demonstrated, the time of their 
practices and pasts, unlike the time of the historical nation, was irreversible. It was in this time that 
irrevocable differentiations had occurred, this time did not and could not neutralise differences. The 
alterity of the Other, it may be said in interpretation of Santal acts, was thus like the alterity of time 
itself. The Other, like temporality, created limits to human practice. But like time itself, the Other too 
had to be harnessed in the practice for a desired future.
Before ending the introduction, I must clarify the approach of this thesis towards the reading 
and interpretation of Santal imaginaries. Rejected by early anthropology as magical, rationalised in 
early twentieth century as functional, narrativised in ethnological ‘thick’ descriptions as symbolic, and 
structured in post Levi Strauss anthropology as signs -  ‘primitive’ imaginaries have always escaped 
the most well-intentioned, the most self-consciously empathetic of universal discourses. This thesis 
therefore, seeks to relocate them from the domain of knowledge and language to the realm of time. I 
shall argue that Santal ghost-spirits and rebellious imperatives seem fantastic in the paradigm of 
science and in the paradigm of history, because both reduce temporality to events which have already 
occurred, to objects already given -  in other words, to the cognisable and conceivable past. Santals
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however articulated the temporal imperative precisely in opposition to this. To them, time was that in 
which the unimaginable and the incredible occurred. In a way, the genre of fiction currently called 
'fabulous realism’ has taught us to suspend common credulity before the ‘politics of the possible’.61 
This thesis draws on that lesson. It argues that the Santal articulations of time existed in opposition to 
the time of history as predictable and predicative, as enunciated by the Hegelian tradition of the 
Zeitgeist.
This opposition becomes explicit if we refer to the remarkable interpretation of Hegel by 
Alexandre Kojeve -  a thinker who was a Russian exile, a nephew of the painter Kandinsky, who 
confronted both Marx’s and Hegel’s philosophies of history during the October revolution, who learnt 
Sanskrit and Chinese, and who gave a famous lecture on Hegel in Paris in the presence of many 
luminaries of the French post-war intelligentsia. Kojeve announced that Hegel’s world-philosophy and 
predictive insight into the ‘end of history’ -  end of wars, conflict and struggle -  was the result of his 
‘absolute knowledge’. It would be in this absolute knowledge, in the final future of the zeitgeistL that 
practice would end:
The disappearance of Man at the end of History is thus not a cosmic catastrophe ... Man remains aiive as an animal 
who is in harmony with Nature or Being as it is given. What disappears is Man properly so called -  that is Action 
which negates the given, and Error, or more generally the opposition between Subject and Object. In fact, the end of 
human Time and of History ...all the rest can continue indefinitely: art, love, play, etc. -  in short everything that 
makes Man happy.62
If in Kojeve we see a strange combination of Hegelian idealism and Marxist polemics, it is not 
accidental, nor exceptional -  after ali, in the early 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
debate on this prophetic end of history was resurrected. This is because Kojeve believed what 
epistemology always aspired to do -  that is, suspend practice, and thereby imply that time itself 
permits its own cessation, in a truly theological, or should we say, ‘magical’ fashion. As we shall see 
in course of the thesis, Bengali intellectuals too proposed this end of karma or practice with the 
completion of knowledge -  a proposal which was attributed by Western commentators to the essential 
Indian trait of renunciation, though it actually shared, of course with differences, something like 
Kojeve’s Hegelian hope. However, if we foreground articulations of time like that of the Santals, the 
incredible but possible future appears as that which can only be negotiated in practice and as that 
which does not offer the assurance of prediction and anticipation. For time is the limit to knowledge, 
and knowledge by itself is never fully ready for the unprecedented future. Where knowledge ends, 
practice -  including that of theorisation -  begins. In a way then, it seems appropriate to end by 
mentioning Walter Benjamin -  the archetypal figure of the Jewish thinker, suppressed at the very 
beginning of Biblical history and dying in resistance to the unmitigated and Nazi face of nationalism, 
who imagined the helpless angel of history, back turned to the future, towards which he was 
inexorably propelled as the past piled up before him.63 If mainstream historiography could only 
interpret Santal rebellion as millenarian at its most radical, the same historiography could never fully 
admit Walter Benjamin, and his messianic disavowal of universal chronology. As Benjamin said, Ihe
61 Kumkum Sangari, The Politics of the Possible1, CulturalCritkfue, VII, felt, 1987, pp. 157-86.
62 Quoted in Lutz Niethammer, Posthistoire, London & New York, 1992, p. 66.
03 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, London, 1992, p. 249.
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nourishing fruit of the historically understood contains time as a precious but tasteless seed’.64 In 
order to break out of this prison of the past, of the factual and the historical, Benjamin preferred the 
‘error-friendly state of the hypothetical’.65 And the Santals acknowledged the temporal state of, what 
has been derogatively called, the ‘supernatural’.
Colonialism and Continuity: a historiographical clarification
It must be apparent by now that, in the way it conceptualises ‘colonial modernity’, this thesis considers 
colonialism to be a clear rupture in the history of India, and of the world in general. This can no 
longer be a simplistic assumption, or a self-evident ‘experience’ as presumed by nationalist 
historiography, which saw the battle of Palasi and the battle of Buxar as singular events inaugurating 
the modern period of colonialism in India. Recent research on the eighteenth century contest both the 
notion of colonialism as an event which happened once and for all in 1757, or in 1764, and the notion 
that colonial rule unequivocally and successfully disrupted the ‘continuity’ of Indian history. Much of 
this research has been in the domain of economic history, and has correctly criticised world-systems 
theories for making it appear as if pre-colonial societies were fragile and passive entities, which 
allowed themselves to be incorporated into the ‘periphery’ of Western capitalism without any 
resistance, and without affecting in the least the trajectory of European history or of metropolitan 
capital.66 Research on the late Mughal empire makes it clear that the decline of the elite groups 
associated with the Mughal state resulted in the rise of vibrant regional political formations in India, 
more deeply rooted in the market place, and in the general expansion of trade and commercial 
production. Even military changes made arms more dependent on the ruler’s ability to command 
cash than on his capacity to command assignments of land.67 David Washbrook argues, that it is this 
pre-colonial context which drew the British into India, making an advantage out of the East India 
Company’s ability to offer fiscal and military services to the regional formations. From this he even 
goes on to argue that ‘in the last quarter of the eighteenth and the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century, the Company Raj was a state as much of indigenous as of British capital and, in certain 
ways, its rise brought to completion the processes of transition begun in the seventeenth century’.68 
C. A. Bayly argues that the East India Company’s success lay in its becoming an ‘indigenous 
capitalist’69, and that early colonialism, instead of disrupting pre-colonial continuity, caused ‘a
64 Quoted in Niethammer, Posthistoire, p; 118.
65 Ibid., p. 118.
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remarkable reproduction of the power of the pre-colonial dominant groups’.70 P. J. Marshall, on his 
part, argues that apart from the intellectual ferment in the nineteenth century which can be obviously 
attributed to colonial rule, it is impossible to clearly ascribe any change or interference to colonialism. 
India was already commercialised and market-driven, and colonial economic policies could not, in any 
case, make deep interventions in the local lives and in the production organisations of the rural 
population.71
There are, thus, two arguments in what can be called this ‘continuity theory’ historiography. 
One, that the eighteenth century had already begun to demonstrate capitalist potentials, and colonial 
rule did not bring in anything new to the Third World.72 Two, that colonialism began with a fairly long 
period of what used to be earlier called ‘indirect rule’, basing itself on indigenous forms of economic 
and social organisation and thereby allowing the continuity of pre-colonial ways and customs in 
Bengal. My thesis is based on an implicit critique of both these arguments. Before going into this 
critique, however, it will be fair to mention what I consider to be a valid corrective offered by this 
historiography. This historiography has taught us that colonialism could not have been a one-time 
event. That would be to construct pre-colonial societies as curiously helpless, a construction that 
constituted the ideology of colonialism itself. Late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries expose 
the negotiated manner in which colonialism took effect -  in the face of much local and political 
resistance. While retrospection may often suggest a kind of inexorability to colonial triumph, the 
rigorous empirical histories of early colonialism show how uncertain and exasperated early colonisers 
must have felt, in the face of indigenous recalcitrance and indifference.
However, it is one thing to say that colonialism was a negotiated process, and not an event. It 
is entirely another thing to say that colonialism smoothly slipped into the ‘continuity’ of indigenous 
history. Even if one accepts, against all senses of history and context, that pre-colonial India 
displayed the same economic or capitalistic propensities as that Georgian England, it can still be 
shown empirically how early colonialism caused a general fall in prices and agrarian stagnation in 
India. This could not have been if the East India Company entered the scene as merely another 
commensurable player in ‘indigenous capitalism’.73 However, there is more to this critique of the 
‘continuity theory’ than economic facts and counterfactuals. The best version of this critique has been 
offered by Sudipta Sen, in his recent book, Empire of Free Trade: The East India Company and the 
Making of the Colonial Marketplace.74 Sen shows that trade and conquest implied, from the ‘very 
beginning’, an attempt by the East India Company to build a powerful and intrusive state in India.
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East India Company’s demands for markets and commerce came face to face with a very different 
I  organisation of trade, market exchange and authority. And it was this difference which was crucial in
determining the nature of the conflict of economic interests in eighteenth-century Bengal.75
The rupture in continuity arose from the colonial desire to promote a ‘pure’ and self-regulated 
market economy in a society where marketplaces and their patrons were part of an extended social 
and political-scape. Drawing from the insight of Karl Polanyi, Sen shows that it was a very specific 
and local European phenomenon that self-regulating markets became a ‘totalising and pervasive’ 
thing, enabling a fundamental separation of the economic and the political in social life. Opposed to 
this, was pre-colonial Bengal, where domains of exchange were not merely implicated in the particular 
hierarchy of goods that entered it, but were also ‘competing denominations of various venues of 
exchange and communion’: markets for temples, markets of mosques, markets for the emperor, 
markets for the landlords, and for the people. Confronted with this political determination of the 
economic regime, the East India Company began to disrupt ‘continuity’ even before 1757. The 
Company undertook the very political act of intruding in the trade in prestige items like salt, betel nut 
and tobacco, at a time when they had permission only to trade in ordinary though profitable items like 
silk and cotton (their trade in salt remained a bone of contention even in the twentieth century). The 
Company even began to issue passes to trade in these goods and sell these passes to petty brokers 
in the manner of indulgences. And since 1757, the East India Company attempted to ‘free’ markets 
from local control, patronage and redistributive efforts through an elaborate revenue and police 
administration, in the name of faissez faire and in the name of Scottish philosophy, which invoked 
§ principles of governance and laws of economy in the same breath, as formidable tools of civilisation
and moral reform. It must be remembered that not only were pre-colonial marketplaces part of a 
wider political economy of redistribution by rulers, they were also traversed by various kinds of 
passages, that of armies, traders and most importantly pilgrims. As Sen tellingly says: ‘Commerce, 
warfare, banditry and pilgrimage all locate[d] the marketplace differently in time and in place, rather 
than as a fixed entity in cartographic space’, which required the East India Company to intervene as a 
political actor in the ‘economy’. The Company sequestered indigenous marketplaces from their 
traditional lineage, caused a rapid expansion police and customs outposts and relentlessly tried to 
standardise money, bills and currency.76 It was no accident that traders and shopkeepers who, for 
decades before the coming of the Company, had accommodated the levies of a host of political 
agents -  nawabs, zamindars and amins -  resisted the imposition of the Company’s police tax with 
I  such unprecedented defiance. And popular rebellions, like the sannyasi and fakir uprisings, targetted
precisely the Company’s factories, thanas and customs outposts. This goes against the continuity 
argument, that the ‘masses’ were unaffected by early colonial rule.
Eighteenth-century marketplaces in pre-colonial India had indeed become sites of 
unprecedented political significance. Yet they could not have been mapped as standardardised and
75 Ibid., p. 3.
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stable locations of totally enumerable revenue output. Nor could their significance have been grasped 
if seen from the point of view of a ‘universal’ observer and an anonymous public, reading gazetteers 
for information about trade, revenue and commercial geography of an area. In other words, 
commercial wealth did not constitute an autonomous field of knowledge, even information in pre- 
colonial India. Wealth was not identifiable as statistics. It could be produced and recognised as such 
only through active and political mediation. With East India Company’s mapping of markets, however, 
came a utilitarian obsession with revenue statistics as valid in and for itself. This obsession with 
revenue at the exclusion of all other forms of political privilege, in turn, was based on the ideology of 
exclusive property rights of the state77 in customs and tolls. This idea of exclusive and singular right 
of the state disallowed any significant collaboration with local merchants and bankers, who, perhaps 
in pursuit of their own profit, became dispensable instruments in the hands of the Company. In 
Bengal, the fate of not only Jagat Seth, but of Khushal Chand, Udwat Chand and Omichand, who was 
framed by Clive in a court case, goes against the continuity-argument, that colonialism reproduced the 
authority of local commercial powers. In fact, early Company rule was based on the ‘suppression’ of 
zamindari rights over the passage of boats, pilgrims and merchandise. In this, the zamindars were 
forced to withdraw into a role of mere landed potentates, with rights only on agrarian produce, causing 
a clear ‘de-commercialisation’, if the term may be permitted, of their power and influence.
That this contest was not purely economic, but political, becomes clear in other ways as well. 
Thus, in pre-colonial Bengal, the modes of authority were emulative, i.e. visible rulership was based 
on the regional powers emulating the conduct and acts of say, the emperor, including issuing coins 
and settling markets. In the formative years of colonial rule, when the Bengal army was being 
fashioned as the major striking force for expansion westward, the Company forcefully prevented local 
powers from sharing their signs of authority. Thus, a regulation passed in 1786 forbade local banias 
from dressing their servants in the red serge uniform of Company soldiers. Also, if local authorities 
sought compensation for dues abolished, they were asked to file documentary evidence, which more 
often than not was an impossibility. All this, Sen persuasively shows, marked ‘the end of an era of 
continuity’, when ‘[t]o this redistributive society, where the power to exploit often flowed from the 
power to give, the British rulers introduced the idea of legal entitlements based on exhaustive and 
public legal documents’.
To them [the Company], all gifts, grants and donations were in essence legal conveyances, a transfer of private
property.... The colonial state refused to honour the unconditional grant that denoted the power derived from social
and dynastic privilege and responsibility rather than from narrowly defined contractual privileges.78
By the end of the eighteenth century, then, a flood of petitions were being made to the colonial 
government, from families unable to live upto this colonial scrutiny and this demand for documented 
‘evidence’ of rights and entitlements. And a large section of these families were also traditional
77 Sumit Guha shows how the Company failed to grasp the-possibility of concurrent, identical rights on a single piece of
property, forcing property to become a simple and homogeneous category contra the earlier compounds of lands, market rigpts, 
perquisites, gifts, ceremonial dignities, public offices, and tax liabilities; The Agrarian Economy of Bombay Deccan, p. 52. 
Empire of Free Trade, p. 143.
26
teachers, maulavis and pandits, whose britti or livelihood seemed to be jeopardised because they 
had no right anymore to draw subsistence from markets and from lands.79
It is based on this critique of the ‘continuity theory’ that my thesis proposes to see colonial 
modernity as a new experience in late eighteenth and nineteenth-century Bengal. Not just mainland 
Bengal, but even its apparently ‘impenetrable’ forested and ‘tribal’ areas were being subjected to 
military and fiscal expansionism from the 1770s. The chapter on money and credit, particularly, 
emphasises this disruption. This chapter problematises temporality from the perspective that Birbhum 
and Damin areas were reproduced by colonial authorities as hitherto unfamiliar with money and trade 
-  not only through discursive reconstruction, but also through active and definitive political 
interventions. For instance, the Company soaked up all the liquidity of the area and reinvested it in its 
wars with Tipu Sultan. And Cornwallis’ currency standardisation policies diminished the general 
purchasing power of the people of this region. At the same time, the Company sought to curtail the 
political relations between ‘tribes’ and zamindars of Damin, and replace them in a ‘purely’ economic 
exchange-relation, which inaugurated a new regime of indebtedness for the so-called ‘primitive’ 
peoples like Paharias and Santals. With a different intellectual purpose, K. Sivaramakrishnan has 
shown how such apparently ‘primitive’ regions were recreated by the colonial government as 
‘anomalous zones’ of exception and exclusion, even as the Company imploded administrative 
frontiers and reduced zamindari policing, by the first half of the nineteenth century.80 It was also in the 
same region of what will soon become known as the Santal Parganas, that the Company intervened 
in the passage of pilgrims to Deoghar and thus in the constitution of religious fairs, markets and 
relations of Hindus with ‘animist primitives’. Thus, for the first time with colonialism, a certain political 
economic rearrangement was effected, by which some peoples were reproduced as more ‘primitive’ 
than others -  i.e. some peoples began inhabiting a time which came across as the past of others. No 
wonder then, the Bengali middle classes categorically formulated the ‘primitive’ condition of Santals 
as embodying a lack of financial and credit rationality. Behind this seemingly ‘derivative’ thought, 
learnt from the Western political economy and ethnology, lay this long colonial process of real 
constitution of some peoples as eternally indebted and unable to manage markets.
79 Ibid., p. 154.
80 ‘British Imperium and Forested Zones of Anomaly in Bengal, 1767-1833’, The Indian Economic and Social History Review, 
XXXIII (3), 1996, pp. 243-82.
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The Subject of Time, the Subject in Space : 
the ‘historical’ and the ‘primordial’ in colonial Bengal
[T]he past, far from being a dimension of time, is the synthesis 
of all time of which the present and the future are only 
dimensions. ... it is the in-itself of time as the final ground of 
the passage of time.
-  Gilles Deleuze1
With the coming of colonial-modemity, the Bengali middle classes’ awareness of time was 
heightened and dislodged. Chakuri, or routine clerical work, was eating away at time, leaving no 
time for this-worldly duties, let alone for preparations for the next world. Despite the new labour- 
saving devices -  railways and print -  the new work-regime, the new desires instituted by 
modernity, and the rising prices came together to undo all the advantages of a fertile land where 
people could work less and think more. It was often said that the Bengali was being emaciated 
by over-work, and by its corollary, over-indulgence.2 This was the singular feeling with which 
the Bengali middle-classes confronted the time of modernity. In pre-colonial paradigms, time 
seemed to appear in many ways -  as an eternal substance or as instantaneous being, as a 
philosophical transcendent or as a philosophical indeterminate, as the concrete becoming^ of 
matter or as kingly calendar, and more commonly, as a normative judgement on the
1 Difference-and-Repetition, London, 1£94rp, 82.
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appropriateness of specific everyday acts (as in almanacs) or as a political reconfiguration of 
regimes and epochs (as in puranas).3 Out of these unlimited imperatives of time, capitalist- 
modernity re-constructed a series of empty, measurable units in which many things could 
happen, but which in itself remained singular and unqualified.4 This time, like money, could be 
possessed, stolen and bargained for.5 I begin my work by foregrounding this change instituted 
by colonial modernity in the Bengali experience of the everyday. With a concomitant change in 
the notion of the epochal, this transformed sense of everyday time caused a crisis of practice 
and possibilities in colonial Bengal. The middle-classes perceived this as a loss of continuity and 
duration, which could only be recovered through collective history-writing and through the 
relocation of a disrupted and defeated present in line with the ‘authentic’ and valorous past.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, thus, Bengal was marked by two critical 
temporal events -  the disruption of everyday time and the call for the writing of history. Recent 
historiography has analysed these two events separately. On the one hand, there has been 
sophisticated work on the nation as a historical imaginary. Ranajit Guha has demonstrated the 
emergence of the nationalist imagination in the second half of the nineteenth-century, a time 
which had been historicised till then as the period of ‘proto-nationalism’, the time of social reform 
and renaissance, prior to nationalism as politics. Guha shows that by the 1860s-80s, the Bengali 
middle-classes already imagined the nation as a political identity -  not just as an object-entity 
whose history could be written but as a subject-agent who could actively write and make history.6 
Partha Chatterjee shows how, in the same period, the notion of identity changed from that of the 
praja (or subject to a regime) to that of the citizen (or subject of a nation), as the subject-agent’s 
position changed from that of customary right to the locality and to local resources to that of a 
historical right over the nation’s destiny as a whole.7 Sudipta Kaviraj shows that, even as the 
educated Bengalis accepted the ‘theory’ of Western history as a mode of consciousness, they 
reconfigured history as a motivated political practice by experimenting with the trope and diction 
of history-writing, by exploding conventional narrative closures and by renegotiating the 
boundary between truth and fiction.8
2 ‘Bangadeser Bartaman Abastha', TatfovodbmPatrik^ smvan, 1856r
3 Romilla Thapar, Time as Metaphor of History: Early India, DelhLI 996.
4 Benedict Anderson, The Imagined Community, London, 1983.
^This has been discussed in context of Western modernity, by E. P. Thompson, Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial 
Capitalism', Past and Present, XXXVIII, 1967; Chris Nyland, ‘Capitalism and the History of Work-Time Thought', British 
Journal of Sociology, XXXVil, 1986; Nigel Thrift, 'The Making of Capitalist Time-Consciousness’ in The Sociology of Time, 
ed. John Hassard, London, 1990.
6 Ranajit Guha, An Indian Historiography of India: A Nineteenth-century Agenda and its Implication, Calcutta, 1988.
7 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments, Princeton, 1993, pp. 83-95.
^ Sudipta Kaviraj, ‘On the Construction' of Colonial Power Structure, Discourse, Hegemony', in Contesting Colonial 
Hegemony: State and Society in Africa and India, eds. Shula Marks and Dagmar Engels, London, 1994, pp. 47-52.
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There has also been definitive work on the temporal politics of capitalism in the colonial 
context. Following the perspective of E. P. Thompson, Sumit Sarkar has shown how Bengali 
middle and lower middle classes, increasingly constituted as a clerical labour force for the 
colonial government, struggled over work-time and leisure.9 He has also shown how the 
assessment of the colonial present as kaliyuga, the evil epoch in which all normative hierarchies 
were inverted, informed the common-sense of not only educated middle-classes but also of the 
rural population.10 In fact, the sense of kali, as used in everyday temporal-normative 
judgements, was not a particularly Hindu idea. Even as late as in the 1920s, when the 
communal question was clearly formulated, we see texts written by Muslims using the idea of 
ka//‘.1i Even so-called ‘tribes’ like the Santals and the Mundas, who were defined as both outside 
‘history’ and outside Hindu caste-society, invoked kaliyuga in their songs and verses.12 In this 
sense, the resentment about the theft of time and about the alienness of the colonial regime 
were experiences, to start with, more common and general to the people of Bengal, than the 
experience of the nation as a historical identity.
In the context of these two distinct strands of recent historiography, this chapter seeks to 
problematise the connection between the imagination of the nation as history and the experience 
of the everyday as disrupted. I shall argue that the call for history given by the Bengali middle- 
classes was not directly produced by either the common struggle over everyday time or by 
common-sensical notions of the epochal imperative. History-writing as a practice emerged in a 
bilateral engagement with colonial discursive practices, displaced from its relation with the 
everyday and the epochal. This chapter shows that this displacement caused a rupture between 
the enunciatory time of history and the enunciatory time of the narratives which sought to 
articulate the epochal imperative. It also seeks to show how historical chronology -  whose 
primary imperative was not so much to thematise temporality as to institute identity as sameness 
through time -  assumed the character of space, shorn of the substantiveness and momentum of 
the epochal and of the struggles and contradictions of the everyday. Once time assumed the 
nature of a divisible and aggregable space, time could be split into two -  the ‘historical’ and its 
necessary counterpoise, the ‘primordial’. With this bifurcation of time, self-criticism -  which the 
decline and defeat of the nation had made unavoidable -  could be directed against the disowned 
part of the nation’s self, i.e. against the ‘non-historical’ and the ‘primitive’. This chapter seeks to 
show that it was through this bifurcation of time that the problematic of history was fully
9 SumiLSarkar, ‘Colonial Times: Clocks andKaJiyuga’, paper presentedat the South-Asia History Seminar, SO AS, London 
University, 20 June 1996.
10 Sumit Sarkar, ‘The Kalki-Avatar of Bikrampur’, in Subaltern Studies VI, ed. Ranajit Guha, Delhi, 1992, pp. 37-8.
Tr For instance, Abed Hali, Kalichitra, Rangpur, 1926.
X2 Tor Santals, see Ch V, note 23. For Mundas, see S. C. Roy, Mundas AndTheir Country, reprint, London, TS70; p. 30.
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articulated in colonial Bengal. As the subject-author of the nation’s history assumed a unitary 
biographical form, identical to the thinking, educated individual, shorn of his corporeality, the 
subject-agent sought to claim a permanent metaphysical presence -  not only beyond the 
vicissitudes of everyday and epochal temporality, but also against the lack of temporality 
seemingly embodied in the purely presentist and sensuous ‘primitive’.
In this chapter the primary emphasis is on the constitution of the historical subject, 
though the later chapters will go on to show that the temporal politics of colonial modernity 
produced history as a disciplinary mode of writing and practice, irrespective of who the subject of 
this history was. The nation as an identity was possible only on the ground of an ‘objective’ 
knowledge of history, which reproduced knowledge as dissociated from practice and from 
concrete being, i.e. knowledge as the site of an abstract time wherein antagonistic and non­
contemporary social temporalities could be re-presented without the time of the nation being 
jeopardised by them. This chapter shows that in order to claim this apparently incorruptible time 
of reason and representation, history had to first purify its author by eliminating the ‘primordial’ 
and the practical from the location of the subject. This is not to say that the author-subject of 
colonial-modern history was more exclusive than the author-subject of epochal discourses. This 
is to say that the exclusions effected by history were of an entirely different order, in history the 
first parameter of exclusion was temporal. Admittedly, the idea of kaliyuga articulated the 
inverted nature of the present in terms of the rise of the outcast and the woman. This epochal 
common-sense thus clearly referred to an upper-caste, male subjectivity, at war with the 
subaltern and the feminine. However, though historical subjectivity too was produced by the 
upper-caste male bhadrolok, it claimed to represent the entire nation, by opposing itself, not to 
another social class, but to what it saw as another time -  the ‘primitive’. In this, it denied 
position to the non-modern in the site of representation, by transferring him or her to an 
anachronistic temporality, to a temporal irrelevance. It was only by making peoples non­
contemporary that the historical subject could assume the right to re-present those who, even 
though part of the nation, seemed absent from the progressive time of the self-consciously 
modern present.
The everyday and the epochal: the context of history-writing
In The Poetry of Manifold Visions, Dinanath Gangopadhyay lamented, that in the modern-age, 
too much time was taken up by the earning of bread and the learning of ‘civilisation’. The only 
escape from this time-theft seemed a renunciation of the conventional householder’s life. The 
only way to return to darshan -  to envisioning and philosophising the world -  was to flee the
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everyday and go on solitary travels.13 In the colonial work-regime, it seemed, each day of the 
week came back with a new and independent texture. Saturday seemed a day when the dark, 
hidden tendencies of society rose to the surface -  over-indulgence by working men, defiance by 
school-boys, mindless shopping and consumption by those returning from work, which made 
prices shoot up incredibly in Sunday markets. Nothing was good about the day except for 
waiting wives, whose husbands returned from the city that night.14 Sunday, the day when work 
seemed forbidden, seemed suspect too -  some feared that Russians might be plundering the 
streets and women dared not go to bathe in the Ganga.15 And since 3 November 1763, the day 
when the government in Calcutta ordered that workers must remain in the office at noon, siestas 
in hot afternoons had become a thing of the past.16 As days took on threatening idiosyncracies 
of their own, the Bengali middle classes began to find that time-management was a virtue to be 
systematically and deliberately cultivated. Advice on time-reckoning can be found in nineteenth- 
century school-books of all kinds. It was said that time arrived as the ‘opposite of one’s desire’, 
that ‘the movement of time [was] crooked’, that time by itself brought down great edifices like 
that of Indian civilisation. The only moral position possible thus seemed to be to delicately ’hold 
time in the palm of one’s hand’, and to pass time consciously in virtuous company, virtuous 
discussion, charity, art and travelling the nation.17 One should make the best of time, because 
both the past and the future were ‘mirages’. School children therefore should be taught 
gunamulak or adjectival essays on ‘laziness’, ‘practice’, ‘the vice of eternal postponement of 
duties’ etc. Even themes like ‘the night' should be formulated from this perspective. Thus, an 
1874 school text publicised exemplary essays on the ’night’ exhorting people to sleep early as in 
the past, and essays on the ‘day’ argued that not returning home for rest even on hot afternoons 
was a good, though new, idea because it saved much travelling time.18
Mid-nineteenth century almanacs textualised the sense of these racing and crowded 
everydays. Each day was characterised in these prescriptive calendars in terms of kriyas and 
kartavyas -  of what ought to be and what ought not to be done. They listed the right time to 
make the plough, to harvest, the auspicious moment to dig wells, build boats, lay the foundation 
of houses, trade, take medicine, wear arms, or visit the king. Interpreted and explained by local 
village brahmins, the instituted generality of the average Hindu everyday preceded the printing of 
almanacs; calendars on tala leaves were already an object sold in village markets in earlier
13 VMdbadarshan Kavya, Calcutta, 1S{35.
14 Chandrakanta Sikdar, Ki Majar Sanibar Calcutta,. 1863vpp. 13-6.
15 Sambad Prabhakar, 17 February 1854.
^Arunendraprasad Ghosh, ‘Aitihasik Jatkinchit', Aryavartta, Oct-Nov 1911, pp. 542-43.
^  IVTbhencfranath Roy, Nabaprabandftasara or MorarancTEntertaimng Essays, 4lhed:, Calcutta, 1874, pp. T2-3. 
10 Harishchandra Bhattacharya Racfransarr Catctitta; 1 874; pp-,21 -2; 12&-38.
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days.19 What was new in the nutan panjikas of the 1860s-70s, published by the Hindu Press, 
Gupta Press, Day, Law & Co etc, was that the presses now competed not so much over the 
accuracy of the list of tithis, as over the additional current temporal information provided in them 
-  railway timetables, stamp rates, lists of names of officials, dividend rates of company shares, 
calculations of monthly salaries, number of guns to be fired in protocol greetings, rates and 
speed of the post, interest rates, court expenses along with equivalences across sambat, saka, 
bangabda, magisan, hijri, fasli and Christian calendars. The almanacs thus attempted to pack 
newer and older time-reckonings and mismatched temporal duties into the everyday without it 
falling apart, just as they printed photographs of Hindu deities next to those of train-carriages on 
their cover-pages.
This experience of this aporetic everyday was translated into a sense of the epochal in 
nineteenth-century Bengal, as the colonial present was labelled as the evil kaliyuga. This 
epochal sensibility must not be confused, as is often done, with a cyclical notion of eternally 
recurring good and bad ages. The yugas constituted a theory of change, not a theory of time.21 
And in any case, in colonial Bengal, the epoch of kali was invoked in an absolutely presentist 
sense, in dissociation from the antecedent epochs. The dominant mode of the epochal 
articulation was through satires and farces. Thus, an almanac of 1877 darkly described Lord 
Shiva lying prone under a modern oil-painting after his mid-day meal, a book of satire on modern 
widowhood at his bedside. The goddess Parvati scratches his back while announcing the death 
of all that was hitherto meaningful. In her vision, she sees the colonial government’s 
extravagant Delhi Darbar as the central event of 1877, and predicts that the workplace would 
become the pilgrimage of the year and the destiny of the nation would rest on the whims of fallen 
women.22 Satires also abound about the illicit loves common to these times, resulting in 
untimely deaths. In kali even the dead had no future except to be disrespectfully disposed off by 
the lowest of the low castes, the doms23 A Dramatic Writing of Tobacco Consume [sic] of the 
Kuleyug,24 about the vice which has captured even the very young; Kalir H a t25 Kalir Kulangar26 
etc about hen-pecked and whore-loving sons who neglect their mothers; Kalir Bau Har Jvalani
18 Johrr Warren, Kai&Sankalita; a-Qoi!eGUen~9TMemoirs-on-theVark>us-Modes-AccordingtoWhom4he-Natk>nsoTthe
Southern Parts of India Divide 77me_ Madras, 1825,p. viL
20 Anandamohan Bandopadhyay, Nabapanjika o Pradarshika, Calcutta, 1871-2.
31 Jitendra Mohanty Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought, Oxford, 1992, pp. 185-88. Mohanty says that to read the yugas 
as cyclical time is like saying that classical economics believes time to be circular, merely because it talks of recurrent cycles of 
crisis in capitalism.
22 Gosaindas Sarkar, Adbhut Panjika o Apurva Directory, Calcutta, 1871, Introduction.
23 Kanailal Sen, KalirDasdasa, Calcutta, 1875, pp. 89-90.
^Hiralal Dutta and Anandoprasad Ghosh, Calcutta, 1870.
25 Bhusanchandra Mukhopadhyay, Jessore, 1905.
^  Harihar Nandi, Calcutta, 1880.
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and Kalir Bau Ghar Bhangani21 about the home and bone-breaking modern wives; Kalir Santf8 
about clowning men and transgressive women -  numerous farcical texts of this kind expressed 
the unprecedented unease of the times. Even texts on general themes -  like the decline of 
kingship in Tipperah29 or the common affliction of dengue fever30 -  articulated problems of 
disease and loss of legitimacy as characteristic events of kaliyuga. That this satirical mode was 
overwhelmingly presentist becomes clear if one notes their purposefully 'anti-historical1 textual 
move -  of removing the kaliyuga from the graduated and differentiated scale of decline through 
the many ages. The past epoch of truth, satyayug, was turned into a metaphor in these texts, 
abstracted from the narrative necessity for detailing and filling, in, for making it even fictionally 
credible. The ‘reality’ of the kaliyuga was set off in great detail against the purely evocative 
'spirit1 of the satya. The past was staged such that the present could be presented as its mirror 
inversion. Thus Natun Babu or Kalir Avatar explicitly said that it sought to 'hold mirror' to the 
absurdity of the present; 31 and Hak Katha or True Words typically proclaimed, ‘in kali everything
32stands on its head... the miracle of time, what else shall we see!'
Another genre of popular texts emphasised, somewhat differently, the presentism of this 
mode of epochal temporalising. These used the older purankatha and panchali forms meant to 
be read out loud (in fact most of the farces too were plays to be seen and heard rather than 
read). These texts claimed to rewrite what had already been narrated in ancient texts like the 
Bhabishyapurana, for repeated hearing and learning of the present were the first steps towards 
release from it.33 In this formulation, the present was marked by the rupture of familiar 
causalities. The very nature of kaliyuga was bina meghe bajrapata -  thunder without clouds or 
pain without reason.34 That there was no escape from this epoch was because antecedents in 
time no longer necessarily limited the events following them. The past had become irrelevant, 
except by way of formal contrast -  or simply of nostalgia. And that too only for the privileged 
few who remained virtuous enough to retain some wisdom and memory of the past, and who 
were visionary enough to have had prophecied this unthinkable future, even when there 
remained no clues for ordinary causal anticipation. 35 That causes no longer retained any 
privilege, even temporal precedence, over effects was not because epochs arrived in recurrent 
cycles but because of the bulldozing motion of an alien temporality,
27 Munsbi- Namdar, Calcutta, 2nde&, 1868.
28 Arya Natya Samaj, Calcutta, 1880,
29 N.a., Tipperah Shaila Natak, Dacca, 1882.
^Maheshchandra Das, Dengu Jvarer Panchali, Calcutta, 1872.
31 Satishchandra Chattopadhyay, Calcutta, 1904, pp. 1-2:
32 N. a., Calcutta, 1873, p. 9.
33 Bishwanath Mitra, Bhavishya Puranantargata Kalirajar Mahattatattva I, Calcutta, 1849.
34 Ibid., p. 31.
35.iagamohan Tarkalankar, Kalkipurana^Calcutta, 2nd ecL, 1878,.Introduction.
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You, in the form of Time, pervade the Universe. Endlessly you make things conform. Who knows you? You are the 
consequence of ail things, the site of work without certainty of effects, you as Time are the cause of all things that
36are.
In other words, in kaliyuga^ familiar senses of causality and apprehension had ceased to be, and 
therefore, kaliyuga made time itself appear as the threatening Other.
Such was the power of this causeless present that kali seemed to contaminate even the 
past epochs of truth.37 This alleged rule of the present over the past was quite the reverse of 
what history would seek to do in this context, i.e. reconvene the present in light of the past. In 
the past kali had a localised presence, but now it was all-pervasive, because time was 
personified into Lord Clive and circulated through the whole of Bengal in the form of treacherous 
trade.38 Very little in these texts seemed to await the end of this cycle or view things 
apocalyptically. The incarnation of kaiki avatar, who was to bring an end to these bad times, 
became, not a metaphor of future hope, but a proof of the already arrived present. Ancient texts 
had predicted that kaiki would be recognised by his iron-chariot -  and since the railways, the 
steam-emitting iron cart, was the defining marker of these times, it was evident that the present 
was indeed kafikal.39 There seemed to be nothing more permanent than this present -  where kali 
had learnt that virtuous acts were neither necessary nor effective. He, it was said, had become a 
Buddhist and propagated abstinence from work. As kali said: ‘O you people attached to work - 
why do you labour in vain?’40 As we shall see in course of this thesis, this idea of the futility of 
practice in kaliyuga was translated into the proiect of a purely epistemological imperative in 
Bengali intellectual discourse.
Sumit Sarkar has already analysed the senses of kaliyuga in colonial Bengal with great 
insight. One must, however, specifically emphasise the difference between this epochal 
temporalisation and the temporalisation of the emerging mode of history-writing in colonial 
Bengal. This section has demonstrated that, from the 1850s onward, two genres of Bengali texts 
were articulating senses of the disrupted everyday and the causeless, inescapable epoch. For 
one, there were the farces and the satires, textualised in the highly presentist, ironic mode. This 
was a narrative convention which sought to express a multiplicity of voices in the same text. 
This was done not only by creating a split between the authorial presence, which obliquely 
commented on the colonial times, and the narrated time of the present, which exhibited the
38 NarayaivChaitaFajv Kalikutuhal, Calcutta, 1853, Invocation.
37 Ramdhan Ray, Kalicharit, Calcutta, 1855, pp. 92-3.
3£hChattaraj, Kalikutuhal, p. 80.
^  Kaltdas-Mukhopadhyay, KalirNaba Rang, Calcutta; t876, pr. 21.
40 Narayan Ghattaraf, Kalikutuhal Nataka, SrirampuF, 1858, p.- 24.
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absurd in everyday things and events. This was done also by directly quoting multiple colloquial 
and slang Bengali usages within the same narration. As Debes Ray has shown in his remarkable 
work on the Bengali novel, this genre was best represented by the social satirist Pyarichand Mitra 
alias Tekchand Thakur. With Bankimchandra, however, this genre of simultaneously textualising 
multiple and antagonistic social utterances was abdicated in favour of the singular time of history 
and the unified voice of the author-subject, claiming to represent the nation. It is not 
accidental therefore that the same author, Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay, who was seen as the 
first pronouncer of the call for history in Bengal, was also seen as the progenitor of a unified 
‘modern’, literary Bengali language.41
Along with the satires and farces, there was also the genre of purana recitation which 
enunciated the present as unprecedented, causeless and therefore discontinuous. The narrative 
technique of this genre too was clearly anti-historical -  in that it sought to enunciate the present 
as an always-already known future. Instead of the historical privilege of hindsight, these texts 
articulated the privilege of foresight. This narrative convention attributed to the subject-author, 
not the task of imagining a succession to the past, but the task of explaining and legitimising 
unprecedented change in the already prophesied present. In fact, it was precisely because of 
the unprecedentedness of the present epoch, that it seemed as if unprecedented acts could be 
undertaken now. The present in this mode of temporalisation could be enunciated as a hitherto 
unthought of possibility, where the temporal imperative was not so much of effecting a continuity 
through time as of effecting novel and unimaginable practices. The Brahmo Samai used the very 
idea of kaliio  do something which had supposedly never been done before, i.e. promote widow- 
remarriage. The Tattvabodhini Patrika in 1854 listed the acts forbidden in kalikal by 
Parasharsamhita to prove that widow-remarriage was nowhere prohibited in the present, in the 
way that crossing the ocean, travelling too far on pilgrimage, fall from too high a place and 
celibacy were!42 In the texts which articulated everyday and epochal disjunctures, therefore, 
time appeared as the unmanageable imperative which could effect the inexplicable, the absurd, 
and the alien. Unlike the enunciation of history which sought continuity with the ancient past of 
the nation, these modes of temporalisation tried to sieze the experiences of discontinuity, 
disruption and irreversible change. Mark the many usages of the term kal or time in the following 
recitation about kaliyuga:
Kali kale kale kal hoiache
emni kal se bisham kal
nibe tore kalerkache
41 Debes-Ray, Upanyas Niye, Calcutta, 19&1-, pp. 4r12.
42 'Should There be Widow-remarriage?’, Tattvobodhini Patrika,. phalgun,, 1854.
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In the time of kali, the end of time has come in time
so fatal (kal) is this time (kal)
that you will be taken by Time (Kal).43
Antagonistic pasts ; the historical and the 'primordial’
In contrast to the ironic and the prophetic modes of time-reckoning, which asserted the 
discontinuity of the present, history-writing emerged in colonial Bengal in order to relocate the 
present in line with the past. This historical consciousness emerged explicitly in response to the 
colonial accusation that the colonised possessed no history to call their own.44 The dramatic 
staging of farces and the recitations of purankatha, addressed the local audience directly and 
figured the colonial ruler as the third person, as the object-they. Historiography, however, 
intended to demonstrate to the colonial ruier, the primary audience, the proof of history amongst 
the colonised. Even ‘vernacular’ texts constructed arguments meant to hold true before the 
haunting presence of the European judge. As Indira Choudhury has persuasively shown, the 
discourse about the historical autonomy and superiority of Hinduism, emerged in colonial Bengal 
as a direct and oppositional response to colonial discourse.45 Bengali history, therefore, largely 
became forged through inversion as the primary mode of opposition to colonialism -  therefore, 
the frequent historicisation of the spiritual East as the exact opposite of the materialist West, and 
the retention of the possibility of marrying the two seemingly mutually exclusive
46consciousnesses.
By articulating time as ‘historical’, authors like Bankimchandra created a necessary 
disadvantage for the colonised. Unlike narratives of kaliyuga which formulated present 
subordination as without reasons and causes, history had to stage an explanation of colonialism 
in terms of past causes and ‘facts’. That is, the ‘historical’ had to accept subordination, at least 
partly, to be the result of the internal dynamics of the nation. Hence the arguments that India 
was colonised because it lacked unity, or because it was emaciated by sheer age.47 One way of
43 Ramlochan-Das, Srikafki-Parana-, Calcutta 19-13,- p-. 10.
44 Thusjn  the firstHindu Mela, organised to commemorate the historical glory, of the. nation,. Nabinchandra Mukhopadhyay 
poetically narrated Hindu historical achievements as direct replies to ‘colonial accusations’ of weakness, disunity, and lack of 
history and against 'colonial traits’ of materialism and greed. Banger Purvamahima Vaman, 1867, reprinted in Rajnarayan 
Basu, Nirbachita Rachana Sangraha, Calcutta, 1995, pp. 164-69.
45~‘Colunialism and Cultural Identity: the Making of a Hindu Discourse; Bengal“t86?-t905\ PhD thesis; SQAS, tondon 
University, 1993,
46 Dwijendranath Thakur, Aryami banam Sahebiyana, Calcutta, 1882.
47 Rakhaldas Bhattacharya, Banger Adhonati, Calcutta, 1886.
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circumventing this self-criticism was to imagine an earlier outside influence, prior to the British, 
which could be blamed with weakening the fabric of Bengali civilisation and making it vulnerable 
to colonial rule. Historicising the middle-ages as the debilitating time of Muslim ‘invasion’ and 
persecution was just such a strategy. But this strategy merely displaced the question of 
‘downfall’ onto a less immediate past, which still had to be answered with ‘self-criticism’ by the 
writers of history. By admitting time as historical continuity, the educated Bengali gave up the 
temporal insight found in the texts of kaliyuga -  the insight that the colonial present could not be 
grasped in terms of pre-existing causes, it was analogous to bina meghe bajrapata or thunder 
without clouds, that colonialism could not and must not be part of the history of the colonised but 
an external and disruptive intervention into it. This chapter argues that this ‘self-criticism’, which 
‘historicity’ forced onto the colonised, had to be neutralised, if the nation was to recover its pride, 
by a double temporal move -  of splitting the presence of the nation into the perpetual contra- 
existence of the ‘primitive’ and the ‘civilised’ and of ascribing a spatiality to time itself such that 
contradictory social times could be configured and gathered across the same temporal-territorial 
expanse called the nation.
The middle classes insisted that Bengalis did possess a history, because they were by no 
means analogous to the unhistorical, ‘primitive’ races of the world. They engaged in many an 
anxious rebuttal of the colonial accusation that the Aryans invading India were so few that they 
were assimilated by the earlier ‘Negrite and Tatar races’. Hindu philosophy, it was asserted, was 
‘too esoteric to belong to a savage race’. Cases like Bhim’s blood-thirst for Dussasana in 
Mahabharata were poetic hyperboles rather than indications of ‘primitive’ violence. If India 
seemed to have disintegrated, it was not because it was anarya or ‘primitive’ but because it was 
old and tired. The emaciation of the nation was itself the self-evident proof that it was ancient, 
and therefore more historical than many a youger/aft*.48 If Hindu society was disunited, it was not 
the fault of the historical nation itself, but a result of the contaminating presence of the ‘primitive’ 
anarya within the historical oneness of the aryas.
Since time moves, there are two jatis. It can never be said that the disunity is owing to internal jealousy within one
jati. The civilised Bengalis who reside near Calcutta and the uncivilised Santal living in the forests of Birbhum can
never be the same jati. Though if these two jatis feel united with each other it will certainly be for the general good of
society, it does not seem possible in any way.49
These anaryas represented the shadowy underside of an ancient historical nation. They were 
the dark, linguistically inarticulate, morally indiscriminate, flesh-eating worshippers of the 
sensuous and the inanimate. They never understood divinity, because they had no sense of the 
temporality of sristhi-sthiti-pralay or creation-conservation-destruction :
48 NilkanthaMajumdar, Are We-Aryans?, Calcutta, 1886, pp, ii, 17-20.
49 ‘Bangadesher Adhibasi’, Aryadarshan. chaitra^ 1874„pp. 549-58,
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[The anarya] remains satisfied like animals with an unintelligent sense of the present, within him there is no sense of 
life after death. ... They can neither feel nor imagine that time can be historical, i.e. longer than the length of their 
individual lives.
The loss of history in the present was the result of the continuing influence of these people, who 
themselves possessed no sense of past (history) or future (transcendence). After all, if the 
dialect of the Bengalis of Birbhum and Bankura had become vulgarised, it was owing to their 
physical proximity to the land of the ‘primitive tribe' of the Santals.50
Even Bankimchandra, who invited ‘everybody* to write the history of the nation,51 
invoked this arya-anarya divide as the ‘original’ question of the nation’s history: ‘[w]hy are there 
two human genealogies in the same nation? Are the Aryans living in the land of non-Aryans or 
are non-Aryans living in the land of the Aryans? This is the foremost issue of the history of 
Bengal'.52 Manindramohan Basu contrasted Bengali society to the West in terms of this very 
divide. Hindus were not Darwinians, he said, who cruelly enforced the ‘survival of the fittest’. 
The anaryas were therefore never completely erased in India. They continued to survive in the 
forests and the hills of the land, and were protected by the caste-system whose function was to 
include yet keep apart antagonistic social practices and temporalities. The ‘original’ difference -  
between the ‘primitive’ and the ’civilised’ -  which produced historical time, thus, continued even 
in the present and kept alive the memory of the ‘origin’ of history itself, the memory of the 
foundational arya-anarya encounter. Basu argued, against what he called Darwinianism, that 
‘Eastern’ samajniti knew some societies to be intrinsically ‘primitive’, a counterpoise against 
which others evolved historically.53 The Aryan polity demonstrated, as the much quoted 
Orientalist text of George Cox said, that the difference between the arya and the anarya was not 
merely a chronological difference, but a permanent and qualitative difference: ‘one class of men 
has risen indefinitely in the scale of being, while the other exhibits no power whether of self­
culture or of imitation'.54 It was from this perspective that the Ramayana was re-interpreted as a 
history of the original encounter between the historical and the ‘primitive’ -  the monkeys, snakes 
and bears, who were won over by Ramchandra, were metaphorical representations of ‘totemistic’ 
jatis.55 Even Lanka was barbaric and destined to fall before the arya king progressing 
southwards. Its grandeur was artificial -  ‘artificiality is a sign of a ja ti developed in luxury, though 
not like aryas in Principle and Dharma’, i.e. in principles of civilisation. 56 A major work of 
linguistics and history, promoted by the Varendra Research Society, The /ncfo-Aryan Races
50 Ibid, pp.. 552-57.
51 ‘A Few Words about the History of Bengal’, Bangadarshan, agrahayan, 1880.
52 Bankimchandra, ‘Bangalir Utpatti', Bangadarshan, poush, 1880.
5S Manindramohan Basu, ‘Samajniti: Prachya o Pratichya', Aryavartta, Oct-Nov 1912, pp. 465-70.
54 George W. Cox, The Mythology otAxyan Nations, Varanasi; 1870; pp. 15-7.
55 Kedarnath-Majumdar, ‘Ramayani Sabhyata1, Aryavartta-, Sept-Oet 1&10, pp 386r89.
56 Kedarnath Majumdar, 'Prachin Bharata Arya o Anarya Sabhyatar Kendrasthal1, Aryavartta, June 1911, pp. 124-8.
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sought to prove that, from the beginning of memorable history, anarya elements, though 
permanently present in Bengal, remained distinct from the run of arya history. Even the lowest 
rungs of Hindu society, the sudras, were not ‘recruited’ from the ‘aborigines’: ‘[f]or the true 
representatives of the Anaryas of the Rgvedic age we should look, not to the fourth order of the 
Vedic society, but to the fifth order, the Nisadas. The origin of this fifth-order -  from Vena, ‘a 
slave of wrath and malice’ who was made to nisida or ‘sit-in-submission’ by the rsis of the 
Mahabharata -  was categorically distinct from the creation of the four varnas out of the primary 
sacrifice of Brahma’s body. That the fifth order remained generally hidden from and irrelevant to 
‘Hindu’ history was proved by the anaryas taking refuge in forests and caves from the more 
powerful aryas. ’57
In Bengali middle-class discourse, therefore, the so-called ‘original’ arya-anarya 
difference represented the foundational moment of the nation’s history. Apparently a racial or 
ethnic construction, this difference, however, was primarily temporal in its intent. The imperative 
to claim Aryanness, and thereby a commensurablity with the races of Western Europe, was less 
about claiming identity with the rulers, than about claiming an ancient enough past for the 
nation. That the first event of Indian history was that of encounter with the ‘primitive’ was proof 
of the immense antiquity of India’s historical ‘origin’. That European history hardly ever referred 
to the anarya was proof that Western civilisation was a much later phenomenon than the ‘origin’ 
of Hindu history. Early Bengali historians engaged in dispute with colonial historians precisely on 
this point -  that the length of the credible past possessed by Hindus was greater than anyone 
else’s, and greater indeed than the world was ready to believe:
These days, according to a purely Western method, every respectable entity of the Indians is first proved to be of 
recent origin ... After this, if it is proved that this particular entity is mentioned in an ancient Indian text, doubts are 
raised about the ancientness of this text; or the section in which the thing imagined to be modern is mentioned is 
suspected as an interpolation and its authenticity questioned. Without doing this, it seems the scientific method 
cannot be maintained.
Against the colonial accusation that ancient Hindu texts were actually interpolations from later 
times, Bengalis argued that the new method of time-determination (kal-nirdeshan) established by 
English historiography deliberately caused Hindu accounts of the past to look ‘superstitious’. The 
primary mistake of the English was to accept Greece, Babylon and Egypt as the earliest sites of 
world-civilisation, as they dared not admit Indian civilisation to be older than them. What 
Western scholars failed to recognise was that in the puranas the names of kings were listed in 
the form of future prophecies, as a political strategy to make their rule seem inevitable -  a mode
57 Rama Prasad Chanda, The /odo-Aryarr Races, I: A  Study of the- Ohgin-of-lRde-Aryerr People and Institutions, Rajsfjahi, 
1916, pp. 4-6.
58 Sakharam Ganesh Deuskar, The Age of Sidhidata Ganesh’, Aryavartta, Juiy-Aug 1910, pp. 232-41.
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of remembrance which did not make the memory any less factual.59 As the historian R. C. Dutt 
wrote
The history of ancient India is a three thousand year long history of the knowledge and progress of human kind. This 
history is divided into a few yugas. Each such yuga is temporally so long that it is greater than the entire histories of 
some modern nations. ...The literature of each yuga is a complete mirror reflection of the state of the Hindu jati in 
that age. Perhaps even the use of photographic techniques do not ensure such an accurate picture ... it does not 
require any labour of interpretation.
This age-oldness of Hindu history -  its prachinata -  was validated by its enounter with 
the other ‘pastness’ -  the adimata or ‘primordiality’ of the ‘aborigines’. The prachin history of 
India was inaugurated at the moment of war with the adim. The prachin and the adim were 
qualitatively different types of times. The prachin signified a temporality where signs and morals 
of the past accumulated as permanent civilisational effects, creating a monumental time, 
attached to the present. The present was established as part of this extended and cumulative 
temporal edifice, for historical pasts did not vanish into non-existence like time, and progressive 
presents were never purely instantaneous. Though it preceded the beginning of history, the 
adim, however, unlike civilisational ‘origins’, could neither anticipate nor generate this 
monumental or historical time. The adim, by the dictionary, meant both ‘old’ and ‘root/cause’. 
But for nineteenth-century Bengali history, the adim did not cause civilisation by its internal 
logic. Instead, it continued to represent the underside of history, that eternally sterile temporality, 
imprisoned in the present and the immediate. As a principle of counterpoise, it seemed to pre­
exist every improvement and progress in the world, but it did not possess the weight and 
significance of the historically prior. Rather, it was the always-already present immoral, violent, 
non-discriminating and purely sensuous being, in contraposition to which ‘civilisation’ must 
necessarily happen to humankind. As Bankim said, if the nation’s history had to be liberated 
from the kalanka or taint of unfreedom, it had to be re-textualised, in opposition to colonial 
historiography, through an invocation of precisely this ever-present adimata in Bengal.61
Arguing against the conclusion that Bengalis were always historically vulnerable to 
conquest and subordination, to ‘Muslim rule’ as much as to colonial rule, Bankimchandra 
restated the ‘fact’ that unlike in northern India, Aryan occupation was a late affair in Bengal. This 
was a matter of some anxiety to many Bengalis, that arya settlement was not as prachin in 
Bengal as one would like it to be. This ‘fact’, however, was turned around by Bankim to show 
that for a long time the inhabitants of Bengal were purely adim anaryas. He proved that the late
59 Sasibbusarv Mukhopadhyay, ‘Raroayan-o-Mahabbafata^, AryavarttSj Au§-Sept- 1-&4Q, pp. 352r63.
60 R. C . Dutt, Hindu Aryadiger Prachin Itihaa^ Calcutta,. 1872, p. 103,
01 Bankimchandra, ‘Bangalar Kalanka’, Prachar, 1884.
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arrival of aryas in Bengal did not imply a lack of arya power or influence. Quoting Charles Lyell’s 
Principles of Geology, he showed how the wet marshy lands of Bengal were initially 
uninhabitable for an advanced, agricultural people like the Aryans. At the time of Muslim 
conquest, therefore, the relationship of the civilised aryas of the north to the ‘primitive’ anaryas 
of Bengal was analogous to the contemporary relationship of the English to India. He showed 
from contemporary Brahmanical texts like Khshitishvamsabali, how even as late as in the 
eleventh century, Brahmans had not arrived in Bengal, until king Adisura, also the founder of the 
Bengali calendar, deliberately settled a few Brahman families in this land. Even afterwards, 
there were very few warring kshatriyas or trading vaisyas in Bengal. Bankim also used texts like 
Samayprakash (The Time-Expresser) by the archaeologist and historian Rajendralal Mitra for 
elaborate calendrical calculations and to prove that until the twelfth century, historical aryas were 
almost completely absent from Bengal. Thus two accusations against Bengalis were negated at 
one go: one, that they were not inheritors of the north-lndian arya civilisation as the Rajputs and 
Marathas were, and two, that aryas in Bengal were conquered by the Muslims. For since the 
aryas had hardly arrived in Bengal till twelfth century, it must have been the adim ‘primitives’ 
who were actually defeated and subordinated by ‘foreigners’.62
The ‘primitive’ thus became the necessary figure in colonial Bengali historiography, 
which explained the defeat and disunity of the colonised nation. However, it is not useful merely 
to say that the Bengali intelligentsia admitted evolutionary categories because they ‘derived’ their 
knowledge from colonial discourse. After all, Bengalis could not have been uaware of the 
perpetual temporal lag that evolutionary theory attributed to them. If they still admitted a certain 
form of evolutionism, it was because their claim of historicity depended on it. It is therefore 
necessary to understand the uneasy relationship that colonial intellectuals had with the idea of 
evolution. The time of progress, in this version of social change, appeared identical with the 
concrete becoming and evolution of an organic social entity like the nation. Time itself seemed 
subsidiary to the evolution of being -  evolution as an automatic and concrete process 
perpetuated time, rather than vice-versa. Most Bengali texts in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, whether they discussed evolution as a principle or not, exhibited a general allegiance to 
this evolutionary unnati or improvement of the self and society. If some authors accused Darwin 
of making human ancestors into apes or of demonstrating an ideological cruelty by propounding 
‘survival of the fittest’, they could not fully reject evolution as a principle of social change.
02 Bankimchandra, ‘Bange BrahmanadWkara^, Bangadafshan^ 1385..
03 For a discussion of influence of evolutionary ideas, see D. L, Gosling, Science and Religion in India, Madras, 1Q76.
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This was because the evolutionary principle provided the temporal category of the 
‘primitive’, against which historical time was enunciated. The evolutionary principle also assured 
the colonised to an extent, that however constrained political practice was in the context of 
colonial unfreedom, things would automatically and naturally progress in time. Above all, 
evolutionism, paradoxically, seemed to resolve the impasse of colonialism-nationalism itself. 
Both the colonised and the coloniser, despite their fundamental opposition, agreed to re-locate 
the present as a germinal potential in the far past, thus somewhat undoing the significance of 
colonialism itself as a ‘critical event’. Colonial histories textualised the vulnerability of India to 
foreign rule as an ancient and long-term ‘fact’.64 In response, the colonised textualised the 
nation as the ancient ‘spirit’ of India. Concomitantly, both the colonised and the coloniser re­
discovered the self (imperial and national) and the Other (the ‘oriental’ and the ‘primordial’) in the 
time prior to the colonial encounter. The urgent and overwhelming nature of the colonial present 
was thus to a large extent placated in favour of auto-generative evolutionary time. Evolutionism, 
in this context, provided the mechanism by which eminently modern phenomena -  the nation 
and the ‘primitive’ -  could be seen to have evolved from the far past into their present form. 
Social Darwinism, thus, which accused the colonised of not-yet being a nation, could itself be 
counter-deployed to prove the embryonic presence of the nation, and its Other, from centuries 
before.
The evolutionary principle -  that the present was not unprecedented, rather it was a 
reiteration of what was already present-in-the-past -  was harnessed by the colonised to prove not 
only the pre-existence of the nation,, but also the pre-existence of history as practice, and of 
evolutionary theory as knowledge. Thus, the tradition of incarnations of Vishnu was taken as 
proof of pre-existing knowledge of evolution in ancient India. Brahmavaivartapurana was 
interpreted as an explication of stages of evolution: the time of creation was life-less, silent and 
unformed, with the absolute presence of nothing^ other than pure space, time and direction. This 
time was followed by the time of the fish and tortoise-forms, indicating that the earth was 
covered by water. Then followed incarnation as the boar, who shored up the earth for the birth of 
terrestrial life-forms. The lion-man or Nrisimha who followed, signified the struggle between 
animal and human-forms; Baman indicated the not-completely erect human form of the 
Pliocene age; Parashuram in turn signified the perfect human-form but represented ‘primitive’ 
violence. This stage was followed by the historical emblems of Ram, Krishna and Buddha, who 
indicated the various stages of historical-civilisational society.65 It was argued that the 
Brahmanical ‘apriori method of unpacking the mystery of creation later evolved into the a
04 James-MW, The History of British India-, 5th ed,, London, 4858.
65 Gyanendra Mohan Das„ Puranas and Science in the Theory of Creation, Calcutta, 1918.
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posteriori method of contemporary scientific evolutionism’.66 In the same way, Bankim 
retroactively proved the presence of ‘history’ in ancient India. He argued that texts currently 
familiar as ‘scientific history’ were actually the evolved form of past historical-insights.
First the naming, vishnu from the root vish [village community]. At the second stage, metaphor -  three limbs of
vishnu -  some say the three positions of the sun, rising, setting and perpendicular to earth, some say the
omnipresence of god in three worlds, some signify past, present and future. Third, history -  e.g. the narrative of
balibaman [the defeat of the non-Aryan king by the baman incarnation of Aryan-god Vishnu]. Finally the
in other words, the seeds of historical-consciousness were ever-present, just as the nation was, it 
only evolved in time to its present form and textuality. Evolution thus assured the presence-in- 
the-past of all that the colonised were accused of lacking. The Bengali middle classes were thus 
freed from the burden of practically creating a new world. All they needed to do was to re­
present that which was always-already there, and which had been only contingently forgotten. 
For this purpose, what was needed was not a painstaking practice, but a sufficient knowledge of 
the past and an evolutionary grasp of time.
Evolutionism however, had to be contested as well. For it remained in the last instance 
to the advantage of the ‘modern’ European nations, who had had a head start in the race for 
unnati or improvement. The evolutionary principle, if taken to its logical extreme, also tended to 
collapse the fundamental counterpoise between the ‘primitive’ and the ‘civilised’, which produced 
the momentum of nineteenth-century Bengali history. It could be taken to imply that the civilised 
was not the counterpoise but only the evolved form of the ‘primitive’. Thus, a 1926 Bengali text 
called Hindu Social Science disputed the evolutionary claim that ail the civilised nations of the 
world had gradually emerged from the ‘primitive’ state. In fact, the author argued, there were 
much evidence to the contrary. The fact that many jatis of Africa, Australia and India, had 
continued for centuries to live in a ‘primitive’ condition proved that they were intrinsically 
‘primordial’ and could not ‘evolve’ into anything else. Hindus on the other hand were never 
‘primitive’ -  even when the ancient sages chose to live in forests, by gathering rather than 
producing food, they represented a highly civilised and introspective state of being.68 In any 
case, unlike in the West, where it was not impossible to imagine a contingent intermixing and 
therefore co-evolution of antagonistic social entities, the caste-system in India, it was argued, 
prevented any problematic overlap between the ‘civilised’ and the ‘primitive’. After all, if the 
worthy and unworthy mingle in society, the average standard of virtue is pulled down and unnati 
jeopardised. Significantly, the Bengali usage unnati signified ‘improvement’ through time in the 
evolutionary sense, yet in the name of progress or unnati itself, the text denied the possibility of
60 Ibid, p.36.
67 Bankim, 'Krishnacharitra', 1892, in Bankim Rachanavati (BR) II, ed. Jogeshchandra Bagal, Calcutta, 1954, p. 444.
63 Kaliprasanna Dasgupta, Hindu Samaj-Vignyan, Calcutta, 1926, pp. 124-5,131.
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the ‘primitive’ evolving into the ‘civilised’. This shows up the indeterminate relationship of the 
colonised to evolutionary principles. In the course of the researches of Varendra Anusandhan 
Samiti, Sasadhar Ray found that Santals believed that they descended from birds and animals -  
from this he concluded that they were organically in contradiction to the inheritors of civilisation.
69
Thus, the evolutionary principle which had to be retained for the sake of national 
progress, had, at the same time, to be contradicted. Bhudev Mukhopadhyay disputed the 
colonial accusation, that the puranas were not historical but metaphorical narrations, by 
criticising what he called the ‘mistaken metaphor’ of Western evolutionism. To equate society to 
an organism was to erroneously imply that society must acquire nourishment from without. 
Bhudev argued that social vitality must be internally generated, which made historical 
temporality fundamentally different from the life-cycle of organisms.
So, if one must use a metaphor, one should understand society as a divine body rather than as an organism. The 
former has no origin, no end and similarly no one can speak with certainty about the beginnings of a society. Just as 
divinity is ever youthful, so is society ... just as deities have their respective locations, each society continues to live 
by their singular root-foundation.70
In other words, societies cannot be classified as a species sharing a common evolutionary stage. 
Instead, one must recognise that each particular nation is marked by a singular temporality, a 
‘root foundation’. According to Bhudev, the foundation of Western history was the substratum of 
a unitary Graeco-Roman civilisation, overdetermined by ‘barbaric’ peoples. Indian history on the 
contrary, rested on a fragmented matrix of various anarya, ‘primitive’ peoples, overdetermined 
and unified by the arya civilisational and conceptual apparatus.71 Therefore, though Europe was 
basically a cultural unity, it was continuously embroiled in cruel wars, while India, with a social 
fabric foundationally split into ‘primitive’ and ‘civilised’, still retained peace. In this paradigm, 
practice -  of war in Europe and of peace in India -  were derivative not of their respective 
evolutionary stages, but of the ‘original’ configuration of the ‘primitive’ and the ‘historical’ in their 
respective societies. The original configuration of the Indian nation, to Bhudev, was the 
structural subordination of the restless ‘primitive’ elements by the unitary and stable, conceptual 
mind, while that of Europe was the opposite.
The history of the nation, therefore, was characterised by the historical subject, the 
aryas, successfully and literally ‘locking-in’ the ‘primitives’ into islandic locations, ‘where the land 
[was] infertile, paths mountainous, the earth forested , human stores empty of wealth’.72 Located
69 Sasadhar Ray, Manav-Samaj, Calcutta, 19-1-3, p. 65.
70 Bhudev,. ‘Samajik Prabandha’, 1892, in Bhudev Rachanavali. ed. Pramath Bishi, Calcutta, 1957, p. 46.
71 Ibid., pp. 114-15.
^Bankimchandra, ‘Anarya1, Bangadarshan, magh, 1880.
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in sterile lands, and hidden from even each other in forests, crevices and hills -  the ‘primitive’ 
could never emerge as an identity like the Aryan.73 Bengali historical discourse thus admitted 
the antecedence of the ‘primitive’, only as a temporal position to be conquered and besieged, as 
fertile plains were salvaged from unproductive ‘tribes’ for the sake of civilisation and cultivation. 
The ‘primordial’ continued to be present even in the historical period, as the counter-reason to 
progress, but remained landlocked, so to speak, surrounded by territories of civilisation -  a 
spatial surrounding which by itself was the evidence, to the Bengali writers of history, of the real 
and moral subordination of ‘dark’ ‘aborigines’. Admittedly, traditional Brahmanical texts too 
distanced lands ‘other’ than that of Aryavarta as morally inferior and contaminating. However, 
this moral exclusion did not make geographical distinction symmetrical to a temporal distinction. 
These texts sought to banish not only ‘forest-people’ but even Aryans like yavanas, mlecchas or 
Muslims and vratya kshatriyas to impure and infertile lands. Even the Bible was interpreted in 
this paradigm, as an acknowledgement that non-Hindus were originally exiled, that Adam and 
Eve lived naked in an otherwise uninhabited ‘forest’.74 The lesson of colonial-modern 
ethnography, however, was that those who lived in another land, also inhabited another time. 
That space and time were parameters which mutually signified each other, was an insight 
borrowed by the authors of Bengali history like Bankim from Western philosophy. In this 
paradigm, the Aryans embodied the monumental temporality of history and the spatial 
permanence of the settled village site, as the ‘primitive’ non-Aryans remained banished to 
unproductive lands and sterile times, living a sporadic, restless and nomadic life.75
This colonial concept of the undisturbed, Asiatic village-community was reinvented by 
Bengali historians, who argued that the real history of India was not the restless ephemerality of 
politics and regimes, but the unperturbed continuity of restful villages.76 The refined and 
unchanged Sanskritic names of Indian villages proved that they were constructed during the 
height of arya glory.77 Even though colonial officials sometimes argued that the ‘unbroken’ 
village-community could be found only amongst ‘aborigines' like Santals, Bengali middle classes 
claimed that the settled site of the village was an ‘original’ Aryan achievement, imitated only later 
by neighbouring ‘primitives’.78 The village was turned into a metaphor of permanence, in 
contrast to the violent, nomadic and hunting ‘primordials’. This permanence signified the
73 BankimohandFa; Tiw-Two-Lineages-of the Anarya: Dravid-and-Koi', Bangadarshan, phaigun, 4880.
74 Nanda Kumar Kaviratna, Sandeha Nirasana^ Calcutta J863_pp. 33-64.
75 E. B. Haveil, The History of Aryan Rule in India, London, 1918, pp. 10-11.
^Th is  position was taken up by the editors and contributors of the first specialised historical journal in Bengali, which started 
in nineteenth century with an introduction by Rabindranath Thakur, and became somewhat regularised in the early twentieth. It 
was called Aitihasik Chitra or Pictures from History.
77 *Sanrafochana\ Aryavartta, July-Aug; t&tO:
78 ‘RaHisama£, Aryadarshan, I: 8, agrahayan, f&74, pg. 359-60.
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concretion and inscription of monumental time, traces of the past indelibly imprinted on the 
always-already present territory of the nation. It was this sense of permanence that made 
archaeological remains the best visual, because spatial, evidence of history in the perception of 
the early twentieth-century Bengali historian. Rajnarayan Basu, the well-known Brahmo 
intellectual who often spent his holidays in the forested retreat of Deoghar in Santal Parganas, 
unhesitatingly claimed in 1865, that ‘primitives’ like the Santals did not possess historical time 
because they had no permanent presence on the land: 'only a/yas have a right to permanent 
works, uncivilised jatis may show momentary courage but they dissipate like the storm’.79
Chronology and geography: the spatial imperative of historical time
In Bengali middle-class discourse, therefore, the foundational split between the ‘primitive’ and 
the ‘historical’ was conflated with the division of space between productive and sterile lands, and 
with the bifurcation of time between the cumulative/monumental continuum of civilisation and 
the sporadic/dissipated existence of the non-Aryan. Underlying this spatial-temporal 
configuration, was the emerging idea of historical chronology as an abstract, spatialised site, 
which contained and gathered various incommensurable time-reckonings. Since the 1820s, 
colonial officials in India were undertaking extensive tabulations of various local modes of 
temporalisation. For the sake of administrative unity of the empire, a system of equivalence of 
time, across all localities and occasions, had become necessary. Colonial officials accepted that 
the existing systems of time-reckoning in India were complex and indeed accurate, resting ‘on 
the immense scope of its cycles and the vast intervals of its epochs... expressed in natural 
numbers and amounting in some cases to thirteen places of figures’.80 A new system was 
needed therefore, not for greater accuracy, but for the sake of a general calendrical consensus. 
Even if it might be more accurate to avoid, like the Bengali calendar, a purely numerical 
averaging of months, it was more convenient, stable and universal ‘to give to the months an 
arbitrary but permanent duration’. 81
The colonial context, of transition from local to universal calendars, which favoured inter- 
commensurability over accuracy, required the rejection and reconfiguration of ‘traditional’ modes 
of time-reckoning in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Bengal. On the one hand, the 
Orientalist scholars of the Asiatic Society of Bengal rejected the elaborate and complex time-
79 Rajnarayarv Basu 'The Origin and-Spread-otthe Aryans ,^ Tattvabodhini Patrika, bbadreh 1-865.
80 Warren, Kala Sankalita, p. xi.
81 Ibid
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cycles of the Hindu shastras, as strategies reinvented by Bengalis to attribute an exaggerated 
antiquity to their own past.82 On the other hand, scholars and missionaries attempted to 
reconstruct Hindu time-cycles as synonymous to the chronology of Christian history, thus 
transforming chronology from a succession of particular events to the parameter of truth in itself: 
‘when the apparently same event is placed by different nations at epochs the most remote from 
each other ... it is a natural inference that one or all the narrations are unfounded.,B3 The 
‘remarkable and exact analogy' of Hindu and Christian times proved chronology to be a universal 
fact, based on natural and ‘original’ events like the deluge, which were common to all nations.
The world and nations, with their ever repeated changes of form and fashion, of renewal and age, of progress and 
decline, constantly suggest the parallel of day and night, of sleep and waking, of life and death; and the facilities 
which figures afford for intricate problems and solutions, exercised their ingenuity and capacity for complicated and 
extensive ranges of thought and calculation, upon these analogies.84
Once this universal and ‘natural’ foundation of time was established, chronology became free of 
the events which it dated, as if making sense even if the events listed had not occurred. 
Chronology thus achieved the nature of a vessel that pre-existed its filling. In other words, even 
before geology (and evolutionary theories) fully replaced theology as the ground for the 
imagination of time in Europe, by the end of the eighteenth-century, historical chronology had 
already acquired the nature of space. The colonial world-order required that distant but co­
existing societies become commensurable and aggregable, in order to allow exchange and 
accumulation. As C. P. Brown, who analysed pre-colonial modes of time-reckoning in southern 
India, tellingly said -  India lacked neither accurate astronomical calculations of time, nor 
genealogical and political records. What it lacked was the ability to see time and succession as 
identical, i.e. it lacked history: ‘[wle find lists of years alone, and lists of rajas alone; if the two 
are connected , it is so mysteriously.’85
We have already noted that nineteenth-century Bengali almanacs too had to provide a 
similar structure of equivalence across different time-reckonings. However, they continued to 
articulate time, not as a chronology pre-existing events and acts, but as acts of the body, as 
nimesha (the twinkling of the eye), as matra (metres and rhythms of utterence), as pran (a full 
breath) or as the subtlest moment of piercing a single lotus leaf with a needle.86 Despite the fact 
that both historical chronology and Brahmanical time-reckoning used numbers, they remained
82 Seethe discussions on Hindu astronomy and chronology-by^Jobn-Bentley, William Jones, Francis Wilford, S. Davies and H. 
T. Colebrookejn O. P. Kejariwal, The Asiatic Society of Bengal and the Discovery of India’s Past 1784-1838^ Delhi, 1988,. 
pp. 85-88.
Alexander Hamilton, A Key to the Chronology of the Hindus, Cambridge, 1820, p. x.
84 S. FT. Bosanquet; Hindu Chronology and~'Anfe<Mtvian Hfstory, London, T880; p. 23.
85 C. Pr Brown, Carnatic ChronologyThe-Hindu-and-MahommedarrMethods of Reekoning Time Explained, London, 1868, 
Preface.
86 Madhavchandrasuryasiddhanta Nutan Panjika, 1868-9, p. 43.
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fundamentally different. Chronology imagined time a priori as numbers and Bengali almanacs 
saw time as post-facto enumerable. In the nineteenth-century, almanac-writers were becoming 
increasingly anxious about the need to ‘update’ their system of time-reckoning. The Bangiya 
Brahmansabha Panjika Committee argued that the Western system based time-calcuiation on 
the shifting position of the sun relative to the earth, i.e. on a non-fixed original point. Hindu 
astronomy on the contrary, rested on the fixity of a star in the sky. This dhruva or fixed cosmic 
point was the foundation of Hindu religious work, and could not be morally or philosophically 
replaced by a shifting reference-point in space. Most scholars therefore advised a practical 
adaptation of the numerals, though not the theoretical presuppositions, of the Christian calendar. 
Prasna-Mimamsa however tellingly argued that it was no longer plausible to deny the primary 
advantage of the Western system, which assured, by its ‘emphasis on the earth’s equator’, drik- 
tufyata or comparability of visions and directions. The text therefore advised the bracketing off 
of unreformed nirayan time, to be used solely for ‘internal’ religious purposes, and the adaptation 
in toto of the Western navigational calendar, which fixed time-zones according to longitudes, and 
which facilitated cartography and travel across the world. It was by navigational time that all 
pratyaksha, i.e. visible/external/public affairs should be conducted.87 The acceptance of the 
spatial intent of time was thus complete, even by the most conservative of the Bengali brahman 
sabhas.
In colonial Bengal, thus, we see glimpses of a self-aware transition to a spatialised time. 
In earlier traditions of darshan, one of the main philosophical errors that was sought to be 
avoided was the error of conceptualising time as symmetrical or even analogous to space. Even 
the Jaina school -  which propounded an atomistic conception of time and which accepted that, 
like space, time too had pradesa or extension -  distinguished time from other substances on the 
ground that the atoms of time could not be combined.88 Time could be traced only in one 
direction, while space, and everything else, could be read in both. However, with the emergence 
of historical chronology as a space-like container category, independent of events and acts, time 
became a series of autonomous numbers, which could be synoptically viewed from both ends, 
forward and backward. It was in this time, analytically indifferent to the direction of its reading, 
that the past seemed, on principle, knowable and the future, with improved knowledge, 
predictable. It was also in this indifferent, space-like, abstract time that different worlds could be 
re-positioned as non-contemporary entities, their simultaneity replaced by mere spatial 
congruence.
87 Satkari-Chattopadhyay, PFasna-mimams^ Calcutta 2nd ed  ^1-91-6, pp. 4-11.
88 Anindita BalsleVj A  Study of Time in Indian Philosophyj Wiesbaden, 1983, p. 79.
It was this neutralisation of time into a space-like site that permitted Bengali historical 
discourses to position and invoke both the ‘primitive’ anarya and the ‘historical’ arya within the 
same location of the nation. It was not accidental that many of the earliest Bengali 
textualisations of the nation combined history and geography in the same narration. In 1840, 
Surroop Chund Doss offered the comprehensive text Sundesabally or the History of India, as 
regards the Geographical Description of all Principalities,89 And Sourindramohan Thakur’s 
Narrative of Events of History and Geography revealed the mutual authentication performed by 
the study of the chronological past and the study of the always-already present land.90 Even 
purely historical texts emphasised in their advertisements that the ‘study of history [was] entirely 
relative (sapeksha) to the knowledge of geography’; that historical events could not be 
‘memorised’ without the help of latitudes and longitudes marking the place of their occurrence.91 
It was presumed that the historical spirit of the nation could be seen mirrored in its territory. In 
1869, The Mirror o f Bengal described the nation as a rolling fertile plain, whose inhabitants were 
‘pleasant in appearance, intelligent, polite, virtuous and hospitable though lazy, weak and not so 
courageous ... who [could] acquire knowledge faster than any other jati’.92
India is a large land ... a microcosm of the entire world. Treeless, ugly rocky and grassy lands can be seen too in 
the land of the aryas. But if you travel through India you shall mostly see endless plains covered in lush green 
crops, feafytrees full of fruits andftowers and far travelling rivers. Itis-mostly this that yoircarrenvisiori.93'
Thus, the nation was primarily a fertile and bountiful land, enabling people to work less and think
more, though, as Bangadesher Vivaran admitted in 1869, the western parts of Bengal were hilly
and peopled by ‘primitives’ and remained a somewhat ‘inferior’ locale relative to the national
average.94 It was in terms of geography then, which mirrored the history of the nation, that
historical time admitted the presence of the ‘primitive’.95 The ‘primitive’, as we have already
demonstrated, was needed by the nation in order to conceptualise the ‘origin’ of historical-
civilisational time in colonial Bengal, though history itself, by its own self-definition, could not
thematise this internal ‘primitive’ presence. Therefore, geography was conceptualised as an
essential adjunct to the writing of history, because geography, unlike history, could perform
classificatory and aggregative functions across incommensurable social times. Geography texts,
39 Calcutta, 1840, pp. 283-90-.
90 Itihas o Bhugol Ghatita Vrittanta, Calcutta, 2nd ed, 1877.
91 This was one of the more popular school books which ran into many editions and reprints. Ramgati Nyayratna, Outlines of 
the History of India , Hoogly, 3rd ed, 1876, advertisement printed at the beginning of the book.
^Ramkamal Chattopadhyay, Bangadarpan, Calcutta, t869, p. 27.
93 Tarinicharan Chattopadhyay, • Bhugolvivaran-, Krlshnanagar-, 9^ ed, 1862, p. 20.
94 Dinanath.S.en, Dacca, 1869, p. 69,128-29.
95 One can make a long list of texts that count these uncivilised jatis as part of the national geography. One school text defines 
the scope of its geography as ‘the land where Bengalis reside is called Bengal’ and then goes on to list jatis like the Santals, 
Shyarna Charan Chattopadhyay, Bhugolanknra] Dacca, 2DtLed., t862, pp. 7-8. Anotherextremely poputarschoot textthatran 
into almost twenty editions, gives an elaborate description of the dark, long-haired, beardless Santals, who are carefully
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written as tables of administrative districts, peoples, languages, religions and resources, were 
therefore common in colonial Bengal and provided the differentiated ground, upon which a 
unitary historical time could be constructed.96
That geography assumed the historical task of thematising the complex concept of 
‘civilisation’ was partly the result of colonial theories of environmental determinism. H. T. 
Buckle’s History of Civilisation in Engand influenced many Bengali historical works of the 
nineteenth-century, including R. C. Dutt’s A History of Civilisation in Ancient India, which sought 
to displace the blame of India’s decline from historical causes to the limiting conditions of nature 
and climate.97 Harimohan Mukhopadhyay’s Bhuvrittanta, i.e. Natural, Practical and Mathematical 
Accounts of the Geography of the World classified nations along temporal stages. The text 
demonstrated that while the banya or wild forest-people often failed to reproduce themselves, 
violently destroying each other and remaining imprisoned in immediate acts of survival, the fully 
civilised nations like England and America exhibited complete knowledge and complete 
freedom. ‘Almost-civilised’ nations like India also demonstrated knowledge and trade, but 
confined them amongst a few. This text eulogised geographical enterprise and narrated stories 
of Western voyages of ‘discovery’, where the civilised faced challenges and even death at the 
hands of ‘wild’ people.98 Such texts seem to have been popular as school-books, and this 
particular ‘comprehensive’ geography published in 1868 had more than ten editions by 1876. It 
is important to remember, however, that these Bengali texts of geography cannot be absolutely 
reduced to a Bucklean sensibility. In colonial discourse, the identity between the hierarchy of 
lands and the hierarchy of times produced history and geography/ethnology as two separate 
disciplines which flourished, literally, in two distinct spatial sites. History became the 
consciousness of the self, grounded in Europe and ethnology became the consciousness of the 
Other, in evidence in the rest of the world. While it can be shown that history and ethnology 
drew legitimacy and evidence from each other, their formal bifurcation permitted an apparent 
export of the non-present times of the ‘primitive’ and the ‘archaic’ to other lands, thus keeping 
the time of the historical subject in Europe pure and uncontaminated. The discourse of the 
colonised, however, remained sharply conscious of the impossibility of this purification, it had to 
admit the presence of the ‘primitive’ within the nation itself.
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Middle-class historical consciousness, therefore, continued to be marred in colonial 
Bengal by an irresoluble tension between the sense of the subject-self and the sense of the 
‘primitive’ but proximate Other. Writing a ‘history of civilisation’, Srikrishna Das admitted; ‘travel 
to the interior villages of Bengal, and you will see that the adim kal is present again’.99 In the 
context of this tension, the idea of progress appeared as much as a sense of developmental time 
as a project of spatial traversing, which sought to trace, integrate and overdetermine temporal 
differences by historical identity. Rather than permitting progress to fully extinguish the past and 
the ‘primitive’ as in the 'New World’ of the Americas, progress in Bengal appeared as a lengthy 
journey, which began with encountering the ‘primordial’ anarya and ended with encountering the 
English trader. The nation thus manifested, in its interiority, the full journey of progress -  
displaying all the stages of world-history, from the most ‘primitive’ to the most ‘modern’. 
Progress became crucial as that sensibility of passage and excursion which could signify both a 
territorial and a temporal imperative. The next chapter discusses this idea of travel as mode and 
metaphor of tracing the nation. Here it is sufficient to refer to a statement by R. C. Dutt; ‘Just as 
while travelling on a highway one comes upon a milestone periodically to show how far one has 
progressed, after every five or six or eight centuries comes an age of progress to show how far 
human society has travelled’.100 Dutt’s metaphor of milestones does not suggest a sense of 
passing time and vanishing moments, rather it hints at a long path, which even though already 
traversed cannot be erased, a path which remains as a concrete, permanently present trace of 
what would have otherwise been merely memory. In this path of progress, the ‘primitive’ 
continues to survive even in the time of history, and can be sighted and befriended -  as much in 
the time of Ram’s epic progress to the south as in the time of Dutt's railway journeys to 
‘historical’ sites of the north.
Biographies and caste-histories : the subject versus time
Yet, as the nation’s history became symmetrical to the internally differentiated landscape of the 
nation, displaying all the stages of civilisation, the colonised appeared dissipated and lost in an 
uproductive plenitude of local identities, vulnerable to the divide-and-rule tactics of the foreign 
rulers. Pyarichand Mitra, the eminent social satirist, found that only ‘primitive’ latis like the 
Santals displayed an undifferentiated unity, while civilised Indians were always bickering 
amongst themselves.101 The question of unity, which haunted the Bengali middle classes in the
98 Srikfishna Das, Sabhyatar Itihasl, Calcutta-, 1876, p, 85.
100 R. C. Dutt. ‘Unnatir Jug', Sadhana^ chaitra, 1892.
101 Abhedi, Calcutta, 1892, pp. 1-2.
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nineteenth century, was thus set forth more sharply as a historical question in counterpoise to 
‘primitive’ communities. Bengali historical discourse went to great lengths to prove that though 
‘tribes’ showed great solidarity, they were intrinsically asabhya or unfit for sabhas or regulated 
assemblies. This was because the unity demonstrated by the ‘primitive’ was not a historical 
unity. ‘Primordial’ unity was inert and sterile, unable to harness the passage of time. As nomads, 
'primitives’ failed to grasp the virtues of ‘domesticity’ and cultivation, i.e. they could not 
comprehend the world as products caused by their own labour. And without this consciousness 
of causality, ‘primordial’ unity, even as it created an immediate solidarity, was incapable of 
anticipating and causing a rational and plausible future.102 To Akshaykumar Datta, historian and 
the one-time editor of Tattovodhini Patrika, ‘primordiality’ was a temporal stage where there was 
as yet no correspondence between human propensities and natural laws. This was a time when 
humankind was still unable to ascertain historical practice through the mutual articulation of 
social causalities and individual rationalities, and therefore still without the right to enjoy the 
world.103 Bhudev Mukhopadhyay said:
[T]he adim times of no nation can be recovered. ... Whichever the nation, if you investigate its history, you will find 
that before the jati which inhabits it currently arrived here, there was another jati occupying the land. If the earlier jati 
has a history, you will see that there was yet another earlier one who was replaced by it. This jati has no history ... 
Butwhatls the proofthenthatth^eyare^th^originarinhabitants'oTthat-ianct?1Qi
In other words, if a nation had a history, it could not have been ‘primordial’. On the other hand, if
there was no history, there was no verifiable proof of either ‘primordiality’ or ‘unity’. The
‘originality’ and ‘unity’ of the ‘primitive’, though evident, was therefore neither historically true nor
historically thematisable. ‘Primitive’ solidarity was therefore redundant in contexts of historicity.
Like infancy, beyond the grasp of memory and recall, ‘primordiality’ could only be retold by a
transcendental, parental subject -  by the historical author who, to acquire historical
consciousness, would have already renounced the unity of the ‘primordial’.105
In contrast to the unproductive and inanimate unity of the ‘primordial’, was the unity of 
the historical subject, a conceptual unity which rested beyond the vicissitudes of time and 
politics. This ideal, historical unity demonstrated the coherence of an individual biography, as 
each historically self-conscious individual emerged as a metonymn of the nation’s destiny as a 
whole. It was not incidental therefore, that nineteenth-century Bengal saw the publication of 
innumerable ‘exemplary and instructive biographies’.106 Though sometimes these were 
biographies of the famous and the exceptional, most biographies consciously thematised
102 ‘Sabhyatar itihasl Aryadarshan, jaistha-, 1874, ppr 93-94.
103 Babya Vastur Sange Manav Prakitir. Camhandha_Vichar, Calcutta^ S&1 ,pp. 14-26.
104 Bhudev Mukhopadhyay, Puravrittasar, Hugli, 1867, p. 15.
]0S Jagater Balya Itihas: an adaptation of Edward Claude's Childhood of the World. Calcutta, 1875, p. 67.
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53
character-traits which were not extraordinary, i.e. which were amenable to being popularised and 
normalised as common or national virtues. Thus, Napoleon Bonaparte and Catherine the Great 
were characterised less by royalty than by determination and humanism. Napoleon 
demonstrated the possibility of rising to power from an obscure and poverty-stricken past, and 
Catherine of Russia displayed her devotion to her father and husband.107 In this direction, 
numerous Bengali civil servants, landlords and teachers had their biographies published, often in 
their own lifetime and often at their own initiative. Even obituaries were published and circulated 
as ‘instructive’ biographies.108 The best instance of this conflation of national history and 
individual biography was the text Ramtanu Lahiri and Contemporary Bengali Society, which 
remains till today one of the most ‘authentic’ sources on colonial Bengal for historians. The 
biographer, Sibnath Shastri, accepted that Ramtanu Lahiri was not as famous as some of his 
own friends, and that it was precisely because of his ‘ordinariness’ that he was the best historical 
representation of the exemplary nature of the nineteenth-century Bengali context.109
A biography published by the Self-Improvement Sabha of Andul, a small Bengali town, 
argued in 1893 that educationists and professionals of nineteenth-century Bengal were 
kshanajanmas or born at the right moment. Like the ancient Indian visionaries Valmiki and 
Agastya, these modern Bengalis envisioned and embodied the unfolding of history in their very 
lifetime. The founder of the English-medium school in Andul was an unknown individual, yet 
being a kshanajanma, his personal charities and griefs represented the benevolence and the 
suffering of the nation as a whole.110 An 1864 school-text argued that biographies and histories 
were ‘writings’ of the same mode, differing only in scale.111 An 1870 school-text could not have 
been clearer about the metonymic relation of the individual lifetime to the nation’s history :
The individual is like the face of the jati. Therefore in the progress of the embodied individual is the progress of the
ja ti.... Doubtless, changes have occurred in collectivities through rules and legislations, but real progress is within
the beings of the people of the regime.112
Unlike ‘primitive’ solidarity, which left no space for individual and future-oriented unnati or 
improvement, historical unity was based on the improvement of the individual. Each individual 
was the mirror of the nation, and each individual lent his personal virtues to the totality. The 
historical characteristics of a nation could therefore be formulated in terms of human vices and
107 Ibid.; also see, Bwarakanath- Bhattacharyay Story- o£ Gathering Empress of Russia-, Calcutta, I860.
108 See for instance the collection of obituaries by Girishchandra Deb, CalcuttaH1370.
109 Sibnath Sastri, Ramtanu Lahiri o Tatkalin Bangasamaj, Calcutta, 1903.
ntrAvinashchandra Chakravarty, Yogendra Jivani, Calcutta, 1893, introduction.
11+ Gopafchancfra Banerjee, SikshapranafT, Calcutta, T864; p. 258.
112 Somnath Mukhopadhyay, Sikshapadhati, Dacca; 1870, p. 33.
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virtues -  self-sufficiency, hard work and character could mark a nation as much as it could 
constitute an individual.113
If history was the biography of the nation, its subject-author appeared singular and self- 
contained, as if held within the same body. This was the unity of the soul or spirit, which 
remained unchanged and undistorted through time, through deaths, declines and even progress. 
It was this extra-temporality, rather than ‘primordiality’, which produced historical unity. As 
Purnachandra Basu wrote, it was only limited knowledge which made time appear as succession 
and God appear as trikalagnya, the knower of past-present-future. With perfect knowledge, 
however, reality is demystified, the illusion of time disappears, and prophecy and prediction 
become redundant as everyday, practical necessities. The subject-author of history must 
therefore strive, in principle, towards this completion of knowledge, which shows up the past and 
the future as equally present and continuous to being.114 This timelessness of the subject-author 
could be variously named -  it could be the Upanishad’s self-evident and formless parambrahma, 
it could be the scientist’s First Cause, or it could well be the Positivist’s Ultimate Reality.115 
Rakhaldas Banerjee, the historian and the archaeologist who excavated the Indus Valley 
civilisation, formulated the historical author-subject as analogous to a ‘rock’. This rock, created 
at the very instant of the creation of the world, displayed changes in form -  as it was excavated 
from the earth, carried to the city, carved into a temple and so forth. Yet it remained always- 
already present as the timeless witness of history, who proclaimed, ‘I have no idea of Time’. It 
was by virtue of this unbreachable presence before and beyond time, that the rock could 
envision the inauguration of history itself: ‘it was by way of the war of the dark primitive and the 
fair arya that I first witnessed the light of fire’.116
This ‘eternal’ or the sanatan subjectivity remained uncontaminated by the time wherein 
conflict and colonialism occurred. The 1911 text called Sanatani, favourably reviewed in various 
Bengali magazines including the Aryavarta, stated that it was an error to assume that change 
was the essence of history. Though movement was universal, it was the axis of motion, the 
identity of the subject, which in the last instance^ could make sense out of random and endless 
transformations. The axis of Indian history was karma, or indifference to the fruits of one’s own 
labour. And this indifference, around which time surged, neutralised the contradictions through 
which history unfolded. Sanatani admitted that the Indian past was indeed a history of conflict
113 Prasad Das-Goswami AmaderSamaf, Srirampur, 1895, p. 4.
114 ‘Adrishtabad’, Aryadarshan, 1:5, W?adra, 1874,_pp. 201-05.
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between the ‘primitives’ and the ‘civilised’, yet the spirit of the nation, once grasped as extra­
temporal, could elevate the subject to a state of non-conflictual ‘permanence’:
[l]n this prachin society, when all around asur; dasyu and monsters prevented the principle of the household, life 
was indeed conflict; afterwards when the influence of rakshashas was strong, life was a struggle too. Even in the 
youth of society, when external enemies were almost all annihilated, terrible conflicts existed amongst ourselves. 
But now we have great peace in India ... In place of the horse-sacrificing world of conquest we have arrived at the 
household stage of the un-indebted, domesticated family man, why should our life be conflictual?117
This ability of the nation to transcend time itself was centred in the phenomenon of caste.
Sanatani, a clearly Brahmanical text, claimed that caste was less a mark of hierarchy than a sign
of temporal resolution. Since caste fixed the position and potential of each Hindu at the very
moment of his/her birth, it freed the individual from the anxiety of continuous temporal
calculations and predictions. In the colonial context of chaotic change, it was caste which
stabilised time and the aporetic everyday, and permitted the Hindu to overdetermine temporal
contradictions by an internalised sense of a unified society, a society which prophesied the future
of each individual biography, right at the moment of birth and origin.118 If, as in the Brahmanical
imaginary, the four original castes or varnas were actually parts of the divine body of Brahma,
stratified Hindu society could simulate a oneness of body and the subject of history could appear
as singular and embodied, like the subject of biography.
Caste therefore emerged as a particularly useful category of temporal resolution in 
Bengali discourse. As Susan Bayly shows, in colonial discourse, caste was constructed less as a 
social or religious or Hindu system of hierarchy than as an indicator of races and ethnic shades 
constituting the Indian population.119 The Bengali middle-classes utilised this colonial- 
ethnological use of caste as a category, in order to resolve the contradictory temporalities of the 
‘primitive’ and the ‘historical’, which tended to split the nation asunder. Caste performed as a 
double-edged concept. When required, it could separate and counterpoise the ‘primitive’ to the 
‘civilised’. It could also make them appear, when necessary, as part of the same synchronic 
structure, in order to prevent the nation from becoming temporally schizophrenic. Thus, the 
Kayasthpurana distinguished the ‘aborigines’ from the sudras. Sudras were originally Aryans, 
who contingently lost their status owing to fallen samskara-s or social habits. The ‘aborigines’ on 
the other hand were always opposed to the Aryans as a ‘race’, with no sense of practical 
specialisation or moral discrimination, who never cared about what what work they did, where 
they lived and what they ate. ‘Aborigines’, therefore, could never be expected to progress 
through improved and discretionary samskara and were ossified in time and eternally outside
117 Akshay ChandraSarkar, Sanatani, Calcutta, t911-, pp.52-5^ "135-36.
118 Ibid., p. 80.
119 'Caste and “Race” in the Colonial Ethnography of India’, in The Concept of Race in South Asia, ed. Peter Robb, Delhi, 
1995.
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history.120 Bankimchandra on the other hand, went to great lengths to develop the concept of 
Aryanisation, to prove that anaryas could be made to adopt not only the language but even the 
religious samskara-s of the aryas, though it remained evident by their appearance that they were 
originally ‘primitives’. He pointed out that the jungii coolies who were originally Santals were now 
all Hindus. Even though Muslims and Christians could not be reproduced as Hindus, because 
they had already assumed another historical trajectory, the non-yet-historical ‘primitives’ 
remained amenable to historicisation through Hinduisation.121 And since the caste-system 
allowed simultaneous inclusion and segregation, the historical could escape excessive proximity 
to the ‘primitives’ and yet admit them into the unified nation.
Yet, since the very intent of the arya-anarya counterpoise was temporal, spatial and 
structural strategies of national integration were bound to remain inadequate. As the Aryan and 
the non-Aryan were reproduced in colonial Bengal as the ‘historical’ and the ‘primitive’, their non­
contemporaneity subverted all discursive attempts at narrating the arya and the arya as either 
structurally congruous (caste) or spatially adjacent (geography). It is significant therefore, that 
some nineteenth-century caste-histories translated the arya-anarya counterpoise in terms of 
political economy, exposing the colonial/capitalist logic underlying the configuration of castes in 
terms of temporalities of social practice. An 1875 Bengali text, thus, etymologically traced the 
noun arya to the Sanskrit root-verb ri, indicating the practical ‘competence to acquire wealth’. In 
this paradigm, it were the agriculturist and the trader who were the ‘original’ Aryans. The Aryan 
was special, neither because he was a cerebral brahman, nor because he was a valiant 
kshatriya -  but because he had the foresight to produce surplus wealth. The Aryan, ‘one who 
made profits’, thus implied a progressive and enterprising person who had the foresight to think 
of accumulation for the future.
Agricultural production needs a sophistication and cerebrality from which trade evolves.... It is through agriculture 
that beast-like propensities have been replaced by divine tendencies in humans. If the aryas had not opened the 
door of progress called cultivation, all men in this world would have spent their lives in forests infested with deadly 
animals, wearing nothing except arms,123
By this logic, not only ‘tribes’ like the Santals but even low-castes like Dorns and Hadis,
otherwise accepted as Hindus, appeared as ‘primitive’ and therefore as superfluous to the nation,
because of their inability to produce surplus.124
120 Sasibhusan Nandi, Kayastbpurana IL, Bhabanipur, pp. 1-36-37.
121 Bankimchandra, 'Bangalir Utpatti: AryikaranV Bangadarshan, chaitra, 1880
122 Bankimchandra, ‘Bangalir Utpatti: Anarya Bangali Jati’, Bangadarshan, baisakh^QQI.
^Shyam lal Sen Munshi, Jatitattva Viveka, Barisal, 1875, pp. 19-20.
124~lbid., p. 58:
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The future-perfect: dream-histories and the ‘primitive’
As the ‘primitive’ and the ‘historical’ became irrevocably non-contemporaneous, antagonistic not 
only in cultural but also in political economic terms, Bengali historical discourse dreamed of an 
alternate temporal plane where identity could be imagined. It was this imperative which gave 
rise in colonial Bengal to the genre called ‘dream-histories’. For it was only in dream-time, that 
the subject could both be timeless and yet be able to harness the eminently temporal logic of 
practically hastening a better future. Dream-time emerged as the site wherein the nation -  
marked not only by an intrinsic temporal lag but also by the internally present ‘primitive’ -  could 
finally capture its perpetually deferred identity. The first issue of Aryadarshan, edited by 
Jogendranath Bandopadhyay as a journal of recall and commemoration of the national past, 
introduced itself through a poem about a historical dream:
Aryal Oh blind youth, you dream in your nights steep
Go back to sleep so you can hear again
That honeyed nam e...
If it is not a dream -  the name that sank in the depths of time,
‘History1! Oh disbelief, history is not a sea of guesses!
Does your history saythis, this very one is the land of Aryasl
Could this be true?
These ‘dream histories’ sought to utter all that disciplined histories could not. They recalled the 
past, not as it really was, but as that which could or ought to have been. Such ‘dream histories’ 
had nothing to do with sleep or with the unconscious -  such dreams were more often than not 
provoked by alert and wakeful contemplation of empirical history. The dreams were clearly 
remembered afterwards, and generalised through systematic publication. Dreaming was a mode 
of re-capturing not only what was forgotten in wakefulness, but what was unrepresentable in the 
form of chronological succession. Thus Rajnarayan Basu, while contemplating the contemporary 
history of Bengal with its modern amenities but with its necessary unfreedom, claimed to have 
dreamt up a bright and clear vision of the Pala regime of Bengal. Circumventing the present, 
these memories directly led to the ‘dream future’ -  when Bengal was completely free, and had 
overtaken England in progress. The people of England had begun imitating the Bengalis, 
wearing the dhuti despite the chill in the air. Most had accepted Hinduism, many from fear that 
they might otherwise be mocked as pagan and rustic. In place of economic classes, English 
society was now stratified in terms of religion and knowledge, and the king of Bengal had
125 ‘Abataranika-’, Aryadarshan, k 1, halsakh, TS74.
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consecrated English philosophers as white-island Brahmans.126 Though this dream-reality was 
never present, except as a potential, and therefore was unrepresentable, it was nevertheless a 
real though abandoned dimension of the past. The dream could therefore be legitimately 
enunciated as history.
These seemingly ‘absurd’ possibilities, recorded as rare visions of enlightenment, were 
no less ‘actual’ than the empirical. Dreams possessed an ethical imperative, for dreams did not 
lie, at least they could not lie in the way that consciously fabricated narratives, including 
histories, could. Dreamt in the isolation of sleep or of lonely contemplation, these dreams could 
be dreamt without fear and could be written by anybody and everybody who dared to transgress 
the given limits of the present. Thus, however impossible it might seem that a Bengali woman 
could generate high philosophy, such possibilities became available to her in her dreams. The 
authenticity of what she wrote lay not so much in the legitimacy of her authorship, as in the 
intrinsic truth and honesty of dreams.127 It was only in the form of dreams that one could write 
about the bloodless war by Bengalis who, tired of their clerical routine, gathered bamboos from 
the Bengal and Assam forests, made them into spray-tubes and scattering chilli-water, defeated 
the entire colonial army.128 The ‘truth’ of dreams was thus harnessed against the ‘truth’ of facts. 
In the colonial present, where truth was submerged in the conflict of many opinions, in the dazzle 
of novelty and above all in the limiting experience of unfreedom, truth could only be activated by 
a release of ‘imagination’ from the prison of representation and mimesis, i.e. from the prison of 
reality. (Significantly this formulation is quite the opposite of contemporary historiographical 
essays, which argued that Indian authors failed to write history because they suffered from an 
excess of poetic and mythical imagination.) Dwijendranath Thakur, in the early twentieth 
century, wrote how imagination had been suppressed by the over-use of irony in nineteenth- 
century historical thought. So he withdrew into dreams to find the true path that ran precariously 
through antagonisms and contradictions: ‘on both sides the infamous knots of discord / On the 
left the high walls of time, on the right time’s deep abyss’.129 Pramathanath Raychoudhury too 
sought to banish ‘the clever, satirical ones ... the wrinkled in mind, the pauper at heart’, who 
disowned the truth of dreams.130 In place of the discontinuous narrative of irony, historians thus 
sought out the evocative diction of dreams.
126 Rajnarayan Basu, ‘Ascharya Svapna-’, Vlvidha-Prabandha-/, Calcutta, "1882, pp. 94t97.
127 Bhubanmohini Devi, Svaprtadarshane Avignyan Kavya^Calcutta, 1877.
128 Ramdas Sharma, Bharat Uddhar, Calcutta, 1878.
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In this same period, numerous Bengali texts recorded popular beliefs about dreams and 
about ways of making dreams come true. These expressed popular codes and usages, which to 
some extent are even today part of the Bengali common-sense. If dream-histories are read in 
association with these texts, it seems possible that in nineteenth-century Bengali perception, 
dreams were neither a sub-conscious phenomenon nor a matter of simple wish-fulfilment. Some 
texts like Svapnatattva, for instance, advised dreaming as a serious mode of introspection, 
because an intense enough dream illuminated truth better than any other cerebral act. One must 
learn the self-control and power to will dreams.131 And one must be careful about articulating 
dreams. Revealing good dreams to a lowly or danger-stricken man caused the loss of dreams, 
to an enemy caused fear, to a fool caused quarrels, and to a seductive woman caused losses. 
The later in the night, the deeper in sleep, the dream, the more probable its actualisation.132 To 
realise dreams, one must never fall asleep again after dreaming, one must act on one’s happy 
dreams immediately.133 An 1875 text Svapnadarshan argued that deeper truths emerge in the 
night, as the empirical gets ‘wiped out of visibility’.134 And an 1867 text Chamatkar 
Svapnadarshan listed advice about health, marriage and employment, and dreamed of the moral 
lesson of unity: ‘while things remain discrete, they can never generate force; the moment 
elements are united, identities are constituted and great deeds accomplished.’135
Dreaming was thus the practice of willing a perfect future onto an imperfect present. 
And it was in dreaming that history achieved what it never could within the limits of ironic self- 
knowledge. It achieved unity. It is here that we must refer to the famous text by Bhudev 
Mukhopadhyay called the History of India as Received in Dreams. One day, as Bhudev was 
reading a book on the battle of Panipat, suddenly his throat became dry and his hair stood on its 
end, he could no longer bear to read about the historical defeats of India. He fell into a deep 
sleep, dreaming what would have happened if the battle had ended differently. When he woke, 
there were sheaves of paper on his bedside, on them was written the dream-history of India. 
Just as the epics Ramayana and Mahabharata had marked her ascendent past, the epic Revival 
marked this dream-future of India. This was the time of a unified world and true laissez faire. 
India had become the greatest merchant-nation of the world and had legislated that no trader 
could henceforth engage in imperialism. India, despite her global-mercantile power, claimed no 
colonies, except- and this is crucial for our purposes -  in the ‘primitive’ islands of Andaman and 
south-east Asia. Bhudev’s dream-world was thus ordered into the powerful and benevolent free-
131 Krisbrtanda Svamr, Svapnatattva, Benara^tai4rppv4-11.
132 Devendra Nath Chatterjee ed., Svapnaphal Katba/?,. Calcutta J 908, pp. 157-59.
133 Ibid., p. 19.
m Tarini Prasad Sen, Goalpara, 1875.
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trading nation on the one hand, and the ‘primitive’ on the other. Through the voice of an 
imaginary American missionary, Bhudev’s dream verbalised this desired future, when ‘the 
uncivilised peoples on the frontiers of India [were] gradually made peaceful, self-sacrificing and 
humble by Brahmans who had agreed to settle in forests’.136 In a long section describing this 
process of converting and containing the anarya, Bhudev described how Brahmans and 
landlords taught ‘primitives’ the virtues of agriculture, modern medicine, mutual help, temporal 
foresight and restraint of the senses. The text dreamt of these ‘uncivilised’, ‘violent’ people 
begging to be given higher caste-status. But to acquire caste one needed more than one lifetime 
of labour -  the first ‘sanskritisation’ caused the ‘primitive’ only to become koch, the second made 
them kalita, a third made them satsudra. Tribes’ could not become Brahmans in one life, even 
rarely in the next, but in the dream future, the ‘primitives’ disciplined themselves in the hope of
A 0 7
eventually being rewarded with the privilege.
Bhudev’s dream-history, thus, articulated the ultimate desire of the historical subject -  
the desire to undo the temporal contradiction between the historical and the ‘primitive’, the 
foundational contradiction which inaugurated the nation itself. Empirically, the nation was 
contaminated by the presence of the apparently sensuous and a-temporal ‘tribes’. Historically, 
the nation was vulnerable and fragmented. In dream-time, however, the impossible was 
imminent -  as India became the free and ascendent trader-nation and the 'primitives’ became 
Hindu. Bhudev’s dream, therefore, made an advantage out of the dark of the night, when 
dreams could play hide-and-seek with the legislative control of bureaucratic chakuri and the 
juridical control of enlightened, positivist history. At dawn, dream-history says to Bhudev: ‘the 
dark of the night is almost gone, the eastern sky lightens. I must leave this earth for now’. 
Dream-history cannot occupy the same time as the evident and the illuminated. But dream- 
history returns over and over again:
With the light of the sun and the moon, Kafpurush, Time, etches history on the surface of the earth, Smriti, the 
goddess of memory tries to recite parts of this history.
I am her companion in the play of memories. When I feel that my friend is suffering in her attempt to 
pronounce all that Time writes, I make her forget Time's lessons. I cannot do it all the time. In the dreamy night, 
however, I succeed. My name is hope.138
The kalpurush who inscribes history on the empirical world is the inexorable, male, chronological 
time -  perhaps truthful, but cruel and fatal. Smriti or memory is feminine, who hurts to recall the
136 Bhudev-Mukhopadhyay, Svapnalabhda Bharatvafsher Itiha&r Hugli, 1895; 59.
137 Ibid., p. 61.
138 Ibid., p. 62.
61
deaths and declines that Time engenders. She must therefore reign in dream-time. With help 
from the other woman, hope, she utters the unprecedented and incredible words, denied by the 
time of history. These words are then recalled in wakefulness and inform collective practice, 
which history seeks to disable. At the very moment of its writing then, Bhudev had to deny 
history itself for the sake of the future and the dream, and for the sake of readmitting the 




Tracing the Nation: travel, migration and the conduct of time
The past leaves its traces; time has its own script. Yet this space 
is always, now and formerly, a present space, given as an 
immediate whole, complete with its associations and connections 
in their actuality.
-  Henri Lefebvre1
The last chapter demonstrated the critical presence of the ‘primitive’ in nineteenth-century Bengali 
historical imagination. In colonial Bengal, the figure of the adim or the ’primordial’ was repeatedly 
invoked -  as a conceptual counterpoise to the nation’s historicity, as an explanation for the nation’s 
defeat and disunity, as a mark of difference to the Darwinian West and as a proof of the immense 
antiquity of the India’s historical origin. Not only in the imagination of history, the ‘primitives’ seemed 
indispensable also in terms of the productivity and prosperity of the nation. The Santals, unlike 
‘civilised’ Indians, willingly cleared forests, reclaimed wastes and made large plantations, like those for 
tea and indigo, possible. After all, it was the Santals who re-settled the ‘wilderness’ that Bengal had 
become, after the great famine of 1770.2 As S. C. Dutt said, ‘[t]he Santal is absolutely the best 
specimen of the wild tribes of India ... a good hunter, a good herdsman, and a good agriculturist; self- 
dependent in everything and never idle, and necessarily almost never in distress.’3 If however the 
’primitive’ was definitional^ antagonistic to the time of the ‘historical’, how could s/he and her/his 
labour be harnessed to the nation, without compromising the nation’s modernity? To circumvent this 
temporal paradox, of needing to simultaneously invite yet exile the ‘primordial’, Bengali historical 
discourse sought to harness the ‘primitive’ in the mode of spatial gathering. This spatial strategy, 
distinct from, yet necessarily attached to, the historical negotiation of time, consisted of two seemingly 
unconnected processes. One was the process by which travel became a central motif in nineteenth 
century Bengali discourse, as a mode of tracing and integrating the variegated land- and social-scape 
of the nation. Since the 1860s, the railways had irrevocably changed Bengali imagination of space 
and time. And following the capitalist logic of ‘discovery’ of ‘primitive’ lands, the Bengali middle 
classes sought to traverse and classify non-contemporary civilisational stages as locations internal to 
the space of the nation. Distinct from but simultaneous to this process, was the colonial process of re­
1 The-Production of Space, Oxford, 1994, p. 37.
2 Morning Chronicle, 1792, quoted in W . W. Hunter, The Annals of Rural Bengal, Calcutta, 1868, p. 219.
3 The Wild Tribes of India, reprint, New Delhi, 1984, p. 68. This was written sometime between 1875 and 1885.
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producing ‘primitives’ themselves as a migrating labour-force. Through enforced migration and 
transportation, ‘tribes’ like the Santals were constituted as pure body-commodities, shorn of all social 
temporalities except the time of circulation. Once the ‘tribes’ thus became purely a-temporal and a- 
social bodies, displaced from their spatial location and past collectivity, they no longer seemed to 
represent a potent counter-historical temporality. Their presence no longer threatened to contaminate, 
by another time and another practice, the continuous time of historical chronology.
Railways, time and money: the travel-imperative in colonial Bengal
In 1881, Rajrajendra Chandra concluded that, to prevent the ridiculous anachronism of ‘precocious 
progress’, the Bengali must first learn to travel the nation and only afterwards, dare to conceptualise 
knowledge.4 Tarinicharan Chattopadhyay, whose geography schoolbook ran into more than twenty 
editions, emotively narrated the struggles of Columbus against his contemporary Portuguese 
conservatives5 And against Bengali orthodoxies, which forbade the crossing of the seas, 
Anandachandra Mitra argued that digdarshan, the envisioning of horizons and directions, ‘released 
civilisation from its prison and enabled epochal changes in the span of a single year’ 6 In other words, 
the self-consciously ‘progressive’ Bengali argued that travel could effect rapid temporal changes. S. 
N. Majumdar-Sastri, in his introduction to A. G. Cunningham’s Ancient Geography of India (1871) 
categorically asserted that a lack of temporal initiative could very well be compensated by travel 
initiatives. Therefore, even though ancient Indians lacked historical sensibility, their remarkable and 
accurate geographical wisdom functioned to generate civilisation just as a historical consciousness 
would have.7 Akshay Kumar Datta acquired a historian’s status by writing the Sea Voyage and 
Commerce of the Ancient Hindus. He argued that since ancient Hindus were known to be prosperous 
and civilised, they must have travelled great distances for conquest and commerce. It was logical to 
conclude that they too must have been great voyagers8
This newly realised travel-imperative in Bengal must be distinguished from earlier travel 
modes. Rajnarayan Basu recalled how twenty years ago, travelling was a risky and daring business -  
Bengalis did not have even the concept of a ’bag’ in which to carry one’s belongings.9 In fact, travel 
forced one to leave all attachments behind. In those days, travelling was as much a form of 
introspection as of outward movement -  where hardship, tedium and the intense experience of the
4 Akal Unnati, Calcutta, 1881.
5 Bhugolvrittanta, 9th ed., Krishnanagar, 1862, pp. 216-17.
6 Prachin Bharat o Adhunik Europer Sabhyatar Bhinna Murti, Mymensingh, 1876, p. 245. This was the same author who wrote 
a text of'political science’ called Vyavahar Darshan in 1878. In this, he contrasted ‘primitive’ practice, generated by unthinking 
and a-social desires, to scientific social practice. For a discussion of this text, see Partha Chatterjee, ‘A Modern Science of 
Politics for the Colonised’, in Texts of Power, ed. Partha Chatterjee, Calcutta, 1996.
7 S.N. Majumdar-Sastri ed., Ancient Geography of India, Calcutta, 1924, pp. xxxviii-xxxix.
Calcutta, 1901, p. 21.
9 ‘Atmacharit’, 1890, in Nirbachita Rachana Samgraha, Calcutta, 1995, p. 24.
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road signified a critical and ruthless self-questioning.10 At its ultimate, journeys of pilgrimage invited 
the excruciating temporality of measuring the road with the full length of the body, lying down flat on 
the face at every step (this is still practised in Bengal and Bihar in the chat festival). After all, a sacred 
destination could not be reached easily. As the colonial traveller noticed, Bengalis, instead of simply 
taking the train, often inflicted unnecessary pains on their bodies.11 Thus, a pre-railway 1844 travel- 
text poetically listed the pains to be borne before one could reach Puri, the land of Jagannath. While 
this account listed numerical distances accurately, it also textualised the pilgrimage site as the sacred 
body of the deity and enunciated yatra or travel as temporal moments in the deity’s auspicious 
routine.12 In contrast to these self-critical journeys which marked the traveller’s body with the pains 
and denials of the road, the new mode of travelling the nation eased the path and turned the 
traveller’s gaze outward. Rajnarayan remembered that only when the Rajmahal forests were cleared 
for the construction of railways, was he, for the first time, able to gaze into the ‘interiors' and to see the 
‘wild dance’ of the ‘primitives’.13 As travel became fast and the time of travel shortened, Bengalis 
published books to help the passing of time on the train, e.g. Railway Companion or Stories to be Told 
During a Railway Journey: Stories about Ghosts and Doctors.™ Travel-time evidently was to be 
passed in distraction. The path in itself held no value unless it led to destinations, which needed to be 
visualised and traced. The Bengali middle-classes interpreted this new travel-experience as a re­
discovered sense of the value of time: ‘railways are an amazing entity on which you can make a 
month’s journey in a day’.15
In nineteenth-century Bengali imagination, senses of fast-travel, time and money directly 
articulated with the idea of historical time. In 1874, a schoolbook explained the nature of time by the 
metaphor of travel: ‘like the train time waits for none'.16 In 1855, The Steam-Engine and the East 
Indian Railway containing the History of India with a Chronological Table of the Indian Princes from 
Judistirdown to the Present, said in so many words:
Even now the people of our country understand only this about railways, that one can travel fast by them. They still
cannot comprehend what that implies. They have not yet known that the accumulated form of time is money.17
This text argued that the villages and towns, linked by the railways, would in time become ‘sites of 
great historical power’, simply by virtue of the fact that people and commodities would be passing 
through them. It was in anticipation of this potential historicity, that he was writing the histories of the 
stations between terminals Howrah and Raniganj.18 Speedy travel thus had become the precondition 
to history. ‘Muslim’ rule was dark because in those days highways were narrow, slushy and infested
10 Thi&conflatlon of external travel andjourneys-of the mind-continued-in nineteenth-century texts of self-criticism like 
Dinanath Gangopadhyay, Vividha-darshan-kavya, Calcutta, 1865; Ramnarayan Biswas, Manobharater Prakriti Darshan, 
Dacca, 1871 etc. These texts however appear more as kavya or poetry than as travel-accounts.
n  Valentine Ball, Jungle Life in India or the Journeys and Journals o f  an fndfan Geologist, London, 1880, p. 245.
12 Bhavanicharan Bandopadhyay, Purushottam Chandrika, Calcutta, 1844, pp. 1-10.
13 ‘Atmacharit’, p. 27.
14 Kashinath Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta, 1863.
15 Akshay Kumar Datta, Advice to Railway Travellers, Calcutta, 1854, p. 3.
18 Harishchandra Bhattacharya, Rachansar, Calcutta, 1874, pp. 21-2.
17 Kalidas Moitre, Srirampur, 1855, p. 182.
18 Ibid., p. 67.
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with ‘murderous dacoits’.19 Historian Akshay Datta argued that nations which lacked fast transport, 
were necessarily inhabited by ‘primitives’, because such people were limited to the use of self-made 
things and incapable of distant trade.20 Even civilised family-life depended on speedy travel, as 
husbands could return home everyday after work only when fast transportation became available21 
To the ordinary Bengali, the train was a sure sign that the evil epoch of kali was here, after all the 
puranas had prophesied that kalki would arrive riding an iron-chariot.22 Train travel thus became a 
central motif of the present. As mentioned in the last chapter, every almanac in the nineteenth 
century listed train-timings and fares along with auspicious moments of the Hindu calendar.
This apparently unmediated link between efficient travel and historical initiative became the 
presupposition underlying numerous travel-texts of late nineteenth-century Bengal. R. C. Dutt, 
historian and historical novelist, spent his time in England, where he had gone to take the civil service 
examination, armed with timetables and guidebooks, travelling to historical sites in Scotland and 
Ireland, and recalling the poetry of Walter Scott. Not surprisingly then, R. C. Duff’s Rambles in India 
During Twenty-Four Years began with the formulation of travel as an almost romantic act of recalling 
and envisioning history:
For a Hindu of Bengal, his first visit to Northern India is an important event in his life. Ail that is heroic in Indian 
history and traditions, all that is brilliant in Sanskrit literature and poetry, all that is sacred in ancient Aryavarta 
connect themselves with Northern India ...Hindu history is recorded on its ancient ruins. A visit to Northern India is 
an education which our schools do not impart, it tells a history which our textbooks do not record.23
Travel thus emerged as commensurate to an act of temporal resolution, which spatially reconfigured 
the historical subject, so as to allow the worthy pasts of others to be attached to the Bengali self. 
Rajput events were not a priori constitutive of the Bengali past, yet by supplementing the text of 
history with the text of travel, Dutt made distant Rajasthan proximal if not identical to the Bengali 
nation. More significant than the gathering of strangers, was the spatial gathering of non­
contemporary times. Ancient Aryavarta was temporally past, yet this past had a permanent presence 
in the form of inscriptions and monuments on land. Travel thus was a mode of gathering and 
integrating the spatial traces of past and ‘primitive’ times.
To connect Calcutta to the north-lndian historical sites of Allahabad, Delhi and Agra, the East 
India Railways had to cut through the ‘tribal’ belt of Rajmahal forests, as if the ‘primitive’ interiors of 
the nation spatially obstructed and temporally postponed the Bengali middle classes’ access to the 
northern civilisational site of Aryavarta. Travelling on the railways, Pyarichand Mitra, the eminent 
social satirist, therefore, could stage an imaginary dialogue with the ‘primitive’ Santal, who appeared 
on the way to the north. The Santal demonstrated to Mitra an enviable ‘primordial’ unity and 
embodied the virtues of being truthful, neighborly, god-fearing and content with the fruits of one’s own
19 Ibid., p. 61.
20 Akshay Datta, Advice, pp. 1-2.
21 Srimunshi Azimuddin, Ki Majar Kaler Gadi, Calcutta, 1863.
22 Kalidas Mukhopadhyay, KatirNaba Rang, Calcutta, 1876, p. 21,
23 Calcutta, 1895, p. 1.
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labour.24 Mitra and his co-passengers were provoked into a debate about atheism by this encounter 
with the Santal. Mitra concluded that since no ‘aborigine1 was ever an atheist, disbelief in god must 
be an ‘unnatural’ condition brought about by colonial modernity.25 Ensconced in the train- 
compartment, literally compartmentalised within the time and the symbol of modernity and speeding 
across the interiors, the Bengali thus literally discovered and textualised the ‘primitive1 into the nation. 
While the Bengali bhadrolok began using places like Madhupur, Jasidih, and Deoghar in the Santal 
Parganas as holiday retreats, away from the tiring work-regime of the city, the possibility of speedy 
travel allowed the Calcuttans to maintain a tourist status in Rajmahal. With the railways always 
accessible, the Calcuttan no longer needed to struggle through and participate in the materiality of the 
‘primordial1 social-scape, nor was his historicity contaminated by long-term residence in ‘primitive’ 
surroundings. Rajnarayan Basu’s Deoghar diary thus proceeds without any reference to Santals, 
except one description of a Santal dance staged by a local Bengali on occasion of his son’s first rice- 
eating or annaprasan ceremony.26 This diary records Basu’s contemplation of the ‘wilderness’ which 
‘lit up thoughts to the Eternal’, his criticisms of Darwin, and his lecture in the local school about long­
distance voyages and ‘colonisations’ by ancient Hindus.27 Thus, as Rajnarayan experienced spatial 
proximity to the industrious and ‘enchanting’ Santals 28 his thematisation of history and time continued 
uninterrupted. What could have been a temporal confrontation between Basu’s historiography and 
the Santal’s presence in Deoghar was eased by its textualisation as a travelling and passing 
encounter.
Not only self-conscious intellectuals like Rajnarayan Basu, R. C. Dutt and Pyarichand Mitra; 
ordinary Bengalis too articulated travel as envisioning the nation’s history. Kedarnath Das, an 
employee of Azamgarh zamindari, marvelled at the speed of the railways and at his first sighting of 
the ‘aborigine’: ‘the image of the asura in our durga-puja is of the same colour as the Santals of 
Birbhum and Rajmahal’. To the author, these ’dark as ink-in-oil’ people were those whom Ram had 
banished to the forests and who, being deprived of the comforts of civilisation, remained, unlike the 
lazy and effeminate Bengalis, hard working and brave29 A similar sense of surprised familiarity was 
expressed by a group of school-boys who had travelled to Sahibganj, a Santal and Paharia locality, 
where the boys found that ‘down-country trees grow just the same, ...people are not so 
uncivilised,...[though] the women do not wear a long length of cloth like ours'.30 Travel thus seemed 
to function as a historical act, by transforming spatial proximity into a simulation of temporal 
contemporaneity. This was a contemporaneity which the historical imagination could not accept as 
internal to time itself, because historiography had to construct an uninterrupted succession between 
the Brahmanical past and the modern present, disavowing all other social and practical times which 
contested the linearity of this enforced genealogy.
24 Abhedl, 2nd ed., Calcutta, 1892, pp. 1-2.
25 Pyarichand Mitra, Jatkinchit, 2nd ed., Calcutta, 1892, p. 1.
26 ‘Devgfihe Dainandin Lipi*, 1879, \rt Ntrbaehita Rachana, p. 193.
27 Ibid., pp. 175-85.
28 Ibid., p. 193.
29 Bharatvarsher Pratichi Digvihar, Baharampur, 1872, pp. 11-12.
38 Bhramanvrittanta, the Travels from Chinsurah to Monghyrby Students of Hoogly Normal School, Hugli, 1878, p. 9.
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Colonial transport: the penetration of ‘interiors’
Needless to say, this Bengali travel-imperative drew its competence from the logic of colonial 
‘penetration’ of interiors. The first colonial tracts on the Rajmahal hills, where Santals and Paharias 
lived, were military accounts, written by officials who literally fought to enter the dense and ‘primordial’ 
forests of Damin-I-Koh 31 Prior to colonial penetration, this space was neither transparent, nor 
continuous, nor always-already present to the gaze32 As the colonial surveyor said, it was no 
accident that most Bengalis believed Rajmahal to be unpeopled -  for, on the surface, all that could be 
seen were uninteresting, barren hill-sides. Only when the valleys and the forests were opened up, 
could the ‘primitive’ Santals and Paharias be seen and registered. 33 In colonial discourse, these 
closed and hidden ‘primitive’ spaces were identical to lost and forgotten times. With modern tools, 
techniques and transport, the colonial surveyor and the geologist seemed to probe and unravel layers 
of both land and temporality. It must be remembered that in colonial-modernity, time -  whether as 
money and number or as geological and evolutionary traces -  was in principle cumulative and 
monumental. Beyond the commonsensical idea that time passed, lay the scientific idea that time 
accumulated as sediments and traces, which could be analysed, mined and read as clues and 
evidences of the past. As anthropology developed in twentieth-century Bengal, H. C. Chakladar 
suggested that Bengalis must travel to Santal lands to peel off layers of time. If in Bengal, the wet 
river silt caused most spatial marks of time to be irretrievably buried, the Santal Parganas were dry 
and rocky and could therefore be unpacked to reveal layers of lost times under the earth’s surface 34 
In this paradigm of exploration as penetration, the land and the people of the land were equated. 35 
The ‘primitive’ inhabitants behaved just as the land did -  both were opaque and obstructive, they lied 
and misdirected travellers and had to be similarly tamed and harnessed.36 The people were rugged 
and prone to cataclysmic fits of violence. The ‘tribes’ descended from the hills like the hurpa, the 
roaring wave caused by the first rains, washing people and cattle away,37 and set-off huge forest fires, 
burning scrubs and bush for cultivation.38 The ‘primitive’ existed in this ossified, primarily physical 
state, except when they violently intruded into the flow of history, by surprise raids on plains-people
31 Thomas Shaw, 'On the Inhabitants-of the Hillsnear Rajmahalf, Journal of Asiatic Research, IV, 1792; James-Browne, India 
Tracts containing a Descnption of the Jungle Terry Districts, London, 1788.
32 Georges Perec, Species of Spaces and Other Pieces, London, 1997, p. 81.
33 W . S . SherwilL 'Notes upon a  Tour through the Rajmahal hills’, Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal, XX, 1851, pp. 544- 
606.
34 H. C. Chakladar, ‘Prehistoric culture of Bengal I', Man in India, XX I:4 ,1941, pp. 208-36.
35 Paul Carter, The Road to Botany Bay: an Essay in Spatial History, London, 1987; Bob Hodge and Vijay Mishra, The Dark 
Side of the Dream, Sydney, 1991; Jose Rabasa, Inventing A-M-E-R-i-C-A: Spanish Historiography and the Formation of 
Eurocentrism, Norman(Oklahoma), 1993; Edward Said ‘Secular Interpretation, the Geographical Element and the 
Methodology of Imperialism' in After Colonialism, ed. Gyan Prakash, Princeton, 1995.
36Journal of Francis Buchanan kept during the Survey of the Distnct of Bhagalpur in 1810-11, ed. C. Oldham, Patna, 1930, pp. 
48, 56, 87-90.
37 Sherwtll, ‘Notes', pp. 562-68.
38 Ball, Jungle Life, p. 68.
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and on the Bengali pilgrims and merchants.39 The Bengali construction of the ‘primitive’, e.g. in the 
geography books discussed in the last chapter, as derivative of wild lands must be understood in this 
context -  as sharing the logic of colonial penetration of ‘interiors’, interiors which represented not only 
untamed lands but also untamed times, contained within but sometimes violently spilling over the 
confinement of ‘primordial’ landscapes.
Colonial officials accused pre-colonial Indian regimes, including the centralised Mughal state, 
of having lacked the power to ‘penetrate’ the ‘primordial’ lands of Rajmahal. The colonial geologist 
claimed that, even though ancient Indians must have surveyed ‘aboriginal’ lands, theirs remained a 
shallow and surface integration; even the mining techniques of this region remained restricted to an 
engagement with surface veins rather than with a penetration of depths.40 The Bengalis were 
described as ‘indolent’ -  who so lacked in travel experience that they mistook railway embankments 
for mountains.41 In pre-colonial times therefore, the Bengali could ‘see’ the ‘primitives’ only when the 
latter deigned to show themselves, by coming down from the hill-tops to ‘plunder’ the plains.42 
Otherwise, the ‘primitives’ remained ‘thrust back by the Aryan invaders from the plains ...like the 
remains of extinct animals found in hill caves’43, reluctant to show themselves, ‘careless of the future 
and do[ing] no more work than required’.44 Colonial discourse argued that even in the mid-nineteenth 
century ‘primitives’ continued deeply to fear visualisation, which in itself was a proof that Indians had 
never been able to penetrate ‘primitive’ spaces. Sherwill remarked: ‘I was always able at any given 
moment to disperse a crowd [of Santals] that had become troublesome by merely producing a 
sketchbook and pencil’.45 It thus remained for the colonial state to not only visualise the deepest 
interiors, but also utilise resources and peoples of the interior for general society. It was the railways 
which symbolised this enterprise. Once the railways integrated the remotest of places, the historical 
subject no longer had to wait for the ‘primitives’ to show themselves; the historically-conscious learned 
the initiative and the virtues of pioneering and penetrative travels. The traveller himself exposed the 
hidden ‘primitives’ -  and as we shall show in the next section, recruited the hitherto unutilised 
‘primitive’ body, transported it to far away Assam and used ‘primitive’ labour to turn north-eastern 
‘wilderness’ into lucrative tea-plantations.
Bengali historical imagination consciously tried to partake in this ‘penetrative’ competence of 
colonial travel. Bholanath Chandra, an erstwhile member of Young Bengal, wrote a voluminous 
travel-account called the Travels of a Hindu. In his introduction to the book, J. T. Wheeler claimed 
that the author’s Hindu and introspective mode of travel was different from the colonial surveying and 
ciassificatory mode of travel.46 Chandra, however, insisted that his travel was not in an introspective
39 Hunter described the untamed Santals prior to-the '1790s as the marauding ‘pests-of adjacent lowland’, Ann alsof Rural 
BengaK p. 219.
40 Ball, Jungle Life, pp. 167-72.
41 Anon., Rajmahals, its Railways and Historical Associations, 1876,. p p^-3 .
42 F. B. Bradley-Birt, The Story of an Indian Upland, London, 1905, pp. 41-6.
45 W . W. Hunter, A Brief History of the Indian Peoples, 21st ed., Oxford, 1895, p. 42.
44 W . W . Hunter, A School History and Geography of Northern India, Calcutta, 1891, p. 36.
45 Sherwili, ‘Notes’, p. 568.
40 London, 1869, introduction, p. xii.
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mode, that his travel-account was in principle different from traditional stories of digvijaya, hunts, 
adventures and romance, which, as he said, ‘put children to sleep’. His eyes remained keenly alert 
and ‘wakeful’; his purpose was to keep the reader ‘awake to the scenes and sights about him’. 
Instead of the traditional triad of the priest, the prince and the jester, he travelled in the triad of the 
scientifically-minded doctor, lawyer and engineer. His travel was a ‘survey [of[the path of Time where 
ruin marks [the] way’.47 Assessing this ‘path of time’, Chandra’s ‘wakeful’ gaze entered the recesses 
and interiors of the nation, where he came across hidden and non-historical locations. He discovered 
scattered ‘primitive’ villages, which were still unintegrated either commercially or politically to 
mainstream society, and which had become visible only recently when the Grand Trunk road ‘acted 
as an open sesame’ upon this land. The vocabulary of penetration is evident. The river Barakar, 
which ran through this ‘primitive’ Santal land, had ‘no history, no antecedents, no names’ and entered 
history’s jurisdiction only when historical travellers entered its ’wilderness’ for the first time.
The stream has no past -  nor shall it have a future. It can never be utilised into a highway for commerce. It has 
flown on for many ages, and shall flow on for all its days, a desert river for desert solitudes. Banks without 
inhabitants look upon water without vessels. The lonely stream is a blank to the civilised world -  a dead letter in 
creation.48
Chandra, however, assured his readers that, as history colonised such non-historical interiors of the 
nation, ‘neat bunglows, pleasant country seats, warehouses and shops’ would be set up in the 
‘primitive’ space, making it in future as picturesque as Macaulay’s vision of the English countryside of 
the past.49
This (penetrative) travel staged the first-ever visualisation of the ‘primitive’ as a discovery, if 
not invention, of a people who appeared not to exist prior to observation. The ‘primitive’ was thus 
denied his/her definitional antecedence which, if allowed to play out its logical possibilities, might 
dislocate history itself, by making the ‘primitive’ more originary than the ‘historical’. Once the 
‘primordial’ anarya was positioned at the ‘origin’ of Indian history, even as a counterpoise, s/he 
retained a claim, though suppressed, in the generative time of the nation’s emergence. In Santal 
Parganas, for instance, the colonial administration denied the right of Bengali settlers precisely on the 
grounds that the ‘primitive’ Santals were more ‘original’ to this land than Hindus; and the politics of 
Bengalis in Deoghar became that of actively re-claiming the Hindu’s tenancy-right over that space of 
the nation which colonial discourse named as ‘originally’ and purely ‘primitive’.50 In this context, once 
the ‘discovery’ of the ‘primitives’ was textualised as their first appearance in history, the problem of 
having to recognise them as ‘originary’ was somewhat neutralised. This must be the reason why 
Rajnarayan Basu imagined himself, ironically, to be Columbus:
The people [of the interiors] thought that we were fabulous creatures. Whenever one of us would go from the 
steamer to buy milk in the villages, he would find that the entire village had run away. What a situation! W e imagined 
ourselves to be Columbus and his sailors, like them we had discovered a new America; and the American Indians 
were running from us.51
47 Ibid, p. 139.
48 Ibid., p. 177.
49 Ibid., pp. 95,139.
50 Shashibhushan Ray, Santal Pargana, Past and Present^ Deoghar, 1^26.
51 ‘Atmacharit', p. 27.
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This must also be the reason why, even today, the Bharatiya Janata Party which explicitly propagates 
India to be a Hindu nation, refuses to accept the currently common term adivasi (original dwellers) for 
‘tribes’ and insists on calling them mere vanavasi (forest dwellers), after their spatial location.
Yet this colonial discourse of discovery also implied that undiscovered lands had till then been 
‘untouched by the stir of passing events’ and were ‘unresponsive’ to mainstream Indian history.52 This 
posed a problem for nationalism. The spatial strategy was indispensable to the nation, if the 
‘primitive’ had to be integrated without disrupting the unitary time of history. Yet this very strategy re­
produced the nation in the colonial image of a fractured and stratified terrain, Hunter’s ‘great museum 
of races ... from [the] lowest to the highest stages of culture’.53 Once space was enunciated in the 
colonial mode as the Other of time, once land was seen as a permanent presence, divested of social 
and practical temporalities, spatialisation reproduced internal frontiers as ‘objective’ and permanent 
boundaries, boundaries which efficient transport could breach but could not undo. This spatial 
strategy of simultaneously instituting and penetrating frontiers, after all, was a logic which served 
colonialism and which the nation could invoke only at its own cost. The question whether ‘tribes’ 
should unconditionally be integrated to modernising mainstream society or should be protectively 
confined within spatialised and bounded ‘culture gardens’ thus became an irresoluble problem for 
twentieth-century nationalism and during the framing of the Constitution for newly independent India 54 
Therefore, even as the Bengali traveller ethnologised and neutralised the time of ‘primordiality', by 
reducing it to a bounded yet aggregable spatial presence, he had to prevent the irrevocable 
fragmentation of the nation-space. Sibratan Mitra claimed that, while colonial authors had always 
found Birbhum to be forest-covered and predominantly ‘primitive’, he had discovered many ancient 
Hindu monuments inside the so-called ’tribal’ land. This proved that there were indeed ‘civilised
55settlements and villages of industrious and grain producing peasants amidst all that barbarism’. 
Vivekananda’s long journey to the southern-most tip of the Indian peninsula, where he sat and 
meditated on the nation, Gandhi’s mass-contact journeys of bharatdarshan or the envisioning of the 
nation, Nehru’s textualisation of national history as a ‘discovery’ of India -  all these articulated travel 
as a breaching of internal frontiers and differences. In the next chapter, I shall argue that this evening 
out of the nation’s space was primarily made possible by the imagination of the nation as a single 
market, as the circulation of money and commodities supplemented the tracing of the nation through 
travel. Colonial transport allowed the entry of Bengali moneylenders and merchants into the Santal 
‘interiors’, effecting that very remix of population which colonialism wished to prevent and which 
nationalism hoped for, and which the historical subject could not achieve through mere travel and 
discovery. If the rhetorics of the national market and of national capital informed the politics of early 
twentieth century Bengal, it was founded on this primarily spatial necessity of having to integrate the 
nation across and irrespective of internal temporal incommensurabilities.
52 Bradley-Birt, Indian Upland, pp. 1-3.
53 Hunter, A Brief History, p. 42.
54 Verrier Elwin, A Philosophy for NEFA ( North East Frontier Agency}, intro. Jawaharlal Nehru, Shillong, 1959.
55 ‘The History of Birbhum: Archeology and Ancient history’, Birbhumi, 1:11, bhadra, 1900, p. 340.
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The nomadic Santals: the circulation of ‘primitive’ bodies
Simultaneous to the above process of constituting ‘travel’ as a historical act, was the colonial process 
of constituting ‘primitives’ as intrinsically nomadic, migrant bodies, who were allegedly indifferent as to 
where they were located and put to labour. Though it might seem that these two processes were 
unconnected, their simultaneous unfolding was not accidental. Both processes were generated more 
or less at the same time by colonial acts of penetrating the interiors, and by the construction of the 
railways. In the 1850s-60s, the laying of the rail-tracks lopen[ed] up’ forests, cleared ‘the growth of 
centuries’ and removed ‘tigers and cholera ...the deadly miasma of jungles’.56 Railways at the same 
time, made Bengali historicat-travel possible. The railways also permitted the recruitment from the 
‘interiors’ of jungli or wild people and their forced circulation across the nation as migrant labour. Of 
course, the transportation of Santals to Assam was a process organised by the colonial state, without 
reference to the Bengali historiographical need of spatially gathering mismatched temporalities. Nor 
did Bengalis demand the forced migration of ‘primitives’ as a deliberate strategy of nationalising them. 
Yet these separate intentionalities came together to make it appear as if peoples like Santals, who 
could not be admitted to history, could nevertheless be nationalised by conducting them over the 
space of the nation. This strategic temporal resolution that migration and travel effected, cannot be 
analytically reduced to the intentionality of a single subject, either colonial or national. Yet if 
interpreted in terms of the articulation of effects, rather than of intentionality, the ‘cultural’ politics of 
Bengali travel and the ‘capitalist’ politics of ‘tribal’ labour-migration seem simultaneous and complicit -  
combining with each other to re-produce the nation as an extra-temporal, spatialised entity. This 
section will try to demonstrate the participation of Bengali middle-class discourse in the colonial 
constitution of ‘primitives’ as pure, transportable body-commodities, deprived of autonomous times 
and practices -  because it was only by depriving the ‘primitive’ of all temporalities except that of 
circulation, could the historical subject cleanse the ‘primordial’ of some of his/her potent alterity.
The transportation of Santals as migrant labour was based on two assumptions. One, that 
being ‘primitive’ they were necessarily nomadic, and two, being naturally without location, all that the 
‘primitive’ possessed was his or her body. If ‘primitives’ had a culture or a context, it was embedded 
in their flesh and embodied in their labour, which they carried wherever they travelled. These 
assumptions were shared by the colonisers, who organised the migration of Santals to the Assam tea- 
plantations, the Bengali arkattis or agents, who indentured and sold junglis to the planters and even 
the Bengali intellectuals who wrote and made nationalist history. As the Bhagalpur Commissioner 
said: ‘from choice they [Santals] select the most wild spots and so great is their predilection for the
56 Rajmahai, Its-Railways, pp. 2-3.
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wildest places that they are seldom known to remain in one station longer than it takes to clear and 
bring it to cultivation’.57 The superintendent of Damin-I-Koh or the Rajmahai foothills, which had been 
recently cleared by the Santals, worried endlessly about this slippery nature of the 'tribe’.58 In his 
annual survey reports of the 1850s, Pontet repeatedly complained how impossible it was to pin the 
Santals to one spatial location59 Any doubt about the suitability of land, the failure of a year’s crop, 
an epidemic, or even the anticipation of a flood, and the Santals wandered away.60 Being 
'uncontrollably independent’, the Santals never considered themselves ‘bound’ beyond the 
‘immediate’ present by any settlement.61 This was contrasted to the permanently-settled regions of 
Bengal, where landowners saw land as passing genealogically through generations, where land was 
itself like the family, expandable but not replaceable.62 The ‘tribe’ however would not allow the 
colonial official to identify and bound land to a single owner-proprietor, beyond the nominal act of 
setting up a bamboo-pole at the centre of the village-land and a rough guess at its expanse and 
circumference.63 In fact, precise boundaries and limits were supposed to psychologically disturb the 
‘primitives’, and Pontet argued that the colonial state must await the ‘naturalisation’ of Santals to a 
‘sedentary’ way of life, before trying to settle and measure their lands.64 Not only the colonial 
authorities, Bengali intellectuals like Rajnarayan Basu too distinguished the ‘primitive’ non-Aryans 
from the Aryans on the ground that the former, being definitionally nomadic, passed over lands 
without leaving any historical trace on them: lkirti [works] of permanence is the singular right of the 
aryas.’65 Bankimchandra defined the ‘primitive’ jatis as those who were not yet constituted into a 
society, who were not yet familiar with the values of family and monogamy. ‘Primitives’ therefore were 
defined as those who failed to comprehend time beyond bodily-cycles and failed to imagine the future 
as belonging to historical successors -  as Bankim said, there was no other principle in the ‘primitive’ 
condition except the principle of the body 66 Note that in this discourse, the ‘primitive’ was defined via 
the mutual articulation of three apparently separate ideas -  that of morality (family, domesticity and 
fidelity as the consciousness of patriarchal genealogy), that of space (sedentariness or the location of 
permanent historical monuments) and that of time (planning for the future through domestic savings 
and financial investment, both of which ‘tribes’ were incapable of).
This nomadic and body-centric ‘primitive’ thus seemed intrinsically amenable to transportation 
and relocation. To permit this relocation of ‘tribes’, the land of the nation was constructed as an 
internally homogeneous space, colonial geographers and geologists even argued that distant Assam
57 Report by Ward, Commissioner, Bhagalpur to Secy., Govt, of Bengal August 1827, Dumka Record Room [hereafter DRR].
58 Flight and continuous movement as a strategy for escaping oppression was common to peasants of all castes in colonial 
India. See Aditi Nagchoudhuri-Zilly, The Vagrant Peasant: Agrarian Distress and Desertion in Bengal 1770-1830, Wiesbaden, 
1982; Anand Yang, The Limited Raj: Agrarian Relations in Colonial India, Saran District 1793-1920, Berkeley, 1989. It is 
significant, however, that in both Bengali and colonial discourses mobility was made into a characteristic of the ‘primitive1.
59 Pontet, Superintendent of Damin-I-Koh, to Collector, Bhagalpur, 15 May 1854, DRR.
60 Pontet to Coll., Bhagalpur, 20 July 1842; Pontet to Coll., Bhagalpur, 4 June 1847, DRR.
61 Pontet to Coll., Bhagalpur, 5 Dec 1S46, DRR.
62 Ibid.
63 Comm, of Circuit to Special Comm, of Santhal Insurrection, [?] Oct 1855, DRR.
64 Asst. Comm., Bhagalpur to Coll., Bhagalpur, 11 July 1846, DRR.
65 ‘The Origin and Spread of the Arya Jati’, Tattovodhini Patrika, 1865.
60 ‘Dharmatattva1, 1888 in Bankim Rachanavali II, Calcutta, 1954, p. 658.
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was originally the natural offshoot of the Rajmahai hills: ‘the break in connection between the Assam 
and the Rajmahai hills which gave an opening for the east-ward flow of the Ganges [was only] 
comparatively recent.’67 Only such a natural identity between distant lands could effect a smooth 
displacement of Santals from Damin-l-Koh to the tea-gardens. In any case, whether or not Assam 
was actually continuous to Rajmahai, it was as much a wilderness as the ‘primitive’ habitat of the 
Damin and was expected to appear home-like to the Santals. And like indigo-planting and forest- 
clearance, tea-planting too was supposed to attract the nomadic Santal, for it ‘allowed him to work, 
according to his wont, by fits and starts, demanding that every sinew should be strained at certain 
seasons, and permitting of almost total idleness during others.’68 The Assam forests needed, like 
post-1770 Bengal, to be reclaimed and settled. This could not be done by civilised people, because 
forests rapidly engulfed fences, boundaries and any other human constructions on this untamed land, 
and caused the complete devaluation of land itself in the speculative market.69 Only people like the 
Santals, who had proved their ‘primordial’ worth by reclaiming post-famine Bengal, seemed capable of 
clearing Assam of these aggressive forests. Santals were therefore defined as the nomadic ‘tribe’ 
whose ‘natural’ tendency had always been to wander eastwards. Rev. Bodding, famous for his 
collection of Santal folk-tales, made an entry in the Santal Parganas gazetteer, summarising the 
contemporary debates about the origin and migrations of Santals and concluding that the east was 
their natural home.70 Rev. Skrefsrud, famous for his recording of the Santal ancestor’s story, testified 
before the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee, that he owned a 420 acre tea-plantation himself and 
could easily make a hundred Santais migrate every year to Assam: ‘there has been a steady 
movement of Santals eastwards as far back as their history can be traced, this movement continues 
and will eventually reach Assam’.71
Opinion thus seemed ‘unanimous’ that the junglis or ‘wild tribes’ were ‘the best class of 
coolies in respect to work as well as adaptability to Assam climate’.72 Bengali labour-contractors put 
advertisements in the Planters Gazetteer reading ‘Coolies any quantity, warranted junglis’.73 Labour- 
agents even painted and dressed caste-Hindus and sold them as ‘primitives’ to planters. Naturally 
such counterfeit ‘primitives’ soon fell ill and died in Assam, and officials advised buyers of ‘primitive’ 
labour to pay attention to the bodily structure of coolies. For anyone 'who knows the Sonthali type of 
face and figure’ could not confuse a caste-Hindu with a jungli.74 The distinction between junglis and 
Bengalis was that the former did not possess the ‘intelligence’ of the latter, this absence caused the 
‘primitive’ to invest everything in bodily labour, thus enabling him like nobody else to turn up with bare
67 T. H. Holdich, Regions of the World Series-: India-, quoted-in L. S, S, O’Malley, Bengal-District Gazetteers: Santal Parganas, 
Calcutta, 1910, p. 6.
68 Hunter, Annals, p. 225.
091 W .  Edgar, ‘Note Submitted on 11 September 1875', Papers: Tearlndustry of Bengal, Calcutta, 1873.
70 O'Malley, Santal Parganas, p. 91.
71 Proceedings, Assam Labour Enquiry Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts, Calcutta, 1906, p. 16.
72 Subdivisions! Officer, Karimganj, quoted in Special Report on the Working of Act i o f f 882 in the Province o f Assam, 1886- 
89, Calcutta, 1890, p. 16.
73 Rev. Charles Dowding, Tea Garden Coolies in Assam: a Letter by Hon’bte J Buckingham, Replying to a Communication on 
the Subject in the ‘Indian Churchman’, Calcutta, 1894, p. 4.
74Comm., Assam Valley Districts to Chief Comm., Assam, 28 Jan 1892, no. 25-26, Bengal General Proceedings [hereafter 
BGP], 1892.
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hands hard soil, full of stumps and roots.75 Also, since the body-minded ‘primitive’ was incapable of 
abstract reasoning, s/he could not distinguish ‘similarity’ from ‘identity’, and could be made to believe 
that Assam was identical to the wilderness of Rajmahai. The same lack of discriminatory sense made 
the ‘primitives' believe that nature itself was an extension of their own bodies; they therefore could use 
and harness nature just as they did their own limbs.76 As David Arnold shows, this colonial distinction 
between the powerful, bodily ‘primitive’ and the malaria-prone, cerebral Bengali was more often than 
not accepted by the Bengali middle classes themselves.77
It must be noted that, unlike the Assam tea-gardens, tea-gardens of north Bengal complained 
that ‘primitives’ were unsuitable migrants.78 The colonial state, trying to explain this difference in the 
way ‘primitives’ were perceived in Assam and in Duars, admitted that the clue lay not so much in the 
intrinsic bodily nature of the ‘primitive’, as in the respective modes of Santal travel to the two tea- 
regions. Santals travelled to Duars on their own initiative, and after earning a few weeks’ wages, they 
returned to their homes in the Santal Parganas. They therefore seemed no different from other non- 
‘tribal’ migrants, who possessed memories of homeland and saw migration as only a temporary and 
seasonal option.79 However, when Santals were indentured to Assam, they seemed perfectly to fit the 
stereotype of the pure ‘primitive’ body, with no sense of past (home) or future (return). This was 
because in the course of enforced transportation, Santals experienced their selves as commodities. 
They were explicitly sold for their bodies, they were constantly in the grip of disease and death, they 
were forcibly and unwillingly circulated with cargo, they almost always failed to return home -  all this 
making their bodily functions and movements seem out of their own control. In other words, shorn of 
their own initiatives to leave and to return, indentured Santals experienced time as solely that of 
transport, sickness and mortality. It was this experience which heightened and dislocated their sense 
of their own bodies, depriving them of the use of ‘culture’ and of imaginations of long-term temporality. 
This section tries to show that Santals were materially constituted into pure body-commodities (to 
which the ‘historical’ Bengali bhadrolok contrasted himself), not only through discursive strategies, but 
through a very concrete, physical mode of transportation as indentured labour. Traces of this 
‘primitive’ traffic to Assam exist in colonial emigration papers as a series of mortality and disease 
statistics. The Bengali press too registered migrants to Assam in terms of high death, high abortion 
and unnaturally low birth rates.80 In the course of their travels and in Assam, labourers suffered from 
acute food scarcity -  even the colonial authorities admitted that ‘the number of imported labourers far 
exceeded the supply of food available to them’. Yet their deaths were explained away in terms of the 
intrinsic nature of their bodies -  ‘primitives’ could not survive on a refined cereal like rice which Assam 
produced, and needed to be supplied coarse maize.81
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The first step in the alienation of the Santal from his or her own self and location was the 
mode of recruitment itself. Except during famines, the Santal had to be forced to migrate.82 Since it 
seemed impossible to ‘interest’ Santals in travel, they were deceived into doing so.83 The Bengali 
arkattis prowling the Santal villages, lied about prospective wages, created rumours, took advantage 
of domestic quarrels and of ‘straying’ young women, visited bazaars to pick Santals who seemed 
trapped in unacquittable debts, captured coolies ‘in the night and [transported them] in covered carts 
lest they be seen or detected by their friends and taken away’.84 Arkattis became so insidious that 
Santals feared every other Bengali to be a labour agent, every other hut a half-way house for 
captured coolies.85 Arkattis were often erstwhile and dismissed government employees, who carried 
pieces of paper, made out like government licenses.86 They were known to deliberately speak in 
Bengali to mislead Santals and often pretend as if the government had summoned ‘tribes’ to 
Chittagong for public-work and then exported them to Assam.87 Even the capture of Santal women as 
coolies could not always be punished, because recruitment was not a legal offence like sexual 
abuse.88 Many Santals went missing because they were removed by labour agents ‘in the dead of the 
night’ and arkattis became so ill famed that Santals often attacked them on sight.89 Thus deceived out 
of their own homes, Santals were then taken to labour depots where they were assigned false 
identities and new names, so that they could no longer be traced to their villages.90 They were then 
taken around to various middlemen, who touched and examined their bodies for signs of illness -  
after all ‘primitives’ were sold precisely because there were ‘no rejections whatever on account of 
physical fitness’ from amongst them.91 Afterwards, they were sold to the highest bidder ‘exactly as 
cattle [we]re\ a transaction perceived by the Santals as ‘sale of human flesh’.92 Thus having lost 
familiarity with their own selves, probed, sold, renamed and cut loose from past ties, Santals were 
transported to Assam.
Once herded into railway compartments and steamers, the supposedly tough ‘primitive’ 
bodies fell into what seemed like a permanent grip of dysentery and cholera. Not only did Santals 
thus lose control over the movement of their bodies; they also lost control over their bodily functions. 
Indentured because of their so-calied intrinsic resistance to the ‘miasma’ of Assam forests, ‘tribal’ 
bodies paradoxically entered the futureless-ness of death and disease, where time was reduced to 
the immediate context of fear, pain and solitude. This too was explained away as the inherent nature 
of ‘primitive’ bodies. Santals were accused of over-eating on the steamers and thus causing their own
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disease.93 To contain the excesses of the ‘primitive’ body, the food allotted to each ‘tribal’ was 
reduced to the ‘smallest amount’ possible.94 The travelling body of the ‘primitive’ thus became like a 
commodity with no needs and no desires, assigned food ‘less and less nutritive than [evenl non­
labouring prisoners’ in colonial jails.95 Since ‘primitives’ were supposed to be intrinsic nomads, they 
needed no facilities on the road;95 they needed only to be physically controlled and clinically handled, 
which the migrants perceived, not wrongly, as ‘tempting the gods of disease’.97 Not only by disease, 
hunger and constant clinical tampering, ‘primitives’ were also made more intensely alienated from 
their own bodies by their strict segregation from other migrants. Even when the regular ship-space 
allotted to each coolie was reduced as a cost-cutting measure, ‘primitives’, prone to greater disorder 
and contagion, were separated from each other by greater deck-space.98 ‘Primitive’ bodies therefore 
had to be individuated and segregated from each other, as much as from non-‘primitives’,99 making 
the formation of any new and travelling collectivity impossible.
The journey to Assam was a journey into almost total physical control: ‘from the time that they 
were recruited till they reached their final destination they [were] guarded not unlike prisoners’.100 
Migration-routes were pre-determined and under constant surveillance, to prevent junglis from freely 
roaming the country and from coming into ‘contagious’ and disorderly contact with settlements en 
route.101 To keep them separate from regular travellers like merchants and pilgrims, it was ordered 
that ‘primitive’ emigrants ‘be compelled to take the train’,102 and compelled to enter Assam only 
through pre-determined ‘gateways’ like Dhubri.103 Surely, this was less an experience of travel than of 
‘transportation’. The labourers’ encounter with the train, the machine breathing fire, which waited for 
no one, was often tragic. On 15 March 1866, 1200 labourers were jammed into a few train 
compartments. The train started before everybody had time to board, in the stampede many died and 
families got separated, there were no lights in the compartment, and many of those who did board 
died of suffocation. Of course the railway authorities blamed this on the lack of time-sense of the 
passengers.104 Railway transport had its own time, which usurped the social time of travel as a 
familiar practice. The journey itself was timed by an autonomous clock. The time for food, the time to 
visit the toilet, the time to drink water, all were pre-fixed by the superintendent of emigration at 
Calcutta. And very often migrants were transported in goods trains rather than in conventional
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passenger carriages.105 Travel as indentured labour to Assam thus caused the ‘primitives’ to be 
circulated and transported like so many commodities.
I have detailed this experience of forced migration in order to show how travel deprived the 
'primitive’ of identity, of autonomous practice and therefore of autonomous temporality -  they became 
literally body-commodities with no time but the abstract time of circulation. Even when they reached 
their destination, the tea plantation, this unsettled state of circulation was forcibly maintained. The 
planters were careful not to ‘localise’ the migrants, it was clear that their interest lay not in settling, but 
in keeping the labourers ‘migrant’. The Assam government tried to implement a policy of waste-land 
settlement by giving forest-lands in nominal rent to newly arrived ‘tribals’. The tea-lobby however 
effectively prevented this by arguing that settlement would make ‘tribes’ into peasants.106 Tribes’ had 
to be harnessed as migrating bodies. If the experiences of uprooting, segregation, transportation, 
control, disease and death reduced the Santals’ temporal sensibilities to an immediate context of day- 
to-day survival, this shrunken temporality was more easily translatable into casual wage labour. This 
time of immediacy could not be allowed to pass into a sense of even a quasi-long-term that came with 
settled tenancy on land.107 The tea-coolies, therefore, lived in Assam in a state of continuing 
movement. They repeatedly tried to escape, but were more often than not captured by chowkidars, 
ferrymen, dogs and local ‘tribes’ who were employed to track down fugitives. The planters had 
magisterial powers and indiscriminately inflicted corporeal punishment on tea labourers, 'the 
prevalence of sickness among the coolies would always be a reason to refer a death to natural 
causes’J08
This time of impermanence and immediacy, of corporeal punishment and mortality in turn 
(disarticulated with the regime of work-time on the plantations. The planters, instead of counting the 
five-year contract as five years, made a complicated regime out of average work-days. The labourer 
soon lost track of his count.109 They failed to comprehend the ‘rational’ work-regime where each was 
‘entitled to one day’s wage for doing nothing’.110 Moreover, the average work-day was not defined as 
synonymous with the rising and setting of the sun -  a full day stretched far beyond daylight and was 
calculated unilaterally by the planter. Most days in the life of the migrant tea-labourer were known as 
half-hazira -  literally, half-presence. This implied that though s/he had not been absent from work, 
s/he was recognised only as having completed half a labour-day.111 There was no fixity in the terms 
of time-money equivalence. In the leaf-plucking season when work was light, labourers were paid by 
the hour. However, when work was heavy, like forest clearance, they were paid only when the full 
task was completed.112 To the migrant, thus, contract time -  though of five years -  stretched much
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beyond. In fact, the tea labourer very often could not even distinguish whether they were working out 
the contract time or actually seiving a jail sentence on the plantation. This was because the colonial 
government admitted that since imprisonment and hard labour characterised plantations as much as 
jails, punishment for desertion should be left to the planters themselves.113
Contracted labour-time was particularly long for the ‘primitives1 because, it was said, they had 
no sense of time and future. The ‘time-expired’ Santals failed to return home, because they were 
invariably in debt and could even be tempted with alcohol to sign longer contracts in a state of stupor. 
They allegedly spent all their money on food and drink, being indulgent and purely sensuous bodies. 
In fact, planters hoped that non-‘tribals5 would imitate the ‘primitives1 in eating and investing more in 
their bodies. The non-‘tribals’ were known to starve themselves in order to save money, in an 
abstract hope of returning home in the future. This future-mindeness of non-‘tribals’ made them 
worse bodies and worse labourers than ‘tribals’.114 In colonial officialese then, ‘tribal1 labour by the 
end of nineteenth century had almost become ‘free labour1, without roots and memories of past 
homelands -  if a Santal vanished without trace, it could safely be assumed that s/he had been 
transported to Assam.115 If a Santal tea-coolie did manage to return, he would find that his place in 
the family and the village was already taken by someone else.116 Significantly, colonial papers 
repeatedly stressed faster transport as the means for this ‘freeing’ of labour. Thus the tramway linking 
Tista and Dharia rivers was expected to ‘free’ coolies by transporting them with, and as fast as, 
mail.117 Transported like cargo, Santals thus became circulating bodies, ‘freed’ not only from their 
pasts but also from any sense of continuous time, in which a future or a return could be envisioned 
beyond the indentured present. Such was the fear of this transportation to Assam, that even railway 
clerks in Santal Parganas tried to dissuade Santals from buying tickets to the tea-gardens.118
B. C. Rai, labour-agent for Bijay Narain Kundu of Madhupur, admitted that in the Santal 
Parganas, junglis were inordinately hostile to Bengalis because Bengalis represented arkattis or 
labour-contractors.119 Bengalis, thus, were as much a participant in the forced migration of Santals as 
were colonial officials. Not only arkattis, even Bengali intellectuals wrote about tea-coolies in the 
colonial mode. The middle classes, for instance, saw tea-labour to be ‘free’ in the negative sense of 
being morally unaccountable to historical society. R. C. Dutt, historian, historical novelist and travel 
writer, was magistrate of Midnapur, from where many Santals were indentured in the 1880s and 90s. 
He believed that ‘young people who have not arrived at an age for using discretion, unprotected 
widows and young females of questionable character seem quite infatuated when in hands of these 
wily coolie agents’.120 In fact, Bengali novels were written about the moral degradation of those who
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allowed themselves to go to Assam, about impatient and greedy women who migrated to Assam and 
ended up compromising their chastity and character in order to survive.121 The Bengali bhadrolok 
gave the impression that a tea-coolie was a person of suspect character, who, in trying to escape 
social and domestic hardships, fell to depths of vice and immorality. At the same time, Bengali 
intellectuals admitted that unobstructed Santal migration did indeed integrate the nation as a single 
space. Rajanikanta Das, an eminent ‘foreign-returned’ economist, argued that unlike Bengal, which 
was permanently-settled and therefore self-contained, Santal Parganas housed crowds of wandering 
‘primitives’, who could easily be transported elsewhere. Since Assam was further away from Santal 
Parganas than from Bengal, migrant Santals had fewer chances of returning home, once they 
travelled to the tea-gardens. Transporting Santals, rather than Bengali peasants, therefore effected a 
much more stable remix of population in line with national unification.122
A number of historical judgements thus seem to come together around the phenomenon of 
forced migration -  that in modern times amoral and unaccountable young people tended to migrate, 
that ‘primitives’ were intrinsically amoral and body-centric, that ‘primitives' were nomadic and hence 
not pressed into any particular location by the accumulation of monumental-historical time, that 
‘primitives’ anyway had no sense of historical continuity and could more easily be displaced, and that 
migration effected the necessary re-mix of population which gave the nation identity across space. Of 
course, the Bengali middle classes often showed outrage at the way planters and emigration 
authorities treated tea-coolies.123 However, it was generally accepted that ‘tribes’ migrated either 
because, being nomadic, they could not help it, or because, being bodies, they deserved it -  as if 
penetration, transportation and dislocation offered the ‘primitive’ the chance to enter mainstream 
society, releasing him/her from confinement in the hidden interiors. In colonial and Bengali 
discourses, it seemed as if ‘free’ migration was a temporal disjuncture, a new beginning, which could 
be effected by the ‘primitive’ only in the time of colonial modernity. This time of the so-called new 
beginning is most often found in missionary accounts -  ‘tribals’ converted to Christianity were brought 
up to Assam so that they could start afresh on a new life, a new labour and a new faith.124 Once the 
‘primitive’ effected this temporal rupture, that is, once s/he was individuated and made into a pure 
body-commodity, s/he became less threateningly Other than those who lived in collectivity within the 
forest regions. Transportation was the moment, which separated the original ‘primordial’ condition 
from the modern condition of the migrant and labouring ‘tribal’. Historical society could harness the 
latter, though not the former. The ‘primitive’ was useful, as it were, only when s/he permitted this 
disjuncture and came into circulation, only when s/he became a pure, virtually perishable body- 
commodity, shorn of threatening practices and times which might otherwise subvert the historical time 
of the nation.
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Time as quest: ancestral travels of the Santals
Constituted as a pure body, with no culture except that of instinctual labour and with no time except 
that of circulation, the Santal voice was naturally erased from emigration papers. In fact, travel itself 
was regimented and structured in such a way that the migrant could not speak. Thus at the gateway 
to Assam, Dhubri, the migrants would be queued up, the deputy commissioner would recite their, 
often false, names from medical certificates, and reel out questions to check if all migrants were 
conscious, free and willing to migrate. Invariably, migrants would shout out affirmatives in chorus and 
seem to display ‘a most enthusiastic ...demeanour’.125 From this version of officially-supervised and 
ritual catechism, it is almost impossible to reconstruct the Santals’ own perception of travel and 
transportation. I found only one recorded testimony of a Santal in the Assam Labour Enquiry 
Committee report, which was otherwise a collection of missionary, planter and labour-agent 
testimonies. Mohan Manjhi from Charanpur, Asansol -  who was fortunate to have returned from a 
tea-garden, though only after twenty-five years -  said
I am a Santal. 1 was twenty-five years in a garden in Sylhet. I was happy and had good masters. I was bunglow 
chowkidar on Rs 7 a month. 1 got ill and when I recovered I came here. I would not go back to Sylhet. I can earn 10 
or 12 annas a day here in collieries, whereas one only gets 15 pice there. The climate is bad there also. I was 
enticed away when a youth by promise of very high wages. I would go back for 8 annas a day. Santals might be 
glad to go there, if they were promised land.126
Mark the fractured nature of the testimony -  the Santal said he was happy in the plantation but would 
never go back, that he had good masters but that he was deceived into going and that he earned less 
than he would have if he had worked nearer honje.
Chotrae Desmanjhi was persuaded by missionaries Skrefsrud and Boerrson, after the 
rebellion of 1855, to go and settle new lands in Assam. His account, Chotrae Desmanjhi Reak Katha, 
reads like a polemic against the Santal rebellion and like a story of the isolated endeavours of a 
handful of Christian converts, who, led by Kerap-saheb and Papa-saheb, chose a special and 
enlightened future away from post-rebellion, famine-ridden Benagaria. 127 However, if read against 
the grain, even this text seems to display narrative fractures. The mood and the intonation of 
narration are not unconditionally happy and celebratory. And on occasions when translation from 
Santali to English appears to have been impossible, the purely hermeneutic intent of the text, the 
Santal-missionary consensus about the new beginning in Assam, seems to fall apart. I shall try to 
reconstruct a Santal version of nineteenth-century travel out of these textual fault lines. It seems from 
the text that Chotrae was willing to go to Assam -  there was nothing at home to hold him back. Since 
the rebellion, the Santals were anyway scattered and lost to each other. When the missionary asked 
why so few Santals attended church meetings, Chotrae reminded him that they had no cattle and no
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land, they were being carried away by ambiguous promises to distant lands.128 Being a covert, 
Chotrae also felt somewhat estranged from his community. He remembered how a great assembly of 
Santals had, under the very bel tree which Chotrae once planted, ostracised Kolean Haram, for 
having narrated the ancestor’s story to the missionaries. Kolean’s son, who had also contributed to 
this missionary document, was desperate to be taken back into the Santal community.129 Chotrae, 
though not ostracised, perhaps felt a similar isolation and was therefore more willing than anyone else 
to leave the Santal Parganas. Even so, it was not quite Chotrae’s own decision to go to Assam. He 
was called by the missionary and told that the latter had decided to grant him a new des, a new 
country -  ‘Kerap saheb went to search for a country. He went to Calcutta, to talk to big men and 
consult books’ and returned with, the idaa_ of. Assam I 30 Skrefsrud then took Chotrae and a  few ottjer 
converts to the Dhubri region of Assam to show them new lands. But even though the Santals at 
home showed curiosity about the handful of soil and water they had brought back from Assam, most 
refused to leave: ‘then the wives started screaming, we shall not go, we know there is a lot of violence 
in Assam, we will labour for wages here and live in poverty, but we will never go’.131 It was only 
Chotrae and a few others who finally decided to travel to the new ‘home’.
Chotrae recalls the journey to Assam as terrible and difficult -  they suffocated and almost 
drowned in the steamer, the children suffered from continuous exposure, and the cattle died on the 
road. When they began clearing the land in Assam, all of them fell fatally ill with overwork and lack of 
food and shelter. Chotrae admitted that, but for the missionaries and their doctors, they would have 
all died in this wilderness to which they had been transported.132 Chotrae’s story ended by expressing 
gratitude to the missionaries for the new country. Yet his narrative rang with live memories of disease 
and pain and of a not entirely voluntary dislocation to an unfamiliar land. There seemed no indication 
that Santals ‘naturally’ moved towards Assam in course of their habitual migration, as Skrefsrud 
claimed. When Campbell granted land to Skrefsrud in Assam, he asked the missionary how many 
Santals he could persuade to migrate. Skrefsrud had replied: ‘do not worry, I shall get as many 
subjects as you want, to clear as large a tract as you can grant’.133 The point clearly was to make 
Santals migrate, so that the ‘wilderness’ of Assam could be reclaimed. It was another matter that this 
unfamiliar and uncultivated ‘wilderness’ threatened Chotrae and his group with separation from their
134ancestral village, with disease and as it seemed for a while, with possible extinction.
Thus, whether converted to Christianity as in Chotrae’s case or indentured as in most other 
cases, Santals who travelled to Assam perceived their recent dislocation as a temporal disjuncture. It 
is true that Santal ancestor-stories were tales of travel as well, which was why colonial officials and 
ethnographers defined Santals as essentially nomadic, and therefore necessarily ‘primitive’. While
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editing Kolean Haram’s narration of the ancestors-story, P. O. Bodding noted: ‘it is in their blood to 
seek f resh fields; as they are often heard to say, they have a wish to “see” land’.135 But what 
ethnographers refused to admit was the fact that these ancestral travels which Santals recalled were 
of an entirely different order, irreconcilable with the experience of transport in colonial modernity. This 
was the reason why Kolean and Juggi Haram did not narrate travels to Assam as continuous to their 
narrative of past times and travels. In any case, Kolean’s 1871 narration of the ancestors-story was 
far from a tale of habitual or voluntary nomadism. To him, the journeys of the past were an eternal 
and tragic quest for a country that could finally be named as the Santals' own. The ancestors 
travelled, searching and clearing forests and invoking spirits in the four directions, yet they were 
repeatedly displaced from the new lands, which they had made productive and habitable by their own
blood and sweat. Thus, the ancestors became ‘exhausted’ by wandering:
From Sikhar some of us came to Tundi. Where shall we stay? -  and a place there is nowhere then we have 
gradually come to the Santal Parganas. W e have come feeding and we exist like the silkworm. And some day we 
shall again go somewhere, who knows where. Some peofjje have gone past Rajmahai to the other side of the 
Ganges. Who knows why Thakur is punishing us in this way.
As will become evident in course of this section, the central motif of this narration was that of a quest 
-  a quest not only for new lands but also for a future ‘elsewhere’.
Unlike the nation of nineteenth-century Bengali imagination, this Santal quest for a country 
elsewhere did not project territory as an always-already present space, waiting merely to be 
traversed, visualised, bounded and signed by the subject-author of history. The Santal des was yet to 
be found. The Santal country did not pre-exist the arrival of the desired future. The quest was 
therefore both a temporal and a spatial pursuit. This Santal mode of travel was very different from 
both colonial ethnological travels and Bengali historical travels. While the latter conceptualised space 
and time as rectilinear and mutually exclusive co-ordinates of thought, the Santal ‘elsewhere’ however 
could not be analytically broken down into space and time as two perpendicular and distinct 
dimensions of experience. In fact, the Santal motif of quest implied an inextricable and simultaneous 
enunciation of time and land. In Santal memories, the passing of time was literally articulated as
passing through lands:
In a (good land) Hihri Pipri we were born 
W e were sought after (by Thakur Jiu) in Khoj Kaman 
W e replenished again in Harata 
W e fixed our social orders in Sasan Beda.
Each memorable land in this recitation implied a memorable act -  birth, search, replenishment and
social ordering. In other words, in the ancestors-story, spatiality was articulated in terms of practices
of travel, quest, life and labour, rather than in terms of a pre-existing or foundational presence. If the
temporal and spatial significations of the narrative seemed simultaneous, if not coterminous, it was
because both territory and the past were presented as provisional and as sought out in the practice of
journeying. Land did not provide, as it did in nationalism, an unquestionable and unceasing ground or
135 Bodding, ‘Note’, in Kolean and Juggf Haram, Horkoren Mare-Hapramko Reak Katha, Oslo, 1942(1-887), p. 21.
137 Quoted and translated by H. Hembrom in The Santals: Anthropological-Theological Reflections on Santali and Biblical 
Creation Traditions, Calcutta, 1996, p. 9.
referent, which contained and moderated the inexorable passing of time. This was because Santals 
remembered being recurrently banished from lands, just as in colonial modernity, they would be 
banished from time. However, when the colonial ethnographer translated this recitation of Santal 
space-time, he based it on his prior decision to name the Santals as a ‘tribe1. In the colonial 
document, the above lines were translated thus:
In Hihri Plpri were we born
In Khoj Kaman we were called for
In Harata we grew up
In Sasan Beda we became septs138
The use of the category ‘sept’ -  which as the previous translation by Hembrom shows, was by no 
means an accurate transliteration of the Santali word for social order -  proves the missionary’s prior 
decision to name the Santal as the stereotypical nomadic ‘primitive’. This was by no means a case of 
mistranslation. This was a temporal judgement prior to the act of translation. Thus the Santals’ 
simultaneous enunciation of space and time was reinvented, through ethnographic translation, as the 
empirical proof of the exceptional and idiosyncratic nomadic habit of the anachronistic ‘primitive’. If 
the Santals commemorated transformative moments in terms of their contingent locations, this mode 
of collective travel and temporalisation was neutralised and localised, so that it could no longer 
interrogate the otherwise universal and rational bifurcation of space and time -  a bifurcation which 
colonial modernity instituted for the sake of ordering the world through temporal hierarchy and spatial 
integration.
Santals themselves did not partake in this dissociation of time and space as symmetrical and 
abstract opposites. When they said that it was at Sikhar that the Bengalis began moneylending or 
that it was at Tore Pokhori Baha Bandela that the ancestors met under a sarjom tree to frame new 
Santal customs, they were remembering significant conjunctures in time as much as memorable 
locations in space.139 These past locations were not reducible to the exterior, visualisable, 
permanently present dimension of existence, to a space that could be conceptualised irrespective of 
travel and habitation. These past locations had intangible virtues to be grasped in relation to human 
practice -  thus Hihri Pipri, where humans were born, was a ‘good land’ towards the rising of the 
sun.140 Beyond the Ajay river, land was defiled and evil, where even the ‘child in the womb must be 
nipped’ before crossing.141 In ancestral travel memories, therefore, lands had to be ‘conceptualised’, 
qualified and narrated just as time had to be. Space was invested with the temporality of social 
practice, with the temporality of travel, reclamation and cultivation. Land, like time, had to be passed 
and land, as much as time, seemed to generate irrevocable transformations. It was not incidental, 
therefore, that colonial authorities failed to match the place-names of Santal memory to extant 
cartographic locations.142 For in Santal modes of articulation, land too, like time, could often be 
accessed only in memory. Lands too were often lost, like the past, to the present. If Bengali historical
Horkoren, p, 12.
139 Ibid., pp. 10-4.
140 H. Hembrom, The^  Santals, p. 9.
141 Horkoren, p. 14.
142 O'Malley, Santal Parganas, Introduction.
imagination sought to contain temporal discontinuities within the vessel-like space of the national 
territory, to the Santal, repeatedly and endlessly displaced from lands which they cleared, even the 
assurance and permanence of spatiality was not available.
To the Santal, as Kolean said, there were many ‘ways of wandering’ -  wandering the forest, 
searching for wood for the plough, searching for hunt, wandering the village looking for vessels and 
pots, wandering to escape moneylenders and sahibs. Or even wandering, leading to a wedding, to a 
meeting of villages. In a Santal wedding, the headman would ask the bridegroom’s party: ‘how is it 
have you come to get as far as here?’. The groom’s people would reply that they had ‘manifolded 
[their] steps’, wandering great distances in search of the jewel (perhaps the bride). On the way, many 
events made them tarry. Often expressed as riddles, these events marked the passage of time in 
everyday and exceptional acts. On the way people saw ‘wild bee honey in the crook of crab-grass’, 
i.e. occasions for communal feasts or pregnancies. On the way people saw the blue-bird dancing, i.e. 
the act of weaving clothes or the occasion for men’s festive dance.143 And on the way the Santals 
were invariably delayed by the traders:
On the rock at the lake bank 
The traders have camped 
You know father, there 
They-are melting-gold.144
Thus, the meeting of people, as in Santal marriages, was enunciated as the result of long journeys, 
and long durations, marked by waiting, delays, everyday acts and festive events, in this, the direction 
of travel signified the direction of time itself, both leading, simultaneously, to one group of Santals 
moving towards and meeting another group.
Travelling to new lands, therefore, was either a matter of meeting of new people or a matter of 
the scattering of peoples. It was in any case a collective practice -  as Kolean Haram said, 'Santals do 
not build houses for themselves away from others, they build villages and there they live together in 
one place’.145 The Santals generally left home in the months of Phalgun and Chaitra, the spring 
season. The journey, which followed, called for a simultaneous tracing of new lands and an imagining 
of new and possible futures. It was never enough to find a land with fertile and worthy soil. The new 
land could become a country only after the life-signs of the land were read and interpreted, life-siqns 
which illuminated the future of the new village in the present. Thus, the birds had to be carefully 
watched, if they seemed to be flying away, it would be known that ‘some day in the future a village 
here [would] be deserted’. A pot of water had to be kept uncovered, if the level fell, it would be known 
that rains would be scarce for the coming year. Chickens had to be tied to a post overnight, the 
scatter of their droppings would signify how far wealth would be distributed. In all the directions that 
the ants carried the rice, spirits had to be invoked.146 Unlike the historical reading of spatial traces of 
the monumental past, this Santal mode of travel read traces of the future in the life-signs of the land.
143 Horkoren, p. 56.
144 Ibid., p. 58.
145 Ibid., p. 100.
146 Ibid., p. 1,01.
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The investigation of the land was thus at the same time a divination of the future. A Santa! invocation, 
recited probably on occasion of propitiating the new land, asked the sun to illuminate the scattered 
signs that lay embedded in the earth:
O Sun, sin bonga, in heaven like a bamboo-mat you are spread, the four corners, the four worlds you have covered
and you, the five and six of the earth, in your name, as you see here, in the new soil, the new forest we are seeking
signs, this you show to us, the milk as milk, and the water as water, having judged show it to us.147
This ‘lack’ of categorical opposition between visualisable space and memorable time was 
attributed by colonial modern intellectuals to a more fundamental ‘primitive’ lack -  the lack of abstract 
thought. The geologist, Valentine Ball, distinguished the Santals from ‘other natives of India’ on the 
ground that while the latter demonstrated accurate ideas of spatial distance, the Santals, despite their 
habitual nomadism, did not. Instead of expressing distance as a prior knowledge of the number of 
miles to be traversed, the Santal would just carry a sa/-tree branch with him. When the leaves 
became so dry as to crumble to dust, the Santal would say that a kos or two miles had been passed -  
as if ‘a kos would be short in hot or dry rather than cold or damp seasons’.148 Evidently the Santals’ 
seemed to grasp distance in terms of the effort spent in traversing it, which depended not only on the 
abstract measurable length of the path but on the time of the day and the season. Instead of 
articulating the path in terms of a pre-given knowledge of distance, this mode of tracing land invested 
the path itself with the temporality of travel as a practice. Distance had no meaning unless it was 
practically and actively traced. In other words, in Santal narrations of travel, space was not 
enunciated as an idea but only in so far as it was traversed, and traversable, in practice and in time. 
This investment of time in apparently inanimate nature was interpreted by contemporary 
ethnographers as ‘primitive animism’ -  where land and nature were seen to manifest lives and times. 
Since ‘primitives’ were incapable of abstract thought, they operated under a fundamental confusion of 
categories, between universal ‘ideas’ like space and time and concrete ‘things’ like land and 
people.149 From this ‘lack’ of ideas of abstract time and space, it was a small conceptual leap to 
formulating the ‘primitive’ condition as ‘lacking’ temporality itself. The next chapter analyses this 
temporal politics of abstraction in the context of money, market and the ‘primitive’.
Conclusion
The Santal refusal to envision space as a strictly a-temporal category posed a problem for 
nationalism. If space, like time, was invested with the irreversibility and momentum of social practice, 
space would seem as differentiated and as un-aggregable as time itself. In Bengali discourse, 
however, space was precisely meant to neutralise temporal contradictions. True, in nineteenth-
147 Ibid I-have slightly changed the translation from Bedding’s.
148 Ball, Jungle Life, p. 235.
149 Handbook of Castes and Tnbes, p. 17.
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century Bengali imagination, the space of the nation did not always appear as an abstract territorial 
category. The nation was often imagined as the valorised body of the mother-in-chains. Even castes 
were imagined as limbs of the unitary body of the original sacrificial purusha, Brahma, whose head 
represented the brahmana and feet the sudra. However, this nationalist personification of space was 
a self-conscious ‘literary’ strategy, a deployment of metaphor, meant to reclaim differentiated space 
as integrated body-politic. Space was not imagined as body in the first place, body was a metaphor 
for and therefore external and discontinuous to the ‘reality’ of space. For the Santals, however, the 
simultaneous enunciation of space and time was not a mode of literary figuration but a practical 
imperative. In Santal practices of travel and quest, space appeared neither as a category of 
knowledge, nor as the Other of time, nor as the essence of the always-already present nation. Land- 
names did not, either metaphorically or conceptually, re-present pasts. Land appeared as that which, 
like time, was traversed and passed and which, like time, was repeatedly lost.
By refusing to de-temporalise space, the Santal seemed to refuse his/her own spatial 
incorporation into the nation. It was this ‘primitive’ resistance to spatial aggregation that called for the 
forcible transportation and circulation of ‘tribes’ as pure body-commodities. If the constitution of 
'primitives’ into pure bodies seemed to somewhat mollify their temporal alterity, it also produced 
amongst Bengalis an anxiety about their own masculinity.150 Once bodily-ness was relegated to a 
non-contemporary, ‘primitive’ Other, the self-consciously cerebral and moralistic historical subject- 
authorfelt emaciated and effete. As Hunter said, Bengalis had become effeminate because they had 
always delegated bodily labour to the ‘aborigine’.151 As colonial modernity sought to de-temporalise 
and commodify ‘primitives’ by making them pure bodies, they seemed to become increasingly 
desirable, as if possessing the secret of unabstracted sensuousness, which the bhadrolok seemed 
incapable of enjoying unconditionally. This produced the Bengali aesthetic imagination of ‘primitives’ 
as sensuous and uninhibited figures -  to be painted, sculpted, filmed and desired. Even as 
Bankimchandra invoked the need to ‘Aryanise’ the ‘primitive’, his brother Sanjivchandra 
Chattopadhyay seemed to desire and recall the pure ‘aborigine’ in almost a therapeutic mode. At one 
point in his career, Sanjiv was compelled to spend some time in Palamau, a forest-land peopled by 
the Kols, a cognate ‘tribe’ of the Santals. In a very short time, Sanjiv returned home, unable to stand 
the isolation of the ‘primitive’ land, comparing his stay in Palamau to the exile of Rama in the forests. 
For a long time he seemed reluctant to even talk about it. Yet, in his old age, Sanjiv, at his own 
initiative, wrote up his memories of Palamau. It was this essay which made Sanjivchandra famous -  
Rabindranath Thakur later talked of it in euphoric terms and ‘Palamau’ became a compulsory reading 
for university students of Bengali literature.152
150 Indira Chowdhury-Sengupta, ‘The Effeminate and the Masculine: Nationalisrrrand-the Concept of Race in Colonial Bengal’, 
In The Concept of Race in South Asia, ed. Peter Robb, Delhi, 1995.
151 Hunter, Annals, pp. 138-39.
152 Asitkumar Bandopadhyay, ‘Introduction’ to Sanjiv Rachanavali, Calcutta, 1970, pp. 39-40.
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In this account, published as a serial between 1880 and 1882 in Bankim’s magazine 
Bangadarshan, Sanjivchandra re-negotiated both the concept of space and the image of the ‘primitive’ 
body. On the one hand, he acknowledged the limits of his knowledge and abstract thought. He 
admitted that ‘in the hills, the Bengali is incapable of ascertaining distances’. His own vision was so 
limited by his own context, that initially he was incapable of envisioning the Kol land as anything other 
than an uninterrupted expanse of blinding forests. Only later did he find that Palamau was as 
variegated a land as any -  marked by rivers, villages and peoples. On the other hand, Sanjiv 
admitted that his visit to Palamau had irrevocably altered his idea of the ‘primitive’. He had always 
found ‘tribes’ to be ugly, when he saw them being transported to Calcutta or through Calcutta to the 
north-eastern tea-gardens. Yet in the interiors of Palamau, the Kols appeared unbearably beautiful 
and sensuous. He believed that even in old age, Kol women remained young.153 And that no woman 
can laugh and dance as much as a ‘primitive’ Kol woman:
All of the same height, the same black colour of stone, bare-bodied, on their naked breasts mirrors sparkle in the
moonlight. Wild flowers in their hair and ears, smile on their lips. Brimming with pleasure, restless with pleasure,
like a quivering, impatient mare, straining their bodies against the reins. ... If there can be a clamour of the body, then
in the bodies of these young women [I saw] an outbreak of tumult.154
In contrast to this ‘free’ sensuality of Kol women, the limits of the author’s own body became apparent. 
Sanjiv could never keep up with the Kols as they travelled miles by foot. To Sanjiv, the Kols seemed 
more valorous than not only the Bengali, but even the conquering British. Since the ‘primitives’ had 
no abstract notion of ‘cause and consequence’, they were audacious and daring like no one else.
In his old age, Sanjivchandra Chattopadhyay admitted, his only pleasurable memories were 
the memories of the forest land of Palamau. It was a memory of his encounter with the ‘primitive’, a 
memory which he had repeatedly denied when he was young, a memory from the ‘sub-conscious’, ‘as 
if from another life’.156 Thus, it was in Sanjiv -  known as the lesser sibling of Bankim, the epitome of 
nineteenth-century Bengali historical consciousness -  that we see the mutual articulation of the 
processes discussed in this chapter. These were the seemingly independent processes -  that of 
Bengali travel into ‘tribal’ lands following colonial administrative incursions and penetration of the 
‘interior’; that of the circulation of ‘tribes’ to tea-gardens which made the ‘primitives’, as Sanjiv said, 
look ‘ugly’ in comparison; and that of the Bengali bhadrolok's uneasy realisation that he had indeed 
abdicated the sensuous and the valorous to the ‘primitive’ in his own pursuit of knowledge, abstraction 
and morality. As an author known, especially in comparison to his brother, to be unsystematic and 
uncaring about literary pursuits, Sanjivchandra seemed to articulate, though without really formulating 
it, the realisation that behind the image of the cerebral bhadrolok lay the effective and violent 
abstraction and transportation of the ‘primitive’ body. That behind the image of the poetic Bengali lay 
the invasive intent of modern transport, the unpacking of hidden spaces of forests and hills, where, it 
was said, the ‘primordial’ had retreated before even the beginning of history, before the ‘original’ 
aggression of the Aryan historical-subject. Sanjivchandra's text ‘Palamau’ thus brought together all
153 Sanjivchandra Chattopadhyay, ‘Palamau’ in Sanjiv RachanavalL, p. 381.
154 Ibid., p. 393.
155 Ibid., p. 387.
158 Ibid, pp. 401-2.
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these processes as generative of both Bengali identity and Bengali self-criticism. Here one may 
anticipate the next chapter. Sanjivchandra wondered why ‘primitives’ -  who were courageous, tough 
and resilient enough to tame forests, beasts and epidemics -  were dying out in modern times. The 
answer, he said, lay in moneylending. ‘Just as Jewish moneylenders had once wreaked havoc on the 
“uncivilised” English’, today Kols were being killed by indebtedness.157 In the times of colonial 
modernity, even the strongest and the most ‘primitive’, Sanjiv said, could not resist the power of 
money.
157 Ibid., p. 39S.
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IV
Money, Thought and the ‘Primitive’: exchange and the politics of time
Logic -  mind's coin of the realm, the speculative or mental value 
of man and nature -  its essence which has grown totally 
indifferent to all real determinations, and hence unreal -  is 
alienated thinking, and therefore thinking which abstracts from 
nature and from real man: abstract thinking.
— Karl Marx1
If there was anything which made ‘primitives’ absolutely different from ‘historical’ societies, it was -  in 
nineteenth-century Bengali perception -  the rationality of money. Colonialism had demonstrated to 
the middle-class Bengali not only that exchange was a source of unlimited political power, but also 
that monetary competence historically coincided with unlimited and universal knowledge. At least, 
that seemed to be the lesson of Western modernity -  that the power of money was, indeed, also the 
power of the abstract Idea. Nationalist discourse therefore invoked both knowledge and commerce, in 
the same breath, as the two absolutes which the nation must strive for.2 By the same logic, it 
constructed the ‘primitive’ as a being inherently incapable of just these two. By the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the Santal came to be characterised by his/her perpetual debt to Bengali 
moneylenders and traders, who had followed colonial revenue officials into the newly established 
markets of the ‘interior’. S/he thus became the empirical proof of the ‘primitive’ condition, where 
people lacked the temporal foresight and the numerical ability required for credit management. 
Indeed, s/he appeared to lack that very sense of abstract time, in which money generated interest and 
knowledge generated long-term predictions and programmes. The Bengali middle classes, therefore, 
counterpoised modernity -  where time was incremental, continuous and chronological and the subject 
capable of abstraction and universal laws -  to the ‘primitive’ condition, where time was immediate and 
unpredictable and the subject imprisoned in the particular, the sensual and the practical modes of 
existence. This chapter analyses the processes by which money came to become, in colonial Bengal, 
the sign of the modern, thinking subject and the mark of the fundamental ‘primitive’ lack.
1 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in Collected Works III, Moscow, 1975, p. 330.
2 The centrality of education in colonial Bengal is well known. For the centrality of the idea of the market, see Bipan Chandra, 
The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India 1880-1905, New Delhi, 1966; Satish Deshpande, ‘Imagined 
Economies: Styles of Nation-building in Twentieth Century India’, Journal of Arts and Ideas, XXV-VI, T993.
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The chapter begins with a discussion of the processes which reconfigured Bengalis and 
‘primitives’ as non-contemporary entities. The colonial state physically circumscribed Santals from 
neigbouring, permanently-settled regions and by the force of law and revenue administration, tried to 
replace all direct and political relations between the ‘aborigine’ and the Hindu by relations of pure 
monetary exchange. The Santal and the Hindu no longer remained just antagonistic co-presences, in 
the image of the arya and the anarya, the civilised and the barbarian, the elite and the plebian, the 
moral and the immoral. They became non-contemporary, existing in succession rather than in 
simultaneity. Once the Santal was removed from the time (and space) of the Bengali, they could no 
longer confront each other without mediation. In other words, pasts and ‘primitives’ could no longer 
come face to face with the Bengali, without first being re-presented in the site of the present and in the 
time of the modern. This chapter argues that representation -  the simulated presence of an entity 
which is actually absent from the time of the representing subject -  was the foundational act of 
colonial modernity. And representation, as an act of temporal negotiation, was possible only through 
the analogy of money and reason -  both abstract and purely a-contextual ideas which could 
exchange and translate not only inequivalent entities, but also incommensurable times. This 
becomes all the more evident, if the discussion is set off against a reading of Georg Simmers 1900 
text The Philosophy of Money, a text which formulated reason and money as simultaneous and 
synonymous achievements of modernity, and which constantly returned to ethnological Others to 
prove the universality of this teleology.3 Surely, Simmel and Bengali intellectuals never read each 
other, though both did read Herbert Spencer. It seems all the more telling, therefore, that, to 
conceptualise the idea of money and modernity, both needed and invoked the ‘primitive’ in exactly the 
same manner.
Giving money to the ‘primitive’: the ‘civilising’ force of exchange
The forest-land of Damin-I-Koh, to be named after the Santals in 1856, was originally inhabited by the 
Paharias. To the East India Company, the new revenue dewan of Bengal, these Paharias seemed to 
be a violent ‘primitive’ people who ‘always had been, and always would be, at open war with society in 
general’.4 in the early 1780s, W. Hodges noted that the Hindus of the plains shunned Paharias as a 
rule.5 In the 1820s, Bishop Heber found the Paharias ‘making forays’ into the plains and the 
‘Muhammedan zamindars killing them like mad dogs or tigers’.6 Apparently, ‘hillmen’ and 
‘plainspeople’, like the West and the colony, were closed off from each other and literally and 
metaphorically, at war. This colonial presupposition anxiously tried to deny the fact that in pre-colonial 
times Paharias existed in active political negotiation with the landlords of the plains. Zamindars often
3 2nd ed., 1-907, London, 1990.
4James Browne, India Tracts Containing a Description of the Jungle Terry Districts, London, 1788, p. 76.
5 W. Hodges, Travels in India during the Years 1780, 1781, 1782 & 1783, London, 1793, pp. 88,92-3.
6 Quoted in L. S. S. O’Malley, Bengal District Gazetteers: Santal Parganas, Calcutta, 1910, p. 35.
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employed Paharias to fight other zamindars and even to support rivals in succession.7 In fact, plains- 
people often disguised themselves as Paharias before making incursions on individual landlords.8 It 
was not as if Paharias and plainspeople were homogenous. Yet, differences, neither absolute nor 
temporal, gave Paharias the power to negotiate the probably better-armed regimes of the landlords. 
Paharias specialised in tapping forest resources, in archery and in modes of guerilla and ambush 
warfare like no one else. Zamindars therefore had to align with, feast and even give tributes to 
Paharias. As Haroo Paharia recalled, by custom the Paharia chief was annually given a hundred 
rupees from the revenue of the locality, until the land was monopolised by the company-government.9 
Clearly, the Paharias had had a place in the general political hierarchy of the region. In fact, an entire 
category of people called bundwaries used to learn the Paharia language and negotiate with them on
behalf of the zamindars. And in the great famine of 1770, many low-country Hindus went to live with
10the Paharias, who knew how to survive on forest produce even in times of absolute scarcity.
These direct political relations seemed not only disturbing, but also inexplicable to colonial 
authorities -  since Paharias ‘in stature, features, language and manner ...differed] as much from the 
subjects of Bengal as ...[Bengalis did] from the Natives of Africa’.11 James Browne, who led the 
colonial army in the 1770s against the elusive Paharias of Rajmahals, argued that Rajmahai was 
literally an ‘island’, unconnected to any other hills and peopled by absolutely isolated ‘primitives'. The 
clinching ‘fact’ of Paharia isolation, to Browne, was that they had no caste and ‘of all things forbidden 
to the ... Hindoos, not one [was] forbidden to them’. Even though the ‘aborigines’ and the Hindus 
were spatially proximate, they were, as John Briggs concluded in mid-nineteenth century, absolute 
opposites.12 It thus seemed imperative that all unregulated relationships between the Paharias and 
the ‘civilised’ Hindus must be forbidden. Browne suggested that zamindars should maintain village- 
registers and banish all unrecorded individuals from their estates, and that police-posts surrounding 
the hills should prevent Paharias from mingling with plains-people.13 Once the ‘primitive’ Paharias 
were thus physically and conceptually closed off from ‘historical’ society, colonial officials argued, they 
must be supplied with enough money to engage in ‘peaceful’ exchange with the Bengalis. Augustus 
Cleveland, collector of Bhagalpur, wrote to Warren Hastings in 1780 that ‘the disbursement and, of 
course, circulation of money in the hills by Government appears to me the most likely bait to ensure 
the attachment of the [Paharia] chiefs, and at the same time ... the civilisation of the inhabitants’.14 It 
was by virtue of this insight, about the ‘civilising’ force of money, that Cleveland was named, by both 
colonial officials and Bengalis, as the pioneer who, by a ‘rational mode of domination’ and ‘without 
bloodshed or the terror of authority’ ‘inspired’ in the ‘primitive’ Paharias, *the arts of civilised life’.15
7 Browne to- W. Hastings, 21 Dec 1777, Bengal Revenue-ProGeedings-(hereafter BRP), P/50/7, OIOC.
8 Browne, quoted in Collector, Bhagalpur to Hastings, 30 April 1778, BRP P/50/9, OIOC.
9 Fombelle, Magistrate, Bhagalpur to Tucker, Sub-Secretary, Govt, of Bengal, 27 Sept 1797, Bhagalpur Judicial Records 
(hereafter BHJR).
Browne, India Tracts, pp. 81-4.
^Gov-Gen. to Mr. Wheeler, in passing through Bhagalpur by the Ganga, 16 Feb 1781, BRP P/50/32, OIOC.
12 Two Lectures on the Aboriginal Races of India, as Distinguished from the Sanskritic or Hindu Race’, Journal of RoyatAsiatic 
Society of Great Britain and Ireland, XIII, 1852, pp. 275-309.
13 Brown, India Tracts, pp. 73-4, 85.
T<r Quoted in O’Malley, Santal Parganas, p. 39.
^Inscription on memorial stone in Bhagalpur, quoted in O’Malley, Santa!Parganas, p. 41.
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Governor-General John Shore himself wrote a monody on Cleveland, and Hastings wrote the epitaph 
for his grave. Undoubtedly, then, Cleveland and his Scottish Enlightenment ideas about money, 
drawn from Adam Smith, David Hume and Adam Fergusson, formed a significant dimension of early 
colonialism in India.16
If, at the end of the eighteenth century and in context of the ‘violent’ Paharias, Cleveland 
expressed the ‘civilising’ intent of money, at the end of the nineteenth century and in Germany, Georg 
Simmel philosophised money as the universal principle of peace. Simmel argued, quite like 
Cleveland, that ‘primitives’, instead of trading and working, preferred to ‘plunder’. Plunder was the 
‘normatively unregulated seizure of what [was] immediately desired’. Money, however, indicated 
exchange under ‘supra-personal and normative regulation’, because money represented the temporal 
distance, the awaiting, between desire and its satisfaction, between subject and object. For a 
‘primitive’, the ‘object’ of desire and knowledge existed as merely a thing of immediate satisfaction. 
S/he therefore had no idea of means and mediation, no idea of money, no temporal sense of deferral, 
and no grasp over tools like machinery and state.17 Cleveland similarly argued that Paharias existed 
in a condition of unpremeditated and immediate subsistence-acts, to them ‘the means appealed] as a 
secondary consideration’.18 ‘Primitive’ violence was therefore impossible to tame by the power of the 
state and administration -  Cleveland remarked that Paharias remained withdrawn, unresponsive and 
slippery, impossible to reach through juridical authority.19 They, therefore, could only be tamed by 
money.
In the 1770s, Browne had noticed that Rajmahai suffered from the absence of money, both as 
a means and as an idea: ‘there is no Influx of money to the country from trade, in the least equal to 
the sum taken in the collections ... [the inhabitants are] obliged to borrow at a high rate of interest to 
pay their rents’.20 Trade was necessarily small, the forest-produce which Paharias exchanged was 
perishable and bulky, and could only be locally traded. Money was therefore unnecessary, ‘the 
greater number ... bartered] Indian corn and other grain that grows in the hills in exchange for 
liquor’.21 In fact, trade was a disadvantage -  if bought against money, Paharias would receive an 
exceedingly small measure per rupee, not because grains were scarce, but because coins 
themselves were. In Rajmahai, a limited trade was carried on by non-local Bengalis and Biharis, who 
maintained outposts in the forests. The Bengali traders bartered their ‘inconsiderable cargo’ of cloth, 
betel nut, salt and spices for large quantities of Paharia forest produce, which they resold elsewhere 
for cash. The viability of this trade was founded on the system of barter, a trade which would ‘be 
destructive to one who attempted it on any other terms’. 22 W. W. Hunter later wrote that whatever 
money might have been in circulation in this area was actually put out of circulation by the colonial
16 P. J, Marshalland G. Williams, The Great Map of Mankind, London, 1982. See discussion in Seema Alavi, The Sepoy&and 
the Company 1770-1830, Delhi, 1995, p. 171.
17 Simmel, Money, p. 97.
18 Q'MaLley, Santal Parganas, p. 38.
19 Browne to Hastings, 29 July 1777, BRP P/50/1, OIOC.
2a Browne, India Tracts, p. 15.
21 Fombelle to Tucker, Sub-Secretary to Govt, of Bengal, 22 Oct 1796, BHJR.
22 Browne, India TraGts, pp. 15-21.
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government itself. In the 1790s the government soaked up all the liquidity as revenue and re-invested 
it in its war with Tipu Sultan. In any case, once Cornwallis decided that debased pre-colonial coins 
were to be accepted only after appropriate devaluation, there was a complete loss of purchasing 
power in the area.23
In this ‘chaotic’ world without money, Cleveland intended to introduce the civilisational time of 
exchange, by paying a monthly cash-pension to each and every Paharia chief.24 Even their intrinsic 
violence could be traded against cash, by recruiting them as paid sepoys of the Hill Rangers. In 
exchange for money, the government could buy the Paharia sardar*s consent to annually assemble at 
Bhagalpur and sit in trial over Paharia ‘criminals’ and the Paharia sepoy’s promise to apprehend 
Paharia ‘plunderers’ and maintain ‘tranquility’. This was no exceptional circumstance -  this technique 
of ‘paying’ the tribes’ in exchange for peace was also employed in the Malabar and Gujrat frontiers.26 
This trade promised to be effective because, except for the colonial state, the ‘primitives’ possessed 
no other source of money: ‘except the species that goes into the hills through the medium of the 
pensions granted by the government and of the pay to the corps of the Hill Rangers, the inhabitants of 
the hills have no other pecuniary resources’.27 However, what the colonial state could not anticipate 
was that money in itself was not enough, that money was neither necessary nor ‘naturally’ desired by 
the Paharias in every context. As the magistrate of Bhagalpur noted, even after ten years of being 
regularly given cash, money seemed to have left no permanent mark on Paharias.28 Paharia sardars 
very often failed to even turn up to receive their pensions, despite government threats that ‘tribal’
on
headship was conditional on their accepting money honorariums from the state. Nor was money 
exclusively controlled by the state. Bengali merchants devalued the copper paisa so much that 
Paharias found coins to be useless things.30 To stabilise the idea of money amongst ‘tribes’, some 
officials suggested the use of gold coins. But the ‘primitives’ were ‘almost, if not entirely ignorant of 
the relative value of Gold...there [would] be much difficulty in prevailing on them to acquiesce in that 
mode of payment’.31 The Paharias therefore continued to ‘plunder’32 and local officials continued to 
recommended more money.33 They were even allowed to keep part of the plunder, if they promised 
to enforce order amongst their own people.34
The little amount of money the Paharias received, instead of investing in saleable 
commodities, they spent on liquor. Paharias thus ironically reversed the ‘civilising’ impact of money, 
money seemed to promote further indiscriminate drinking, which the colonial officials saw as the 
singular characteristic of the ‘primitive’ condition. Officials were outraged to find that the pensioned
23 W . W. Hunter, Annals of Rural Bengal, London, 1868, pp,-289-907 311-21.
24 Cleveland, Collector, Bhagalpur to Secy., Govt, of Bengal, 19 Sept 1780, BRP P/50/30, OIOC.
25 Cleveland to-Secy., Govt, of Bengal, 21 April 1780, BRP P/50/24, OIOC.
26 Alavir The. Sepoys, p. 156.
27 Fombelle to Tucker, Sub-Secretary, Govt, of Bengal, 22 Oct 1796, BHJR.
28 Fombelle to John Shore, Gov-Gen., 11 Jan 1793, BHJR.
28 Fombelle to Sub-Secretary, Govt, of India, Jan 1802, Board Collections (hereafter BC) F/4/943.
30 Fombelle to Shore, 21 Feb 1794, BHJR.
31 Fombelle to Secy., Govt, of Bengal, 4  July 1794, BHJR.
32 Fombelle to Shore, 31 March 1795, BHJR; arzee from Abdool Rasool Khan, Hill sezawal, 8 April 1795, BHJR.
33 Fombelle to Shore, 29 June 1795, BHJR.
34 Lieut. T. Shaw, Comm-Off., Hill Rangers to Fombelle, 16 July 1795, BHJR.
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Paharia chiefs actually considered ‘crimes’ forgivable, if committed in a drunken state. That despite 
this, for fear of political unrest, the government continued to supply ‘primitives’ with money and with 
cheap liquor.35 Apart from spending their money on liquor, the Paharias participated in, what the 
officials felt to be, a rather suspect trade with wandering marginals like sannyasis, fakirs, banjars and 
nats, accused of as much disorderliness as the ‘primitives’ themselves36 In fact, the ‘primitives’ 
seemed to turn the fact of money-payment into an argument against the colonial government itself. 
Commissioner J. P. Ward -  who argued that Paharias be replaced as a group by a more ideal-typical 
‘primitive’, the Santals -  complained that by being given money, the former had acquired
an idea that they occupy the hills as an independent nation, that as they contribute nothing to Government, on the 
contrary receive from the state very liberal pensions, they cannot be regarded as tenants of the government but 
rather as occupants of the hills of their own immediate right, with their goodwill and affection to the Government 
purchased at the expense of pensions to their chief.37
That is, money confirmed the Paharia’s ‘proprietorship’ of the hills and the forests. When the 
government offered them forest-land on condition that they reclaim it, Paharias made applications not 
for individual grants, but for the entire Damin territory as their natural des or country 38
It thus seemed clear that no amount of money could ‘pacify’ the Paharias into production for 
the market and into regular trade. Paharias considered ‘ploughing’ an unnecessary violation of the 
earth -  which offered, without interference, timber, firewood, gum, honey, lac and khut, and which 
could be bartered for grain, tobacco and cloth.39 In fact, even today Paharias generally refuse to clear 
forests, they cultivate beans which grow entwined with older trees and accuse the land-clearing 
Santals of deforestation40 By the 1820s, therefore, it appeared as if Paharias, who neither cleared 
forests nor laboured in the field, were not ‘tribal’ enough to be granted the legal exemptions, which a 
modern state owed to the ‘primitive’. Far from existing in isolated ‘primitivism’, Paharias in fact, like 
the typical ‘Hindu’ landlord, rented out their foothills to Santals.41 It seemed imperative then, to 
replace the Paharias by a more suitable ‘primitive’. For the colonial state, this more suitable ‘primitive’ 
was the Santal, who seemed, to the authorities, more amenable to control, to forest-clearance and to 
‘tribal’ autarchy. The colonial authorities argued, mostly in retrospect, that Paharias did not exhibit the 
intrinsic ‘primordiality’ of the Santals. The colonial ethnologist was familiar with local ballads about the 
brave Paharias who had defended the Rajmahai hill-passes against the Marathas. Yet to them, the 
Paharias did not seem as ‘muscular’ and as strong as the Santals. Thomas Shaw remarked that 
Paharias did not even live long enough to have to count their years 42
The Paharias seemed as ‘arid’ as the hills to which they confined themselves. If they had 
ever had the body of a stereotypical ‘primitive’, they had eroded it by mixing with mainstream society. 
For, unlike authentic ‘tribes’, the Paharias had no totem-system which prevented indiscriminate
35 Fombelle to Tucker, Sub-Secretary, Govt, or Bengal, 22 Oct 1796, BHJR.
30 Fombelle to Committee Investigating the State of Police in Bhagalpur, 31 July 1799. BHJR.
37 J. R-. Ward, Commissioner, Bhagalpur to Secretary, Board of Revenue of- Lower Province, 17 August 1827, Dumka Record 
Room (hereafter DRR).
38 Ibid.
39 Pontet to Collector, Bhagalpur, 2 July 1839, DRR.
40 Samar Kumar Mallick, Transformation of Santal Society: Prelude to Jharkhand, Calcutta, 1993, p. 113.
41 Report by Sutherland to Board of Revenue, 8 June 1819, BC (1827-28), F/4/953, OIOC.
42Thomas Shaw, ’On the Inhabitants of the Hills near Rajmahall’, Journal of Asiatic Research, IV, 1792, p. 107.
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marriages and intermingling.43 Mark the contrast to the image of the Santal, which, as discussed in 
the last chapter, was constructed as that of an inherently powerful body. Paharia ‘origin myths’ 
claimed that Paharias, Hindus and even the English were brothers. They, therefore, failed to 
categorically distinguish themselves from mainstream society. 44 Neither were the Paharias an 
internally homogeneous community, as the ‘primitive’ was supposed to be. They sometimes existed 
as ‘absolute aboriginals’ isolated in hills, sometimes as ‘semi-civilised’ Hindus who were hostile to 
those amongst themselves who ‘ate beef. Thus, as Oldham noted in 1880, unlike the communitarian 
Santals, Paharias were ‘each man his own sardar’ -  ‘any cohesiveness that the Maler had was 
entirely due to the physical character of their situation; any which they still have is solely due to 
Cleveland’s [monetary] system'.45 In other words, the Paharias would disperse into mainstream 
society the moment their money pensions were cut off. Moreover, unlike true ‘primitives’, Paharias 
had a ‘code of morals’. Oldham remarked that 'each successive step of removal from the original’ had 
had a ‘moral’ impact on the Paharias.46 Even though they drank as much alcohol as the Santals, they 
had come to grasp the idea of morality and time -  the idea that sins of this life were punished in the 
next, the sinner might even transmigrate as an animal. This sense of time beyond life and memory 
was a sensibility definitionally absent in ‘primitive’. Bainbridge argued that unlike Santals, Paharias 
were not imprisoned by legends of an ambiguous, ‘mythical’ far past -  in this, they were potentially 
historical in a way in which a pure ‘primitive’ could never be.47 Writing in the earty twentieth century, 
the first Indian anthropologist S. C. Roy remarked upon the absence of ‘tribal’ traits like totems and 
exogamous clans amongst Paharias. In fact, S. C. Roy noted that Paharias exhibited a rather fast 
pace of internal transformation. Between the 1906 account by Bainbridge and the 1938 account by S. 
S. Sarkar, the Paharias had abolished the entire institution of common dormitories for the young. This 
was unlike the typical ‘primitive’, who changed, if at all, extremely slowly.48
Bounding the ‘primitive’: land, market and the Santals
By the 1830s, therefore, colonial officials in Damin-I-Koh had decided to replace the ‘not-quite- 
primitive’ Paharias by the ideal-typical tribe’ of the Santals.49 Once Santals were settled in Damin, it 
was administered as a purely ‘primitive’ land, physically circumscribed against mainstream society. 
And once the ‘primitives’ were literally fenced-in and bounded, the colonial state systematically 
instituted markets as ‘neutral’ sites of exchange between them and the ’historical’ Bengalis. This 
strategy of containment and consequent monetisation reconfigured the locations of the ‘primitive’ and 
the ‘historical’ in such a way that they were no longer able to interact without the moment of mediation
43 R. B. Bainbridge, The Saorias-of the Rajmahai Hills'-, Memoirs ofAsiatic Society of Bengal //, 1907-10, pp-. 43-4.
44 Shaw, On the Inhabitants, pp. 46-7.
45 W . B. Oldham, Some Historical and Ethnical Aspects of the Burdwan Distriet, Calcutta, 1894, pp. 23-4.
46 Ibid., pp. 10-12.
47 Bainbridge, 'The Saorias1, pp. 48-9.
48 Sarat Chandra Roy, 'Introduction', in Sasanka Sekhar Sarkar, The Malers of the Rajmahai Hills, Calcutta, 1938, pp. ix-xi.
49 Hunter, Annals, pp. 216-27.
96
and translation by money and by the colonial-modern state. In this way, it can be argued, exchange 
and the state emerged as the precondition of ‘primitive’ presence, in the time of modernity.
We have seen in the last chapter how Santals constantly moved over lands in order to escape 
colonial attempts to fix them to one location. These travels must have brought Santals into contact 
with many non-Santal peoples. It was precisely such unregulated encounters which the colonial 
authorities sought to prevent. To enforce the Santal’s categorical containment, Damin was physically 
fenced off from neighbouring permanently-settled lands, such that no ‘historical’ entity, except the 
colonial state, could directly access the ‘primitive’ 50 A 295 mile boundary of masonry pillars was 
constructed from Nowadah to the base of the Dumuriah hill, to Pertaulpur foot-hills and stretching upto 
the hill Kutheharry.51 Initially a combination of natural frontiers and pillars, it soon became clear that 
this ‘tribal’ boundary had to be made more absolute in nature. As late as in 1853 the revenue 
surveyor Pratt complained that the ‘primitive’ presence seemed to be spilling beyond the original 
boundary mapped by Captain Tanner, for the Santals continued to travel beyond the demarcation-line 
and to put up pillars post-facto to mark new boundaries.52 in other words, despite the boundary, 
Santals and ‘outsiders’ seemed to continue direct negotiations. The colonial government, therefore, 
instructed local administrators to erect additional posts and poWce-chowkies at small intervals, to stop 
the ‘tribe’ from crossing into non-‘tribaP locations 53 It was also argued that the boundary must be 
made purely cartographic, precisely mathematical and in straight lines wherever possible. Natural 
frontiers, the government argued, tended to be tampered with by the ‘primitives’ and by nature itself. 
After all, roads could be redirected54 and even the river Ganga shifted its course in time.55
Once cartographic lines replaced experienced and ‘natural’ frontiers, encountered in everyday 
travels and crossings, Damin appeared as a representational space, rather than as purely a land. 
From their encounter with the Paharias, the colonial authorities had learnt the danger of defining a 
people in terms of their natural landscape. Such a definition held within it the danger that the 
inhabitants could claim the land as organically their own. The cartographic boundary, on the other 
hand, ensured the indispensability of the cartographer, of the totalising gaze which could envision the 
variegated landscape as a whole and aid the locals to interpret and admit conceptual boundaries as 
‘real’ ones. The Damin boundary was therefore perpetuated by the colonial state, not so much as the 
perimeter of a country, but as a line dividing two kinds of conceptual terrains -  the wild land of 
‘primitives’ and the permanently-settled land of the mainstream Indian peasant. It differentiated two 
kinds of potential productive-times, the primordial time of sporadic and pure bodily labour and the 
continuous time of sedentary culture. It was to make Santals acknowledge and conform to this 
conceptual/temporal boundary, that the colonial state became a necessary and continuous presence 
in ‘tribal’ lands. And once Santals were enclosed within this ‘primitive’ time-space, they could no
50 Asst. CollectoFtoColl., Bhagalpur, 13 April 1830, DRR.
51 Ibid.
52 Coll., Bhagalpur to Pontet, 31 March 1853, DRR.
33 Ibid.
54 Coll. to Brown, Commissioner of Revenue, Bhagalpur, 6 July 1853, DRR.
55 Coll. to Brown, 19 May, 6 August, 14 August 1853, DRR.
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longer flee the state. The entire Damin was integrated by newly-built roads, which the colonial official 
followed in his chase and capture of the mobile 'primitive’. This obsessive building of roads is 
recorded in great detail in the reports of Pontet, superintendent of Damin-I-Koh. By 1849, he proudly 
claimed to have induced the Santals to build about 350 miles of roads in the ‘interiors’. In fact, Pontet 
argued that roads were more significant in the long-term than immediate success in revenue 
collection. For it was roads which enabled the revenue-collector to track-down and arrest the 
wandering Santals within the boundary of the ‘primitive’ land.56
Earlier, Santal villages were a moving assembly of people, identified in terms of their 
collective biography rather than in terms of their spatial location. With boundaries and roads however, 
Santals were immobilised into fixed locations. Village-names came to signify particular and 
permanent spatial sites.57 As Santal villages became fixed on land, border disputes became 
unprecedentedly common. Unable to travel elsewhere, Santals cleared more and more forests in one 
spot, and villages began to extend towards and confront each other. Even the cattle of one village 
grazing on the lands of another became a matter of discord. The colonial official emerged as a 
necessary arbitrator in these border-disputes. Pontet claimed that Santals had come to need and 
desire ‘kind words’ from the sahib.5Q As Damin was labelled as a ‘non-regulation’ ‘tribal’ district -  free 
of all the laws meant for the general historical subjects of the empire -  the ‘primitive’ was put in direct 
relation to the colonial state, at the exclusion of ‘foreigners’ like Bengalis. Bengalis were no longer 
‘permitted to hold land within ... the reserve for the aboriginal races’.59 If they did, as ruled in January 
1845, they would have to pay exceptionally high rents. Many Bengalis gave up their plots to the state, 
and those like Narayan Hajam and Anoop Mai who did not, hurriedly assured the government that 
they were tenants of the Santal Surmoyi Manjhi.60 Thus, not only was the ‘primitive’ excluded from 
‘outside’ historical society, the ‘historical’ too was denied presence in the ‘primitive’ location. In 1846, 
Pontet claimed that he had successfully excluded all caste Hindus and ‘civilised’ races from the 
‘primitive’ land. The few Hindus and Mussalmans who remained in Damin had been there from ‘time 
immemorial’ by virtue of Ghatwali and other extraordinary customary grants.61
Effectively circumscribed within the non-regulation land of Damin-I-Koh, Santals were now 
placed in exchange relations with the ‘outside’. Pontet argued that, since Santals were ‘innocent’ and 
‘primitive’, they could not handle direct contact with historically evolved societies. Only in the site of 
the market could there be a ‘primitive-civilised’ contact, without it degenerating into violent 
confrontations. By 1850, Pontet claimed to have ensured the ‘satisfactory’ establishment of eighteen 
full-scale markets and numerous weekly hats, as Bengali traders from Murshidabad, Birbhum and 
Calcutta took the now ‘straight and safe’ route to Bhagalpur. In Sahibgunj even boats plied. In a 
Sultanabad hat established in 1842 even English longcloth, ready-made caps and jackets were sold.
56 Annual Report by Pontet, 1848-9, DRR.
57 Sudder Board of Revenue to Secretary, Govt, of Bengal, 21 Nov 1836, DRR.
58 Pontet to Collector, Bhagalpur, Annual Report, 1-844-45, DRR.
59 Q'Mailey, Santal Parganas, p. 251.
60 Collector to Commissioner, Bhagalpur, 21 July 1851, DRR.
81 Pontet to Collector, Bhagalpur, 22 August 1846, DRR.
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In this period, numerous moneylenders and traders applied to Pontet for the opening of more markets, 
for grants of grazing-land for pack-animals, for permission to clear water-tanks adjoining potential 
market-sites, for construction of grain stores and parallel rows of shops, such that commodities on 
offer could not be missed by anyone even casually walking down the market street.62 In 1851, 
revenue-surveyor Sherwill noted that the settling and bounding of Santals in Damin coincided with the 
organisation of an ‘impressive’ trade-network across Murshidabad, Jungypur, Suri and Rajmahai.63 
Markets generally consisted of about forty shops, selling cloth, spices, salt, tobacco, betel nut and 
similar accessory items to the ‘tribes’, and buying from them, and reselling, crude iron, fuel, wood 
commodities, grains, lac, honey, kattha, mahua, ‘greens’ and similar necessary products. Though the 
Paharias were still refusing to come to the markets, selling their forest produce at most at the foot of 
the hills,64 ‘primitives’ in general had become attractive customers. Pontet claimed that ‘tribes’ were 
sought after by every market in and outside Damin, so much so that in 1845 an ‘outside’ zamindar 
was found to be seducing ‘primitives’ into his market by liquor. Pontet instructed that every Damin 
market should keep a register of attendance and that ‘tribes’ should be stopped from moving outside 
the boundary to buy and sell.65
It was not as if Santals were unfamiliar with exchange in pre-colonial times. Earlier traders 
used to travel across Damin in particular seasons and set up shops in the villages. They had a 
temporary access to the ‘tribe’, and operated on ‘tribal’ home-ground. This meant not only that 
Santals retained a certain bargaining power vis-a-vis travelling merchants, but also that merchants 
traversed and located on what later came to be ‘primitive’ spaces, temporarily occupying forested and 
cultivable spots. The colonial government objected precisely to this ambiguous overlap between 
‘primitive’ and market sites. It ruled that trade must be confined only to authorised markets. Traders 
who located on ‘tribal’ lands were to be charged high busowri tolls. A clause was inserted in all land- 
grant pattas, making the grant conditional upon Santals preventing merchants from coming and 
settling in ‘primitive’ villages.66 Traders who engaged in exchange with Santals anywhere other than 
in authorised markets were to be punished and fined.67 An explicit temporal logic emerged out of this 
colonial legislation. To the Santal, exchange became an act, distinct from and external to their 
everyday village life. It seemed as if exchange between the ‘primitive’ and the ‘historical’ was possible 
only in the bounded, colonially-settled markets, understate supervision -  ‘primitive’ locations were not 
to otherwise admit outsiders. These authorised markets emerged literally as little, bounded worlds of 
the ‘outside’, embedded into the ‘tribal’ land. The market, thus, assumed the status of the unique and 
singular ‘civilised’ site accessible to the ‘primitive’, who was cloistered for ail other practical purposes 
within the enforced ‘primordial’ boundary.
02 Pontet, Annual Report, 1848-9, DRR.
03 Pontet to Collector, Bhagalpur, 30 May 1851, DRR.
64 Pontet to Collector, Bhagalpur, 28 June-1845, DRR.
65 Pontet to Collector, Bhagalpur, 20 July 1846, DRR.
68 Collector, Bhagalpur to Pontet, 20 Oct 1854, DRR.
67 Pontet to Collector, Bhagalpur, 22 May 1852, DRR. Of course, travelling merchants could not be taxed as systematically as 
settled markets could be.
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Georg Simmel, not unlike Pontet, interpreted ‘pre-modern’ exchange as discontinuous and 
sporadic, outside the continuous time of money-circulation. To Simmel, money, the ‘greatest advance 
of mankind1, was the meta-temporal achievement of modernity -  which made two completely different 
‘qualities and peoples ... comparable and measurable by referring to a third entity, money1.68 While 
‘primitive’ modes of plunder and barter interrupted the ‘logical connection in the ideal line of the 
economic process’, money instituted continuity across the most sporadic and the most independent of 
concrete values, products and lives.69 This Simmelian philosophy of money evidently drew its 
illustrations from the kind of colonial context outlined above. The colonial event of first segregating 
and then exchanging non-contemporary worlds, produced not only the necessary stereotypes of the 
‘primordial’ and the ‘civilised1, but also the necessary idea of money as the singular abstract mediator, 
capable of negotiating incommensurable temporalities and unbreachable time-lags. Of course, 
Simmers text stops short of naming colonialism. In fact, it was through this very hiding of colonialism 
that the money-problematic was ordered in European thought. Money as a phenomenon was 
thematised in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Europe as a debate between those who 
considered money as a product of society and those who saw money to be a product of state 
legislation.70 It is the legacy of this debate that even today it is generally believed that market and 
state exist in opposition, that the freeing of market forces necessarily calls for a rolling back of the 
state. Colonialism, however, reminds us that capitalism itself was the process of market expansion 
through state politics, and the increasing pervasiveness of the state apparatus in the wake of the 
capillary spread of market and credit.
The systematic institution of markets at the apparently impermeable boundary between the 
Santal and the Bengali was, therefore at the same time, also the process of insertion of the colonial 
state between the ‘primitive1 and the ‘historical’. The Santals evidently knew that they had ‘taken the 
place1 of the Paharias via official policy. The Santals could not therefore stake an unmediated claim 
to this land by virtue of being ‘original’ inhabitants, as the Paharias could. The land remained 
estranged from them as a land which was emptied by the state of its ‘original1 people. Such a land, 
emptied of one people and filled by another, developed the characteristics of abstract space, a 
container category. Santals could not include such a land in their self-definition. For Paharias, land 
seemed to have no autonomous presence as a resource, outside the life of those who drew from and 
nurtured it. Santals however experienced Damin as a space which pre-existed their arrival, where 
they had only recently been given a place, in exchange for their promise to produce a taxable and 
marketable surplus.71 By this policy of ‘replacement1 -  of Paharias by the Santals -  the colonial state 
had engendered a primary alienation of the ‘primitive’ from his/her location. The government ruled 
that unless Santals farmed one-tenth of their land within ten years of the grant, Ihe tenures would be
63 Simmer, Money, p. 147.
69 Ibid., p. 125.
70 S. Herbert Frankel, Money: Two Philosophies, the Confiict of Trust and Authority, Oxford, 1977.
71 In. the.cQurse-of my field-work in the Dumkeregion, I foundthat the.Paharias stilLfeei that they have_heen. displacedby the 
Santals, and Santals admit to the fact that this was originally Paharia land. Significantly, the Paharias feel so alienated by the 
‘unjustifiable’ presence of Santals in Damin, that they are the only ‘tribe’ who do not all participate in demand for an 
autonomous Jharkhand state, in which they fear that Santals will become more dominant. Santals in other districts, for instance 
in Burdwan, West Bengal, however remember Dumka as their original home.
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deemed forfeitable to [the state] for future’.72 The colonial assurance, that the wild lands of Damin 
were natural to and coterminous with the ‘primitive’, was overdetermined by this constantly looming 
threat, the threat that the ‘primordial’ land of Damin could be resumed by the state if Santals failed to 
perform the stereotypical ‘primordial’ labour. This ‘primitive’ labour -  of forest-reclamation -  was no 
longer seen as conditional upon the Santals location in forest-lands but as personified in their pure 
‘primitive’ bodies. It was through this alienation of ‘primitive’ bodies from their location -  this 
necessary undoing of Buckle’s land-people equation -  that junglis were put to circulation in the 
labour-market, as discussed in the previous chapter. And it was through this alienation that the state 
could successfully insert itself between people and their land -  not only as the regime which judged 
the potential of land as resource, but also as the regime which judged the ‘primordiality’ of different 
peoples. By this judgment, Santals qualified to a ‘primitive’ status in a way in which the Paharias, 
organically entrenched in their lands, could never have.
In this novel, bounded location, Santals experienced the colonial state as omnipresent. 
Pontet and his staff constantly supervised standing crops and made Santals experiment with new 
products. They were induced to eat potato, to try growing coffee, and to cultivate oilseeds, sugarcane 
and cotton.73 ‘Primitives’ were used in cash-crop experiments because, unlike the ‘civilised’, they ate 
everything and could survive, by scavenging the forests, despite the worst of crop-failures. 
Consequently to the Santal, the familiar land became estranged and unpredictable. Between 1855 
and 1938, there were four major famines and a constant scarcity condition in Damin, as if land 
behaved differently once it was forced to yield money rather than food. Earlier, Santals cultivated only 
as much as they needed for subsistence. Rice-fields were laid out in restricted locations, in ravines 
and depressions naturally fed by the lakes and springs. The cash-imperative, enforced by the state, 
forced the extension of cash-crop cultivation even on uplands and ridges, where nothing but dry-crops 
would have been grown earlier. This raised the proportion of infertile and unprotected fields to the 
total Santal land, making it much more vulnerable to natural disasters. Once Santals were deprived of 
their right to cultivate only where and when it was safe, they became absolutely dependant, during 
scarcity times, upon the discretionary right of the state to exempt and waive revenue-claims74 In 
other words, the colonial state emerged as the necessary arbitrator exactly at the moment when 
money became the necessary mediator between the ‘primitive’ and his/her land, and between the 
‘primitive’ and the Bengali.
Time-money: debt, interest and the Santals
72 Ward's-Report, Aug 1827, DRR.
73 Locke, Collector to Brown, Commissioner, Bhagalpur, 18 Sept 1850, DRR.
74 S. C. Mukherjee ed., Bihar District Gazetteer: Santal Parganas, Patna, 1938, p. 215.
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Santals claimed that they had become lazy once money appeared in their world. They no longer 
manufactured but bought ready-made things from the market. And once they began buying, instead 
of making things, they fell into a perpetual debt to outsider-moneylenders.
In a former age there was no money, it is told, neither was there any buying and selling. All necessaries they were
earning and making ... even salt they were preparing from saline earth. Oil they were pressing from different forest
fruits, they were weaving clothes for themselves ... whether we formerly had gold or not we do not know. But in the
old country they called gold samarom.75
Those days, when the Santals worked hard, ‘rice grew ready husked, and the cotton bushes bore 
cloth all ready woven and men did not have to pick lice out of each other’s hair; men’s skull grew 
loose and each man could lift off his own skull and clean it and then replace it’. The sky was so close 
to the earth that the sun and the moon could be reached by hand. However, when the Santals 
became lazy, the sky went beyond their reach.76 In other words, when Santals produced things for 
themselves, they recognised their own labour in the things they used. Such labour came easy, as if 
rice grew ready-husked. However, once commodities were bought in the market, they could no 
longer be identified as the product of one's labour. Needs were fulfilled by the labour of others, just as 
one’s own labour was expended in satisfying strangers. Shorn from its fruits, labour became work-in- 
itself. This labour, without need, initiative and fruition, was more likely to be shirked than familiar 
labour practices. It now seemed as if work was an abstract and senseless intention, until it passed 
through the market and became purchasing power. The Santal lament about the alienation of the sky 
and the earth probably signified this sense of loss, when products of past labour no longer seemed 
familiar and accessible to the present labourers themselves.
Santals, left to themselves, were unpredictable labourers. Though capable of extreme hard 
work, they refused to extend cultivation and clear forests in excess of what they judged as necessary. 
The colonial state therefore had to enforce the idea of surplus production, as opposed to Santal 
‘indolence’.77 To show labour to be a necessary and unqualified virtue, Santals had to be familiarised 
with the idea of exchange value and money.78 They had to be taught that selling in the market was 
not merely a means of fulfilling present desires, in fact the present could be adequately fed by the 
production of use values. Selling for money was a matter of future desires, desires which could not 
even be conceived in the present. More than an immediate means of exchange, money was a 
congealed power over the future, a debt upon society which could be called in at a distant time. If 
Santals did not understand money as credit, it was because ‘primitives’ were inherently body-centric 
and non-cerebral, incapable of imagining time in the abstract, i.e. incapable of imagining a future 
which cannot be visualised and apprehended in the mode of the present. This absence of money- 
sensibility was analogous to the absence of the notion of sin amongst Santals -  both implied that the 
‘primitive’ had no anxiety about the time beyond the present. They therefore neither produced 
surplus, nor saved, nor postponed immediate satisfaction to secure the not-yet. As Reverend 
MacPhail said, the Santals were so sinfully indulgent, that they wanted holidays for every festival.
73 Koleanand Juggi Haram, Horkoren MareHapramko Reak Katha, ed. L. Q. Skrefsrud, 1887, Oslo, 1942, p, 121.
76 ‘Beginning of Things’ in Folklore of the Santal Parganas, ed. C. H. Bompas, reprint, 1981, Delhi, pp. 401-402.
77 Ward’s Report, Aug 1827, DRR.
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Each Santal village held the festival on a separate day, so that everyone could drink and dance in 
every other village, without the celebrations clashing with one another. As if this were not enough, 
Santals ‘appropriated’ their neighbours’ calendar too, celebrating even non-Santal festivals in 
characteristic alcoholic ‘frenzy’.79 Given this excessive and sinful presentism, money seemed to be 
the only short-cut by which ‘primitives’ could be reminded of the thing called future. Money could 
teach Santals the virtue of deferred consumption and surplus labour, without having to conduct them 
through centuries of civilisation. After all, purely abstract and monetised labour and purely body- 
centric and ‘primitive’ labour were both amenable to the highest velocity of circulation -  as even Marx 
said, there was indeed an apparent similarity ‘between barbarians who are fit by nature to be used for 
anything, and civilised people who apply themselves to anything’.80 Being pure bodies without culture 
or time, ‘primitives’ could be put in circulation and in any kind of work, forest-clearance, mining, tea 
plantation or railway construction. That is, the market could make ‘primitives’ simulate ‘civilised’ and 
specialised labour, which was free and abstract enough to, as Marx said, ‘apply to anything’.
Simmel argued, like the colonial officials and the missionaries, that -  unlike in ‘primitivism’, 
where the future appeared as an absolute Other to the present -  in modernity the future was captured 
and valued in the present. With money, the present came to signify the capacity, the potential and the 
chances one lown[ed] for the future’.81 Colonial officials, Bengali middle classes and Simmel all 
agreed that ‘extravagance’ was the defining trait of the ‘primitive’, which completely destroyed this 
'rational sequence of purposes’ in tim e82 If the Santal lived in festivity and extravagance, it was 
because s/he lacked a continuous time, which connected past debts to future interests. For the 
Santals, therefore, interest, the money-value of passing time, had a moral-civilisational lesson. As 
Soshee Chunder Dutt, uncle of the historian R. C. Dutt, said, it was moneylenders rather than 
missionaries who could really ‘civilise’ the aborigine: ‘the blessings of civilisation among most of the 
tribes are now mainly represented by the presence of the mahajuns, moneylenders and spirit- 
sellers’.83 This was because money liberated the imagination of time from dependence on an 
immediately present referent -  from need, desire, body and practice. Money permitted a temporal 
distance between production and consumption, sale and purchase. With money, one’s need to buy 
another’s product no longer had to coincide with the other needing one’s own. Money therefore 
enabled logical deductions across moments which were non-present and enabled thought without 
concrete referents. Money, as Simmel said, allowed foresight across ‘contradictory stages of value 
and non-value’. ‘Primitive and vacillating’ thought, however, lost its way in the intermediate, 
reference-less stages of awaiting and speculation. ‘Primitive’ thought therefore remained viable only 
‘by moving via obvious and concrete statements’ of barter and coincidences of need. ‘Primitives' 
could only manage a short temporal distance between buying and selling, thus losing the flexibility 
required for a rational credit management and for the securing of the future.84
79 Rev. J. A. MacPhail, The Story of the Santaf Calcutta, 1922, pp. 68-9, 75.
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It was not accidental that this Simmelian theoretical principle coincided with the empirical 
instance of the Santals’ experience of the market. Santals found buying and selling in colonial 
markets to be curiously unconnected and inequivalent acts. The weights by which Santals sold their 
produce were called becharam or chotobau, the younger wife, by Bengali merchants. These were 
lighter in weight than the measures used for purchase, kenaram or borobau, the elder wife.85 
Evidently, these differentiated measures made Santals sell more than they could buy from Bengalis in 
return. Again, selling cheap in harvest-time, and re-purchasing their own product at unaffordable 
prices in scarcity-time, reinforced the Santals’ experience of exchange as necessarily unequal.85 In 
other words, Santals found that in the market, their own past labour, now an expensive commodity, 
was unattainable by their present labour. Practice and the product of practice, once mediated by the 
monetary moment, thus seemed wholly incommensurable. Marx described this rule by the past 
(commodified, dead labour) of the present (living, social labour) as the amnesia of alienated labour, 
which failed to recognise their own past in the fetishised thing called money.87 In his critique of this 
Marxian theory of value, Simmel invoked what he called the ‘primitive’ error of confusing money, a 
pure sign, with a substance or a referent like labour. This ‘primitive’ error caused the ‘astounding 
arbitrariness, instability and inadequacy of value concepts in primitive culture’.88 According to Simmel, 
‘primitives’ saw money as a consumable thing, just as they saw time as a qualitative experience. 
Simmel defined time as the average measure of the pace of events, and money as the abstract 
measure of the pace of exchange, such that neither could show substantive characteristics.89 
Colonial authorities complained, like Simmel, that Santals confused money with consumable 
substance, they failed to realise that money lost its value-significance unless its use was temporally 
deferred and negotiated. The moment Santals sold their produce, they immediately consumed their 
cash-earnings as tobacco or liquor.90 Even as late as in the 1860s, officials complained that the 
people of Santal Parganas had not developed a sense of money as abstracted from its materiality. 
Petty merchants from the more ‘advanced’ markets of Birbhum, therefore, unhesitatingly released 
counterfeit coins in Damin, coins which the Santals accepted without question but with which they 
could never pay rent.91 Most exchange here still took place in terms of barter or of copper coins and 
even the relatively ‘civilised’ zamindars and ghatwals could not quite comprehend the nature of paper- 
notes.92 After nine months of trying to put them in circulation, the office in Deoghar had to return all
Q3the paper currency to the central treasury.
The ‘primitives’ had therefore to be taught that money was a purely abstract sign, which, 
precisely being free of body and context, could defy erosion by time. It was not enough to engage in
85 Pontet, Annual Report to Collector, Bhagalpur, 1845-6, DRR.
86 M. C. McAlpin, Report on the Condition of Sonthals in the Districts of Birbhum, Bankura, Midnapore and Balasore, Calcutta, 
1909, pp. 25.
87 Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, Moscow, 1971, pp. 279-80.
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trade, the Santal had to grasp the idea of debt and interest. By the second half of the nineteenth 
century, most Santals were being born into debt-bondage, a condition worse than slavery, the 
Assistant Commissioner of Deoghar argued, because the 'outsider’-moneylender had no interest in 
the person of the debtor, only in his possessions.94 In fact, the moneylender, unable to find the 
particular Santal who owed money to him, often seized the land and cattle of another. As if every 
Santa! was a defaulter, in a common and collective state of ‘primitive’ indebtedness.95 To the Santal, 
therefore, the past appeared as a negative inheritance, the present as a time of repaying the past. 
The moneylenders often charged compound interest, despite laws against it. No matter when the 
loan was taken, interest was demanded for the whole year. If Santals repaid debts in kind at haivest- 
time, moneylenders accused them of returning bloated new paddy against matured, shrunken grains 
and demanded a greater volume than that borrowed in the first place. More often, interest was 
demanded in cash, a sure way of making the Santal lose his land. Moneylenders charged a hundred 
percent interest for seed-loans, because each grain borrowed was pregnant with its own future 
reproduction. In fact, debts became such an inexorable condition of Santal life, that some Santals 
turned indebtedness into a sign of respectability -  a Santal would often boast, ironically, that he had 
more than one personal moneylender.95 The Santal’s ‘innocence’ and ‘truthfulness’, i.e. his/her 
‘primitiveness’, became the ideal and corporeal form of his credit. Credit, as Marx said, is the 
'economic judgement on the morality of man’, where counterfeiting is done in the material of the 
debtor's own person.97 As the old Santal lamented, though in old times Santals did not lie, now that 
they were so often taken to court by moneylenders, they had begun to lie and cheat.98 In a passage 
recorded in 1871, Jaher Era, the forest-spirit, said:
I came in haste, what my race, my birth may be. I might show twelve shapes, show twelve meanings, what it is, is 
fully true. Otherwise all is up. Wealthy people, stallions at the back of the house, in the eaves, gold silver they bury, 
put away. For what purpose would I bury, put away my race, my birth? ... Shopkeepers, peddlers for a seer of 
paddy, a basket of paddy they sell away, throw down oil, salt; as for my race, my birth. Whatever it may be, for a 
seer of paddy, a basket of paddy I may sell it away, throw it down with happiness, with easy circumstances I may 
strengthen, may apportion it, it is fully up."
However may this passage be interpreted, it seems clear -  in the context of nineteenth-century debt- 
bondage -  that Santals were uttering the question of time and identity (birth, race) in reference to the 
question of money and market.
It seems evident, therefore, that the nineteenth-century Santal experience of money was 
primarily an experience of indebtedness.100 Santals recognised this indebtedness as a recent 
phenomenon:
In the Sikhar country, the moneylenders found us for the first time. There the first moneylender with the Santals lived 
in Nandura. From that time on, we are in their hands and they are tearing us like vultures. By constantly paying we 
become numb, still the debt never comes to an end ...at first they did not unrighteously charge us interest to such a 
degree, they were taking only 25 percent in paddy or money, but gradually they commenced to charge exorbitantly.101
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They also identified debt and interest with the phenomenon of the ‘outsider’. The term diku literally 
meant ‘outsider’ in Santali. However, the term was not indiscriminately used for any one who was not 
a hor or a ‘man’, as the Santals called themselves. Though it is difficult to trace the etymology of this 
word, it seems clear from nineteenth-century and contemporary usages, that diku-s were necessarily 
outsiders who were also moneylenders, or associated with moneylenders (police, shopkeeper, court- 
clerks etc.). This conflation of money and the Other was not accidental. As we have seen in the 
previous section, the bounding of the Damin in the 1830s and 1840s produced for the first time, a 
sense of an absolute ‘outside’ which was no longer easily accessible to the Santal. Revenue 
demands could no longer be escaped by fleeing to lands beyond this boundary. Santals therefore 
had to take loans to survive. The Santal experience of debt and the Santal experience of 
boundedness, thus, coincided in colonialism -  making the creditor and the outsider appear 
simultaneous. (Interestingly, Simmel explicitly stated that money was always related to the idea of the 
stranger, because money was an abstract idea which did not require location or acculturation. He in 
fact argued that Jews were efficient money-managers precisely because they were estranged and 
exiled in the first place.102) As moneylenders emerged as ‘outsiders’, on whom Santals had no 
customary ‘moral’ claim, interest-payments could no longer be negotiated, waived or deferred. The 
numerical and incremental time of interest could no longer be interrupted by social relations and 
contingent bargaining.103 And as outsiders began to control the value of time, time itself emerged 
before the ‘primitive’ as a threatening and abstract Other.
In the course of their 1855 rebellion, Santals categorically stated that if a length of time was 
not productive -  as the length between sowing and harvest was -  there could be no money-price on 
it. Since money itself was not a living thing, there could be no interest on cash-debts. Soorae Manjhi 
remembered the rebellious occasion, when
the soubah buried a rupee and some dhan in the ground. When the dhan began to appear above the ground, he told
the Sonthals that as dhan produced a return and a rupee in cash did not, therefore when they got grain from the
mahajan they were to pay 4  annas interest in the rupee but when they borrowed cash no interest was to be paid,104
In capitalism, however, money was time. This was not just because of the capitalist transformation of 
money into a ‘consummate automatic fetish’, which obliterated the differentiated form of productive 
capitals and made money appear as an organic, self-multiplying thing.105 It was also because of the 
capitalist transformation of time itself into an object which displayed the cumulative and incremental 
characteristics of money. Santals, like the so-called modern homo economicus, admitted that when 
productively invested, time generated value, in money-form or otherwise. What Santals did not admit 
was the curious phenomenon that, whatever the nature and use of a time, it was necessarily and 
primarily money. That is, Santals did not accept the presupposition that time had value -  not as a 
positive trait of how the subject lived his/her time, but as a negative attribute, as the opportunity cost 
of a time which could have been invested elsewhere for better profit. This idea of opportunity cost -  
that time, in principle, could be confiscated like money from an idle subject and re-located in another
102 Simmel, Money, p. 227.
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104 Statement of Runjit Manjhi of Sarmi to-Brown-, Commanding Officer, 13 Regiment Nl, 23 Nov 1855, no. 52, vol. 303, Judicial 
Proceedings, West Bengal State Archives.
106
productive context -  transformed temporality itself into a free-floating object, irrespective of practice, 
event and agent. In other words, time became extricable from society and autonomous of social 
temporalisations. This time was no longer perpetuated in local practice, but universalised by its prior 
evaluation through the idea of opportunity cost, of the elsewhere where time could have been more 
valuable and more profitably employed. In this paradigm, it seemed logical that the extravagant 
‘primitive’ would pay higher than normal interest. This was the compensation extracted by the 
‘civilised’, against the ‘primitive’ waste of time, a time which would have been more relevant and more 
appreciated, in both financial and historical senses, elsewhere.
Faced with this accusation, in the form of interest, that their money and time would have been 
of better use elsewhere, the Santals found their own social temporality becoming more and more 
superfluous. In Santal perception, festivities constituted productive time as much as labour did. The 
Baha or flower festival in spring or the Sohrae or harvest festival in winter enhanced the fruitful 
potentials of nature and life. This is not to say, as is usually done, that ‘primitive’ time was purely 
cyclical, returning like seasons to the beginning, rather than moving irreversibly like money towards a 
perpetually deferred future.106 This is to show that for Santals, ‘productive’ time extended beyond 
labour-time and that ‘enjoyment’ was not always postponed to residual, after-work leisure. 
Indebtedness, however, caused such Santal practices, which did not partake in the time of money- 
circulation, to be ruled away into the inconcrete, immaterial sphere of ‘culture’. And culture-specific 
‘subjective’ time was forced to adjust to the universal ‘objective’ time of circulation and incremental 
interest. Social practice and its consequence, temporal intent and its effects were thus irrevocably 
split apart. If, through festivals, Santals intended to make nature and time flourish, festivities actually 
resulted in ‘waste’ and further indebtedness, and festive time appeared as an illicit leisure, opposed to 
the productive and cumulative ‘objective’ time. As Soshee Chunder Dutt said, in a necessary 
civilisational judgement:
[the tribes are] represented by a continuous round of festivities and debaucheries, from one end of the year to the 
other, which has contributed more perhaps than anything else to their degradation ...it is scarcely right to attribute 
any degeneracy in their character to their dealings with the mahajuns and the moneylenders.107
In order to be valued then, Santals had to abandon their social time of practice and re-locate 
themselves in the abstract time of money-circulation. Money replaced practice as the referent of time. 
In this process, time seemed to lose its own materiality. Removed from the realm of practice to that of 
the infinite generative mode of money-interest, no end was valid in-itself, but only as a means for 
furtherance and re-production. This was the distinctive moment of capitalist modernity. Not that 
colonialism introduced money and market for the first time, but that with colonialism and capitalism 
money sought to become an autonomous representational space, where the sign of money could 
mediate and exchange all things and ail times. Eric Alliez describes this as the replacement of
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economic exchange by ‘chrematistic’ exchange -  where money traces its proper space as a self- 
enclosed ‘private space’, split off from social and political acts and judgements.108 If Simmel argued 
that the circle of value and the circle of reality were irreducible to each other, that the objectivity of the 
economic was irrespective of the objectivity of the political109 -  it was because he presumed this 
chrematistic split between the conduct of money-time and the conduct of practical/political-time. It 
was this temporal split which depoliticised the moment of encounter between the ‘primitive’ and the 
‘historical’ -  as they became politically incommensurable but economically exchangeable. No wonder 
then, as colonialism sought to absolutely and physically separate Santals and Bengalis, it never forgot 
that the ‘primordial’ and the ‘civilised’ must be put to exchange -  as an essay on the Santal rebellion 
in Calcutta Review categorically stated, ‘trade is humanising’.110 If this implied that Santals would fall 
into a perpetual debt to the Bengali, it would only be the natural and unacquittable debt of the 
‘primitive’, the debt that s/he must owe to the ‘historical’, for surviving in a time not its own.
Thought and money: the abstraction of time
Thus, in colonial modernity, money confronted the Santals in the form of the inexorable temporality of 
debt. It can of course be argued that ’pre-modern’ conditions too exhibited if not similar, at least 
analogous experiences of unmanageable, unrelenting time. The time of god and of nature, of the king 
and of disease surely appeared as capricious in pre-capitalist societies as time-money did in capitalist 
ones. However, there was a crucial difference between the two. With colonialism, things and ideas of 
everyday encounter began asserting a temporality of their own. The autonomous time of money (or of 
the railways, which I discussed in the previous chapter) could not have been explained away as the 
inexplicable will of the pure Other -  as the time of god or of nature could have been. Pre-colonial 
societies did make everyday claims on god and on nature, yet these entities were also constructed as 
the metaphor of human finitude, as a reminder of the limits of human knowledge. Money, railways or 
the colonial state however came across not only as things of everyday time, but also as products of 
human will and ingenuity. However capricious and cruel they might have seemed, their time could not 
be completely other-ed, without the colonised losing the human status itself.
It must be remembered that in the colonial context, the clock, the train, the colonial state -  
ideas and things with autonomous time -  assumed their appearance of modernity precisely from 
being alien. As Sumit Sarkar says, they were ‘telescoped’ into the colonised society.111 In other 
words, they were not produced through social processes and struggles which could be recognised as 
one’s own. They appeared as visitations upon colonial society, as abrupt insertions of islands of
108 Eric AUiez, Capital Times: Tales from the Conquest of Time, London, 1996, p. 8.
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’modernity’ in a sea of ‘tradition’, as it were. This ‘telescoping’ through time was precisely what 
produced fractures and mismatches within the colonised, as society came to represent an 
agglomeration of the inequivalent times of creditor-debtor, state-society, ‘historical-primitive’. This not 
only meant that in terms of the ‘universal’ time of the creditor, the modern state and the historical, the 
colonised, the debtor and the ‘primitive’ were inherently marked by a temporal lags. It also made 
possible the conception of co-existing entities as non-contemporaneous, entities which, despite being 
together, failed to come face to face, failed to claim the same moment of time. Bringing these non­
contemporary times into contact therefore required the a priori act of re-presentation, of the non­
modern by the modern, the identification of ‘primitive’ entities and their re-textualisation as present 
‘survivals’ of past centuries.112 Hence the absolute centrality of money -  and of knowledge -  in the 
imagination of the nation. For only money and knowledge, being universal and abstract, resisted 
erosion and death in their travel across times. Time could destroy ‘traditional’ wealth and wisdom, but 
money and reason, being abstract, were free of the assessment of time, as it were, as they sought to 
represent and trade with non-present peoples and things. Exchange and representation, in fact, 
captured passing time, by representing it, by putting an interest on it, and by making time accumulate 
as capital and as history.
This section analyses the emergence of the idea of money in colonial Bengal as symmetrical 
to the idea of thought. Nineteenth-century Bengali texts categorically stated that commerce and credit 
were fundamental to civilisation because their absence made people ‘primitive’. An 1871 schooi-text, 
written in the form of a catechism, began with the interrogation: ‘Why are uncivilised people of the hill- 
tracts in such a terrible state?’ This was because the asabhya did not understand the virtues of 
money and trade. Therefore, though these ‘primitives’ worked harder than anybody else, they 
nevertheless remained inadequately equipped for even an ordinary life.113 Another text of 1870 
argued that because ‘primitives’ did not rationally use money, because they neither saved nor traded, 
their poverty was far worse than the poverty of the Hindu poor -  it was indeed a great waste that 
‘primitives’ were allowed to occupy lands, which if commercialised, could have provided thousands of 
‘our own’.114 This text argued that ‘primitives’ made the fundamental error of thinking that labour by 
itself generated value. Because one had to work more to acquire expensive goods, the ‘primitive’ 
mistakenly thought that high prices were caused by hard labour. Reality was just the opposite -  
value was determined in exchange, because despite the most earnest of labour, some things 
remained too costly to acquire.115 Simmel published his philosophy of money thirty years later, and, in 
exactly the same mode of counterpoising the ‘primitive’, rejected Marx’s labour theory of value.118 
Another 1866 text said, commerce was the noblest of nationalist acts, sometimes even nobler than 
medicine and religion. It required great insight, bravery and sacrifice, as the trader travelled vast 
distances, penetrated dense forests and hostile regimes, risked his life on the high seas. The lowliest
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and the most complacent of acts was to remain rooted to ancestral land, hunting and scavenging like 
‘primitives’. The Bengali proudly announced that in this scale of nobility, the Hindus came first 
because they were world-traders even before the Phoenicians were.117
An early twentieth-century Bengali text about aranyabas or ‘life in the forest1 explicitly 
counterpoised the ‘primitive’ condition with the ‘poor, but educated’ condition of the enterprising 
Bengali trader.118 A ‘novel’ by its own admission, this text claimed to represent the reality of the ‘tribal’ 
lands of the nation. It was the story of a Bengali who took the radical decision of renouncing the 
urban pleasures of Calcutta. A trader by caste, he decided to begin life afresh, in the forest lands of 
the Kol ‘tribes’. It was a self-imposed exile, provoked by the realisation that it was irrational to suffer 
the anxieties and unfreedom of salaried work, when there still remained extensive and unutilised 
stretches of fertile land in the nation’s ‘interior’. After all, the author said, trade and cultivation were 
callings which best served the nation. He therefore bought a ‘wasted’ zamindari in Chota Nagpur at a 
very low price and soon, with the help of local ‘primitives’ like Kols, transformed its wilderness into a 
plushly cultivated stretch. Having learnt from the local English administrator, that ‘trade [was] the 
basis of all power’, he settled this ‘tribal’ land with markets and earned unexpected prosperity.119 The 
author articulated his commitment to trade as a historical, civilisational act. According to him, since 
ancient times it were traders who acted as pioneers, opening up and ‘civilising’ the ‘primitive’ localities 
of the nallpn:
In almost all villages gandhabaniks [a trading caste] from the east have come and settled. ... As they did the same in 
ancient times, they were called visha or pioneers. This is an anarya country. But even here they are seen to be 
present. ...you [traders] are still the real pioneers ... With and after you, Brahmans too have come to this region; ... 
After your example other castes will also turn up. By your settling in this anarya country, and by example of your 
customs and habits, the people of this area are also changing. Perhaps it was through you that in the ancient times 
Hindu civilisation was disseminated in the four directions.12
These ‘primitive’ interiors were marked by a duality, a contradiction between ‘fear and prosperity’, 
between ‘beauty of the landscape’ and ‘wild beasts’. To resolve this ‘primordial’ duality, the Bengali 
trader was exhorted to inhabit the ‘tribal’ spaces of the nation, in emulation of the ‘image of God’, in ‘a
divine, non-contradictory state, to banish all that [was] wild and fearsome [from] here1. For trade, the
121author said, represented the final and divine principle of unity and integration.
In this historic project of monetisation and integration, Bengali trader-pioneers harnessed 
'primitives’ to fight wild beasts and cut roads through the hilly terrain.122 After all, ‘primitives’ were 
immaculate and excessive bodies, lacking conceptual tools to even appreciate the ‘natural’ beauty of 
their own landscape, let alone to grasp abstract imperatives like that of exchange:
Natural beauty cannot get reflected upon the primitive. Like sunlight. Sunlight gets reflected more or less by all 
objects; but the way it does on clear water or transparent glass it cannot do on anything else. For this is required 
cultivated thought-capacity...123
117 JogodishTarkalankar, A Treatise on Commerce, Krishnanagar, 1866, pp. 21, 30-35, 57,145.
118 Avinash Chandra Das, Aranyabas, Calcutta, 1913.
110 Ibid., pp. 352- 67.
120 Ibid., pp. 210-11.
121 Ibid., pp. 413-14.
122 Ibid., p. 414.
123 Ibid., p. 150.
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R. C. Dutt contrasted this ‘primitive’ opacity to the clear transparency of the reasoning mind, in terms 
of thought and money. He believed that even the most uneducated and poor Hindu was more 
thoughtful than the purely body-centric ‘primitive’. Even when living in the same village as the 
‘aboriginals’, the Hindu refused to drink alcohol and indulge in loud merry-making, for the complexity 
of Hinduism made even the lowliest of castes ‘contemplative’. It was this thoughtful life-style which 
made Hindus more ‘frugal’ with money and ‘regular in habits, industrious in toil, peaceful in 
disposition’.
The semi-aboriginal ... a striking contrast ... is of an excitable disposition and seeks for strong excitement and 
pleasure; he is incapable of forethought and consumes his earnings without thought for the future; he is incapable of 
sustained toil and therefore, often works as a field labourer than as a cultivator. Simple, merry in his disposition, 
excitable by nature, without forethought or frugality and given to drunkenness, the semi-aboriginal of Bengal bring to 
his civilised home many the virtues and vices of the savage aboriginals which his forefathers lived.124
R. C. Dutt, thus, found the ‘primitive’ to lack abstract thought-capacity and future-orientedness. He 
then represented this absence of thought as identical to the absence of thrift and credit sensibility. In 
this, the Bengali historian, historical novelist and civil servant seemed to be in prior agreement with 
the colonial administrator-ethnologist.
In his Annals of Rural Bengal, Hunter noted the ‘absolute inability’ of the ‘primitive’ to 
articulate ‘reflex conceptions of the intellect’. Santali speech, it seemed, was totally ‘barren’ of 
concepts of ‘matter, spirit, space, instinct, reason, consciousness, quantity, degree’ etc. It was a 
language o f ‘sensation rather than of perception; of the seen rather than of the unseen; of the present 
rather than of the future and the past’.125 Lacking abstract concepts, Santals lacked senses of future, 
of ‘transcendence’:
The absence of abstract nouns renders it difficult to get at his real view on these subjects; but the most intelligent I 
have met, seemed to think that uncharitable men and childless women were eaten eternally by worms and snakes, 
while good men entered into fruit bearing trees. The common Santal’s ideas are much looser. He believes that 
ghosts and demons surround him, who will punish him in body unless he appease them; but who these ghosts may 
be he knows not, and after death all is a blank.126
Apparently, ‘primitives’ imagined time as an endless replication of their experienced present. 
Reverend F. T. Cole for instance, recorded the Santal belief that after death there remained nothing 
but hard work. Dead Santals grind bones day and night, the only respite comes when men stop to 
chew tobacco and women to breast-feed their babies.127 C. H. Bompas recorded that, after death, 
Santals expected
a very hard time of it in the next world. Chando Bonga makes them work terribly hard; women have to pound the 
fruit of the castor-oi! plant with a pestle; and from the seeds Chando Bonga makes human beings. ...in the next 
world also it is very difficult to get water to drink.128
It seemed to follow from this, that ‘primitives’ had no conception of eternity and of infinity, beyond 
death. As Hunter said, in Santali ‘the longest period of time that [could] be expressed [was] the 
duration of a man’s life’, and instead of invoking the transcendent, Santal funerals were therefore 
merely ‘occasions for gluttony and drunkenness’.129 Interestingly, in Algeria, Pierre Bourdieu was told
124 R. C. Dutt, The Aboriginal Element in the Population of Bengal', Calcutta Review, CL,1882, pp. 245-46.
125 Hunter, Annals, pp. 113-14.
126 Ibid., p. 210.
127 ‘SantaLldea of the Future', Indian Antiquary ,.\lII, 1878, pp.. 273-74.
128 Bompas, Folklore, p. 410.
123 Hunter, Annals, pp. 124-25.
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by old Kabyle, that ‘[tjhe French act as if they would never die’. Bourdieu quotes this statement, about 
death as an end of time, to explain the difference between the time-sense of the Algerian peasant and 
that of the capitalist coloniser. The Kabyle peasants refused to admit the possibility of a predictable 
and manageable future, which was beyond the perceptible present, i.e. beyond death, but prior to a 
future which was as yet inconceivable. Thus, Kabyle thought seemed to proceed either by 
sensation/perception or by dream. The Kabyle, therefore, refused to ‘postpone’ present consumption 
for the sake of an uncertain future, for the sake of investment and interest.130 In the paradigm of 
money-time, thus, even as radical a thinker as Bourdieu seemed to share, perhaps unwittingly, the 
colonial construction of the 'primitive' as without credit-rationality.
These conclusions about ’primitive’ temporality -  or rather the lack of it -  were drawn not from 
analyses of Santal social practices, but from a classification of ‘primitive’ vocabulary. In the 
nineteenth century, vocabulary was accepted as the assemblage of knowledge-concepts. The 
temporal judgement about ‘primitives’ was thus a judgement more about ‘primitive’ knowledge than 
about everyday life. From Paharia language, Reverend Droese concluded that Mai Paharias did not 
understand infinite time; they could articulate the present only as continuous tense, and past and 
future only as simple tenses. They could therefore neither grasp continuity with the past, nor predict 
and manage the future. And instead of understanding time as immanent in the subject, Paharias 
apprehended time as a thing of the world, external and often lost to the individual -  thus, instead of 
saying that ‘one is so many years old’, they said that ‘so many years belonged to one’.131 This 
inability to grasp time as the Kantian a-priori, as a precondition to the intelligent grasp of reality, 
implied that the ‘primitive’ was incapable of abstracting singular laws and general concepts from the 
plenitude of what they saw and felt -  ‘light, lux is a high abstraction which none of my informants can 
grasp, though they readily give equivalents for sunshine and candle, firefiame’.132 And though 
‘primitives’ had an ‘excessive’ number of specific and concrete words, they suffered from an ‘absence
133of terms representing relationship in general ...conspicuously the relationship of cause and effect’
If ‘primitives’ failed to comprehend abstract time, this was because they could not imagine 
that ultimate but simplest of abstractions, namely numbers. Sarat Chandra Mitra noted that Santals 
had no calendar and could not count beyond the fingers of their hands. ‘Lapse of time’ was grasped 
only as the completion of a task at hand.134 If the ‘primitive’ failed to imagine duration beyond the 
duration of present practice, this was contrasted with the duration of nationalist history -  wherein the 
nation existed in a durable and recognisable form, long before it could concretely and practically 
materialise as active nationalism in the nineteenth century. As S. C. Roy said:
The historical memory of unlettered tribes is necessarily short and faulty. Young races like young children possess a 
short memory. The present fills their mental horizon ...and they have neither the capacity nor the leisure to look 
before and behind ...It was only when more settled conditions of tribal life allowed them time to think, that their 
traditions must have taken their rise.135
130 P. Bourdieu, The Attitude of the Algerian Peasant towards-Time’, Mediterranean Countryman, VI, 1963, pp. 55^72.
131 Ernst Droese, Introduction to the Malto Language and the Malto Vocabulary, Agra, 1884, pp. 50-1.
132 B. H. Hodgson, ‘A Brief Note on Indian Ethnology1, Journal-of Asiatic Society of Bengal, March 1849, pp. 238-43.
133 Hunterr Annals, p. 124.
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The ‘primitive’ was, by the same logic, contrary to the time of money. For money was the 
embodiment of temporal durability. Money, unlike things, were never consumed or withdrawn from 
circulation. Money, like the nation, could never perish and represented the time of infinite 
accumulation, of value and of history. A Santal could not grasp the institution of credit (and the history 
of the nation), not because s/he was ’innocent’, but because s/he conceptually lacked this notion of 
temporal duration as infinity, as a continuity that remained after the end of work, after the demise of all 
that was practical, contingent and mortal. Money and numbers represented the ‘civilised’ desire for 
infinity, which went beyond need and labour, and became the sophisticated, quasi-religious desire for 
‘duration’ beyond life.136 For the educated Bengali, abstract laws and numbers answered this desire 
for duration: on the one hand, in the form of trade, 'company papers’ and credit which continued to 
produce interest for generations after the ‘death of the patriarch’; and on the other hand, in the form of 
chronology which promised progress and accumulation irrespective of deaths, defeats and kaliyuga. 
For the Santal however, money, credit and numbers seemed to bring only misery and fear. During 
the first census of 1871, the idea of enumeration agitated the Santals almost into a rebellion, even 
though the method of counting was allegedly imitative of ‘primitive’ modes. Each Santal manjhi was 
given black, red, white and yellow threads -  each thread was to be knotted as many times as their 
were men, women, boys and girls respectively. Yet Santals suspected that counting heads could not 
be a benign or motiveless act, surely the government was conspiring to either indenture or conscript 
them.137
One must return to Simmel, to clarify what thus seems in colonial Bengal to be a commonly 
presumed relation between abstract thought and money-rationality. Bengali historiography and 
Simmelian philosophy of money both shared their theoretical foundation in an originary ’primitive’- 
modern counterpoise. Simmel’s paradigmatic presupposition -  that the ‘primitive’ existed in a state of 
passion and solipsism -  was shared by the Bengali bhadrolok. This was the supposition that the 
primitive condition was a ‘naive projection’ of the self onto the objects of need and desire, which 
disallowed the subject-object distinction and the rise of an abstract consciousness which could 
function without objects of reference.138 ‘Primitive’ practice was therefore necessarily ineffective, 
because ‘primitives’ were ‘driven’ to act by passion and desire and often attributed inexplicable futures 
to magical authority. Modern practice on the contrary, based on abstract analytical thought, was not 
driven, but ‘pulled’ forward by the idea of potential consequences. To Simmel ‘the great antinomy in 
the history of thought [was] between the causal approach and the teleological approach’. The ‘causal’ 
approach informed ‘primitive’ practice, which exhausted itself in action and impact. The ‘teleological’ 
approach informed purposive practice, based on analysis of the future.139 ‘Primitive’ practice grasped
136 Alliez, Capital Times, p. 8.
137 H. Beverly, ‘Knotted Ropes used by the Santals in Taking the Census of 1872', Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 
1872, p. 192.
138 Simmel, Money, pp. 70-71.
^  Ibid., pp. 204-05.
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the object in an immediate and sensuous mode, while modern practice reached for the object through 
mediation by the highest conceivable tools, through money and the state.
The time of progress was thus founded on the idea of means, for tools and mediatory 
concepts were end-oriented, and therefore, by definition, willed the future.140 To Simmel, therefore, 
the real question of practice was the production of means. The better the means, the easier it was to 
achieve the end without effort: ‘one cannot promote the final purpose any better than to treat the 
means as if it were the end itself. And money was the best instance of means becoming the end. In 
archaic times, continuity was founded on the finite permanence of land and the cosmos. In modern 
times, every end was experienced as a transitional moment in the advent of a further future. In 
modernity, time, like money, never terminated. Money thus destroyed 'the fear of the infinite’ which 
marked the ‘primitive’.141 With the appearance of money as the ultimate abstraction, Simmel argued, 
exchange, ’the purest and the most developed kind of interaction’, became the mode of all human 
relationships.142 With money, even non-contemporary peoples could be put to exchange, as trans­
valuation assumed the form of temporal re-presentation. After all, money perpetuated time as an 
uninterrupted and infinite continuum, where substantiality was indefinitely postponed in favour of 
seriality.
Conclusion
All the elements of Simmel’s philosophy of money were thus present and active in colonial Bengal. Or 
rather, contexts like nineteenth-century Bengal were a precondition to the production of such Western 
philosophies of money as that of Simmel. These were the contexts of colonialism -  where the 
colonised was forced to admit that commerce was the primary source of power and knowledge, where 
both colonial and ‘vernacular’ texts lamented the absence of abstract thought and monetary 
competence amongst ‘primitives’, where money was employed as the effective ‘civiiisor’ of interior 
‘autarchies’, and where the state sought to circumscribe the ‘primitive’ away from the ‘historical’ and 
then put them in monetary exchange. As colonialism proved that exchange and politics could be 
synonymous, civil service and commerce became the most prestigious professions among Bengali 
elites. And the market and the state came to represent desirable but not always accessible realms of 
universal time. These were sites where modernity existed uncontaminated by social and cultural 
temporalities, where universal mediators like money and reason operated irrespective of concrete and 
active differences. The modern state thus appeared to exist in ‘advance’ of society, which often 
caused the Bengali middle classes to abdicate the work of reform and education to the state. The 
‘free’ market appeared to promise an unencumbered time of circulation, where duty and obligation,
140 Ibid., pp-. 211-13.
141 Ibid., pp. 231-43.
142 Ibid., p. 62.
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i.e. politics as dharma, could be replaced by the more predictable and ‘fair’ moment of exchange, the 
state offering law and education to society in return for money, tax and revenue.143
This is not to say, by any means, that money and commerce were new to non-Western 
societies. Nor is it to attribute an autonomous causal power to money itself, changing social 
formations without reference to production relations. Nor is it to admit evolutionism through the 
backdoor, by suggesting that peoples like Santals and Paharias lived autarchic lives of ‘primordial’ 
authenticity until they were colonised since the late eighteenth-century.144 In fact, I am arguing just 
the opposite -  that Santals and Paharias did not exist as authentic ‘primitives’, until they were 
colonised, bounded and deprived of political and practical relations to ‘mainstream’ society. This was 
because colonial exchange was primarily founded on the prior temporal hierarchisation of 
communities, which were then re-placed, post-facto, in monetary contiguity. In other words, in the 
paradigm of colonial modernity, political practice was based on the re-production of money as an 
abstract mediating entity which could trans-valuate and represent incommensurable worlds, acts and 
things in universal and infinite ideal-time.
Late eighteenth and nineteenth-century political economy -  based on imaginations of perfect 
information and free market, i.e. on principles of knowledge and money -  theorised precisely this 
centrality of representation, where all social productions, endowed with monetary value, seemed 
capable of standing in for all others, where universal exchange replaced the transcendental signified 
as the basis for thought.145 Once we recognise this re-presentative intent of colonial modernity, we 
can better understand the limits faced today by ‘post-colonial’ political practice. Founded on the 
temporal mismatch of peoples, modernity reduced both knowledge and political practice to re­
presentation. Bengali middle-classes tried to attribute to themselves just such a mediating, re­
presentative role -  analogous to that of money and imitative of that of the modern state.146 Their 
claim to this representative, mediating status was founded on the idea of modern knowledge, and on 
a denial of the practical and ‘primitive’. After all, as R. C. Dutt claimed, the Aryans became great 
intellectuals precisely because, having once and for all suppressed the ‘primordial’ non-Aryans, they
147no longer needed to waste time in ‘action’, in the practice of politics and of war.
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The next two chapters will discuss this overdetermination of practice, and therefore of time, by 
the universal, abstract time of re-presentative knowledge, I shall try to argue that in nineteenth- 
century Bengali discourse, the nation was constructed through representation rather than through a 
practical creation of solidarity. It was nationalism in this form that reproduced the nation as identical 
to the national market and reduced a people to a state. Political and monetary representation -  
across temporal lags -  articulated the principle that peoples and products not present in the time 
modernity could be harnessed in the sites of the market and the state. As temporal politics was 
reduced to acts of exchange and re-presentation, time itself was reproduced as an objective, abstract 
series. And with its abstraction, time was relocated from the field of practice to the site of thought, a 
relocation which took away the subversive force from temporal antagonisms. Society, now an 
agglomeration of non-contemporary locations, was shorn of the politics of time. And practice was 
banished to the pragmatic terrain of tactics and of strategy.148 Knowledge was henceforth ‘objectively’ 
conceived, without reference to practice, as representation and exchange sought to conquer time 
itself. Law and knowledge conceded to local contaminations, in the process of their execution and 
implementation, just as the ‘modern’ conceded to accommodate the ‘primitive’ in the nation-state and 
in the market. And by virtue of this ‘concession’, the ‘primitive’ was placed in a non-dischargeable 
debt to the ‘historical’, just as the ‘local’ time of practice was placed in an infinite debt to the meta­
temporality of the theoretical.
140 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, Berkeley, 1984, pp. 36-9. It can- be argued that this exile of practice is 
central to modern European thought, which allows thinkers like Rorty to reject philosophy -  not via the notion of political 
practice -  but via the hope of free and individual ‘pragmatics'. See Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, Brighten, 
1982.
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VTime to Act: Historical Event and the Practice of Rebellion
[0]ur crucial problem has been a lack of conventional means to 
render our lives believable. This, my friends, is the crux of our 
solitude.
-  Gabriel Garcia Marquez1
In the middle of the nineteenth century, the Santals rebelled. They rebelled against the colonial state 
and against the Bengali and Bihari moneylenders, and above all, they rebelled against what they 
rightly saw as the alliance between merchants, moneylenders, government officials and the police. 
To both the colonial state and the Bengali middle classes, this ‘primitive’ rebellion represented more 
than a threat of subaltern insubordination. It shook the middle-class certitude that the anarya was 
always-already suppressed at the very originary moment of history. It even seemed to subvert, by 
interrupting the time of debt and interest, the empty and continuous time of chronology itself. In 
colonial Bengal, thus, the ‘primitive’ rebellion represented the theoretically absurd moment of the past 
rebelling against the present, as it were. No wonder, it provoked more disbelief than outrage. This 
chapter does not seek to describe the Santal rebellion as an episode in itself -  that has been done 
often and exhaustively enough.2 Instead, it tries to problematise the Santal rebellion as a potentially 
critical act, which had to be not just defeated but also neutralised, if modernity and history were to 
become universal modes of contemporary existence. Historiography had to reconstruct the Santal act 
of temporal contestation into an exceptional and singular event, so that the ‘primitive’ rebellion could 
be put in succession to other events of nationalist history, and so that chronology, as a purely formal 
succession, could overdetermine and defuse what were clearly temporal contradictions between 
Santal practice and the colonial-modern teleology. This chapter argues that, by rebelling, Santals 
invoked, from a position marginal to the colonial present, the discontinuous and unpredictable time of 
willing a future other than that which seemed presently possible. This practical and portentous time 
confronted the incremental and gradual time of progress and interest. In this, Santal articulation of the 
rebellion and its memories provided a critique of the disciplining of time into chronology, and of the 
capture and reduction of temporal acts into synchronic and cumulative knowledge.
1 Quoted in Eduardo-Galeano, Memories of-Fire, London, 1995, p. 880,
2 Dhirendranath Baske, Saontal Ganasangramer Itihas, 5th ed., Calcutta, 1995.
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Momentous times: the many moments of rebellion
Historiographically, the Santal rebellion is placed in the year 1855. Yet, as this section tries to 
demonstrate, the rebellion could not be completely exhausted by this momentous date, this singular 
numerical Instant. The judicial files of colonial officials -  which tried to explicate, record and sentence 
the rebels and which became ‘sources’ for later historiography -  show that Santal rebellious practices 
could neither be ascribed a clear beginning nor an effective end, nor could they be contained as a 
once-and-for-all occurrence. In other words, the magisterial and disciplinary discourse of the state, on 
which the historical discourse of juridical truth and evidence depended, failed to reduce the hul, as the 
Santals called their rebellion, into a single event, into a punctuation in time, which could be put in 
direct succession to that unilinear series of pure moments called chronology. The hul seemed to 
propose an altered everyday, irreconcilable with the continuity, the causal predication and the 
overdetermined eventualities that historiography could accept as chronological. To make it appear as 
a single event, colonial officials tried to document the hul as a centralised occurrence, where four 
brothers, Sidhu, Kanu, Chand and Bhairav were accused of mobilising all Santals. Yet the authorities 
had to admit that there were many versions of the beginning of the hul, and the simultaneous but 
disparate risings were not all explicable by the ‘swift sending of letters1 by Sidhu and Kanu to faraway 
villages. Most Santals arrested called themselves manjhis or headmen, and there was no way of 
separating leaders from the ‘masses’.3 The very fact that the Santals acted in solidarity -  ‘Santals 
have great unity; if in a crisis one beats the drum, in an hour 4/5 thousand Santals can collect on the 
hills, such solidarity can only be met by the army’ -  were invoked by the Bengali middle classes as 
‘proof of the rebellion being one great conspiratorial event with one single leadership.4
Yet the central characteristic of the hul, which the authorities tried hard to understand and 
which later histories tried to underplay, was the massive participation of non-Santals in it. To say this 
is not to deny the Santals' initiative, but to indicate that the hul was more than a single event authored 
by a single agent. When none of the two hundred rebels arrested at one spot turned out to be 
Santals, the official wrote in confusion: ‘I do not understand the system and reasons and no one here 
can enlighten me.’5 Such was the network of common interests that initially the rebellion appeared to 
colonial officials to be a war led by the wealthy Amir Sahib of Hazaribagh, who used to hunt with the 
Santals and who was sent a letter by the rebels after they killed the darogah Mahesh Dutt.6 Officials 
also noted the 'five favoured castes’ that were always spared by Santals.7 At Kumrabad, even as the 
Santals were suppressed, Haris, Bauries and other outcastes prepared to rebel.8 Even as Bengali 
moneylenders petitioned for extra troops,9 Santals brought in Brahmans to conduct durga puja, a
3 Special Commissioner to Secretary, Govt, o l Bengal, 26 SepttSSS^ Judicial-Proceedings, West Bengal-State Archives, 
(hereafter BJP), vol. 299, no. 21.
Sambad Prabhakar, 11 July 1855.
5 Loch, Special Commissioner to Secretary, Govt, of Bengal, 13 Aug 1855, BJP, vol. 294, no. 168.
6 Commissioner of Circuit, Bhagalpur to Secretary, Govt, of Bengal, 20 Aug 1855, BJP, vol. 295, no. 107.
T Commissioner of Circuit, Bhagalpur to Secretary, Govt, of Bengal, 6 Aug 1855, BJP, vol. 294, no. 158.
a J. R. Ward, Commissioner on Special Duty, Raniganj, to Secretary, Govt, of Bengal, 20 Sept 1855, BJP, vol. 297(1), no. 13.
9 Petition of Gangaram Mundle et al., Parihapur, 17 Sept 1855, BJP, vol. 298, no. 51.
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primarily Bengali festival.10 In Jamtara, even a trader was found sheltering Santal rebels.11 And 
though Paharias were bribed to inform against the Santals,12 many joined in the rebellious activities.13 
Thus, while historiography recorded the hul as a ‘primitive’ event, it was evidently a far more general 
practice. In the rains of 1855, Basun Manjhi proclaimed: ‘virtue lives in all joogs [epochs] -  sathha, 
trota, dapur, kolee, what more shall we write’.14 Like the Bengali, the Santal too used the motifs of 
satya and kaliyugs to indicate epochal temporality. It was this rebellious complicity between the 
‘aborigine’ and the low caste Bengali -  that defied the conceptual exclusion of the ‘primitive’ from 
historical society -  which colonial officials and later historiography sought to wish away, by recording 
the hul as a purely Santal event, with a single perpetrator, a synchronic unitariness, an immediate and 
marked origin and a total and final end.
Colonial officials found it difficult to ascertain the precise beginning of the hul. Santals 
themselves perceived the rebellion as directly linked to their earlier ‘dacoities’. In other words, the 
condition of rebellion evidently pre-existed the origin of acts apprehensible as a single event.
It appears that the Sontals had collected from Beerbhoom, Bancoorah, Chota Nagpur and Hazareebagh, to the 
number of 6 or 7000, for the purpose of avenging the punishment inflicted on their comrades concerned in last year’s 
Dacoities,.. committed on the Bengatiee mahajuns15
Though Kolea Santal did not rebel, he was invoked as a leader because he had participated in the 
‘dacoities’ of 1853-54.16 Dhirendranath Baske mentions Santals rebelling as early as in 1785 -  when 
Tilka Murmu was hanged for fatally wounding Augustus Cleveland.17 This past rebellion was 
completely exorcised from historical memory -  even Vidyasagar wrote in his History of Bengal that 
Cleveland died owing to the unhealthy climate of Rajmahai hills18 -  for Cleveland, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, was recorded by history, both colonial and nationalist, as the peacemaking civilisor 
of the ‘violent primitives’ of Rajmahals. The hul also continued beyond its alleged suppression. The 
official at Deoghar wrote, as late as in 1858 that Santals were continuing to assemble in large 
numbers, with bows and arrows, even when there was no hunt.19 They insisted on hook swinging 
during charak festival, defying government orders against such ‘violent’ worship.20 In 1859 Santals 
killed the chowkidar of Gopikander;21 in 1861 they almost rebelled again;22 in 1865 they assembled in 
Hazaribagh, circulated messages on chits of paper and promised to return on the full-moon of 
baishakh with two rupees from each village;23 and in 1871, they rebelled against the census. By the 
end of the nineteenth and in early twentieth century, Santals organised the Kharwar movement;24 and
10 Commissioner of Circuit, Burdwan to Magistrate, Birbhum, 24 Sept4855, BJP, vol. 298, no. 87.
11 Ward to Secretary, Govt, of Bengal, 5 Oct 1855, BJP, vol. 299, no. 59.
12 Secretary, Govt, of Bengal to Commissioner, Bhagalpur, 20 July 1855, BJP, vol. 293, no. 58.
13 Commissioner, Bhagalpur to Secretary, Govt, of Bengal, 22 July 1855, BJP, vol. 293, no. 151.
14 Basun Manjhi to Sidhu et al., BJP, vol. 294, no. 130.
45 Commissioner of Circuit, Bhagalpur to the Secretary, Govt, of Bengal, 9 July 1855, BJP, vol. 291, no.44
16 Bidwell, Special Commissioner for Suppression of Santal Insurrection to Secretary, Govt, of Bengal, 13 October 1855, BJP, 
vol. 300(1), no. 21.
17 Baske, Ganasangramer Itihas, pp. 11-5.
18 Dhanai Kisku, Baba Tilka Manjhi tatha Bhagalpur, quoted in Baske, Ganasangramer Itihas, p. 13.
19 Asst. Commissioner, Deoghar to Commissioner, Bhagalpur, 11 June 1858, DRR.
20 Asst. Commissioner, Deogharto Dy. Commissioner, Godda, 30 April 1858,. DRR.
21 Asst. Commissioner, Deogharto Commissioner, Bhagalpur, 8 November 1859, DRR.
22 Home Political Files, 1861, National Archives, Delhi.
23 Asst. Commissioner, Deogharto Commissioner, Santal Parganas, 17 June 1865, DRR.
24 P. O. Bodding, The Kharwar Movement among the Santals’, Man in India, I: 3,1921, pp. 240-61.
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in 1917, Santals rebelled in Mayurbhanj against British attempts to recruit labour-corps.25 Being 
armed was an everyday life condition of the Santals -  officials tried in vain to persuade them that they 
need not carry bows, just arrows should suffice as the sign of ‘tribalism’.26 It seems then that the state 
of ‘unrest’ continued among the Santals much beyond 1855, an everyday state which defied a 
categorical containment within the idea of the event -  especially since a ‘momentous event’ implied 
time standing-still until the uneventful time of the ordinary everyday resumed.
The hul passed in the course of the same year, from an act of protest into the time of the 
everyday. As we saw in the previous chapter, colonialism had authorised markets as the only 
possible site of ‘peaceable exchange’ between the ‘primitive’ and the mainstream society. Santal 
rebels, however, by the end of 1855, understood that the only relation to the market was and could be 
that of appropriation. They articulated going to markets as dours or 'runs’,27 used government 
certificates of pardon as money to ‘plunder’ shops, and hunted merchants and moneylenders as 
shikar or game28 Colonial officials rightly attributed ‘the totally different character’ of these acts to the 
rebels’ perception that there was no return to the time prior to the hul.2Q Time itself was irrevocably 
changed. Even Santals with government certificates of pardon were no longer acceptable as 
‘innocent’ and hard-working tenants30 Unlike earlier in the rebellion, when Santals would precede 
their attacks by messages of the sal branch31 and arrive in clear daylight, they now moved and 
worked in the dark of the night. Unlike in groups of warring men, they now moved in much larger 
numbers with families and children, ‘foraging’ the countryside and living a life of defiant mobility.32 
They gave up living in villages, took off the roofs of their houses and stored their acquisitions from the 
market in them for general access of the people.33 They began marrying their children in great haste, 
‘the Sooba baba having given out that no marriage [could] take place for twelve years’.34 Evidently
the rebellion had irreversibly changed the texture and quality of time, such that for as long as twelve
years the Santals expected to live differently, with no time for social festivals. After the rebellion, 
times could never be the same again, and it was this change in temporality, which it was impossible to 
bracket within the formal duration, the pure moment of the event.
Thus, if historical narratives foregrounded the ‘event’ of the rising -  battles, deaths, ‘plunders’, 
the face-to-face encounters of Santals with dikus and sahebs -  Santals foregrounded the transformed 
nature of everyday time. In this changed everyday, laq-lagin snakes swallowed whole humans, 
women with equal number of children exchanged flowers and swore eternal friendship, people died in 
places where buffalo-cows grazed, leaders were born to unmarried girls. This was a time when dikus
25 SitakantMahapatra, ‘Raghunath Murmu-'s-Movement for Santal Solidarity’, in Tribal-Movements in India-, edr K. S. Singh, 
Delhi, 1983,„ pp. 131-32.
26 Quarterly Report of Asst. Commissioner, Deoghar, June 1858, DRR.
27 Collector, Birbhum to Secretary, Govt of Bengal,. 6  S ep tl 855, BJP, vaL297(l), nn_25.
28 Diary, Collector, Birbhum, 22 Sept 1855, BJP, vol. 298, no.60.
23 Special Commissioner to Secretary, Govt, of Bengal, 26 Sept 1855, BJP, vol. 300(1), no. 4.
^Asst. Magistrate, Monghyr to Special Commissioner, 23 Sept 1855; BJP, vol. 300(1); no. 5.
31 Diary of the-Collector, Birbhum, BJP, vol. 298, no. 43.
32 Lieut. Col. Houghton, 63rd Regiment, Nl to Brigadier Bird, Birbhum & Bankura Field Force, 29 Dec 1855, BJP, vol. 306, no. 
59.
33 Asst. Magistrate, Monghyr to Special Commissioner, 13 Sept 1855, BJP, vol. 298, no. 16.
34 Ward to Secretary, Govt, of Bengal, 19 Sept 1855, BJP„vol. 298, no. 38.
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were all to be killed. And so Santals must, henceforth, hang cowhides and flutes before their houses 
to prove that they were not dikus. Women were to be married off quickly, not with vermilion but with 
oil, and witches be 'brought to sword’.35 Village-streets were to be cleaned, cowbells and brooms 
hung before them -  for people were coming and must see everything shine. Houses and courtyards 
were to be decorated, and dances danced wearing ankle-bells.36 The time of ‘wanderings had 
begun’, when men from five villages would walk through five others, teaching new songs, putting the 
sacred-thread on unmarried young men and handing over ploughs. Then the men from these villages 
would wander through five others, and so continue.37 In this changed everyday, there remained no 
difference between the rebellious and the non-rebellious. Colonial officials requested martial law not 
because Santals were winning in battle, but because few could be convicted in regular trials.38 All 
Santals lived transformed lives and no evidence could be brought against one that did not apply to all 
others.39 This was the time when sahebs killed Santals and Bengalis followed colonial troops, burning 
and ‘recovering’ property from Santal villages.40 As Chotrae Desmanjhi, who was a teenager in the 
hul, remembered: the hul was the beginning of a time of ‘hunger worse than the burn of disease’, as 
famines raged one after the other, ‘even wet marshy lands cracked under the sun’ and ‘this became 
the time in terms of which we started calculating the age of our children'.41 After the hul, Santals 
were forever separated from each other,
scattered through poverty. ... [Santals] went to the towns...crossed the Ganges to earn our living and were scattered 
as far as the Pandua forests, Sikharpur, Catai and the country of Barin. It was then that we started selling fuel, 
leaves and charcoal. Some people did not return to their houses ,..42
Contesting eventualities: causes and the rebellion
In conventional historiography, events are imagined as exceptional moments, foregrounded against 
and predicated upon uninterrupted and ‘normal’ everyday time. Colonial histories of India were thus 
histories of events like wars and defeats, which showed up the colonised as repeatedly falling prey to 
‘foreign’ invasions. In opposition to this, nationalist history textualised samaj or society as the real 
uneventful state of the nation, a temporal continuity where culture resided and which the ‘ordinary’ 
Indian refused to stake in political contests and events. Evidently, both these histories shared the 
idea of the everyday as the location of the ‘normal’, which remained beyond the reach of extraordinary 
political events like rebellions and wars. If events had any connection with this uneventful everyday, it 
was mediated by the idea of causality. Causes were the antecedents, which could inhabit ‘normal’ 
time, but the events, which these causes produced, succeeded and superseded the realm of the 
ordinary. In other words, by making causes logically and structurally antecedent to events,
35 KolearvS-Juggl Haram, Horkoren Mare Horkoren-ReakKatha-, Oslo, 1887(4942), pp-, 188-90.
36 Chotrae Desmanjhi ReakKatha, reprinted in Baske, Ganasangramer Itihas, Appendix 2, p. 162.
37 Horkoren, pp. 189-90.
38 Commissioner of Circuit, Burdwan to Secretary, Govt, of Bengal, 3 August 1855, BJ.P, vol. 294, no, 27.
39 Commissioner, Burdwan to Magistrate, Birbhum, 10 Sept 1855, BJP, vol. 298, no.14.
40 Finch, Commanding Nulhati Detachment to Commissioner, Bhagalpur, 6 Aug 1855, BJP, vol. 294, no. 88.
41 Chotrae, pp. 162-70.
42 Horkoren, p. 190.
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historiography suspended the concurrence of everyday and eventful times -  as if, despite the 
occurrence of unserialisabie events like revolutions, chronology seemed to continue uninterrupted, in 
a simulation of ordinary everyday life.
Santal rebellion, being a ‘primitive’ subversion of historical modernity, was just such an 
unserialisabie act. It had to be therefore, contrasted to and causally predicated upon the ‘normal’ 
everyday life of the Santals. Santals, however, articulated the rebellion as a change in everyday time 
itself. Such a rebellious imperative could not be easily split into prior causes and a succeeding event. 
J. P. Ward -  who had supervised the bounding and settling of Santals in Damin and who therefore 
was as familiar as any administrator could be with the ‘aboriginal question’ -  was surprised to find that 
Santals were unable to give causes for their rebellion. Moneylending did not seem to be a cause, for 
Santals mentioned it ‘with less fear and loathing than most ryotts of Bengal’.43 Nor did they make a 
cause out of exploitation by railway officials, known to have molested Santal women.44 Officials in 
Birbhum believed that there seemed to be no cause’ except that Santals from Damin must have 
‘persuaded’ Santals elsewhere to rebel.45 On the other hand, officials in Damin believed that ‘the 
cause did not originate here’, for the axes used by rebels were alien to the area.46 The Special 
Commissioner for Suppression of the rebellion in fact requested a complete map of Santal migration, 
trying to trace causes across the trail of past Santal travels47 Yet nothing was found which could 
serve as either the immediate or the sufficient cause, fully explaining the hul. Everything the Santals 
said seemed ‘afterthoughts’.48 it seemed to colonial authorities, therefore, that it could only be Santal 
‘primitivism’ which could have caused the hul. Because Santals were a people absolutely alien to the 
‘rest of the inhabitants of the country’, living in unthinking and habitual solidarity, it did not ‘require any 
deep research to discover the cause of their conduct’.49 For, what was not cause enough for the 
‘civilised’ could very well suffice as a cause for the body-centric and unthinking ‘primitive’. And since 
a cause is defined by its anteriority, the generic ‘pastness’ of the ‘primitive’ could by itself function as 
an adequate cause for ‘primitive’ acts like violence and rebellion. Colonial juridical discourse 
therefore decided that the cause for the hul was nothing other than the ambiguous Santal idea that 
this land was once theirs. For, as ‘primitives’, they could not grasp the temporal ‘fact’ that ‘primordial’ 
conditions were annulled long ago by history and progress.
To the question ‘why’, the Santals said nothing more, and nothing less, than that the time to 
rise had arrived. Not only Santals, a Muslim julah too proclaimed that the time had come.50 There 
was nothing otherworldly or divine about this inspiration. God was certainly invoked but he was called 
the subah, the tax-collecting sovereign as termed in Hindustani political vocabulary. The subah-
43 Ward to Secretary, Govt, of Bengal, 13 October 1855r BJP, vok 300(1)-, nor 18.
44 Sambad Prabhakar, no. 5300, 12 sravan, 1855.
45 Ibid.
40 Commissioner of Circuit, Bhagalpur to Special Commissioner, (day illegible) Oct 1855, DRR.
47 Special Commissioner to Pontet, Superintendent of Damin, 1 S ep tl855h.DRR.
48 Commissioner of Circuit to Special Commissioner, 11 October 1855, DRR.
4 rlbid.
50 Commissioner, Burdwan to Secretary, Govt, of Bengal, 28 July 1855, BJP, vol. 294, no. 4.
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51thakur ruled that fair revenue was never imposed on land, but only on cattle and ploughs; that a tax 
of five rupees should be put on every Bengali in Santal land;52 that the houses of moneylenders 
should be burnt but those of the ordinary peasants spared;53 that no creditor was to be repaid, and for 
any debts thereon only one pice per rupee should be given in interest.54 Often local manjhis verified 
with the subahs if individual acts of attack had prior ratification so that they might not turn 
indiscriminate 55 A Santal order of 9 sravan from Durgacharan Manjhi to Jagannath Manjhi clearly 
stated that ‘plundered’ property must be made public or else ‘thakur would search the house’.56 
These clearly indicate the this-worldly nature of the temporal imperative. Time was invoked not as a 
divine intent, but as an articulation of the changed nature of the present, such that judgements could 
no longer be made by past parameters. Thus, when the magistrate asked Buflea Santal -  since how 
long were Santals collecting guns and poisoned arrows57 -  he replied, ‘on account of [sic]’ time’s 
arrival, ‘we all had swords’.58 Kanu Santal was arrested for ‘plunder’ of a brass-encased mirror, Lieut. 
Toulman’s waist-plate, three pocket books, an old book on locomotives, a few visiting cards of the 
engineer Brown, pieces of English paper, a few silver ornaments, a few rupees and one gold muhur. 
When asked why, Kanu replied ‘that every Santal was to share land equally, mahajuns were to be 
expelled from the country and zamindars were to be deprived of all authority and land, except that on 
which their houses stood.’59 It was not so much that the interrogator and the depositor were speaking 
at cross-purposes, as that they were living in different times.
Sidhu testified that Santals were sitting on his veranda for months, wondering about the bad 
times, when half a paper fell from the skies and when the other half fell too, thakur descended in the 
form of a cartwheel. Though Sidhu could not read, an outcast Dorn told him that the thakur had 
written asking him to fight the moneylenders. When the impatient official asked Sidhu to decide, once 
and for all, if it was god’s order that caused him to rebel or if it was his complain that superintendent 
Pontet did nothing about his grievances, i.e. decide between a religious and a secular cause -  he 
could only say, ‘the thacoor would also come to the Bengallis. And they will fight with one another. 
The Sahibs will also fight forever together. The time will come. I cannot say when ...’. 60 Kanu 
Santal’s parwana said:
The reign of truth has begun. ...He who does not speak the truth will not be allowed to remain on earth. The 
mahajuns have committed great sin. Sahibs and amlahs have made everything bad. In this Sahibs have sinned 
greatly. ... On this account the Thacoor has ordered me saying that the country is not the Sahibs’.61
Santals thus attributed their hul not to god but to something god-like -  to inexorable time, impossible 
to master and predict like a rational cause. A cause by definition has a kind of repeatability -  
wherever and whenever a specific cause is found, a similar event is bound to follow. To the Santal,
51 Magistrate, Bhagalpur to Secretary, Govt, o f Bengal, 24-July1-855, BJP, vok 293, no. 221.
52 Commissioner of Circuit, Bhagalpur to Secretaiy, Govt, of Bengal, 10 July 1855, BJP, vol. 291(11), no.45.
53 Asst. Magistrate, Monghyrto SpeciatCommissioner, 13 Sept 1855; BJP, volv298j no. 16.
54 Magistrate, Murshidabad to Commissioner of Circuit, Nuddea, July 25,1855, BJP, voL 293, no. 306.
55 Petition of Bhagea Manjhi to Sidhu and Kanu, BJP, vol. 294vno.130.
56 Enclosure, vol. 294, no. 130.
57 Magistrate, Murshidabad to Secretary, Govt, of Bengal, 13 July 1855, BJP, vol. 291(11), no. 46,
58 Deposition of Bullea Santal, 14 July 1855, BJP,.vol., 29.1(.U),no. 67.
39 Statement of Kanu Manjhi, BJP, vol. 304, no. 83.
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however, the rebellious imperative was epochal, and not characterised by this generality, this 
recurrence which causality must possess as a law of history. Read for instance the following version 
of the beginning of the Santal hul
A bit of paper fell on Seedoo’s head and suddenly the Thakur appeared before the astonished gaze of Seedoo and 
Kanhoo; he was like a white man though dressed in the native’s style; on each hand he had ten fingers; he held a 
white book and wrote therein; the book and with it 20 pieces of paper, in 5 batches, four in each batch, he presented 
to the brother... then came two men with six fingers on each hand ... at one time it was in a flame of fire, with a 
book, some white paper and a knife ... a solid cart wheel. In the silvery pages of the book and upon the white leaves 
of the single scrap of paper, were words written.02
These apparently supernatural signs which announced the hul were not arbitrary. When the Santal 
put the fire and the wheel in association with the coming of the book, he was, not unlike the Bengali 
middle classes, making a statement about a new epoch. All through the rebellion the idea of the 
written word, the marker of this new time, fired the imagination of the Santals. The god, dreamt by 
Sidhu and Kanu, was white, demonstrating the invincibility of colonial authority, dispensing the book 
amongst the poverty-stricken Santals, the increased number of fingers on his hands, signifying the 
enhanced power given by wielding the written word. One of the Santal leaders arrested had on him 
pieces of the New Testament translated in Hindi, which he used in worship.63 At Bhagnadihi, where 
the infamous policeman Mahesh Dutt was killed, Santals showed Sheikh Sunno ‘a written paper 
stating that the thacoor gave them that paper and told them that there has been much sin in the 
country ... on which I told that it was a paper not given by any god but by some Europeans.64 Such 
was the perceived importance of the written word that the Santals captured local literates and forced 
them to work as writers for them.65
What was singular then was not the event of rebellion itself, but this exceptional imperative of
time which brought the hul about. There was no determining necessity -  except perhaps an ethical
one -  no predictability associated with the rebellion, as a causal explanation would have it. Yet the
temporal imperative was more overdetermining, if less predictable, than a causal law could ever be. It
possessed a sanctity, which went beyond the conceptual purity of a neatly rational, and successful,
calculation of cause and effect. It signified an imperative to act beyond precisely such calculations of
probability and success, giving the Santals the unflinching mood of rebellion,
that no one could stand before them, that none of their own people should be killed, and if killed that they wouid be 
restored to life, that the soldiers’ musket balls would turn to water, that a small knife should have a miraculous power 
to sweep away a mass of opponents65
And this imperative lay not in the recognition of a sufficient cause -  the circumstances of oppression 
were reasons enough to act, but were too constant and too present in the everyday to explain the 
rebellious conjuncture. The structural spacing between poverty as cause and rebellion as event, 
required a retrospective position that was available only to the historian, just as chronological 
continuity beyond revolution was available only to the self-consciously historical being. To the rebel, 
however, what was available was only the possibility of repossessing and reshaping temporality itself.
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As the Santals exclaimed, ‘in twelve days will be the thacoor’s fight, ... Two days will be made into 
one, and two nights into one'67[emphasis mine]. By rebelling, the Santal accepted that, whatever the 
consequence, it was only immediate practice, which could stretch and shorten time, to take hold of 
time as it were.
If the rebel tried to keep alive this overdetermining temporal imperative, the authorities tried to 
fix a single antecedent cause which, once administratively taken care of, could be firmly put in the 
past. Bengali historians, who used colonial papers as historical ‘evidence’, foregrounded the question 
of causality in a similar juridical fashion -  as we shall see in the next chapter, Bhudev Mukhopadhyay 
in fact defined history as causality itself. Like the administrator, the purpose of the historian was, in 
principle, to stabilise the past by reducing the generative time of practice, and its many eventualities, 
into a single, authorised event. James Cox describes this historical emphasis on causality, which 
makes ‘beginnings more important than endings’, as a transformation of the present, from ‘a point 
from which to renew the past’ to ‘a point of vantage from which to stabilise it.’68 Unlike the Bengali 
middle classes, for whom the present was educative if unfree, the Santal had few stakes in the 
indebted present. Hence the destabilising temporality of rebellion. Some historians have dispensed 
with this destabilising temporality by calling it millenarianism.69 This is the effect not only of 
modernity’s imposition of the Christian calendar world-wide, but also of modernity’s claim to causally 
predict, manage and limit all futures -  which has removed from imagination all senses of revolutionary 
change, except apocalyptic ones like nuclear conflagration or environmental disaster, where human 
agency is finally forsaken in favour of cosmic ones. The hul on the other hand did not mark this 
suspension of history, by final judgement as it were. It was not a millenarian hope so much as a 
practical claim to repossess time itself.
Pierre Bourdieu enunciates the logic of practice in these very terms, when he says that 
practice is temporal not just because it plays out in time, but ‘because it plays with time’.70 Juridical 
discourse in colonial Bengal sought to neutralise this logic of Santal temporal practice, by 
reconstituting acts into events, by putting acts in succession despite their temporal 
incommensurabilities, and by explaining acts retrospectively through the synchronic spacing of cause- 
event-consequence. This chronologising move nullified the fundamental nature of practice, its 
irreversibility, by replacing it with the cause-event-consequence series, a series which could be read 
both ways by the logic of deduction. How far history itself shares in this juridical logic of detection and 
deduction is demonstrated by Carlo Ginzburg, in his analysis of the ‘evidential paradigm’ and 
‘retrospective forecast' of historicisation.71 He distinguishes the retrospective historical method from 
archaic methods of invocation and divination. Like the police detective, the colonial magistrate in our 
case, the historian, along with the archaeologist, palaeontologist, geologist and philologist, detects
67 Magistrate, Purnea to Commissioner, Bhagalpur, 19-July 1855; BJP, vol. 293, no, 219.
68 Quoted in Elizabeth Tonkin, Narrating our Pasts, Cambridge, 1992, p. 56.
69 Stephen Fuehs, Rebellious Prophets, London, 1965; MiohaelAdas, Prophets o f Rebellion, Cambridge, 1-979.
70 Logic of Practice, Cambridge, 1990, p, 82.
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indelible clues of the past from spatial traces in the present.72 Significantly, Ginzburg’s originality lies 
in his creative use of ‘primordial’ and folk tales. In this context, when Ginzburg says, with appropriate 
caveats of course, that the historian must align his/her position with the inquisitor and the 
anthropologist -  in the hope that the accused speaks up, even at his/her own peril -  the politics of 
historical authorship is exposed.73 In seeing time as a clue-like precipitation on space rather than as 
created in practice, disciplinary history of events, falls into the juridical-inquisitorial position -  ruling not 
only knowledge, but legislating practice and sentencing rebels as well.
By making detective-hindsight the most accurate mode of knowing, history refuses to validate 
the urgency and the unpredictability of practice, the temporal imperative that gives up distance, 
detachment and pondering pauses to identify with the imminent future. Theory refuses to admit 
practice because practice refuses to admit the theoretical but real possibility of sudden reduction to 
the present, of, to quote Bourdieu again, ‘the abrupt severing of relation to future, which like death, 
casts the anticipations of interrupted practice into the absurdity of the unfinished’.74 That is, history 
advises against practice by reminding us that after all it might fail. And this retrospective mode 
disguises the primary limits of knowledge -  by denying that the time and the significance of practice 
lay beyond the extent to which it allows itself to be captured by history and in terms of precedents. No 
wonder, then, juridical discourse, in its search for clues, motives and causes, overlooked the temporal 
imperative of Santal rebellious practice. However, it is not enough for us to say in Bourdieu-ian terms, 
that by positing the act as the event, historiography sought to hide the distinction between theory and 
practice. Practice is not itself an undifferentiated category, it is in fact a category reinvented by 
modern knowledge to counterpoise itself. In fact, the specificity of the colonised condition, as we shall 
discuss in the next chapter, was the formulation of history not just as consciousness and knowledge, 
but also as the only valid mode of practice. This chapter will demonstrate how historical discourses 
tried to not only nullify rebellion as a practice, but also to discipline the remembering of the rebellion. 
Narration as a practice too was sought to be monopolised by history.
Uses of the past: history, narration and time
If the authorities failed to detect ‘rational’ causes for rebellion in Santal testimonies, it was also 
because it was risky to admit that ‘primitives’ could rebel in full consciousness. The official said: To 
those who have seen the disciplined conduct of tribal councils, the dignified administration of tribal 
justice, the anarchy of revolt must seem the very antithesis of all that is truly tribal’.75 Even at the 
height of the hul, the army was kept subordinate to civil administration, as authorities could not quite
72 Ibid., p.117.
73 'The Inquisitor as Anthropologist' in Ginzburg, Clues, p.164.
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believe that ‘primitives' could actually rebel.76 While opinion in England urgently campaigned for all 
Santals to be exiled to Pegu,77 the colonial state issued a general pardon.78 It was argued that 
Santals did not rebel, they were merely provoked into uncharacteristic action by Hindu lower-castes 
like Gwalas, Telis and Kamars, who were seen ‘taking milk and dhye to Sonthals and striking drums 
to announce our progress’.79 As if to admit that the ‘primitive’ could rebel, was akin to saying that the 
embodied past could rise against the present. Santals could not rebel, because they were not 
historical. They could not rationally mobilise a past for a future -  ‘[fjraditions of their ancient 
migrations are rendered obscure by the succession of dissolving views to which this nomadic habit 
introduces us’.80 Nor could they imagine a rational future - ‘having no education to guide or strong 
intellect to direct [them, their] ... ideas of a future state coalesce into an insane fancy’.81 They were 
merely in history by spatially co-existing with the modern. It then was a conceptual impossibility to 
attribute rebellion to the tribe’s own ‘consciousness’. Santal narrations of the hul were therefore 
useless except as confessions, which placed them in the judicial purview of the state.
Middle-class Bengalis shared in this official incredulity about ‘primitive’ rebellion. Digambar 
Chakravarty, a lawyer in Birbhum, believed that low-caste Hindus like Manglu Julah and Jagannath 
Sikdar incited Santals. For Santals were otherwise a ‘lively and extravagant people, if they could 
sustain themselves for the present, they were never restrained by thoughts of the future -  the flow of 
time seemed their only possession’.82 To the local Bengali bhadrolok, the ‘primitive’ thus represented 
the rather loveable, though alien, tendency of living for the moment, in spontaneous and joyous 
abundance -  a presentism which could not become a political programme unless led from outside. In 
fact, a Bengali newspaper of 1855 referred to contemporary speculations about the possibility of a 
disguised Russian agent amongst the Santals.83 The same ‘primitiveness’ explained why, once 
provoked, Santals would turn indescribably violent: 'the sight of the Santals is horrific, they wear only 
a loincloth, red garlands around their neck, their bodies massive and black, they eat all animals, a few 
days ago they cut up and ate a tiger, they are greatly united and never move except in large crowds, 
their agents are prowling over the hills.’84 The hul therefore was merely an instance of the unthinking 
and unwieldy bodily excess of the ’primitive’. As an event, it was fundamentally different from say the 
uprising of 1857, which, though as ‘unsuccessful’ as the Santal rebellion, did demonstrate a sense of 
political succession, the rulers of Mughal times leading soldiers in a war for recovery of the throne. 
Though Bengalis in Calcutta supported the colonial state during 185785 by late nineteenth-century 
they had owned up the ‘sepoy mutiny’ as their own history.86 The Santal rebellion on the other hand
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017 E. T. Dalton, Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal, Calcutta, 1872, p. 209.
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could not trace such a political-historical genealogy and, therefore, could not acquire the emblematic 
status of Rajput and Maratha battles, so as to be able to represent the unitary time of the nation. 
Nationalist histories therefore textuaiised the hul in two ways. Either it was included in a medley of 
discrete, ‘proto-historicaP events, pre-dating the ‘first freedom struggle of 1857’. In these texts, 
authored by historians like K. K. Datta and P. C. Roychoudhury, Santal Pargana was included in the 
nation through the activities of Bengali settlers, of Aurobindo’s revolutionary-terrorism, Sahajananda’s 
Kisan Sabha movement and Gandhi’s anti-liquor campaigns. Santals were rarely mentioned, except 
as part of the 1942 movement, when they participated in large-scale arson and destruction of 
telegraphic communications, acts which conformed to the Bengali image of sporadic, violent ‘primitive’ 
outbursts.87 Or the hul was included as part of nationalism, but tribes’ were thematised as Hindus 
themselves. Subodh Ghosh, well known for his short stories about Munda and Santal rebellions, 
rejected the categories ‘aborigine’ and ‘animist’, criticised the ‘negative utopia’ of Verrier Elwin and 
claimed that the Santals were actually ‘tribal Hindus’.88
If Bengali narratives of the hul were written at all, they were written as local rather than 
national histories. The locality signified a time different in nature from the time of the nation. It was a 
spatialised time, which accumulated traces of all that passed over it. The authenticity of local history 
lay, not in chronological succession, but by virtue of the past and the present having the same 
location on the ground. The local historian knew the past because he lived in spatial proximity and 
intimacy to it. He often qualified the simple past of history-writing with past-continuous, use of 
dialogues, visual metaphors, intimate landscaping -  as if he himself was present when the past 
happened at the same spot:
‘Come on’, Sidhu called, 'you are the sons of the great Chando Bonga -  cross the river. See much of the water I
have already drunk up, I have left just enough for bathing the buffaloes’. ...The day was unnaturally hot, clouds were
crowding the western corner of the sky.89
Local historians loosely wove broken narratives of first-hand testimonies, personal memories, 
proverbs and tales, descriptions of the land and of ruins of monuments. The ‘facticity’ of these scraps 
rested on the fact that the historian did not select, streamline or summarise them into a smooth, 
uninterrupted narrative, nor dated nor remedied the ambiguous memories and presentist opinions of 
his ‘sources’. He gathered them all exactly as they were, in a state of ‘natural’ temporal 
entanglement. It was the task of national history to resolve these temporal knots into the unitary time 
and narrative of the nation. In other words, if the nation was history, the locality was its archive.
In 1862, Tattobodhini Patrika invited ‘collections’ of local histories and geographies for 
national history to draw upon.90 In this mode of ‘collection’, the magazine Blrbhumi thematised the 
Santal rebellion, as part of the local history of district Birbhum. Birbhum was a forested and 
variegated locale, flanked by hills, from beyond which 'primitives’ attacked Bengali peasants. To 
survive these ‘primitive’ raids, people of Birbhum became so brave and enduring that, as
87 K. K. Datta, History of the Freedom Movement in Bihar, Patna, t95S; P. C, Roychoudhury, 1857 in Bihar, Patna, 1959.
88 Subodh Ghosh, Bharater Adivasi, Calcutta, 1948, pp. 31,195.
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grandmothers recalled, even the geese of this land could defeat hawks from elsewhere. Hence the 
name Virbhumi, land of the valiant. The same author also admitted that the name Birbhum could 
have derived from the Santali word bir or forest.91 These alternative versions about the district name 
were not resolved. They were in fact unified by virtue of the contiguous location of these memories 
and counter-memories. It was only thus that the Santal rebellion could be narrated, through a long 
poem written by Rai Krishna Das of Kulkuri village. For local history was like a painting, where 
shades and contrasts were present synchronically, unlike in time where the present could be 
represented only by clearing the space of the past. Poems about the hul were thus textualised in 
Birbhum! \n a visual, integrationist mode: ‘just as in painting mobile brush-strokes bring life to a vision,
92the unhindered, rhythmic moves of verses describe a vision in totality and in mobility.
These local memories however, appeared in the texts of disciplinary history as attachments 
and appendices, leaving the narrative of the historical subject-author untouched. The style and the 
mood of the ‘source’ were kept distinct from the style and mood of history. In the rigorous two-volume 
history of Birbhum by Gaurihar Mitra, son of the same Sibratan who had collected local verses of the 
hul for Birbhuml, the account of the rebellion was constructed using government files, Hunter’s Annals 
and Bradley-Birt’s The Story of an Indian Upland. The main body of the history of the hul was a 
narrative of tested and proven facts, i.e. facts produced out of colonial, juridical trials, which Mitra 
presented not as a narrative but as reality itself. In a separate section, he attached eyewitness 
testimonies and poems by villagers.93 The temporal principle that distinguished this history from 
adjacent local narratives was not only that of retrospection. It was the temporal principle by which 
history represented the future of the past as fully foreclosed. After all, when the disciplinary historian 
prescribes that the present must not distort the vision of the past, what he means is that the past is 
ended, totalised and bracketed, and can no longer redo and change the present. It can only be from 
such an assured and stabilised present that 'sources’ could be used, without fear of their internal 
narrative-times tainting the continuous temporality of the nation's history.
In ‘local’ testimonies, however, the future seemed still attached to the past, as people 
continued to ponder over alternate directions that reality might have taken. Hill-Ranger Chand 
Paharia remembered explaining to the rebels the dangers of attacking Pathrul zamindari -  if they had 
listened, he lamented, they would not have faced the saheb directly.94 Nabin Das of Lahati expressed 
the same urgency, when he recalled that ‘the Santals ran like arrows’ and he could himself have been 
killed had a Santal parganite not helped him run.95 An old Santal said that he did not remember the 
causes of the hul, but one night Sidhu and Kanu became gods, ‘because men rise and fall precisely in 
nights, some become judges, some magistrates, even though it is the same man’.96 Old Brahman 
Banawari Sahu said, ‘the brahman is the issue of the sun, and the sun is the god of Santals. ... They
91 Sibratan-Mitra, The History of Birbhum-: the Name-and Borders of the- District', Bifbbumi, I: 3, poush, 189a, pp. 83-5.
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used to slice up the moneylender from the lea up... returning parts of the loan with each severed limb. 
... Those days the rails had not been put, then the railways began to be built’.97 The sense of 
alternative realities and multiple possibilities is unmistakable in these local versions, which suggested 
that the future would have been different but for minor contingencies. Local witnesses translated the 
centrality of the hul by drawing personal significance from it, counting the age of children by reference 
to it, narrating it in its continued immediacy, even as it became past. In the locality, the hul was never 
far past, even when it was over.
Historiography had to replace these provisional and expectant memories with historicised 
pasts -  no longer open but indefinitely re-presentable, in principle unchanged whatever the present 
and the future might be. Just as inequivalent presents could be translated in the market through 
money prices, incommensurable pasts could be transcribed into historical continuity through 
numerical dates. In this paradigm, the only temporal entities that could not be dated, enumerated and 
exchanged were futures. Once historiography captivated the future within the causal/anticipatory 
logic of the (re)presentable past, futures, the unenumerable time beyond the limits of thought, were 
repeatedly deferred before the colonial ideology of improvement and development. It was this 
necessary deferral of the future for the sake of modernisation (of the present), which had to be 
compensated by the deployment of the novellic time in colonial Bengal. The subject-author who had 
to see the past as fully foreclosed and who had to defer difference itself for the sake of being 
disciplined as modern and historical, could play with the past only in the ideal time of fiction -  creating 
sought after endings and leaving ends open such that the past could be resumed for the desired 
future. This narrative time could even simulate the time of practice, as the protagonist of the novel 
acted out, freely, the imagined future of the nation. The centrality of the literary text in nineteenth- 
century Bengal was therefore not only because it allowed the free play of imagination in developing 
the counter-factual to empirical history -  the estranged temporality of the ought-to-be and the wouid- 
have-been -  but also because novellic time was posited as a surrogate of practical time itself.
We therefore find the Santal rebellion and its local memories being repeatedly invoked in 
Bengali novels. Tarashankar Bandopadhyay admitted that to him the hul had always seemed an 
event of ‘primitive’ excess, until he took ‘local’ and oral testimonies seriously. Nayan Pal, descendant 
of the potter who had sculpted the goddess Durga for the Santals in 1855, told Tarashankar: though 
‘people say that sahebs have left all this written’, one can never grasp the ras or mood/essence of the 
hul unless one is able to sense the limits of time. Like the Santal rebels almost a hundred years ago, 
Nayan Pal claimed: when time can no longer hold the excess of sin/acfhamma, gods must act.98 
Nayan reminded the novelist that he too was related to the hul, because Tribhuban Bhattacharya, who 
supported and conducted worship for the Santals, was actually Tarashankar’s kinsman. Nayan 
showed the author a collection of pats, paintings illustrating the events and stages of the hul on 
terracotta plates -  as he recounted his memories in a song. The narration began: ‘Kenaram, the
97 V M .
93 Tarashankar Bandopadhyay, Aranyabanhi, reprint, CalcuttaL 1966, p. 22.
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moneylender is not one, he sits over every village/ through the country is the same condition/
> brahman, kayasth, vaidya all those of wealth and deference/ ail of the same kai [time]’. In those times
of indebtedness, the men of the white-island were trampling the earth, shackling the landscape with
iron (railways), bringing down mountains, filling rivers, whipping people, building palaces, the poor
were heard weeping endlessly.99 And then, when the railway sahibs raped three Santal women, the
gods arrived on earth in thunder and in rain. The Santal acted on the signs of the god -  god alighted
as first a low, pregnant cloud, then as the fire of lightning and then as the widowed daughter of the
Brahman Tribhuban Bhattacharya. To Nayan, the rebel Santal was the incarnation of Kali, the
goddess of force and destruction. He was the hunter Kalketu of Mukundaram’s epic-poem
Chandimangal. 100
Ten heads, twenty hands Ravan the brave 
) Hands in pairs tremble
Before the army of human-apes 
By the wish of the goddess the weak triumph 
The Santal arrow wins over gunpowder101
Thus as historiography pushed these memories into the realm of the fictional and the ‘primitive’, the 
local Bengali villager placed the Santal rebellion in the time of the so-called Hindu epics Ramayana 
and Chandimangafkavya, disrupting the original antagonism between the civilised and the ‘primordial’.
If history needed to retain the originary contradistinction between the fair arya and the ‘dark’ 
anarya, the novelist could make a metaphor out of darkness -  slipping from the ‘dark of the night’ to 
the dark of dreamless amnesia to the dark skin of the ‘primitive’.102 Navigating though the darkness of 
the forest, the unconscious and the forgotten, Tarashankar claimed to write across the text of history,
> with the help of the song and the pats of the local villager.103 In much the same manner in 1923, 
Loknath Dutta wrote a long poem about the 'brave of the forests’ fighting the evil (dushta maha[an) 
moneylenders and the illusory weights and measures of the market (mithya taula bat). Datta did not 
call this an adaptation of history, but a Walter Scottish effort at aestheticising the ‘highlanders’ -  as if 
‘primitive’ rebellion could be acknowledged only through a stroke of poetic justice, by disowning 
history for the sake of the literary.104 Fictional time could make the end appear contingent, such that 
contradictory possibilities and suspense could be maintained till the final resolution. In novels, the 
future was not foreclosed. Historical narrative on the other hand, making retrospection the principle of 
truth, inscribed the end on the very beginning of the historical question. Practice, the negotiation of 
contesting possibilities, appeared in history either as an evolutionary or as a logical progression 
towards the known end, the given present. This was more than teleology. This was a redeployment
> of temporality such that the present refigured itself as the origin. What could have been a valid 
description of contemporary hierarchical Bengali society -  the contradistinction between the Santal 
and the upper-caste, educated Bengali -  was historicised as the original condition of historical 
consciousness, as the war between the Vedic-Aryan and the Dasa-‘aborigine’. The Hindu, male,
99 Ibid., pp; 25-6.
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upper-caste / middle class moral collectivity, which was aspiring to represent the nation in the
> nineteenth century, was historicised as the ‘originary’ spirit of civilisation. In other words, historical
narrative began from the end, and called its narrative register ‘objective’ time. And instead of being 
acknowledged, as fiction was, as a construction, this history was presented as a positive description 
of reality itself. As history performed this necessary slippage between narrative and the world, all 
other ways of narrating the past were displaced as fictional.
Telling pasts: narration as practice
>
The rest of the chapter sets off this disciplinary move by Bengali historiography against Santal 
memories of the rebellion. Santali narratives were documented in late nineteenth century by 
missionaries who believed that ‘primitives' were easier to educate and convert, because, being body- 
centric and thoughtless, they were yet to imagine a future for themselves. They were, in other words, 
still waiting to be guided into a historical trajectory. Santals not only reminded Reverend Knockaert of 
St Ignatius’ description of mankind drinking and dancing, rushing into hell,105 they reminded Reverend 
C. D. Snell that ‘primitives’ had no sense of life after death and of temporality.106 Therefore, 
conversion meant not only the lesson of moral restraint, but also the temporal lesson of distinguishing 
death from time. While on conversion most Santals merely added Jesus to their repertoire of dead- 
spirits, the real ‘primitive’ convert had to learn the lesson that spirits and dead-ancestors were past 
and obsolete. On conversion, Suija Santal went ‘mad’, burning down the village deities. When the 
sardar reminded him that the manjhithan was the mark of the fathers, Suija screamed: ‘My father is 
dead more than twelve years’. 107 Kolean Haram, who narrated the ancestors-story to Reverend 
Skrefsrud, resisted conversion till the very end when, as Chotrae Desmanjhi remembered, in old age 
he succumbed to the dark horrors of hell. And Singrai died screaming that the dead-spirits refused to 
leave him even as he was going to hell.108 In other words, making the Santals literate enough to be 
able to document their narratives, was also the process of converting Santals into a new temporality. 
The Santal narrators, whose stories the missionaries recorded, were converts. But unlike Suija and 
Singrai, these were the converts who resisted falling apart as time was forcibly rationalised for them, 
and who appeared more contemporary than other ‘primitives’. For it was no longer enough to have 
the memory and the capacity to tell, the Santal narrator had to be a mediator and a translator as well, 
with access to the contesting worlds of the ‘book’ and the ‘myth’, and to the contesting times of the 
ancestors and progress. The storyteller thus turned ‘informer’, as the past of the bongas became 
obsolete in the time of history.
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10S7fte Hill Tribes of India, an Account of the Church Missionary Society’s Work amongst the Santals, Pahan'as etc, London, 
1891, pp. 6-8.
107 Snell, The Hill Tribes, p. 16.
TOS Chotrae, pp. 174-75.
132.
Sagram Murmu, ‘informer’ to Reverend Bodding, was anxious about this newly ‘rationalised’ 
> time in which stories and memories, despite their truth-value, became extinct. He acknowledged that
only when printed, did pasts and stories seem to acquire permanence: ‘We Santals do not know how 
to read or write ...still somehow or other we have these stories, as it is seen, they have not been lost 
to us’.109 And once permanent, stories acquired the authenticity of historical evidence. Sagram 
realised that once printed, Santal stories would become true and thus defeat the missionary effort at 
replacing Santal customs with Christian habits.
But along with writing I have also been thinking that this actually belongs to the heathen, and if this should be 
prepared into a book and printed, they will at once buy it with great joy and when they have been reading it, they will 
get up against us...they will say: ‘Look here, ours is correct. If we were not correct, it would not have been printed.’ 
By this argument we will be defeated.110
An old Santal headman who had lost his village to his creditor and spent his time visiting the courts, 
* proudly showed the missionary his most precious possessions -  a bundle of papers, English
advertisements, circulars and even a tattered copy of the Queen’s Proclamation -  ‘our papers, your 
papers, papers of the ancients and papers of the present day’.111 As the courts had taught this Santal 
obsessed with papers, truth no longer rested in truthfulness of the narrator, but in the permanence of 
inscription, in proof as deed and signature, which the moneylenders could produce before the judge 
and which the Santals could not. From that which truly was, truth had become that which survived.112 
Time became the test of truth, and truth became historical evidence, accessible to the present as 
spatial traces and residues of the past.
In Santal narrations, however, time was the test of truth in quite the opposite way. If the 
ancestors were to be believed, it was not because their words survived the vicissitudes of time as 
evidence, but because their words were lost -  for these words were too true to exist in the colonial 
present.
From ancient times upto near the present day we Santals did not know false statements ... After the Europeans have 
come, a few Santals have been judged to be hanged, because they have spoken the truth. There were no witnesses 
of their crime, if they had lied and denied it, they would have been set free. In our councils we did not bring 
witnesses one by one, we put all witnesses forward at once; still they did not tell falsehoods. Nowadays they have 
learnt deceit from the Dekos and like them, they sell their soul and honour for one brass cup of beer.113
Therefore, ancestral truth was proven precisely by its extinction in the compromised and 
contemporary times. The leit motifs -  ‘people tell’, ‘it is said’, ‘they were saying’, ‘who knows why’ -  
in Santali narrations of the past signified not hearsay, but the uncertain and lost words transmitted 
from a true but extinguished past. Temporal uncertainties were part of this narrative time -  thus 
when the ancestors changed the customs,
Whether they were discussing the matter for twelve days or for twelve months or for twelve years, they do not know. 
They were sitting till the grass had become dirt and they had finished all the water in the river and ponds. ..[then they 
moved until Sikhar] from Sikhar country to this land everybody knows and can tel!.114
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That exact dates and durations could not be recalled was proof that the past was indeed lost. The 
narrator could not simulate the passage of time day by day, as historical chronology did. Narrative 
time did not represent real time. Grass passing into dust and rivers drying up were not literary 
representations of the depth of change, they stood in for the temporality of ancestral acts, a 
temporality whose duration, measure and date could not be recalled in contemporary times.
If the past appeared to the Santals as a lost time and a time of losses, what did it mean to 
say, as colonial historiography did, that Santals were ‘primitive’, past-minded and future-less? It 
meant that the past of the Santals was not the past of history-writing -  i.e., not a completed past that 
stopped at a date, common to the nation, beyond which time became contemporary and present 
across all generations. To Santals, the passing of time between generations was substantive, 
qualitative change; at every birth therefore the ancestor’s story had to be renewed, as binti was 
recited for the new-born and the older generations represented themselves as past ancestors to the 
child. This constantly renewable ancestors-story began with the creation of the earth and ran 
unmediated into the immediate and personally experienced present of the narrator. While the 
creation, the good days of Cai Campa, the d/'/cu-outsiders first entering the Sikhar country -  that is, the 
far past -  would be more or less common to all narrators, the story gradually diverged as it moved 
towards the present generation. The particular travels and memories of one village added on to the 
general narrative, the story with a common beginning ended differently. E. G. Man’s ‘informer’ thus 
ended his story with the birth of the custom amongst Santals of his village by which, even when paid a 
single man’s wage, no less than four Santals carried government packages -  because once upon a 
time a police-cfarogab had forced an old Santal to carry the collector’s luggage for fourteen miles and 
he had died on the road.115 Dalton’s ‘informer’, Kangail Parganait, ended his story with the arrival of 
Laf-lathi, the white man with a red stick, accompanied by followers with brass plates on their chests 
and two curious dogs. He tied up the headman of Sonabadi, took land for himself, set up smelters 
and ‘made quantities of iron ore and sent them all out of the country’.116 Skrefsrud’s ‘informer’, Kolean 
Haram, ended his story thus: ‘[f]rom Sikhar some of us came to Tundi [Manbhum]. ... And someday 
we shall again go somewhere who knows where’.117 This open-endedness of the narration, which 
exposed the past to present experiences at every act of narration, was what distinguished the Santal’s 
past from history’s autonomous and finalised past, beyond which all was contemporary. As Jonathan 
Smith puts it, this was not a pure, pristine past, a time ‘other’ than the present.118 It was a past that 
could be invoked precisely in simultaneity with the present.
This Santal past, which remained open to its own future, i.e. to changing presents, defies the 
image of the ‘primitive’ as essentially past-minded. It also defies the stereotype that ‘primitives’ hold 
their pasts to be too sacred to be transcended by a future. Ancestors were, of course, deferred to as 
guardian-spirits. But the authenticity of this ancestral past was not the authenticity of the stereotypical
Mart, Sonthalia, p, 92-3.
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'origin myth’, a category of non-historicai past-consciousness constructed to gioss over not only the 
complexities of non-modern narratives, but also history’s own dependence on the idea of the ‘origin’. 
Nineteenth-century Bengali history, following the European model of dark ages preceding the 
Renaissance, tried to circumvent mediating times and reach the ‘original’ condition of arya superiority 
over the ‘aborigine’ and the ‘original’ truth of the Vedas. This significance of the ‘origin’ can be read in 
European historical thought as well -  in Hegel’s realisation and ‘return’ of the Spirit to itself, in 
Heideggar’s claim to ‘original’ parentage by Greek antiquity, in the theoretical return by both 
rationalists and romantics to nature as the source of laws and of aesthetic solidarities respectively. 
Perhaps because they were not ’historicised’ in this modernist sense, Santals did not ascribe too 
much to the notion of ‘origin’. The creation was merely the story of creation of the earth -  it did not 
posit any ‘original’ difference or contradiction out of which Santal identity was constructed. ‘Towards 
the east, where the sun rises, is the birth of mankind’ -  it began.119 In those times there was no earth, 
only water. God summoned the turtle and the earthworm to dig up earth from under the ocean. First 
the sal tree was born, then the mahua, and the first man and woman were born out of a pair of birds. 
The birds did not know where to place the humans, their nest was too small -  ‘oh, oh, in the sea of 
sorrows/these little human ones/ oh, oh where could we place them.’ So they flew towards the sunset 
and found the island of Hihri Pipri. There the first human pair grew feeding on the seeds of shyama 
grass. Soon introduced to the intoxicating drink they learnt of sexuality and bore children. Then they 
travelled to Khoj Kaman -  where they became bad, like buffaloes, without ‘concern for anybody’ and 
god rained fire, which destroyed all but Pilcu Budhi and Pilcu Haram.120
At the time of origins, then, humans were not differentiated from the world around them, not 
even from animals; Santals in fact descended from them. If they became different from other 
humans, that happened in course of time. The point of the ancestors-story was to indicate this 
progressive differentiation of peoples through time, not to foreground the ‘origin* of Santals, nor to call 
upon a ‘golden past' as nationalist historiography would have it. In fact, the Santal past was as sad a 
time as the present, a time of forced wanderings, when ancestors lost all the lands that they had 
cleared. This past could not become a contrastive metaphor or a dream past to the present. Much of 
this past was irrevocably lost, like the lands from which the ancestors were displaced. What remained 
were memories of the moments when these irrevocable changes occurred, displacing and estranging 
peoples from each other. Thus, at Cai Champa, Santals were living peacefully, until a clever but cruel 
son of mixed-marriage, Madho Singh became king and tried capturing Santal women. But even the 
happy days of Champa was not glorious, for fights had already begun:
Get up, get up, do get up my friend,
Be watchful, be watchful, my friend
For the sake of boundary they are killingLeach other
For the sake of a landmark they are cutting each other...121
Then at Tore Pokhori Baha Bandela
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The country people came together at the foot of a tope sarjom, labar atnak, the bent Mahua trees having spread lotus 
leaves and drinking water of the Kere spring, they whether for twelve days or twelve years legislated and ruled; 
namely, from this day when we have ceremonies in connection with birth, death [etc.] ... we shall act and follow such 
and such customs. There our ancestors, who knows for what reason, upset the rules of the ancient ancestors. Much 
was mixed up for us with what the Dekos have.122
This was the time when Santa! and diku customs became mixed. Despite mixing, however, Santals 
ruled well -  when they crossed the river stepping on lotus leaves, their feet did not get wet a, nor did 
the leaves break. Those days Ramraja was living, the Santals had helped him defeat Ravana and 
were friendly with the diku-s.^23 Bhuiyas and MarMundas gave out land and took little rent from 
Santals. But ‘day by day’ as the dikus began moneylending, even the Munda kings lost land against 
money and cloth loans. Mark the emphasis on the conjunctural nature of Santal enmity with the 
moneylender-outsider -  the diku was not constructed as an ‘original1 Other, who ‘contaminated’ 
Santals. In fact, once upon a time, Birhors, Kurmis and Santals lived together as Kharwars. Then 
‘who knows why’, Birhors ate a monkey and were thrown out of their lands, and Kurmis became dikus, 
trying to marry out of the group and own land. The Santals thus became lonely and ‘who knows why’ 
lost the name Kharwar. In fact, one version ascribed the beginning of the hul not to a Santal but to a 
low-caste Dorn, who touched a golden boat in the Ganga and made it sink. The dikus came to ‘hack 
Dorns to death1 -  the Dorns began to move like stags in a forest. They dressed as Santals and lived 
in Santal houses.’124 The Muslim Julahs too seemed one with the Santals, such that in worship a 
Santal prayed: ‘when we speak, it stops in our throat, we are choked in our words, ... in the house of 
jolhas, in the house of dhunias, stuck thread, stuck cotton is caught up, ... like thread stretched out 
make a way, make a road, lord Father, my thacoor'.125
The story of the Santal past was thus a story of separation and scattering of a people, who 
called themselves hor or simply ‘men’. Unlike events, these differentiating occasions were not dated 
but themselves served as ‘dates’ or marks, reminding Santals of the moments which led to the 
present as it was. Time was perpetuated by these separations and encounters. As ihe Santals 
travelled in search of land, these moments of irreversible change and differentiation were 
remembered by the name of the country they were passing through at that time. Significantly, uniike 
the formalisation of time as numbers, which affixed ‘historical’ events, this mode of remembering via 
landmarks did not reduce time itself to a permanent trace over space. These moments of 
differentiation were not autonomous events, serialisable by virtue of the mere fact that they happened. 
Every moment could not be serialised (in) every time. Thus, the colonial present could not be inserted 
into the narrative time of the ancestors-story. As Skrefsrud noted, in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, memories of the immediate past could not longer be added onto the story of creation and 
ancestral travel.126 As the ancestors-story stopped growing, the present became a dislocated and 
condemned ‘bad time’. Why and when this happened is a separate project -  but the entrenchment of 
the printed/written word and the forcible prevention of Santals from collectively travelling over
122 Ibid,, pp. 12-3.
123 Ibid., p. 10.
124 Ibid., Juggi Haram’s version, pp. 189r90.
125 Ibid., p. 1Q3.
126 Annual Report ofSanthal Mission, Benagaria, 1887-88.
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land/time-marks, except as indentured labour, probably disallowed the possibility of everyday renewal 
of the past. Earlier, as Kolean Haram remembered, stories emerged out of collective conversations -  
‘If a person suddenly speaks and reveals this or that, then others, thinking that this is good and fitting, 
will also speak the same, and thus it is spread.’ But then, making stories was no longer possible for 
everyone and in the everyday: ‘Folktales and fairy stories are not composed nowadays, only old ones 
are in vogue, learnt one after the other. Riddles we have also only old ones.’127 In other words, the 
Santal narrators admitted that the present could not partake in the same practice of narration, which 
enunciated the time of the past.
If every time was not serialisable in every temporal sequence, the particular time and 
occasion of remembering determined the critical ‘event’ of each narrative. It could be Madho Singh’s 
becoming king, which ended the good days at Campa. It could be the first arrival of the diku- 
moneylenders in Shikar country. It could be the hul, which forced many Santals to leave their homes 
and start afresh as indentured labour in Assam tea-plantations. Or it could be the crossing of the Ajay 
river into the defiled country where, the ancestors had said, ‘even the chiid in the womb’ must be 
nipped before entering. Though there was hardly any mention of Muslims in this narrative, perhaps 
the context of speaking to a missionary required that the coming of Muslims be spoken of as one such 
time-marker as well -  Kolean thus mentioned the event of war with Muslims, when the sun was 
shadowed by Santal arrows.128 Critical ‘events’ could also differ across the paris or sub-groups of 
Santals. When the hor became too many, a massive hunt was organised by the gods, and Marang 
Burn or the great-mountain-god divided the people according to what they were doing at that 
particular moment of differentiation. The Santal surnames thus signified not essential identities, or 
fixed lineages, but acts that groups were performing at the moment of naming. Baijal of Koa-Am 
remembered, that they became different from other Santals, while fighting the dikus in Pandra. The 
land flowed with blood and even the waters of Damodar could not wash the blood-marks off the back 
of the ancestors’ hands, who thus became forever marked as Khanda Sorens.129 The Laher-Tudu 
remembered making vessels and great drums in the smithy -  'they danced in twelve villages in one 
night’ and by virtue of this specific propensity became different from others.130 These critical ‘acts’, 
which made one Santal different from another, were summoned in order to identify strangers as kin, to 
remind each other that though ‘we get lost and become strangers’, it was ‘from one people [that] we 
have been spreading far and wide just so when the seed of mustard and sesame are scattered, we 
have filled the world’.131 Unlike in Santal narratives, in which critical ‘events’ differed according to the 
critical moment of remembering, nationalist historiography tried once and for all to hyphenate the past 
and the present by a single event -  the event of English triumph at Palasi, or the event of Muslim 
conquest. In fact, the one was often the metaphor of the other. Colonialism itself was thus 
constituted into an event -  before which times were happy, and after which time was troubled -  as if,
127 Horkoren, pp. 126-27.
128 Horkoren, pp. 2-15.
129 Gausdal, Santal Khuts, pp. 128-29.
130 Ibid., p. 151.
131 Ibid., p. 157.
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if freedom could be lost at one stroke, the glorious past and a modern future too could reclaimed with
> a single event as well. Freedom became an event itself in nationalism, with Nehru’s metaphor of the 
stroke at midnight. Bengali historiography therefore presumed that when Santals summoned their 
past, the hul would appear as the singular event distinguishing the past from the beginning of the 
present, especially since the ‘tribe’ entered history’s vision only by virtue of the rebellion.
In Santal narrations, however, neither was the rebellion the only critical event, nor was it an 
‘event’ in the episodic sense of the term. In other words, the event of rebellion did not by itself place 
the year 1855 in continuity with the Santal past, nor was it the only moment dividing the past from the 
present. Narrations had to thematise temporal dislocation itself. For Juggi Haram, rebellion was thus 
the epilogue and the closure to his father’s narration of the ancestor’s story. For Chotrae Desmanjhi, 
it was the explanation, which framed stories of missionary activity and migration to Assam. Santal 
accounts thus always seemed somewhat displaced from the line of historical interrogation, which 
presumed rebellion to be an autonomous and episodic event and time to be continuous, despite it. 
No wonder colonial officials found it difficult to pinpoint the ‘cause’ of the rebellion. When Sagram 
Murmu asked the wise old Jhagru Haram about the hul, ‘his answers had no connections with my 
questions’. Jhagru said that he 'made red’ the lands across the Ajay and then ‘he started to tremble 
and did not reply at all ...his eyes became very red’.132 Santal memories of rebellion thus passed, not 
into a historical continuum, the specialised site of knowledge of the past, but in the common and 
fragmented repertoire of present utterances. This inheritance, this debt to the past, was different from 
historical succession. When Santals sang songs of the hul, it was not only because memories of the 
) rebellion were a crucial inheritance, but also because the rebellion was not yet completely past. As
we have seen in the first section of the chapter, rebellion remained a compelling and contemporary 
condition for the Santals even in the eariy twentieth century. When Santals sang in Bankura, a district 
to which they later migrated,
On this side Santbhui, on that side Sikarbhui, babu Nilu Singh 
O babu Nadu Singh, Jadu Jamadar 
W e will not let you pass . . .133
they remembered the rebellion by relocating it from the hul-country of Damin to the old lands of the 
old times. The rebellion, in other words, was extended, through songs, beyond the event and its 
historical site, into the present as well as into an earlier past. For those socialised in the historical 
mode of remembrance, it might seem as if there is only one use of memory -  the genealogical. 
However, it is possible to write a history of memory itself -  which would demonstrate ‘historical’
► changes in uses and modes of memory and thereby ‘historical’ changes in deployment of time in 
everyday life.134 Once we remember that memory itself is not a historical or a psychological constant, 
Santal memories of rebellion can be read as an implicit critique of the historical mode of nineteenth- 
century Bengal.
132 Gausdal, Santal Khuts, p. 43.
133 Quoted by Culshaw, 'Santa! Rebellion’, Man in India , XXV: 4,1945, p. 221.
134 James Fentress and Chris Wickham, SociaLMemory, Oxford, 1994.
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Santal memories were not the representation of an-other time in self-enclosed knowledge, but 
) the making present of the past in everyday practice. Stories of Santal life and travels were recited as
binti at births and marriages, and rebellious songs were occasioned at times seemingly odd and 
irrelevant, as when a sad song about deaths in rebellion would be sung during a festive dance. 
Through songs and verses thus, the Santal past let itself out of one single narrative. It can even be 
said that the past seemed possible without the narrative form of linear time. Songs often referred 
back to stories, stories had songs sung in course of their telling. But episodes and references from 
the past also existed as relatively free-floating images, lending themselves to different 
interrelationships, configurations and modes of remembering. The past, in other words, lent itself to 
practice. In songs and dances, the Santal past was spoken in rhythm and in tune. The past in this 
case could not only be danced to, but its enunciation, for example in harvest songs, often provided the 
pace and tempo of work. All senses, the body itself, could be placed in this mode of remembering. 
Narrative time generally was short, where critical acts like rebellion were enunciated almost 
laconically, in the form of a fragment of memory. This narrative economy was required because in 
practice, there was no time for elaborate pauses and detached explications. As Italo Calvino says, 
where time must be made for storytelling as part of work, where songs might be sung in work without 
feeling thriftless about time, long durations may be crossed in a flash.135 In remembering through 
practice, time was not represented merely as duration as textualised in narrative. Time was 
perpetuated by differentiated use of tonality and metaphor, by the swiftness of passing over and 
beginning new stories, by the rhythm of the song, by repetitions, and above all by the temporality of 
the practice which summoned this remembering in the first place. This mode of practising the past 
) was necessarily collective, songs to which the entire village danced, songs, even when sung in
solitude, were known to be known by others. All observers noticed that song and dance were not the 
specialised vocations of some Santals, but were common to all ‘primitives’. In fact, it was in the 
commonness of this past, rather than in the authority of its knowledge, that time was articulated. The 
temporal economy of practice required that a person’s acts be read, the logic of his/her practice be 
understood, the song joined in, without pausing and making-time for elaborate discourses and 
explanations.
It is necessary to understand the use of tenses in this practice of remembering. The entire 
ancestors-story was narrated by Kolean Haram in the past continuous -  ‘we were living in Champa’, 
‘having left there’ etc. -  signifying, not a relationship of succession between past and present, but a 
continuance of the past in its present re-enactments. In songs, the rebellion was spoken of in present 
and future tenses:
Sidhu why are you bathed in blood?
Kanhu why do you cry ‘hul, hul’?
For our people we have bathed in blood,
Since the trader-thieves have robbed us 
Of our land.
Or
Saheb rule is trouble full
135 Italo. Calvino, Six Memos for the Next Millenium, London, 1992, p. 37.
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Shall we go or shall we stay?130
Tense, it may be said, not only positions the ‘subject’ in temporai-relation to its ‘object’ (the past in this 
case), but being a form of the verb predicates the ‘subject’ practically in relation to time itself. 
Enunciating the past in present and future tenses thus put the Santal in a practical relation to time -  
such that the past could be figured only when it was also enacted. In contrast, the subject-author of 
history could grasp the past only in knowledge because the past was unequivocally past and ancient. 
The only relation that practice could have to such a historical past was a moral relation, taking lessons 
and inspiration from the past but unable to act upon it. In fact nineteenth-century Bengali history can 
be read as an agonistic exercise in knowledge, which admitted that the factual past could not be 
changed while resisting with all its might the past, of decline and defeat, that was empirically on offer.
It may be argued, therefore, that the Santal modes of telling the past were also attempts at 
redeploying time through practice, through practices of rebellion, work, dance and narration. In 
practice, time appeared neither as a pre-existing, calibrated straight-line, nor as a space-like duration, 
formalised into chronology and succession.137 Instead, time thematised the limits of present 
imagination, the limits beyond which knowledge failed and practice was summoned. Time appeared 
as that imperative, beyond knowledge and inheritance, which could change reality beyond belief.
the word of the Ancestors of old is not to be doubted; that will come to pass. ... presently who can say, after how 
long a time, we human-belngs shall use a hook to reach egg-plant fruit; whether the eggplant will grow, or we human 
beings shall become stunted, this we are unable to say.138
Incredible possibilities lay in time, which neither the inherited past nor the imaginable future could 
apprehend and anticipate. Just as the temporal imperative of hul augured changes which could not 
be rationally expected, Santal bongas or ghost-spirits suggested inconceivable realities, which the 
present could neither rationally explain nor contain.
What seemed ‘primitive’ supernaturalism to the rational subject of history, was in fact the 
articulation of a present that was neither fully explicable, nor entirely inherited or deserved by the 
people. As Santals knew very well, gliost-spirits did not always co-habit with the Santals. Only when 
Santals were displaced from their pasts and their lands, without any fault of theirs, did bonga-s appear 
as necessary clues to survival. Ramu of Bisunpur remembered that when the Santals were forced to 
leave cropped lands and enter dark forests, a spirit arrived in the form of a Brahman and asked for 
worship, promising to save Santals from wild animals.139 Lachu Haram remembered that, after the 
wars between Koenda Gar and Badoli Gar, ‘it is said, they started to find and invoke Bongas in 
stumps and roots, and on this side of the Nai river they have found more and more Bongas. Thus, the 
Bongas have become very many.’140 Kisar bonga incited men to get rich quickly.141 In fact, by the
130 W. G. Archer and Soren, HorSeren, Dumka, 1943, noT 1489.
137 George Gurvitch critiques the historical method by sayingLthat history attempts to make reality conform to the collective 
subject/nation, by ignoring ruptures, hiding hierarchies, and pretending that time is a continuous chronology; The Spectrum of 
Social Time, Dordrecht, 1964, pp. 34-5.
138 Bodding, Santhal Folk Tales II, 1925-29, reprint, Calcutta, 1990, p. 95.
m  Gausdal, Santal Khuts, p. 23-4.
140 Ibid.
141W. G. Archer, The Hill of Flutes: Love, Life and Poetry in Tribal India, London, 1974, pp. 26-7. The Santal customs 
mentioned in this text were collected by Archer between 1942-6.
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early twentieth century Santals had even acquired a chuprasi bonga -  the spirit of the court peon, 
without whose benevolence the debtor could never triumph over the cWfu-moneylenders. Jugi Murmu 
said
[when]_Muti Sin increased the land rent, he claimed from them double and treble ...our fathers ran away leaving 
behind everything they possessed and they came to this country with only their courage and a few hens tied to a 
wooden pestle. ... the Abge bonga appeared [and said] ‘ How many countries are you to run away from, make a 
promise to Desdana [one who grants a country] bonga and they will give you very much.’142
Local non-Santal deities, whom Santals came in contact with in their travels, also became bonga-s, as 
did headmen and ancestors who died and yet who continued to remain active in village affairs.143 The 
boundary or sima-bonga, the bir or forest -bonga, the mountain-bonga and the khuntut or tree-stump 
bongs -  all resided in the Santal village like inconceivable glimpses of time, signifying realms neither 
of the dead nor of the living. Authors like Marquez, Isabelle Allende, Ben Okri etc have helped us 
understand this fabulous presentism of unmastered reality -  in which nothing is absurd, but for the 
absurdity of the present itself. And Derrida has hinted at the non-chronological future to which an 
unacquittable debt is owed and which appears as a spectre, which is neither past, nor present.144
Conclusion
Nineteenth-century historiography ethnologised these Santal narratives as 'myths’, just as twentieth- 
century historiography ethnologised them as ‘oral’ traditions. It is however not enough to deconstruct 
the arbitrary nature of these distinctions, by showing that myth and history or orality and literacy do 
not appear in neat succession in the time of progress but that they confront and counterpoise each
other as contemporaries, in the course of the political mobilisation of pasts.145 This chapter has tried
to show that disguised under these conceptual binaries, proposed and problematised by modern 
disciplinary knowledge-forms, lay the foundational confrontation of knowledge with practice. My 
reading of Santal memories of the rebellion, and of historiographical attempts to textuatise them, was 
geared to demonstrate that there was nothing ‘oral’ or 'magical' or ‘pre-modern’ in Santal narrative 
practices, which a Bengali or a Hindu did not partake in, in everyday time. Historically reconstructing 
the hul as a purely ‘primitive’ exercise had, therefore, a purpose other than what seems evident. On 
the one hand, by relegating bodily, violent and portentous acts to the ‘primitive’, historiography tried to 
remove temporally disruptive practices from the ‘historical’ present of Bengali / Hindu society. On the 
other hand, by denying rebellious agency to the Santals and by blaming low-caste Hindus for 
provoking ‘primitives’ into uncharacteristic political practice, historiography tried to neutralise the 
impossible moment of a past rebelling against the present. As the ‘primitive’ was paradoxically 
textualised as both inherently rebellious and intrinsically non-rebellious, the point was not so much a
142 Ibid-., pp. 64-5.
143 P. 0 . Bodding, A Santal Dictionary I, Oslo,1929, see entry for ‘Bonga’.
144 Jacques Derrida, Spectres of Marx, New York, 1994
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definition of the ‘primitive’ as a category. The point was rather to make temporally discontinuous 
> practice itself appear as the 'primitive' Other to historical knowledge. As knowledge sought to study
modes and manners, like rebellion and rebellious memories, which could not be uprooted from 
practice, it turned the time of practice into an ethnological ground, untouched by causal rationality and 
unable to touch rational thought, where the author-subject entered like an anthropologist and then 
returned uncontaminated to the ‘objective’ present, having collected evidence about both archaic and 
extant pasts, about both the past and the present ‘primitive’.
This is what Michel de Certeau calls the ‘ethnologising effect’ of knowledge.146 In order to 
make itself ‘objective’ and absolute, historical knowledge in colonial Bengal not only ‘ethnologised’ the 
past as 'another country’, untainted by colonialism.147 It also ethnologised practice itself. In Bengali 
historical discourses, this Othering of practice was done by rejecting some practices like rebellion as 
futile and irrational, and elevating others -  like trade, education, self-improvement, art and travel -  into 
‘historical’ acts. This was also done by historiographically reconstructing acts of rebellion into events 
of rebellion -  by renarrativising the verb as the noun, as it were. When colonial and Bengali historical 
discourse thematised rebellion as an event to be put in chronological succession, when it sought to 
structure the rebellious imperative into a synchronic cause-event-consequence series, when it made 
‘local’ history into an encyclopaedic existence overdetermined by national historical time, when it 
separated yet harnessed ‘fictional’ to ‘factual’ recollections of the past, when it made the ‘magical’ and 
the ‘supernatural’ into the ‘primitive’ Other of rational pedagogic and monetary practice -  historical 
discourse was not only seeking to subordinate antagonistic practical-times, it was also seeking to 
I monopolise the practice of narration itself. In this historicised narrative, incommensurable and
antagonistic acts were sought to be serialised as successive events, and time was conducted through 
causal rather than futural imperatives. It was only through such narrative strategies that the rebellion 
of Santals against moneylending, i.e. against the abstraction of time into money, could be placed in 
that very abstract time which the rebels tried to question.
In other words, historicisation sought to create a split between consequences of acts and 
consequences of events. To view the present as a conseguence of past acts was to admit the 
present as actively created, rather than passively received. To view the present as a consequence of 
finished events, however, was to make present actors relatively free from the presence of the past, a 
need deeply felt by the Bengali middle classes in the face of unfavourable colonial-empirical histories 
of India. As the next chapter tries to show, Bengali historiography tried to define historical practice as 
karma and anusilan, so as to ensure that the past was passively received in practice and actively 
restructured in knowledge -  thus preventing the present from rebelling against or jeopardising the 
progressive time of history, in spite of the acknowledged incommensurability of past / tradition / ’
145 In context of Indian history, this demystification of the oral-literary divide can be seen at its best In Ranajit Guha, Elementary 
Aspects of Peasant Insurgency, Delhi, 1983; Gautam Bhadra, Iman o Nishan, Calcutta, 1994; Shahid Amin, Event, Memory, 
Metaphor, Delhi, 1995.
146 The Practice of Everyday Life, Berkeley, 1984, p.65.
147 David Lowenthal, The Past is Another Country, Cambridge, 1985.
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spiritualism and present / modernity / materialism. Articulation of historical time then became a 
theoretical exercise, an act of knowledge -  historicising Rajput wars as the emblem of national pride 
did not therefore logically call the Bengali to battle. The nation needed to assert only a ‘spiritual’ 
rather than a practical continuity with the past. As the Bengali upper-caste, middle-class male author 
of history experienced the unbridgeable chasm between his so-called modern-liberal education and 
his aggressively ‘traditional’ everyday life, this schizophrenic modernity was itself textualised into 
history as the acceptable and unavoidable difference between knowledge and practice. Only by virtue 
of such a split could the history and the ‘spirit’ of the nation be distilled and de-temporalised out of the 
practical and the pragmatic. And only by virtue of such a split, could rebellious practices, including 
that of narration, be reconstituted as immoral, violent, illiterate, thriftless, irrational and in the last 
instance ‘primitive’.
VI
Neutralising Time: Knowledge and the Disciplining of Practice
In time, today is always yesterday. But every today is also 
the offer of the chance to ‘space time1 and to decide how it 
will no longer just be time, but our time.
-  Jean Luc Nancy1
Bengali history-writing not only sought to textualise rebellions, rebellious memories and narrative times 
into a proper historical order, it also sought to formulate practice itself as an appropriately historical 
category. This did not merely imply a historical judgement on whether a certain social or political practice 
was relevant, anachronistic, consistent and continuous with past practices etc. This was also an attempt 
to epistemologically structure practice -  i.e. render to practice the nature of knowledge itself. This 
chapter will try to demonstrate that late nineteenth and early twentieth century Bengali historical 
imagination was founded on the construction of an ‘idea’ of practice, of practice as a subordinate category 
of gnyan or knowledge and of practice as the opposite of, the Other to knowledge.
Like European intellectuals, Bengali intellectuals too claimed historicity as the central attribute of 
the nation. Unlike in European modernity, however, this history appeared as both as the consciousness 
of consciousness a la Hegel and as the consciousness of subordination. The colonised could therefore 
not merely ‘be1 history like the Hegelian Ge/sf, s/he had to reconfigure history as it was on offer -  in order 
to escape historical subordination -  through an alternative and self-conscious historical practice. It is in
1 The Birth to Presence, Stanford, 1993, p. 166.
144
this sense, one may say, that the Bengali historical sensibility tried to conceive of the historical, not just as 
a mode of awareness of the nation, but as a mode of acting. Needless to say, all knowledge-forms tend 
to do this to an extent. Even purely classificatory and neatly numerical knowledges try to project a certain 
kind of social practice as legitimate and/or possible. However, modernity emerged on the principle that 
knowledge was a specialised and autonomous site, which lay beyond the reach of everyday practices of 
life. If the totalising intent of non-modern knowledge-forms lay in their claim to explain life and death, the 
sacred and the profane, the human and the cosmic in one single move, the universal claim of modern 
knowledge-forms lay their indifference to everyday, local and practical contexts, i.e. in their universal and 
scientific applicability. As the Foucauldian version of European history has taught us, beyond modern, 
disciplined knowledge, thus, seemed to lie a surplus reality -  an excess that returned before the rational 
mind as the regime of the unconscious, as the realm of desires, as the world of insanity and as the time of 
the primordial. Modern knowledge faced the task of explication, disciplining and/or abolition of such 
realms of practices as these, which seemed to thrive outside, beneath and irrespective of reason.
The colonised had to lay claim to this detached realm of theoria, beyond everyday practices. Yet 
it also had to define itself as national or indigenous in the strong sense of the term, in order to refute the 
universality claimed by the discourses of the rulers. The idea of historical practice emerged in an attempt 
to resolve this paradox. Edmund Husserl accused Indian and Chinese philosophies of ‘thematising’ the 
world merely ‘in a practical way’, while Greek philosophy thematised ‘universal life-interests in the 
essentially new form of a purely “theoretical" attitude ... bringing about theoria and nothing but theoria.'2 
Placed in this paradoxical double bind of lacks -  between the absence of ‘free’ practice of ‘Indian’ values 
and the absence of ‘pure’ theory -  the colonised saw ‘history’ as the solution. This chapter intends to 
demonstrate how this happened and what the implications of this history were with regard to the idea of 
political practice itself. As I shall argue, historical knowledge of this kind sought to impose upon practice 
the temporal structure of knowledge -  i.e. formulate practice in a synchronic and causal manner, rather 
than admit to the irreversibility and inherent unpredictability of practical time. Historical practice was 
made to appear as a conquest and rebuttal of everyday time, rather than as an alternative redeployment 
of the everyday life of the colonised and the subaltern. It was this neutralisation of the politics of the 
everyday, which allowed the articulation of Brahmanical philosophies of karma, abhivyakti/vivartana, and 
itihas/purana with theories of scientific evolution and causal prediction, rendering to Hindu principles a 
‘rational’ universality of the Western kind, at the cost of other past systems of thought.
2 The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Evanston, 1970, pp. 280-83.
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The conquest of time: the epistemoiogical structure of practice
In colonial Bengal, historical practice was defined as anusilan and karma, Anusilan was ‘culture’, the 
regular and repeated practice of ‘natural’ and ‘harmonious’ human tendencies. This culture, in the verb- 
form as in plant-culture, constituted what Bankim called the ‘substance of religion’.3 Education itself was 
subsumed under this practice -  the term anusilan literally stood for the practice-exercises given after 
each lesson in school manuals. Practice in this sense, was repetition ad infinitum, ensuring that an 
identity-in-formation was materialised into existence by the sheer disciplined repetition of the identical 
through time. For Bankim history was just such a repeated nation-effect. The jatiya-bhav or the spirit of 
the nation was seen to recur at different moments in the past -  when the aryas defeated the anaryas at 
the very beginning of history, when Prithviraj Chauhan fought Muhammad Ghori in the eleventh century 
or when the Marathas fought the Mughals in the seventeenth and the eighteenth. The same nation-effect 
could be made to recur in the colonial times, through anusilan -  the repetition and relearning, in the 
present, of what was already present in the past but which seemed to have been forgotten. Seemingly 
dissociated from conceptual thought, which every individual could not be expected to cultivate, anusilan 
was pure practice -  the bringing to the surface of dormant national traits, the habituation of the masses to 
these traits, all this through sheer reiteration. Anusilan samities or local club-committees where Bengali 
youth ‘cultured1 their bodies, sang patriotic songs, and even organised revolutionary terrorism, were 
locations of this exercise of repetition. It was said that nationality and historicity were abhyasgata gun, 
that is qualities which one could make a habit of, through practice and repetition. Thus, war, which 
signified historical practice in many of Bankim’s novels, was the practice or anusilan of national unity.4 
Such was the power of disciplined repetition, Bankim argued, that it could habituate even a ‘primitive’ 
Hottentot to practices of civilisation.5 True, a ‘primitive’ possessed no culture except that of the body.6 
Yet, if properly modulated, 'primordial’ bodily propensities could be overdetermined by the anusilan of 
mental and aesthetic faculties. Clearly, the ‘mental’ was the precondition to all practice, even the 
religious. Without knowledge, even devotion, worship and faith were ineffective -  as Bankim exclaimed, 
‘the fool has no god’.7
Karma, the other concept of historical agency, was non-teleological practice, which was socially 
necessary and morally valid irrespective of its end-results. Its telos might act as a heuristic tool but it did
3 Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay 'Dharmatattva;, 1888, Bankim Rachanavali //, (hereafter BR), Calcutta, 1954, p. 591.
4 ‘Aikya’, Bangadarshan, magh, 1872.
5 ‘Dharmatattva’, p. 590.
6 Ibid., p. 658.
7 Ibid., p. 612.
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not invest the practice with value. Value was inspired by the act itself that defied the need and desire for 
its fruits, interpreting Krishna’s utterances in the Bhagavat Gita, Bankim said that the impact of nishkama 
or desireless karma, even when undertaken by a lonely individual like Arjuna, continued beyond the life­
time of the individual. In this sense, karma was social practice, because its fruits were not claimed or 
consumed by the agent him or herself. The consequences of such acts were invested in society and in 
god.8 Such practice was therefore ‘historical’ even prior to the constitution of the collective historical 
subject, like the nation, and even before the arrival of the promethean time of epochal transformation. 
Even when a nation or a people did not exist as a self-conscious collectivity, in and for itself, karma 
ensured that each individual’s actions produced collective intentionalities. Professional, domestic, 
middie-class Bengali individuals thus formed a nation, not because they possessed a ‘primordial’ unity 
like the tribes’, but because they constituted a moral group, wherein each could consent to sacrifice 
individual ends in nishkama karma, even though each acted as a solitary individual. If James Mill 
accused Comte, and the Hindus, of subordinating the individual to the community, he failed to 
comprehend this nature of karma -  that it was precisely a theory of individual practice, though the results 
of such practice were common to society. In this, it was not as if the individual had no value. It was just 
that the individual or the individual goal was not the end. The individual was the 'witness consciousness’, 
the precondition rather than the goal of conceptual knowledge. Practice as karma thus not only pre­
existed the actualisation of the nation, it also pre-existed the arrival of the suitable time and context for 
action. For it was collective practice which had to await the right and relevant context. Individual karma 
did not -  it could engender social reform even though it might seem ahead of time.9 Evidently posited 
against simplistic historicism -  that societies could change only when the right time comes -  karma 
asserted that ‘time does not arrive by itself, ‘whatever must happen by the end of kaiiyuga must happen. 
We shall do our work. The autonomy of the subject is not to be abdicated. Ought never be relinquished 
in favour of time and destiny.’10 Karma must conquer time itself, which in the paradigm of colonial 
modernity, appeared as the constitutive lag of the colonised.
Nineteenth-century Bengali authors relentlessly contested the allegation that karma led to 
renunciation rather than to practice. Giving up the fruits of labour was not so much a renunciation as a 
transferance of the lessons of one’s own practice to future successors. It was the final triumph of history 
over finite human life, over evolutionary disadvantages, over anachronistic efforts by the ‘backward’ to 
progress. It was not incidental that in this period, numerous books on death and the after-life were 
published, with explicit historiographical intentions. Death represented that ultimate denial of collectivity, 
that ultimate individuation of a human being who dies alone and in doing so realises that, in a way, the 
world ceases to be with the end of an individual life. Everyday time, lived in the shadow of imminent and 
inevitable death and of colonial unfreedom, seemed logically to disrupt and cut across historical
8 ‘Krishnacharitra’, B R II, pp. 560-84.
9 ‘Samaj Sanskar', Bangadarshan, kartik, 1878.
10 ‘Abisranta Bairagya', Bangadarshan, ashar, 1882.
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continuity. Death and slavery in this sense emptied future-oriented practices of their significance. Hence 
the argument that practice must be understood as karma, transcending its own end and its possible 
failure, transcending its own agent and transcending the spectre of the unfinished and the meaningless. 
On the one hand, Bengali texts harnessed scientific principles, like the law of conservation of matter and 
energy, to prove that time was continuous despite the everyday experiences of death, defeat and 
finitude,11 On the other hand, they argued that the nation must practise history precisely because death 
and decline were final. Not surprisingly then, Nagendranath Gupta, who wrote numerous historical novels 
and plays, also wrote:
W e can only claim consciousness. Eternal consciousness is our blessing. The destruction of amnesia is in this sense our 
immortality. I shall always recognise myseif, I shall reject my own body at my discretion, but my memory shall never 
cease. Let me never be conquered by the terrible forgetfulness that is death.12
Bankim too sought to extricate history from this discontinuous temporality of the colonial everyday by 
relocating karma in the site of consciousness; for to see practice as embodied and therefore imprisoned 
in ‘reality’ and in the ‘everyday’, would, in other words, be to deny god, that ultimate agent sans 
materiality, the power of creative practice.13 Only when practice became karma, could consciousness 
defy death and defeat: ‘in the real world there is no death and no dead. Everything is life ... where is the 
split between the past and the future? Where is the fragmentation of the great life of the world? How can 
there be discontinuity ever?’14
It was thus karma, and not historicism per se, which made the present continuous with the past 
and the future. It detached the actor from the prison of the present and reconfigured the present as the 
past of the future. Bhudev Mukhopadhyay argued that practice as karma activated the present in a way 
in which European historical consciousness never did.15 Despite knowledge of evolutionary time, the 
West based practice and ethics on the individual. The West failed to grasp that individual acts, invested 
in society, had common consequences for the species and the epoch. Western presentism, therefore, 
failed to engage with collective destiny, as karma:
Epochs are immanent in Hindu destiny: the elements, stars, animals and the entire universe are inherent in this. This 
destiny has no form, no image -  but the destiny has an intent (dhyan). That destiny is not a person, but a subject, a 
thematic (vishay). That destiny is named the eternal, the absolute -  History without origin.
This was evident in the difference between Greek and Hindu senses of destiny. Greek destiny was 
tragic, because it unfolded despite the protagonist’s knowledge of the awaiting fate. Hindu destiny was 
blissful because it was the knowledge itself.16 Bhudev admitted that history as a practice existed in a 
minimalist sense amongst all peoples -  even ‘illiterate primitives’ memorised their pasts in ‘long poems’ 
(and Tartars and Muslims’ chronicled regnal chronology accurately). However, unlike Hindus, others
11 ‘lhalok o Porolok’, Bangadarshan, agrahayan, 1882.
12 ‘Jivan o Mrityu’, 1900, Nagendra Granthavali II, Calcutta, 1925, p. 361.
13 ‘Dharmatattva’, p. 605.
14 ‘Jivan o Porolok', Bangadarshan, poush, 1882.
15 ‘Samajik Prabandha’, 1892, Bhudev Rachanasambhar (hereafter BHR), Calcutta, 1957, p. 33.
16 'Adrishta', Bangadarshan, sravan, 1882.
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failed to grasp the profound causality of historical practice. To grasp the causal imperative, Graeco- 
Roman antiquity imposed the human form on nature, god and nation. And Christians invoked the 
indecipherable will and discretion of God.
Hindus however did not need to personify causal forces as either human or godly will, in order to 
understand history. This was because they understood practice as karma, and thus could place the most 
arbitrary of events in temporal continuum. They could find causes behind causes, thus reaching time and 
subjectivity -  kal and atman -  as the ultimate a priori. They could invoke the past and the future 
simultaneously, and through causal prediction and predication, imagine practice even in the most 
debilitating and contingent present.17 It must be remembered, however, that though karma as a system 
of causality was part of the pre-colonial darshan tradition, it underwent a crucial displacement in colonial 
modernity. In darshan, causality was not invoked to explain necessary events -  the ‘ever present1, i.e. 
the essential or the eternal, or the ‘never present’, i.e. the ficitional or the imaginary, could not be caused. 
Causality was invoked to explain only the contingent.18 Faced with the logic of modernity and history, 
however, Bhudev had to narrate the nation as necessary. Though Bhudev described the defining feature 
of the ja ti as causal consciousness, he had to stop short of admitting the constructedness and 
contingency of this causal identity. Therefore, instead of foregrounding the contingency of karma as 
causal practice, as in pre-colonial theory, Bhudev had to imagine his and his nation’s difference with the 
coloniser well within the domain of the necessary, of progress, essentialism and historicism. Though 
Bhudev did articulate the insight that the ideology of karma differed from Western historicism precisely 
because the former recognised the contingent effects and nature of practice, he had to essentialise this 
difference as a necessary difference between two kinds of knowledge-imperatives, the Western and the 
Hindu. His insight into the nature of practice was cancelled out as it became sublimated into a certain 
static knowledge-fomn, in authorial possession, that is in the possession of the educated male Hindu.
Thus, the Bengali intelligentsia could epistemologise the practice of karma to the extent of saying 
that karma foregrounded causality so as to make divine intentions identical to natural laws. This 
conflation of the ultimate agency with the ultimate structure, it was argued, generated the ultimate 
civilisational stage. This highest civilisational state was in absolute contrast to 'primitive animism’, where 
every object, animate or inanimate, was attributed an autonomous will and agency.19 This apparently 
was the lesson of Auguste Comte’s ‘positive philosophy’. Since ‘primitives’ did not understand natural 
laws, they lacked the patience and the foreknowledge to await the working out of causalities. They 
therefore showed a futile restlessness of desire and will, in acts like bidhroha or rebellion. Karma on the 
other hand, was fundamentally patient, and able to harness the certainty of determinate futures and
17 Bhudev, ‘Samajik’, pp. 36,146.
18 Anindita Balslev, A Study of Time in Indian Philosophy, Wiesbaden, 1983, p. 21.
19 ‘Can There be an Exception to Natural Laws?1, Bangadarshan, jaishtha, 1873.
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natural laws.20 The ‘Indian Positivist Society’ of Jogen Ghosh et at, with whom even Bankim and R. C. 
Dutt were associated, thus invoked natural laws for purposes of causally informed and future-oriented 
karma, while explicitly asserting a Brahmanical or ‘intellectual’ privilege to leadership.21 In this ‘positive’ 
paradigm, ‘primitive’ superstitions were interpreted as nothing other than erroneous causal connections 
between the present and its irrelevant antecedents.22 An 1872 essay criticised those who saw the 
‘innocence and truthfulness’ of ‘primitives’ as proof of their practical or ethical superiority. Allegedly 
drawing evidence from Darwin, Burton, Robert Lallemont, Paul Duchaillu and Herbert Spencer’s work, 
this essay argued that ‘primitives’ practised violence, sex and other ‘practices of the night’, saw death as 
the end of time, failed to see the relationship of ‘mortal man’s practices with general society’, failed to 
causally predict the future because they failed to see similarities between superficially dissimilar empirical 
objects.23 ‘Primitives’ thus not only lacked knowledge, they also lacked valid life practices. Or rather, 
‘primitives’ were incapable of historical practice, precisely because they were incapable of knowledge as 
causal and deductive explication. After all, the primary ‘primitive’ error was to confuse time with practice. 
Since in the ‘primitive’ condition, unnati or development was inordinately slow, the ‘primitive’ confused 
change with the ‘natural’ movement of time itself, instead of ascribing change to historical practice and 
laws of nature. It was this ‘primitive’ reduction of time to practice which disabled peoples like the Santals, 
Kols, Bhiis etc from harnessing the certainty and confidence of historical causation.24
An 1878 essay on causality argued that there were two kinds of relationships between acts -  
samakalvrittitva, co-evalness or simultaneity in time, and anantarvrittitva, succession in time. Acting-at- 
the-same-time as a concept was cryptically dismissed by the essayist by saying it was ‘a matter of 
numerical sciences’ etc, though it is difficult to understand what he means when he says this. 
Significantly however, he says that in the case of social action, it was succession or anantarvrittitva which 
was relevant25 Another essay of the same year said that a sense of time as succession generated 
patience and mercifulness in historical practice, and prevented unnecessary confrontations, 
impulsiveness, anger, desire and violence in society. Because time as succession apprehended each act 
as a future cause, such practice emphasised forethought rather than a leap into the future for the sake of 
change.26 Evidently, this denial of simultaneity or coevalness in favour of succession, was an attempt at 
defusing potential temporal confrontations between the present, and what were seen as its antecendents. 
Such karma, though it saw the present as the antecedent to the future, took the past as given and 
uncontestable. it could not transform the past, though it could grasp it as causally fully explicated. From 
a site of contest and contradiction, the past was transformed into a conceptual a priori, into a cause of the
20 'Gomte Darshan’, Bangadarshan, po«s/i,1874.
21 Guiseppe Flora, The Evolution of Positivism in Bengal, Naples, 1993, p. 1. Also see Jogen Ghosh, The Political Side of 
Brahmanism, Calcutta, 1896 and Brahmanism and the Sudra o r the Hindu Labour Problem, Calcutta, 1902.
22 ‘Karya Karan Sambandha', Bangadarshan, poush, 1873.
33 'Gnyan o Niti', Bangadarshan, ashvin, 1872.
24 ‘Katakal Manushya', Bangadarshan, phalgun, 1873.
25 'Tarka Samgraha: Karya-karan Sambandha’, Bangadarshan, shravan, 1878.
26 ‘Karanbad o Adrishtabad’, Bangadarshan, ashvin, 1878.
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present -  on the principle that ‘that which is past is presently factual’ (rather than the reverse, that facts 
are past and thus presently non-factual).27 In this vision, like all pasts, the ‘primitives’ too were received 
as a given fact, along with his or her primordial timelessness.
Despite its apparent foundation in the pre-colonial ideal of karma, this version of the past was 
very different from the pasts of earlier traditions of purana-itihas. The latter too excluded ‘barbarians’ like 
Nisadas from mainstream polity. However, as Romilla Thapar has shown, the very point of the puranas 
was to rewrite the past when erstwhile ‘barbarians’ successfully pushed for political incorporation into the 
structure of power. Puranas were written retrospectively like modern histories, but they were textualised 
as predictions and prophecies of the future so as to project the present changes as always already 
foreknown and therefore unsurprising and acceptable. These new futures were made to appear as 
admissible into the past. Unlike the paradigm of modernity, which conceptualised the ‘primitive’ as 
factually given and always already past, this tradition reworked the past and its history every time the 
‘barbarian’ effected a political triumph.28
Once karma was defined as identical to (causal) succession, there remained no social act or 
event which could not be put in anantarvrittitva or causal continuity. Historical practice in this mode 
accepted discontinuous acts (like ‘primitive’ rebellions), non-convergent narratives (like caste-histories), 
incommensurable worlds (like the ‘spiritual’ East and the ‘material’ West) and even oppositional histories 
(like traditions and counter-traditions invoked in course of, say, widow-remarriage reform). What it could 
not admit was the impossibility of placing certain practices and counter-practices in a single time of 
succession. In other words, the chain of karma, though a theory of praxis, became reified into a formal 
structure of causation, without reference to the intrinsic time of particular practices. The notion of karma 
was not new to Bengal, but once it was formalised as historical causality in the nineteenth century, it 
acquired the status and the form of explicatory knowledge -  shorn of the problematic of ontological 
liberation or moksha and shorn of the puranio divination of the future. This formal karmic succession now 
coincided with the empty chronology of capitalist modernity. Bhudev Mukhopadhyay distinguished 
Western evolutionism from his own bhavishya vichar or analysis of the future. Based on the profound 
causality of karma and on the renunciation of interest, desire, anger, and guilt, he announced that neither 
inequality nor war could be abolished in the future. Scarcity of resources was permanent, as were 
ethnological contrasts -  therefore both conflicts and ‘primitives’ were eternal and factual.29 Western 
historiography deluded itself that ‘primitive’ and violent conditions would in time be given over to 
‘civilisation’. However, Hindu history recognised that, though ‘primitives’ may try to Hinduise, 'what was 
not foundational but contingent will not remain ... In Hindu texts, though there is faith on evolutionary
27 See C, F Von Weizsacker's definition of ‘facts’, quoted in Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other, New York, 1983, pp. 88-9.
28 Romilla Thapar, ‘The Image of the Barbarian in Early India', Comparative Studies in Society and History, XIII: 4,1971, p. 436.
29 ‘Samajik’, pp. 145,150-51,191.
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improvement in personal matters, social development is not envisioned as limitless.’30 For it was time, not 
practice and change, which was constant. Thus, if anusilan effected the conquest over ‘primitive’ 
conditions of body-centricity and evolutionary lags, and if karma enabled the conquest over everyday time 
of death, defeat and amnesia -  these historical practices were defined in opposition to contingent, 
thoughtless and limitied everyday social practice, including that of Hinduisation. This was because 
historical practice had to stabilise time and smoothen succession, a capacity which everyday or ‘primitive’ 
practices did not possess.
Gnyan and karma: articulation of the nation in time
By invoking disciplined repetition (anusilan) and desireless work (karma), the Bengali intelligentsia sought 
to undo their evolutionary temporal lag. These types of historical practices in turn were distinguished 
from ‘primitive’ practices on the ground that the former were founded in knowledge and causality. In 
some theoreticians like Bhudev, this developed into a full critique of evolutionary time, which, according to 
Bhudev, was teleological or end-oriented. In place of evolution in time, Bhudev proposed what he called 
abhivyakti or articulation of time. This was conceptualised not as an inexorable movement towards the 
future, but as an originary imperative -  which articulated not only progress, but also the acts of creation, 
destruction and rest. This time was not necessarily evolutionary, though it might articulate gradual 
developmental change in particular contexts.31 It, on the other hand, might remain avyakta or immanent. 
This avyakta kal or immanent time acted as the centre of the universe and perpetuated evolution only 
when it chose to articulate itself. Evolution was the limiting form of time, while the self-evident, immanent 
time was the limitless -  both were the same kal or temporality, for ‘the limit is attached to both the limited 
and the limitless beyond’.32 When this originary time confronted a limit, it turned away from itself and 
engaged in practice -  creating the world and the worldly in a negation of its own limitlessness and 
immateriality. When an impassable schism or barrier threatened to obstruct the flow of time -  as when 
the arya and the sudra became completely irreconcilable in Indian society -  a mediator was born, to 
arbitrate and clear the path of time.33 Krishna was one such mediator, who told Arjuna, on occasion of 
the great war of Mahabharata that ‘I am Time’. And Atjuna took the practical decision of war, despite his 
own personal misgivings, because he realised through karma and history, that the self and the Other 
were the ‘inner and the outer extensions of the same self as time’.34
30 Ibid., p. 147.
31 Ibid., pp. 74-5.
32 Krishnachandra Sarasvati, Mahamanaber Kramabikash ba Dharmatattver Kramaprakash, Pabna, 1924, preface.
33 Ibid., pp. 38,60-1.
34 Pramathanath Mukhopadhyay, Itihas o Abhivyakti, Jadavpur, 1929, p. 29.
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To understand this notion of articulation, we must briefly refer to its uses in pre-co!onial 
philosophies of India and their redeployment in the colonial context. As Jitendranath Mohanty shows, 
almost all Indian philosophies conceived of Knowing as articulating, revealing or illuminating the object of 
knowledge. Even when cognition was inferential or propositional, it was formulated as a manifestation 
and not as a representation of reality. Of course, the knowing subject was manifest both as the 
transcendental telos knowledge and as the concrete person, for whom knowledge generated the 
affective-volitional structure of desire and action. However, unlike in Europe, in darshan there was no 
natural conflation of the subject with the person/ego. A pure, monadic person, despite the highly 
individualistic theory of karma, did not emerge as the automatic referent of subjectivity. Even where the 
concept of person was most likely to be autonomous, as in the theory of action, the ‘subject’ dominated 
the ‘person’. In the ethics of non-attached karma, the agent ceased to be a person, and became a pure 
subject, empty of all contents and interests. Western philosophy on the other hand, was not about the 
pure subject, but about the person, stripped of his corporeality, in the interior of his reflective thinking. In 
Western modernity, this extrication of the mind from the concrete individual produced senses of 
disjuncture between form and content, word and meaning, sign and signified. In darshan, however, the 
idea of a purely formal validity contra material truth or the notion of reality as a mental ‘construct’ never 
emerged. Here meaning was an act of cognition -  illuminating without representing, inner and outer,
35known and unknown objects. Meaning was not a theory reconciling sign, meaning and reference. 
Even time was not formalised into a pure chronology or concept -  in Sankha-Yoga time was the concrete 
becoming of matter, in Nyaya time was an eternal substance with qualities, in Buddhism time was the 
instantaneity of being. In this time, there were no ‘bare possibilities’. Counterfactuals constituted 
‘motivated possibilities’, which played out a political contest.36 In fact, universal skepticism and empty 
chronological time were ruled out because they contradicted practical life. If Western modernity proposed 
a disinterest in knowledge and competitive interest in life-practices, darshan proposed disinterest as 
much in practice as in knowledge. Knowledge and practice did not appear here as oppositional domains.
In the colonial context, however, science appeared as an alien yet universal knowledge, posited 
against local practices and wisdoms. For the first time, it seemed that (rational) knowledge and 
(indigenous) practices were opposed. The colonised, therefore, became anxious not only about the 
status of their knowledge, but also about the practical implications of their knowledge-systems. If Husserl 
accused Indians of not being adequately theoretical, missionaries accused Hinduism of inability to 
generate ethics and practice. Devendranath Thakur and Dayananda Sarasvati saw non-dualism as non- 
conducive to practice, Rammohan Roy believed that it needed a dose of Christian ethics, and Kesav Sen 
debated the possibilities of the ‘applicability’ of Vedanta thought37 In pre-colonial Advaita-Vedanta
35 Jitendranath Mohanty, Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought, Oxford, 1992, pp. 197-99.
36 Ibid., p. 20.
37 Wilhem Halbfass, ‘Practical Vedanta1, in Representing Hinduism, eds. Vasudha Dalmia and B. von Stietencron, New Delhi, 1995, 
pp. 218-22.
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traditions, though the world was denied a transcendental reality, it was accepted to have an epistemic 
and empirical status.38 In the nineteenth century, however, this tradition was reinterpreted as a 
renunciatory philosophy, which refused the world a place in knowledge and therefore was unable to 
generate practice. Placed in the colonial-modern problematic of knowledge versus practice, the 
colonised felt compelled to reclaim temporality as a domain of knowledge, thus removing it from ontology, 
where it seemed to have hitherto belonged and wherefore it articulated both knowledge and practice. An
391872 essay conceptualised practice categorically as a necessity, only when knowledge was incomplete. 
This displacement of time from the domain of ontology and life-practice into the field of epistemology can 
be demonstrated by a reading of Ramendrasundar Trivedi -  who replaced the notion of evolutionary time 
by the concept of articulation of time, and who, to do so, had to reconceptualise time as the 'mental 
construct' of the knowledgeable subject.
Ramendrasundar defined the articulation of time thus: ‘in the process of continual transformation, 
what was unexpressed, formless, inarticulate and ambiguous becomes manifest and articulate. This is 
called scientific abhivyakti.’40 This articulation demonstrated, among other forms, the progressive 
evolution of an entity to higher states. But unlike Western evolutionism, it did not elevate the imaginary 
far future to the highest level. Articulation admitted the ‘originary’ moment as the ultimate. This adi kal or 
originary time remained stable through all historical changes and thus allowed a self-conscious ‘return’ to 
it in a final realisation of identity -  the identity of the nationalist consciousness with the nation-subject. 
Though this might sound Hegelian, Ramendrasundar’s return to originary time was not the end of history. 
Return was possible at any historical moment, through pragnya, a compound of memory, knowledge and 
upaiabdhi or realisation, it was the pragnya of the originary which produced identity across infinite 
practical changes. Thus, though successive thinkers appeared in history as separate agents, they could 
be realised as identical when they themselves realised their succession to a common and singular past.41 
This identity however, was the equation of the knowable-subject grasped across time, not the unity of the 
knowing subject.42 The knowing-subject demonstrated a unity of a different order. It was self-evident -  
being its own proof and its own articulation. It was timeless in itself, presiding over the ‘practices of the 
knowable, object-l dispersed over yuga-kalpa or epochs’.
Time, in other words, was the fragmentation and distribution of the knowing-subject across past, 
present and future:
38 Anindita Balslev, Time, pp. 60-2.
39 ‘Swabhavik o Abhyastha Punyakarma', Bangadarshan, kartik, 1872.
40 ‘Pratityasamutpad’, in ‘Jignyasa’, 1904, Ramendra Rachanavali l i (hereafter RR), Calcutta, 1950, p. 320.
41 ‘Mukti’, RR I, p. 418.
42 Ibid, pp. 410-11.
43 'Ek na Dui', RR I, p. 276. Ramendrasundar also mentions that others like Dwijendranath Thakur agreed to this formulation of time 
by him.
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The entire world is imagined by me; with me my imagination will also end. if 1 do not remain how will time? Empty, 
eventless time? It is a lie. If there is no origin, there cannot be time. It is 1 who throws myself into time; it is I who defers 
myself in three, who sees the self scattered in three, it is my play, my illusion.44
To critique the idea of an empty,chronological time that appeared to flow even when no event or act
occurs in it, Ramendrasundar defined time as the fragmentation of the self -  as the arrangement of the
self in the form of a syntax. This formulation, which could have had a very different ontological
implication, was however reduced by Ramendrasundar himself to an epistemological proposition. He
interpreted his own formulation of originary time and articulation of time to say that temporality was the
‘mental construction’ of the knowledgeable subject. He clearly stated that that the knowing-mind
articulated itself as time, while the empirical world appeared as space. In the world of practice, he
argued, time was secondary. Here, time merely functioned as the appearance of motion, only because,
as Newtonian physics showed, two objects could not occupy the same space at the same time. The mind
however was purely temporal -  it had presence and absence, but no position.45 Though this particular
theorisation was exclusively Ramendrasundar's own, the multiplication of analogies that this propounded
was common to late nineteenth and early twentieth century Bengali intelligentsia. As mind and matter
were reproduced as the domains of time and space, time and space were reproduced as the domains of
knowledge and practice on the one hand, and as the domains of the ‘historical’ and the ‘primitive’ on the
other. In other words, the ‘historical’ and the ‘primitive’ came to represent the principles of knowledge and
practice respectively. Time, the mental construct of the knowing-subject, appeared as duration only in
practice.46 As Ramendrasundar said in a telling aphorism: ‘succession is popular practice
(lokvyavahar).’47 History was therefore not time itself, but the articulation of time in practice:
As if the world of practice is a drama -  it has a plot, an end, it begins with a design -  act after act brings a purpose, 
nothing comes which is not relevant. And the world of perceptions seems to be an epic, eventful, chaotic, a crisis at every 
moment, a revolutionary potential. One is amazed to see it, one has to laugh, to cry, to be overwhelmed, to be excited, 
but to what end it moves no one can say.48
This world of practice and of narratives was the regime of the popular, the ‘ordinary’. This world was a 
detour from the originary. Only knowledge could transcend this regime.49
In thinkers like Ramendrasundar, thus, it was knowledge that sought to overdetermine both time 
and practice. The subject who was conscious of his own identity had to demonstrate this foundational 
epistemological intent. In this paradigm, Hindus could be identified neither by a ‘commonality of doctrine’ 
nor by ‘social practices’, for both ‘varied across times and lands’. They could only be identified by their 
‘veneration of cows’. This was no mere practice or custom. Nor was it a survival of some ‘primitive’ 
totemism -  for as Ramendrasundar reminded his readers, Hindus used to eat beef in earlier times. This 
was actually a veneration of the go, a term which etymologically signified the word or logos.
44 'Atmar Abinashita’, RR I, p. 237.
45 *Ek na Dui’, RR I, p. 266.
40,Mukti\ RR I, p. 393.
47 Ibid., p. 419.
48 'Vyavaharik o Pratibhasik Jagat’, Bharatbarsha, phalgun, 1914.
49 ‘Vichitra Prasanga', 1914, RR II, p. 417.
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Ramendrasundar argued that the world was perpetuated through ‘naming’: ‘from the time of the Vedas till 
today, all the philosophical schools of India have acknowledged the world as namrup, as the form of the 
name, even the atheist Buddhist has had to admit this.’50 These name-concepts -  imperceptible, 
formless and beyond bodily touch -  were produced by pragnya, knowledge and memory, and by the 
knowing-subject as a ‘free agent'.51 Herein lay the fundamental difference between Hinduism and 
Christianity. Since Christianity opposed time to eternity, salvation was imagined as the result of virtuous 
practice in empirical time. In Hinduism however, time and eternity were continuous, in an unending cycle 
of karma or practice. Liberation therefore could only be the result of the transcendence of practice.52 it 
was only knowledge, beyond practice, which could negate death and conduct itself across generations 
into the future.53 The West-East difference was thus less a difference between materialism and 
spiritualism, more a difference between their respective knowledge-imperatives. Like Ramendrasundar, 
another essay in 1872 argued that in the West, ‘knowledge was power’, which provoked practice. In 
India, ‘knowledge was mukti (liberation)’, which transcended practice. In the Vedic times, practice was 
oriented towards gnyan or knowledge. But in the colonial present, knowledge had become ‘slave to 
practices or kriyakarma'. The purpose of the nation should therefore be the release of knowledge from 
the immediacy and thoughtlessness of practice.54
According to Ramendrasundar, anarya or ‘primitive’ jatis were excluded from Hindu society, not 
because they were immoral as pre-colonial Brahmanical paradigms claimed, but because they were not 
‘educated’ in this knowledge. He accused anthropology of producing ‘confusion through its national and 
temporal comparisons’.55 What anthropology missed was the crucial distinction between the ‘civilised’ 
and the ‘primitive’ -  the distinction which explained why the African and Pacific tribes’ survived for so 
long, while ‘civilisations’ rose and fell rapidly. This was essentially because the ‘primitive’ restricted 
himself to mere survival practices, which allowed him to perpetuate himself and his society.56 But 
civilisations often pursued higher and transcendent purposes -  ‘science, arts, philosophy and politics’ -  
often at the cost of practices of self-preseivation.57 This was because the ‘civilised’ realised that creation 
was ‘the projection of knowledge of the knowing subject from within to without’.58 They knew that ‘death 
[was] not the necessary end of life, but the norm of articulation of individual life for the purpose of 
expansion of national life’.59 Vedic Hindu sacrifice embodied the principle that human consciousness took 
leave of itself in this primary civilisational sacrifice or yagnya. ‘Primitives’ misinterpreted this lesson of 
creative self-sacrifice in crude practical terms. They therefore practiced cannibalism, human sacrifice,
50 Ibid., pp. 362-77.
51 ‘Bangmay Jagat’, Bharatbarsha, poush, 1914.
52 Vichitra Prasanga', RR II, pp. 334-36.
53 ‘Pragnyar Joy1, Bharatbarsha, sravan, 1917.
34 ‘Sankhya Darshan’, Bangadarshan, magh, 1872.
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58 ‘Mukti’, RR I, p. 401.
58 ’The Limit to Knowledge’, in ‘Prakriti’, 1896, RR i, p. 30.
L56
and took intoxicating drinks in order to simulate a release from self-consciousness.60 That is, ‘primitives’ 
reduced sacrifice to practice, while the Vedic Aryans knew it to be nothing other than the conscious self- 
alienation of the knowing subject for the sake of the creation of the world and the worldly. 
Ramendrasundar thus, literally constructed the ‘primitive’ as the practical and the ‘historical’ as the 
knowledgeable. Explaining the Brahmanical ceremony of second-birth (the sacred thread ceremony), he 
categorically defined the Hindu society as a society which ‘did not give the uneducated the right to family 
or to religion; the uneducated remained fallen in this society’.61
Ramendrasundar was not alone in this attempt to define the nation in terms of pure knowledge -  
irrespective of practice. Brahmamadhab Upadhyay, an educationist and Rabindranath’s associate in 
Shantiniketan, said in so many words:
Having learnt European sciences, we think these days that the purpose of life is work. But the Hindu ideal is to give up 
work and be instituted in the site of the self. Being is rest. Practice and will are needed to remove existential obstacles, 
only when rest and foundation are absent. Practice is indicative of a lack, an incompleteness. Where there is self- 
possession, practice cannot last.62
Like Ramendrasundar, Brahmamadhab also argued that self-knowledge ‘invents’ time and space in order 
to articulate its contingent locations. Western science, unable to distinguish knowledge from these 
constructed dimensions of existence, believed time and concomitantly the subject-object opposition to be 
transcendentally real.63 A Hindu however was one who knew that ‘only in practice [was] the world an 
Other’, argued Mahendrachandra Majumdar. While the Greek philosopher mistook time for motion, the 
Hindu philosopher knew time to be akarya or non-active.64 As another essay of 1875 argued, the Hindu 
knew knowledge to be articulation of the originary -  and not the uncertain attempt at predicting a practical 
future -  for him, there was ‘nothing that was unknowable in principle’. While the Hindu understood 
originary time as cognisable, though ‘unthinkable by language’, theorists like Herbert Spencer and 
Auguste Comte imagined the originary as the unknowable and inscrutable god. Knowledge therefore 
appeared in the West in the evolutionary mode, tending towards but never reaching completion, in the 
form of progressive accumulation through time, rather than in the form of articulation of the originary.65 
Rabindranath, who dominates the cultural sensibility of the Bengali middle classes even today, made this 
non-practical nature of the nation’s time very clear. In a 1902 speech, on occasion of the Bengali New 
Year, he said:
If one sits amidst the silent landscape of the ashram, one clearly realises inside, that being is the highest ideal of the 
world, not doing. In nature there is no limit to work, but nature keeps practice in the background and manifests itself in its 
being. ...Nature’s work is felt to be play, its movement is known to be a dance, the efforts as indifference. Hiding the 
cycles of time under the surface, foregrounding rest over motion, nature keeps herself as eternally manifest/articulate -  
she has not blurred herself in the breathless velocity of practice, or buried herself in hoards of practical consequences.66
60 ‘Yagnya’, RR II, pp. 171-72.
61 ‘Yagnya Agnyadhyan o Agnihotra', Sahitya, phalgun, 1917.
62 ‘Varnashramdharma’, Bangadarshan, phalgun, 1901.
63 'Vedanter Pratham Katha’, Bangadarshan, ashar, 1904.
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To Rabindranath, this silence and stillness was the natural bhav or mood of the Indian nation, a mood 
which was only recently ‘disturbed’ by colonial intrusion. To him, karma was the foundational national 
practice. Here, non-attachment to the consequences of action made practice into a mere pretext of 
‘being’. This national time of karma was not characterised by the rhythm of everyday work, but by the 
‘firm strength of poverty, the rigid peace of dutiful engagement and the generous solemnity of one without 
desires’.67 Away from the tumult of the everyday and from the perpetual struggle of evolution, this 
solitude and timelessness have been ‘granted us by our ancestors. Like the Ramayana and the 
Mahabharata, this silent loneliness in also our national resource’.68
The return of time: poetics and anthropology
This theoretical privilege of knowing over doing transformed, by the beginning of the twentieth century, 
the historical project of the educated Bengali middle classes. In 1914, Akshay Kumar Maitra, the first 
self-consciously disciplinary historian, explicitly announced that Bankim’s time was over. Instead of 
encouraging every Bengali to write history, history should now be disciplined as ‘correct and worthy’.69 
Even when late nineteenth-century authors textualised history as a practice for and by all, they tried to 
scientifically ‘eliminate’ all ‘imaginary' and ‘aesthetic’ elements from older texts, to glean out the objective 
‘facts’ about the past.70 Despite this, Mitra complained in his speech to the seventh Bangiya Sahitya 
Parishat conference, no ‘consensus’ had emerged on the discipline and methodology of history. He 
advised that historical education must henceforth train students in ‘discovering, collecting, preserving and 
assessing classes of evidence’ and in the ‘hardship’ of fieldwork and archaeology. Historical practice was 
no longer a collective effort in the societal sense, an effort at recovering national pride, but a rigorous and 
scholarly discipline. Historians must, from now on, specialise in ‘suspending community or national 
interests’, for ‘truth was a greater ideal than patriotism and the ethics of practice’.71 It was only such a 
disciplined history, which could cause ‘the present to lose its autonomy and, like the uninterrupted river of 
time, flow as the extended from of the past towards the future.’72
The journal Itihas o Aiochona, published since 1921 in association with the Thakurs of 
Shantiniketan, classified Hypes of history’ and clearly laid out historiographical rules. By these 
parameters, ‘local’ histories appeared amateurish, ill-written and unfounded.73 The nation appeared in 
the pages of this journal as a ‘readership’ rather than as the author of history -  to interest the ‘lay
07 Ibid., pp. 368-69.
68 Ibid., p. 370.
09 ‘Aitihasik Rachana Koutuk’, Sahitya, XXV: 7,1914.
70 Nalinikanta Majumdar, Veder Aitihasikata, Calcutta, 1929, pp. 2-3,
71 Reprinted in Sahitya, XXV: 1,1914, pp. 42-54.
72 Ibid., pp. 58-9.
73 Pramathanath Sarkar ‘Bange Itihas Charcha l l \  Itihas o Aiochona (hereafter IA)t I: 2,1921, p. 30.
158
audience’, it was suggested that historians write more often about modern rather than ancient times.74 
Ramendrasundar, Rabindranath and Benoy Sarkar (whom we shall discuss shortly) appeared as the 
‘only’ philosophers of history.75 From practice, history had become a lesson -  since India was large and 
internally variegated, a ‘study’ of national history was sufficient for a ‘cultural and liberal education’. This 
education involved the study of eminent and scholarly texts, of ‘source-methods’, of inductive reasoning, 
of the comparative method and of the deduction of practical lessons from historical knowledge.76
Once history was transformed from a national practice to a genre of knowledge, senses of time 
and imagination returned through the backdoor as it were, by way of aesthetics and anthropology, and by 
as slippage of one into the other. Thus, Pramathanath Mukhopadhyay’s ‘philosophy of history’ critiqued 
the historical discipline on the ground that ‘no inductive science [could] take us to the interior of any 
concept’. If based on mere ‘empirical facts’, even large scale ‘comparisons across epochs and nations’ 
would not yield much. It would merely frustrate the ‘desire for history’. This desire for history could be 
satisfied only through an ‘introspective’, an ‘a priori’ method, which grasped the world as always already 
in potentia. This ‘immanent’ or avyakta temporality was still operative in colonial modern times, the author 
assured, ‘sometimes as absence, sometimes as non-being, sometimes even as death’.77 Empirically, 
time was constraining, because it partitioned the present from the future. But when the time of 
articulation ‘consciously intersected] with the time of practice’, pragnya or ‘intuition’ was generated, which 
conducted the present and the past in simultaneity to the future.78 And it was this pragnaya which could 
truly historicise epochs -  epochs not of knowledge-paradigms but of different knowledge-pracf/ces. In 
these terms, national history began with the ancient epoch of ‘intuition’ by the sages. This was followed 
by the smritiyuga or the epoch of memories. The present was an epoch of forgetting, and therefore of 
'scientific discovery, classification and collection’.79 Each of these epochs of knowledge-practices was 
founded upon a certain ‘desire’ -  ‘it is this that is the rasa of history’.80 This historical time, rooted in rasa 
or desire/mood, was closer to Henri Bergson’s notion of creative temporality and elan vital than to Hegel 
or Kant. In fact, many Bengali intellectuals chose Bergson’s theory consciously over that of Kant’s.81
Pramatha Choudhury, critiquing Akshay Mitra’s speech on scientific history, argued that the exile 
of aesthetics from history necessarily disabled practical creativity: ‘Science is the knowledge of pre-given 
substances. The account of new creations is not to be found in the book of science.’82 Even Prama(ha 
Sarkar, who, as we have seen above, wrote historiographies for itihas o Aiochona, admitted that, contrary
74 Sarkar, ‘Bange Itihas Charcha', IA, 1:1,1921, p. 8.
75 Sarkar, ‘Bange Itihas Charcha III’, IA, I: 3 ,1921, p. 54.
76 Sarkar, ‘Bange Itihas Chacha IV’, IA, I: 4,1921, pp. 76-8.
77 Itihas o Abhivyakti, p. 19.
78 Ibid., pp. 39, 299.
70 Ibid., p. 305.
80 Ibid., p, 63.
81 Ramesh Chandra Ghosh, ‘Nature of our Aesthetic Faculty’, Calcutta Review, October 1938, pp. 42-50.
82 'Review of Sahityasammelan’, 1914, Prabandhasamgraha, Calcutta, 1952, p. 55.
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to history, literature was the associate of karmajivan or practical life. Whether the karma of Rama, 
subsuming the ‘primitives’ to southward Aryan progress, or the karma of daring sea-merchants like Chand 
Saudagar, practices had always been textualised in kavya or literature.83 The time of practice thus 
returned to the Bengali middle classes as the time of poetics.84 It was this poetics, rather than the 
historical discipline, which tried to defy the reduction of time to evolution and progress. Pramathanath 
Mukhopadhyay, who formulated historical epochs as articulations of rasa or aesthetic moods, vehemently 
disagreed with Darwin on the ground that the crucial insight of history was not that ‘primitives’ pre-existed 
the ‘civilised’, but that the ‘primitives’ and the ‘civilised’ coexisted. Unnati or improvement would 
otherwise be impossible. If ‘primitives' were made to disappear from the face of the earth, the history of 
even the most ‘civilised’ ja ti would have to be rethought.85 Whatever physical anthropology might claim, 
Pramathanath argued, the ‘origin’ of all the constituents of the nation was founded in the same rasa. In 
India, even arya civilisation prescribed the experience of forest and nomadism to the householder in the 
later stages of his life. After all, since creative time was necessarily non-linear, modernity would be lost 
without the ‘primitive’ as its simultaneous counter-existence.86
In early twentieth-century Bengal, therefore, anthropology was invited as a necessary supplement 
to the nation’s history. In Itihas o Aiochona, Sisirkumar Har argued that history’s primary lesson was that 
everything, ‘animate or inanimate’, could be and must be historicised. Yet the ‘history of man’ was yet to 
be written. Therefore, in order to complete the historicisation of the world, ‘to know the origin and the 
qualities of the jatis who make history through their practices and movements, history must always take 
the help of anthropology'.87 The history of man however could not be thematised as a deductive, 
inductive science, because any 'theoretical priniciple’ functioning as the axiom would anyway be a human 
assumption, therefore a part of the object of study rather than a deductive ground for it. The only ground 
for a history of man could therefore be the contemporary and ‘extant’ ‘primitives’, who seemed to offer the 
only instance of the ‘originary causes of dharma, society and history’. In the colonial context, therefore, 
anthropology was often invoked as history’s desire for an augmentation, rather than as history’s desire for 
an opposite. Though the ‘historical’ retained its contrast to the ‘primordial’, the Bengali middle-classes 
now admitted their need of the ‘primitive’ as an ethnologised and poetic figure.
Accusing Bankim of ‘over-historicism’, Benoy Sarkar stated that ‘primitives’ were ignored by 
history, at its own peril, because ‘historicism’ then failed to harness the ‘creative intelligence of man’.88 By 
contrasting itself with the ‘primitive’ condition, scientific historicism abdicated what was crucial in human
83 ‘Literature and National Life’, IA, I: 5 ,1921, pp. 106,108.
841 use the term ‘poetics' deliberately, because this imperative which was supposed to found the creative temporality of national 
practice and of which poetry and literature were not only instances but metaphors, was an alternative politics that sought to go 
beyond the application of scientific and rational, and therefore, predictive knowledge.
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development -  the working of creative imagination -  in favour of the ‘irrational’ and ‘myth-oriented’ 
‘primitive’. The historical nation must reclaim this power to imagine from what it had othered as primitive 
and archaic, by banishing the ‘poetic’ from historical texts like the epics and the puranas. For it was ‘[not] 
demonstrable anthropologically or psychologically that imagination belong[ed] to the primitive mind and 
preceded ratiocination and concrete experience’.89 Only by incorporating imagination, creative 
temporality and the ‘primitive’, could the nation achieve totality’ -  for history was ‘incomplete and quite 
unable to guess the future destiny of mankind ... so long as it [did] not concern itself with the whole of 
human life and its thousand and one manifestations’.90 Benoy Sarkar taught philosophy at the Calcutta 
University, chaired the Malda education council from 1907, ran an institute of economic study from 1927, 
and one of sociology from 1931 and published the monthly journal Arthik Unnati (Economic 
Development). He also proposed the popularisation of Vivekananda’s philosophy of karma and the 
introduction of manual labour amongst the Bengali youth.91 He emphasised that national unity was 
possible only through the study of ‘folk culture’ via ‘anthropology, sociology, ethnology and philosophical 
history’. He suggested the works of his mentor Brajendranath Seal as constitutive of this philosophy of 
history. Seal had not only written about the poetic epochs of the Indian civilisation, and about the 
‘positive sciences’ of the Hindus, he had also attended the 1911 Race Congress in London University. In 
his address to the Mythic Society, Seal had rejected the conventional ethnological techniques of static 
comparisons and analogical induction, and proposed a ‘historical-genetive’ method which could uncover 
the originary and the creative temporality of a nation.92
Pramatha Choudhury mocked Western anthropology, because it feared to admit the ‘primordial’ 
or the adim to its own time. The West pushed the ‘primitive’ to distant lands and then ‘discovered’ them, 
with guns in one hand and clothes in the other -  as if violence and embarrassment were actually not 
signs of ‘barbarism’ in modernity.93 At the same time, he showed up the limits of karma as historical 
practice -  for, he said, karma identified only the self and failed to identify with the world or the nation. To 
him, the nation called not for the past, but for the future -  the ‘playground of imagination’. In this future, 
unity could appear not as an exclusive Aryan unity, but as the unity of popular dharma. Even the past 
demonstrated that the only imperial unities that India could boast of were not Hindu but Buddhist (Asoka) 
and sudra (Chandragupta Maurya) phenomena.94 Pramatha Choudhury saw the practice of poetics 
rather than the practice of karma as the ideal historical practice. He formulated the poetic as the 
metonymn of civilisation. In this time of poetics, Greece appeared as dramatic, Rome as epic, Italy as 
sonnet, and the Jews as lyric. The Indian civilisation appeared as the fairy tale, with a bold and
80 Benoy Sarkar, The Positive Background of Hindu Sociology, quoted in Flora, The Evolution of Positivism, p. 46.
90 Benoy Sarkar, The Science of History and the Hope of Mankind, London, 1912, pp. 12, 17-8.
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unrestrained imagination, 'which conceptual and scientific knowledge [could] never discover, because it 
[was] the postulate of active life, not a passive axiom of knowledge’.95 Choudhury argued that Hegelian 
history was limited to the ‘restful’ times of growth, progress and realisation. Hegel shied away from 
creative and destructive temporalities of the Spirit. Unnati however was hardly ever restful, it occurred 
only through critical disjunctures. Continuity disabled practice. Therefore, what the Bengali needed was 
not 'to synthesise the old and the new, but to snap the two apart in his mind’ and take a risky but poetic 
leap into the future 96
In 1872, Aitihasik Nabanyas -  a collection of historical tales to be ‘shared after a hard days work’ 
-  was criticised for trivialising history as fiction.97 By the first decade of the twentieth century, however, the 
poetic and the imaginative were recalled as the practical need of the nation. ‘Tribal’ and ‘folk’ tales had 
become a necessary part of the national education of middle class Bengali children. Shyamacharan Dey 
compiled Bengali folktales, Kashmiri folktales, and Bhil, Kuki, Chakma, Paharia and Santal creation 
stories.98 Encouraged by Rabindranath, Asit Haider wrote, in simple Bengali without conjoined letters, 
Santal tales of how in the olden days, rabbits could scare tigers. The famous painter of Shantiniketan, 
Nandalal Basu, illustrated these Santal stories.99 The Sishutosh Series of texts for children included 
Santal stories too, presented through the voice of the old Santal Udol, who spent every evening chatting 
with young boys and girls. The author called upon every Bengali parent to let this Santal into his or her 
home. For though Santals were apparently uncivilised, they were a people who ‘lived in amazingly clean 
houses’, ‘lived in the open and grew in the sun like wild trees’, “were handsome and tough’, ‘never feared 
hard work’ and ‘were self-sufficient, conducting themselves in their own village councils’. These Santal 
traits were ones which every Bengali child must learn.100 The same Sishutosh Series also published the 
book Arya o Anarya, which taught children that the ‘next door’ presence of the ‘primitive’ was proof of the 
ancientness of Indian civilisation. Neither the Vedas nor the ‘aborigines’ could be dated; they were older 
than the oldest ancestor a child could imagine.101
If nineteenth-century Bengali discourse had claimed a philological sameness between Sanskritic 
Hindus and their modern colonisers, early twentieth century Bengali linguists asserted that historical 
Sanskrit, Prakrit and modern ‘vernaculars’ were structurally different from Indo-Aryan Sanskrit. They 
rejected the ‘replacement theory’, that with Aryan invasion, Sanskrit replaced earlier Dravidian and ‘tribal’, 
Mundari languages. They argued that Sanskrit and ‘aboriginal’ languages not only borrowed vocabulary 
and phonemes from each other, but their exchange of words also mutually restructured their grammar
95 'Is India Civilised?', 1918, Prabandhasamgraha I, pp. 19-20.
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and syntax. It was this mutual restructuring, this ‘aboriginal’ influence on Indo-Aryan Sanskrit, which 
made Indian languages and cultures so different from the European.102 The ‘primitive’ was thus invoked 
as the reason and the sign of the nation’s difference with the coloniser. The anthropologist, Saratchandra 
Roy, proved that there was a regular law of reciprocity of consonants, between Sanskrit and Mundari, and
103that the genetive suffix ra and the locative suffix te were shared by Bengali and ‘tribal’ languages. 
Sunitikumar Chattopadhyay argued that in structure and in syntax, Bengali was closer to Tamil and to 
Telegu than to ancient Sanskrit, of which only some roots and some words remained in modern Bengali. 
Words indicating time in Bengali and in the Kol languages like Santali were constructed similarly. And 
Bengali and Santali were similar in their differences to Sanskrit, both depended on suffixes rather than on 
prefixes, as Sanskrit did, and both were founded on asamapika or auxiliary verbs.104 Though 
Ramaprasad Chanda, the author of Indo-Aryan Races, strongly differed from this linguistic, and thereby 
cultural, conclusion (arguing instead for an internally differentiated Aryan identity to explain the Bengali- 
Sanskrit mismatch), Sunitikumar asserted that most village names of Bengal were in anarya languages. 
Agreeing with Rabindranath and Ramendrasundar, Sunitikumar argued that the Indian nation was not just 
an Aryan identity in the way that the Anglo-Saxons were. It was much more. It was a civilisation where 
many worlds met, where the most ‘primordial’ and the most ‘modern’ blended to produce a third entity.105 
The use of betel nut, of vermillion on married women, of turmeric as a necessary colouring to food, the 
technology of rice cultivation, the custom of charms to ward off evil, even the idea of the transmigration of 
souls which placed humans in a temporal continuum with plants and animals -  all these ‘Indian’ practices 
were actually borrowed from the proto-Australoid ‘animists’ and ‘aborigines’:
The mysticism of the Austric and Dravidian worked hand in hand with the imagination and the practical common sense of 
the Aryan in evolving that attitude of balance between the unseen world and the seen, which is one of the most 
noteworthy things in the Hindu vision of life, as it has struck disinterested observers.106
The nation was thus different, because it epitomised ‘difference’ itself, and therefore a spirit of 
capaciousness and diversity.
India appeared to display the entire world in itself, its continental proportions were not just 
geographical but cultural. This was the cultural, if not aesthetic, lesson that anthropology offered to the 
nation’s history. H. C. Chakladar, an anthropologist at Calcutta University, enunciated India as a ‘cultural 
complex’, where the ‘tribal’ areas displayed the ‘ancient formation of Gondwana stretching from south 
America through India to Malaysia and Australia’.107 Panchanan Mitra, another anthropologist from 
Calcutta University, argued that Polynesians computed time and the lunar month in the same way as the
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Hindus.108 The Indian nation was thus the critical instance which demonstrated, via anthropology, that the 
world was not made of races and nations, rather it was the nation which was itself the microcosm of the 
entire world. If Max Muller sought to historicise the variegated world in terms of races and linguistic 
groups, India proved that ‘mankind is above all made of mixing’.109 Mitra, therefore, formulated a concept 
of large temporal cycles, which could show that cultures, apparently distant in space and time, actually 
constituted a common ‘culture drift’. This was the anthropological time, the time of the history of mankind, 
which addressed the ‘origin’ and informed large scale processes and changes, which, ‘attaching 
themselves to forms persistent from the past to the present, marchfed] to the common meeting ground’. 
This time, Mitra clearly stated, proceeded in a direction opposite to that of ‘historical inference’.110 In his 
presidential address to the anthropology section of the Indian Science Congress, Panchanan Mitra said, 
‘the comparative study of culture over intercontinental regions is likely to reveal the important role of India 
as a primary or secondary stage of her culture complex in the march of time.’111 Thus like Rabindranath’s 
poetry, like Pramatha Choudhury’s imaginative leap, like Pramatha Mukhopadhyay’s creative articulation 
of the ‘primordial’ time, and like Benoy Sarkar’s criticism of over-historicism, anthropology too sought out 
difference in the poetic imagination of an-other, non-historical, originary time.
Symbols and time: poetics and politics in colonial Bengal
in early twentieth century Bengal, therefore, a certain poetics emerged as the surrogate of historical 
practice. This poetics, which drew its lessons not only from literary imagination but also from linguistics 
and anthropology, enunciated itself against the idea of ‘objective’ and ‘scientific’ historical knowledge that 
appeared as a knowledge of pre-given things rather than as an indication of the imaginary future. This 
poetics self-consciously founded itself on a non-chronological time, on a ‘primordial’ time of originary acts 
like creation and destruction. These were acts which were not caused in the historical or genealogical 
sense, but were effected in imagination and realised through poetic practice. It is not easy to unpack the 
implications of this poetic critique/use of anthropology in Bengal. On the surface, it might seem a 
repetition of the romantic tradition of Europe, of Rousseau on the one hand, and Wordsworth and 
Coleridge on the other. This was a tradition which announced a poetic return to nature and to the 
‘primordial’, in a reaction against industrial and urban alienation. However, in the colonial context, the 
position which disallowed a distancing of the ‘primitive’ to another land, also disallowed a ‘retreat’ into 
nature in a Rousseau-like fashion. The colonised appeared to be already located there. Thus, in the 
‘backward’ and forested district of Birbhum, the Bengali seemed caught between the need to invoke and 
the need to escape nature, caught between the imperative of temporality and the imperative of the nation,
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as it were. Addressing nature, the poet wondered: ‘are you one or many, finite or infinite ... what appears 
as truth now, soon is no longer -  having passed into the evolutionary stream ... how would I know if you 
are formed or formless?’112 Nature seemed to be an ‘infinite process of articulation of forms’, yet it was 
also contaminating, ‘however unerring and free, I the truth-like being, am still ... a shadow of 
consciousness because of your touch’.113 If Rousseau and Wordsworth could invite nature’s 
metatemporality into the discontinuous, estranged and finite everyday,114 such allegories could only 
reinforce the image of the Bengali as technologically powerless and as besieged by nature. The option of 
recovering temporality from nature was thus unavailable to the colonised.
Bengali poetic practice of early twentieth century however did appeal to the ‘primordial1 and the 
‘primitive’, not as a Romantic ideal, but as the only inappropriate sign and site of difference for the 
colonised. If the West defined itself by othering the ‘primitive’ to another land, Bengali poetics, and 
anthropology, presented itself as the realisation of the ‘primitive’ within, if the modern West seemed to 
throw its shadow over the entire world, the ‘primitive’ -  and the poet -  remained its last free location, the 
perpetual excess beyond the homogenising effect of modernity, in opposition to which the ‘modern’ could 
imagine itself as modern in the first place. Thus Jamini Kanta Sen said: ‘upto the time of Rousseau’s 
deification of Nature in a wild protest against culture, tradition and society, [t]he West never knew Nature 
as she is, -  as part or phase of a larger existence where it has no conflict with Man’. Even Rousseau 
could see nature only as a moral asset. Herein lay the foundational difference of the colonised with the 
coloniser -  for while the West displayed an antithetical relationship with nature (or inverted it like 
Rousseau in an attempt at moral recovery), Jamini Sen argued, India had always grasped nature as a 
proximate aesthetic presence.115 Yet, despite this effecting of difference, the paradox remained. Bengali 
discourse continued to imagine the nation’s civilisational character in opposition to the ‘primordial’, yet 
tried to re-invoke the natural and the ‘primordial’ as the final sign of difference and identity. It is by 
explicating this paradox -  between the need for the ‘primitive’ and the refusal of the ‘primitive’ -  that 
alternative poetics emerged in Bengal, which was able to subsume even anthropology. And as we shall 
see in this section, the logical culmination of this alternative was the possibility, though abandoned, of a 
critique of not only colonialism, but of nationalism itself.
It is true that early Indian anthropology did not particularly contest the colonial nature of the 
discipline. It traced its lineage to the Asiatic Society, to William Jones and to the linguistic and 
ethnological surveys of colonial officials. The first Indian to be accepted as a ‘scholar’ of the discipline 
was Saratchandra Ray, a lawyer from Ranchi, Chota Nagpur, who became interested in Munda 
customary law in course of his legal practice. Funded by the colonial state and awarded the Rai Bahadur
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title in 1938, he began the journal Man in India in 1921.116 Roy was clear about the anthropological 
objective -  to allow greater business and administrative success by producing ‘sympathy’ towards the 
‘habits and mentality of the tribes and castes that an officer or even a businessman has to deal with’. His 
nationalism was limited to encouraging more Indians to study anthropology and correcting what appeared 
as a merely empirical imbalance, which made most anthropologists ‘foreign’.117 However, early Indian 
anthropology did produce an image of the nation as a 'tangled skein of diverse race elements and culture 
elements’, the sheer complexity of which made classificatory work like that of Herbert Risley’s seem 
incorrect.118 The eighth annual meeting of the Indian Science Congress, which revived anthropology as a 
separate section of science in India, saw papers which emphasised this complexity of the Indian 
civilisation, where ‘aboriginal’ and Hindu symbols seemed to be functioning inextricably together. This 
anthropological agenda seemed common to almost all the participants in the Congress -  H. C. Chakladar 
and Panchanan Mitra who enunciated India as a culture complex, Prabodh Bagchi who aligned with 
Sylvain Levi et al. in tracing the Bengali language to Australoid linguistics, even P. C. Mahalanobis, who 
would become the architect of the Nehruvian mixed economy and who rejected Risley’s anthropometry 
because it failed to evolve any measure of homogeneity, and drew racial conclusions from measurements 
of individuals.119 A survey of the book-review sections in Man in India reveals that the most celebrated 
authors amongst Bengali anthropologists were James Frazer, Robert Lowie and Franz Boas -  who 
proved that ‘cultures’ where not unitary and mechanically evolved, but a ‘planless hodge-podge, a thing of 
shreds and patches’.120 S. C. Roy himself advised students to follow Lowie and Boas, instead of 
evolutionary and functionalist anthropologists.121 If anthropology simulated scientific empiricism -  by 
narrating the minutae and details of a culture -  this very mode of, what later came to be called, 'thick 
description' was used by Bengali anthropologists to give society a texture like that of painting, with many 
colours, shades and lines, which made sense only when viewed as a comptex whole. Thus:
As the architect creates an edifice out of stones of many kinds and colours, as a picture is embellished with many paints,
as the merchant presents his repertoire of variegated goods, as an exhibition sets up a collection of many flora and fauna,
in the same way, many jatis, languages, religions, trades and natures constitute the Santal Parganas.122
While history opposed the ‘primitive’ for the sake of total knowledge and unitary time, 
anthropological 'thick description’ aestheticised the nation as a complex artwork. Radhakamal 
Mukherjee, who described Indian society as ‘permeated by the aboriginal element from top to bottom’,123 
also claimed that the symbol was the most useful figure that could be used to narrate the nation. A 
symbol could stand for multiple referents -  i.e. capture 'infinity in a concrete form’ -  and at the same time
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a concrete symbol could be unpacked to reveal a many layered reality.124 Significantly, the symbol was 
formulated as a kind of narrative device useful both for anthropology and for aesthetics. A crucial figure 
who represented this double-edged use of the symbol was W. G. Archer. A typical figure of the 
administrator-ethnologist who spent a long time in the Santal Parganas, in order to collect and codify 
Santal customary law, Archer went on to become a historian of Indian art. Archer’s favoured status 
amongst Bengali intellectuals did not derive from his well-known sympathy for the marginalised ‘aborigine’ 
-  after all Verrier Elwin was strongly criticised by Bengalis for protecting and preserving 'primitives’ as 
anthropological specimens. Archer was liked because he invoked the ‘primitive’ in context of a certain 
aesthetic discourse. Archer’s personal notes show his alliance with Bengali authors like Rabindranath, 
Sudhin Ghosh, Rathin Mitra, Gopal Ghosh, Tarashankar, Bishnu Dey, and with painters like Nandalal 
Basu and Jamini R oy-w ho according to Archer, showed a ‘warm appreciation’ of this conflation of poetic 
and anthropological thinking.125
A reference to Archer and to the aesthetics of symbolism is necessary to foreground the problem 
of temporality involved in this poetic use of anthropology. Archer aestheticised the Santals as free, 
sensuous, natural and ‘original’.126 He agreed with Verrier Elwin that it was this very ‘originary’ nature 
which made the ‘primordial’ into a poetic ideal of the future -  ‘a hundred years ahead of the modern world’ 
(in this the ‘primitive’ was not archaic in the way many historical antiquities were seen to be).127 Yet 
Archer strongly disagreed with Elwin’s interpretation that Santal symbolism was a representation and a 
reification of everyday acts and objects. To Archer, Santals practised a certain poetics precisely in 
transcendence of the everyday -  for them ‘the symbolism of poetry is poetry’. Their symbols were neither 
a matter of the everyday, nor a matter of leisure and escape from the everyday.128 Santal songs, 
paintings and poetry symbolised a ‘natural’ and originary life-condition, where the idea of holiday and 
entertainment were meaningless. Despite their low productivity in a material sense, they in themselves 
were ‘a technique of alternative to the peasant’s life of mechanical labour’.129 Santal poetic practice even 
made the modernist and evolutionary accusation -  that ‘primitives’ were incapable of abstract thought -  
meaningless. To Archer, Santal wall paintings were proof that geometric shapes and formal relationships 
constituted a ‘primitive’ poetic insight -  for Santals pressed even figurative paintings into a geometrical 
form. The Santal world of spirits, neither dead nor alive, was proof that what was currently known in 
Europe as surrealism also constituted a ‘primitive’ aesthetic insight. Thus, the avant-garde ‘abstract 
movement in Europe was not a mere sophistication ... [but] returning to a natural need’.130 However, the 
economy and geometry of Santal symbolism was not merely ‘abstract’ art, because the ‘vital geometry’ of
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‘primitives’ associated multiple images with every single abstract shape gleaned from nature, leading to 
an infinite reproduction of meanings through a unitary sign.131 Precisely owing to this possibility of 
multiple meanings, Santal symbolism could never be, according to Archer, irrelevant or anachronistic.
Archer explicitly stated that the ‘subject matter of anthropology is material for poetry’.132 So did 
Reverend MacPhail when he wrote that ‘[among] the Santals, a spade is called anything but a spade, and 
a man is almost never addressed by a [proper] name. Relationship is universally assumed to avoid the 
necessity of doing so.’133 The Santal world-view was thus seen as that of symbolic plenitude and cross- 
references -  articulated not in a structural mode like knowledge, but in the work and slippage of 
metaphors, by which seemingly far-fetched things insinuated each other. In a manner almost reminiscent 
of Umberto Eco’s fascinating character Padre Emanuele -  who said ‘Metaphor, setting our mind flying 
betwixt one Genus and another, allows us to discern in a single Word more than one Object’134 -  Archer 
made copious notes of Santal dreams, riddles and poetry in search of unthinkable and outrageous 
analogies.135 In this, the realm of dreams, poetry and anthropology were coterminous to Archer.135 If 
Freud saw dreams as clues to an individual’s most hidden private world, Archer claimed that the symbols 
of ‘primitive’ dreams were clues to society’s most ‘originary’, hidden -  often inarticulate -  thoughts. 
Interpreting of ‘primitive’ dreams was therefore the most radical act of anamnesis. Unlike the 
romanticised ‘savage’, produced by the European imagination to fit the desires of European poets, the 
anthropologist’s very real ‘tribe’ offered ‘the shock of new images’. The wholly unfamiliar world that the 
‘primitives’ brought to attention liberated the mind from the prison of the present. Eliot’s Waste Land was 
founded on this very principle and demonstrated a galaxy of rich metaphors, as did the Santal, in
137articulating the ‘disjointedness’ of a world made up of real confronting modes of being.
In a poem two images which are normally separate may become connected and the poem works through the ‘charge’ 
which this connection generates, in a similar way a tribal system brings together objects and actions which are alien to a 
civilised consciousness and these actual connections in tribal life induce an excitement which is parallel to the charge in a
138poem.
The anthropologist created a similar charge and excitement by bringing two irreconcilable times together 
-  the time of the ‘primordial’, originary yet never past, and the time of imagination, not yet present yet not 
far in the future. The articulation of these two times exploded the constraining and contextualising 
presence of the historical and the empirical and simulated an escape from the prison of representation.
The symbol -  the figure common to poetry and anthropology -  was thus invoked by Archer and 
Radhakamal Mukherjee, both claiming to be anthropologists and aesthetes in one. It must be kept in 
mind that the figure of the symbol itself has had a very specific history in European thought. Hegel had
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argued On Aesthetics that symbolism represented ‘primitive’ art, where form and content were irreducible 
and accidental to each other, where there was no unity of origin and expression, where the spectator 
could only remain doubtful about the ‘meaning’ and intent of art. Modern art, on the other hand, 
expressed the inner unity of form and content.139 A century later, Georg Simmel similarly invoked the 
symbol to distinguish modern from ‘primitive’ minds. To Simmel, ‘primitive’ symbolism was ‘nebulous’ and 
represented the lack of the mind’s ‘direct’ access to reality. If the modern mind used symbols at all, they 
were highly developed abstract signs, like money, which could mediate complex exchanges and 
processes. As Simmel said, ‘[sjymbolism, which at a lower cultural stage often means detours and waste 
of energy, is expedient and saves energy at the higher stages’.140 In a mirror-inversion of these 
progressivist mentions of the symbol, Archer and Mukherjee conceptualised the symbol as the originary 
and fundamental capacity of the human mind to effect a multiplicity of meanings in one single gesture. As 
Mukherjee said, symbolisation was ‘the process of substituting relatively simple and concrete images for 
far more complex and abstract ones’.141 Suniti Chattopadhyay invoked symbolisation as the originary act 
of art, where nature was manifested through emblems and icons rather than through mimesis and 
representation.142 The symbol was a unit with multiple meanings, the perfect trope for a nation of ‘unity in 
diversity’. Jamini Sen quoted Nietzsche against the Socratic tradition of pure intellectualism, to show that 
India began its culture not in mimesis but in an aesthetic/symbolic mode, i.e. through the first deification 
of life. This achintya bhedabheda implied that ‘in the unity of our vision is involved a diversity of outlook 
[which] makes us, at every moment of our life, players in an expressional drama that never denies the 
multiplanar being of man'.143 The West must borrow from India a dose of this originary expressionism, if it 
had to recover from the trap of defining itself negatively, in terms of what it was not (the Other) and what it 
was no longer (after the original Fall).144
Western literary theory has distinguished the symbol from figures like irony and allegory, in terms 
of its temporal significance. Gadamer, for instance, argues in his Truth and Method, that the symbol 
historically emerged in Europe as literally an identity -  where no deferral or disjuncture seemed to appear 
between perception, representation and enunciation of the world. If the world was represented through a 
symbol, the image or the emblem and the reality of the world appeared coterminous and identical, 
appearing to resolve the problem of representation itself.145 In contrast to allegory (which referred to 
another purely anterior sign), irony (which admitted a temporal disjuncture between the authorial allusion 
and the authorial representation of reality), simile, metaphor (where the act of comparison between the 
figure and the object to be represented remained apparent), in symbolism the subject-author and the
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world appeared as simultaneous. This simultaneity, as Paul de Man says, was of almost of the nature of 
a spatial congruence, where temporality (the lapse between the world and its representation) seemed 
‘merely a matter of contingency’.146 If the symbol was a figure which undid the problem of the 
‘intervention of time’, to use de Man’s phrase, it is not surprising that in talking of ‘primitive’ symbolism, 
Archer predominantly used the image of painting. After all, an appearance of the simultaneous presence 
of multiple images was more easily painted than textualised, i.e. more easily spatialised than 
temporalised. Even though Archer collected and published numerous Santal poems, his imagination of 
‘primitive’ life was more in the nature of a ‘depiction’ than an enunciation. And when he wanted to convert 
his field notes from the Santal Parganas into a book about Santal love and poetry -  he called his book a 
‘portrait’ of the ‘primitives’. 147
Even though Bengali authors shared Archer’s emphasis on the symbol, imagining the nation as a 
portrait or a painting could pose obvious problems. It was too close to the colonial version of the 
indigenous society as a static collection or museum of races. A portrait or a collection, even as it painted 
shades and classified difference, could not engage with temporality. As Rabindranath explicitly said, if 
painting gave form to the Idea, it was only the temporal phenomenon of music which could give life and 
animation to it.148 Bengali poetics therefore had to make use of the symbol somewhat differently from 
Archer’s and the European tradition’s use of it. If the latter posited the symbol as a spatial/synecdochic 
embodiment, literally, of a complex whole, the Bengali needed the symbol to delineate and mediate time, 
and history. Thus, Dhurjati Prasad Mukhopadhyay said, the symbol was the form in which the past 
appeared in the present. The past lent itself to reuse and reinstation in contemporary times as a symbol. 
The time of history was therefore clearly non-linear.149 In fact, in early twentieth-century Bengal, the 
debate about art often took the form of a debate on the nature of the time of history. Abanindranath 
Thakur criticised Orientalist schools of painting because they formulated the nation’s temporality in the 
archaeological mode, as static and synchronically structured. Historians like Akshay Maitra and 
Rakhaldas Banerjee in turn criticised Abanindranath’s aesthetics for its historical ‘inauthenticity’.150 In a 
remarkable essay on Aryan and non-Aryan art, Abanindranath Thakur made the technique of 
chiaroscuro, the play of light and dark, into a symbol of known and unknown, far and near epochs 
blending into each other.151 When Abanindranath wrote historical short stories for children in his 
Rajkahini, the ‘primitive’ Bhil often appeared as a character in the Rajasthan polity. And when he wrote 
about art, the ‘primitive’ anarya appeared as the ‘seed in the fruit’, ‘which even though rejected while
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tasting the flesh, was the precondition of the fruit in the first place’.152 Sunitikumar described the 
contemporary art scene in Bengal as frequently using ‘primitive’ symbols:
The poetry underlying much of the life of the Kols, where they have not been spoiled, has been felt and appreciated by 
people of culture in Bengal. The Kol already figures in Bengali fiction, in a number of short stories, full of pathos and 
sympathy ... The neo-Bengal school of painting has given us some beautiful paintings of Kol life -  Santal girls, Santal 
couples, and above all, the glorious picture by Nandalal Bose, Dance in the Forest, a group of Kol girls dancing to the 
sound of the drum in the flowering forest -  a vision of colour and throbbing life.153
As evident, the Santals were a symbol of the temporality of life -  the rhythm of music and dance centrally 
defined the Bengali impression of ‘primitive’ existence -  even in traditions of painting.
Rabindranath Thakur was the most complex theoriser of this poetic engagement with time. In his 
works, we see the symbol being displaced from the domain of figuration to that of articulation. Of course, 
Rabindranath’s version of the nation’s history was not particularly different from say that of Bankim’s. 
Both saw history as emerging out of the originary arya-anarya counterpoise. Both saw the Ramayana as 
the story of Aryan conquest and subsumption of totemistic ‘tribes' by Aryan progress. Both saw the ‘fall’ 
of Hinduism in the Buddhist era causing indiscriminate mixing of social groups.154 However, while Bankim 
sought to resolve the antagonistic times of the ‘primitive’ and the ‘historical’ into a unitary historical time, 
Rabindranath believed that contradiction was itself the source of creative temporality: ‘it is through the 
clash of nationalities, through the Other, that man awakens fully within the self ...[Thus] at the very rising 
of the curtain we see the extreme encounter between the arya and the anarya.' Precisely because 
history emerged out of this creative and generative contradiction, time proved itself to be non-linear:
The unendingness of the straight line, the keen extremity and the sharp thinness of the straight line are not that of the 
world; it is the beautiful, full self-enclosure of the circular form which is natural to it. Creation does not happen by a 
unilinear intent, such force can only sever, it cannot hold anything, cannot contain anything, it is entirely empty, it is the 
line of destruction.155
The creative spirit of the nation, though historicised in opposition to the ‘primitive’, accepted ‘even the 
anarya’ in practice -  thus achieving an unprecedented totality where the fundamentally different and the 
purely antagonistic could be configured into a single whole.155
In this creative temporality, the ‘primitive’ was a necessary figure. Rabindranath figured poetic 
freedom as the freedom of the forest-people. He wished to create ‘free verse forests which imp!od[ed] ail 
limits’.157 He wished to 'liberate creation from the prison of the unending, unmoving present / the endless 
arrivals of the not-yets’.158 Living in Birbhum, Rabindranath recognised in his ‘tribal’ palki-bearer, the ‘god 
carved of black stone’, ‘the beauty of the farthest of times and distance’.159 In the Santal youngster
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playing the flute he recognised 'the call of time’.160 In the Santali young woman, working on a 
construction site, he marked the ‘black bird, made of cloud and lightning, wings hidden within1.161 
Inaugurating a Santal co-operative society in village near Bolpur, Rabindranath said that he loved Santals 
because they were ‘free’ and ‘self sufficient’ and never begged for aid.162 In a remarkable prose-poem, 
Rabindranath figured the river Kopai that ran through Birbhum, as a Santal woman. It is worth quoting at 
length, because it demonstrates the poet’s faith in a creative temporality, which made dignity and liberty 
possible even in subordination, poverty and colonial unfreedom.
She lacks the distinction of ancient lineage. The primitive name of hers is mixed up with the loud laughing prattle of the 
Santal woman of countless ages. ...
Slender is her body that glides in curves across shadows and lights, clapping hands in a tripping measure.
In the rains her limbs become wild like those of the village girls drunk with mahua wine, yet never in wantonness 
breaks or drowns her neighbouring lands ... [when she dries up in autumn] her destitution does not shame her, for her 
wealth is not arrogant, nor her poverty mean.
Kopai in her pulsation finds its semblance in the rhythm of my poet’s verse, the rhythm that has formed its 
comradeship with the language rich in music and that, which is crowded with the jarring trivialities of the work-a-day 
hours.103
In the Santal woman, Rabindranath sought a language like music, which did not make itself redundant by 
reducing itself to a transparent mirror of reality. In fact, this language did not claim to represent reality at 
all. Rather, it sought to poetically transform the otherwise triviaiised reality of congested and colonised 
everyday time.
In one of his late poems, where Rabindranath presented temporality as the attempt to search for 
the ‘unspeakable’, this critique of representation becomes all the more evident:
Across the limitless sky, moves the ship of time
Bearing strokes and lines
Prefaced by the dark, it is a dance of forms
A dance to the wordless utterance of the unlimited
To the unformulated language of limits, to the signs of the limitless.164
Against the ideology of progress and of hierarchical times -  which sought infinity ‘in the domain of 
quantity through an endlessly progressing process of measurement1 and ‘which was neither moral nor 
immoral’ -  Rabindranath invoked the creative time of the limitless and the unrepresentable.165 This was a 
temporality which worked beyond knowledge, and beyond the apprehensible idea of ‘duration1, as the 
'vehicle of creative energy1:
In the Hindu Pantheon, the deity of time not merely measures but it works. W e do not know ... why the mind should at all 
depend on time for the assimilation of thoughts. In fact, we never shall solve the mystery why there should at all be a 
process of creation, which is a process in time.166
This particular formulation by Rabindranath is significant. On the one hand, he articulated time as the 
indeterminate, the surplus which forever remained beyond representation and comprehension. On the
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other hand, however, he named this very insight as a Hindu insight, named this temporality as a Hindu 
deity. In doing so, he abandoned the critical alterity of this creative time and attributed it incontrovertibly 
to the nation. It is clear that one strand of Rabindranath’s thought -  where he admitted creative time -  
was strongly critical of nationalism as an essential and singular identity. He urged painters like 
Abanindranath to deny their obligation to ‘label’ their art as ‘Indian’, for as he said, ‘art is not a gorgeous 
sepulchre, immovably brooding over a lonely eternity’, but an exploration of ‘unknown realities’ and a 
move towards a ‘future which is as different from the past as the tree is from the seed’.167 Yet another 
strand in Rabindranath’s thought was trapped in chronology, history and nationhood. Here he went to the 
extent of labelling the unrepresentable time as a Hindu icon. And here, in an acknowledgement of the 
modern, capitalist bifurcation of time into work and leisure, he named the location of poetic practice the 
‘width of leisure’, thus wishing it away from the everyday and the ordinary.168
Rabindranath critiqued representational knowledge as unable to ‘think’ time and he critiqued the 
nation as unable to define all dimensions of existence, especially the aesthetic and the creative. Yet in 
his withdrawal into what he called ‘leisure’, he left the everyday time of colonial experience untouched by 
his poetics. Precisely because he conceptualised the nation, and its history, as opposed to the ‘primitive’ 
was he compelled to reach for the ‘primordial’ in his search for creative temporality. But precisely 
because he attributed the non-practical calm of knowledge to the nation -  as we saw in the second 
section of this chapter -  was he forced to make his poetics ‘leisurely’. This poetics stopped short of 
becoming a political strategy of resistance to colonial and universal forms of knowledge and 
representation. Poetic time did not inform practical time, it remained its surrogate as the historical nation 
subsumed creative time itself as one its many essential traits. Rabindranath’s invocation of the ‘primitive’ 
thus became in practice, a way of evading the colonial present of lost leisure. This paradigm of leisure 
could not quite grasp the logic of what it identified as ‘primitive’ symbolism or Santal poetry. In Santal 
usages theoretically distant things and acts appeared as practically proximate and confrontational. Thus, 
the Santals referred to excretion as ‘paying the moneylender’, to eating watered rice during their annual 
‘hunger period’ as ‘looking at the stars’, to the coconut as the ‘brown sahib of Calcutta with hair on his 
bones’.169 These operated as riddles which every Santal was supposed to know how to crack, if s/he 
was aware of his or her socially marginal and subordinate position. If there was nothing common 
between faeces and the moneylender, the Santal’s life demonstrated that whatever the Santal had to pay 
to the mahajun was as useless and foregone as human excreta. Bengali poetics missed the everyday 
and concrete nature of these creative and political associations, of apparently far-fetched but actually 
proximate experiences.
167 'Art and Tradition’, VQ, 1:1, new series, 1935, pp. 7-10.
108 ‘Philosophy of Leisure’, p. 8.
169 A P /181.
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In terms of political practice, therefore, proponents of ‘progress’ like R. C. Dutt and proponents of 
‘unity in diversity1 like H. C. Chakiadar seemed to agree with each other -  across half a century -  that 
‘primitives’ must be ‘Hinduised’. Thus, while poetry and anthropology aestheticised difference and 
variegation, the nation continued to be ovrdetermined and mobilised in practice as an essential Hindu 
identity. To prove unity in diversity, Sitalchandra Chakravarty textualised the Kols as ‘historical’ remnants 
of the Hindu Cholas.170 And Sashibhushan Ray believed that Santals were already Hinduised. If the 
Baidyanath shrine at Deoghar was claimed both by Santals and by Hindus alike, it did not become a 
ground for solidarity, or even for face-to-face contention. It merely became historical ‘evidence’ of an 
overdetermining Hinduism -  ‘in almost every sub-division [of Santal Parganas] places of worship are 
present as proofs of indestructible Hinduism’.171 Apparently in 1925, Gandhi instructed the Hindus of 
Santal Parganas to show a spirit of patience, sacrifice and satyagraha in order to resist the colonial 
attempts at privileging the ‘primitive’.172 When Gandhi called for a boycott of all that was white, the 
Santals killed all their white poultry and thereby ‘proved’ their Hinduism and vegetarianism! Even the 
Christian missionary P. O. Bodding reluctantly admitted that the Kharwar Santals seemed to be
combining the Hindu god Ram with the Santal sun-god Chando.173 Instead of seeing these ‘facts’ as
‘proof’ that at the local level, frontiers between Hindus and ‘animists’, as between Hindus and Muslims 
were most often blurred, these became proofs of the indelible Hindu-ness of all communities within the 
nation. Sakharam Ganesh Deuskar argued that by counting some Hindus as ‘aboriginals’, the colonial 
state was conspiring to deplete the number of Hindu Bengalis and make Muslims the majority population 
of Bengal.174 And even Rabindranath accepted that however tolerant India was, society must in the last 
instance ‘improve’ and to do so, refuse to ‘preserve the grotesque just for the anarya'. After all,
“tamasikata [indulgence of dark and immoral vices of the flesh] could never be a truly Indian
17^substance J
At every census, therefore, nationalists campaigned for ‘tribes’ to be returned as Hindus. In
1941, the deputy commissioner of Betul found local Congressmen rewarding Gonds, if they counted
themselves as believers in the Hindu religion. When the Bihar Commissioner for Census ordered that 
‘tribeness’ must be determined on the basis of the festivals an individual celebrated, the test had to be 
altered because of a major newspaper campaign and deputations by local nationalists.176 In numerous 
civil cases, primarily involving property and inheritance, the courts were pressurised to see ‘tribals’ as 
Hindus, and in one such case, the anthropologist S. C. Roy was summoned to testify upon an Oraon's 
‘tribeness’, though he refused to appear in court.177 Nationalists also campaign for Santali to be written in
170 Aryetar o Anaryajatir Itihaser Rahasya, Birbhum, 1928, p, 48.
171 Santal Parganas: Past and Present, Deoghar, 1926, p. 3.
172 Ibid., 93-4.
173 The Kharwar Movement among the Santals', Ml, i: 3,1921, p. 223.
174 Bangiya Jati kiDamsonmukh?, Calcutta, 1910.
175 ‘Bharatbarsher Itihaser Dhara', pp. 450-51.
176 Verrler Elwin, Loss of Nerve, London, pp. 35-6.
177 Appeal no. 68, Ranchi, 21 Nov 1940, Manu Oraon vs Abraham Oraon, AP/51.
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Devnagri script, and one educated Santal wrote that his community was being split into two by the 
struggle between Hindi and English.178 That in course of the Tana Bhagat movement, the ‘tribes’ had 
reinterpreted the practice of writing in strong political terms was never considered. Writing, the Bhagats 
said, was scratching with a golden plough on the golden land, the deeds of title/authorship were the 
‘spade, the axe and the plough’, the text was the land on which all was marked and which could not be 
rolled up and carried away like a mat or a piece of paper by the landlords.179 This metaphorical 
association that the tribe’ made between land and the text, was a strongly political association, 
neutralised by Archer as ‘poetry’. For in the discourse of modernity, writing remained a matter of 
knowledge, not a practice generated by social and political confrontations. Nationalists recognised that 
the Santals seemed to be in a constant state of rebelliousness, or readiness to be mobilised. But this did 
not mean much, for ‘since they are not educated, no great did can be performed by them’.180 The 
defining image of historical practice, despite the invocation of poetic temporality, thus remained that of 
‘knowledge prior to action’. Nationalists complained that in non-regulation districts, Hindus had trouble in 
securing tenancies, because colonialism gave special status to the ‘original’ or ‘primitive’ cultivators of 
land. These privileges made the ‘tribe’ unlike itself -  i.e. made them ‘sly and untruthful’. In 1924, the self- 
conscious Hindus of the Santal Parganas ran a signature campaign amongst Santals, to persuade them 
that land-aiienation was a profitable opportunity. Many meetings were held to that effect with the help of 
Marwari traders and of the local Congress committee.181
Thus, despite the poetic insight -  that ‘primitives’ were the last inappropriable location in colonial 
modernity -  Bengali discourse failed to generate an alternative politics of time, which, as Rabindranath 
thought possible, would free the nation from the debilitating linearity of progress. Even Rabindranath, in 
the last instance, imagined the nation, not through a politicisation of temporal difference -  temporal 
difference between the coloniser and the colonised, between the ‘primitive’ and the ‘civilised’ -  but 
through the hope that while India would assert the principle of difference in confronting colonialism, it 
would relinquish difference itself in its own mobilisation. This was because, while poetics invoked 
creative temporalisation against the limits of representation, it did not interrogate representation’s own 
status as the only principle of knowledge. It did not demystify representation as a way of absenting 
peoples from the present and then re-presenting them in the author’s own terms and in the author’s own 
time. It did not critique representation as a practice of making peoples non-contemporary and thus of 
undoing both confrontations and solidarities. Even as poetics critiqued the historical construction of the 
past as given, final and factual, even as it interrogated the ethnologisation and spatialisation of 
temporalities -  poetics shared with representational knowledge the Othering of the everyday time of 
practice. And having abdicated to knowledge its practical and strategic significance, poetics dared not
178 AP/53.
179 Recorded by Archer, AP/1.
130 Sashibhushan Ray, Santal Pargana, p. 22.
131 Ibid., pp. 3,18-22, 60-1.
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venture into the uncertain future that it had imagined -  a future, which saw, in Rabindranath’s 
imagination, even the nation as contingent and the national as merely contextual. In other words, poetics 
made difference -  between its internal constituents, between creative time and progressional time, 
between the coloniser and the colonised -  into a metaphor of the nation. It failed to make difference into 
a ground for practical negotiations. It neither sought to make the ‘primitive’ contemporary to the 
‘historical’, nor tried to inspire competing futures through potent temporal antagonisms. Because it did 
not lend difference to strategic and political use, poetics’ own difference to historical practice remained 
neutralised. In practical terms, like the farthest outpost of the nation, the rebellious poet and the 
sensuous and free ‘primordial’ of his imagination awaited their mobilisation by mainstream nationalist 
politics, without being able to intervene in it.
Conclusion
As we had argued in the first chapter, in colonial Bengal historical knowledge was founded upon the 
counterpoise of the ‘historical’ and the ‘primitive’ -  the latter signifying all that was absent and 
anachronistic in the present and therefore in need of re-presentation by the historically-conscious author- 
subject. Counterpoising -  i.e. enunciating something by contrasting it with something else -  is in itself a 
valid strategy and not specifically ‘modern’ at that. The temporal politics of colonial modernity, therefore, 
lay not so much in the act of counterpoising, as in its attempt to Gonflate this practice of knowledge to 
knowledge itself. Modernity sought to hide the contingency and the temporality of its knowledge 
practices. In colonial modernity, this was done not only through the economies and technologies of 
power, which forced the Other to conform to the author-subject’s knowledge of it. This was also done 
through that particular mode of Othering, by which practice itself was made into the subordinate Other of 
knowledge, which we tried to demonstrate in this last chapter.
Whether it was W. W. Hunter arguing that the ‘primitive’ represented the absence of abstract 
thought, or it was Rabindranath arguing that the laughing Santal woman represented all that was free 
from the subordination of everyday time and practice -  practice seemed to be banished in this discourse 
to that lesser realm of the easily compromised, the contaminated and the contingent. If poetics opposed 
‘objective’ knowledge, they shared with each other this disdain for the practical, the uncertain and the 
> everyday. By thus subordinating, in fact, by Othering practice, discourses of colonial modernity hid the
fact that time and knowledge emerged out of the encounter between antagonistic practical positions and 
the fact that time could not be the sole possession of any one identity, including the nation. In this 
context, it seems meaningful to end by counterpoising to this practice of colonial representation and 
Othering, the othering practices of the ‘primitives’ themselves. This demonstration will perhaps help us to
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remember that social practice and temporal politics need not necessarily generate Others in any 
epistemological sense. That it did so was the contingency of colonial practice.
My chapter on money and credit argued that the Santals did not imagine an absolute Other until 
they confronted Bengalis as moneylenders. The chapter on rebellion argued that Santals did not posit an 
‘original’ difference between themselves and the cf/ku-outsider. In fact, Santals enunciated time itself as 
perpetuated through encounters and scattering of peoples, as ‘men’ travelled in search of a country. 
Here, the Santal practice of bitlaha may be mentioned. This was a practical mode of othering, an act of 
collective gesturing and defilement, of a transgressor who had committed an unacceptable act and 
refused to make amends for it. The decision to perform this act was taken collectively by all Santals of 
the pargana, whereupon a sal branch was circulated in all the villages, with the leaves indicating the 
number of days until bitlaha. On the day of the act, large groups collected near the house of the person 
to be expelled, danced to the drum and to bir seren or forest songs, and recited the reasons why the 
individual must be ousted from the solidarity. Then the house was defiled by throwing soiled plates, and 
other such things into the courtyard. This act of other-ing was not so much a punishment, nor a 
permanent exclusion of the Other. It was a publicisation of the event of alienation, generally open to later 
rapprochements through fines and feasts. The colonial state outlawed this Santal practice by terming it 
‘criminal’ and ‘violent’, because sometimes the Santals performed this act on non-Santals, including on 
moneylenders.182 I mention this Santal practice to emphasise the practical nature of othering in non­
colonial societies, which was fundamentally different from the representation of the Other as always 
already so, in the time of knowledge.
Santal songs themselves articulated this difference between ontological and practical others. 
Santals pointed out that ‘some say Hindu and some say Mussalman, was alas the disaster of kaliyuga.' 
That is, these estrangements were contingent to the present bad times:
Ke bole Hindu, ke bale Mussalman 
Ke bale haiia sarbapas 
Kilike jo samae/ore... nayan 
Kuli yuge hoilo sarbanas.
Some say Hindu, some say Mussalman 
Some say what a catastrophe 
Take care of your eyes [?]
Kaliyug has brought catastrophe.183
A recent Santal author, despite thematising history in terms of the dominant arya-anarya split, has 
reiterated this provisional and open-ended nature of Santal identity ‘through the ages’. Their binds or 
recitations of the past, N. Hembrom says, 'were tested time and again’ as to their truths. The journey of 
the ancestors and their collection of stories and experiences constituted the sari-panja or the ‘expedition’ 
to truth. One of the Santal festivals, Dasain, thus not only celebrated raska or pleasure, it also
182 W . G. Archer, Tribal Law and Justice: A  Report on the Santal, New Delhi, reprint, 1984, pp. 559.-64.
183 W . Archer & G. G. Soren (eds.), Hor Seren, Benagaria, 1943, p. 372.
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commemorated and ‘verified’ the words of the ‘oldest of the old generations who had suffered for the 
cause of desh and dishorn, land and country’.184 The Santals thus saw their body of knowledge as the 
product of the practice of journeying, which was reassessed along the way, along changing positions and 
practices. The Karam festival of the Santals therefore invoked karam gosain, the deity of hard and 
honest work, in the twin brances of the karam tree. The story goes that once upon a time, dharam -  
roughly translated as normative knowledge or truth -  had committed the sin of mocking karam or 
work/practice. Hurt by his brother’s contempt, karam deserted dharam. Since then, dharam suffered 
endlessly, because there was no work to accompany him. So he had finally to undertake great pains to
•joe
woo karam back.
If we take this Santal lesson seriously, that even knowledge is an act of expedition, which must 
be accompanied by practice at every step, proper names, and language itself, come across as a temporal 
and contingent entity. Suhridkumar Bhoumik reminds us how nationalised languages like Bengali were 
actually produced through a forgetting of the shared temporality of utterance between Bengali and 
‘primitive’ Kharwar languages. He shows how the pauses, the rhythms and syllabic emphases of Bengali 
folk-poetry and vratakatha matched, not to Sanskrit poetic metres, but to the temporalisation in Santal 
songs and musical matras.m  Debes Roy’s path breaking work, on the other hand, shows how written 
Bengali in the nineteenth century was produced through an imitation of English syntax and verb-forms,
187thus making ‘nationalised’ and literary Bengali almost intranslatable into spoken and ‘popular’ Bengali.
It is appropriate therefore, to end with a Santal lesson. Ramdas Manjhi Tudu’s Kharwaf Bamsak 
Dharmputhi says that naming is an act simultaneous to the clearing of the forest -  that there cannot be a 
name, a word, without a work or a practice.
The sound came from /  Where the sun sets / Then the great storm / And the reckless rain / The earth softened, the rivers I 
Flooded / The great mountain said in Cai Campa, Chirunaghar/W e shall clear the forest /  Then they cleared the forest / 
And sowed hari erba /  Then the man and woman /  Had a daughter f The eldest /  On the ninth day they named her first.180
This narration of the Santal creation-story, in which the first child was named on the day of sowing, could 
only be significant, not as a historical knowledge of the past which remained true irrespective of the 
present, but as a reminder that naming must occur in association with everyday practice, and that the 
name must be recited at every naming ceremony of every new-born, as the Santal binti-s were. This is a 
reminder that the name, like language, too is a contingent and temporal act. And this name holds true 
only in the necessary presence of Others to whom a Santal is a Santal -  in the absence of the Other, who 
calls a Santal a Santal, the Santal is only a hor, a human.
184 Austria Civilisation of India, Calcutta, 1982, preface, pp. 35, 41.
185 Ibid., p. 42-3.
186 Adibashider Bhasa o Bangla, Mecheda, 1991, pp. 4-5.
187 Upanibeser Samaj o Bangla Sangbadik Gadya, Calcutta, 1990.




As such, fed up by a philosophy that it no longer admits, our 
historiography, remarks Emmanuel Levinas, conceives in turn the 
relation with others as if it were at play within the destiny of 
sedentary populations, owners and builders of land.’ According to 
this logos of a revelation of being, transformed into a 
comprehension of ‘historical facts,1 ‘possession is the form par 
excellence by which the Other becomes the same by becoming 
mine.1
-  Michei de Certeau1
It is not easy to ‘conclude’ a thesis, which has been trying to interrogate and politicise the temporal 
resolutions taught us by modern historiography. As a work which has had to refer to the 1780s as 
well as to the 1930s, it cannot claim to have a single temporal bracket. Undeniably, this long period of 
a hundred and fifty years saw many changes, contingencies and unresolved processes -  in the 
structure and institutions of colonial power, in the politics of nationalism, in modes of collectivity and 
mobilisation, in social alignments and in distribution of power. If the thesis seems to view this long 
century and half from a single vantage point, it is not to impose a unilinearity on it. It is rather to 
highlight different moments from across the century -  the moments of history-writing, travel, money, 
rebellion, aesthetics and representation -  which came to constitute the dominant politics of time, 
defining colonial modernity and marking the predicament of post-colonial practice. I argue that this 
temporal politics, though developed through multiple and multi-centred negotiations, seems to offer a 
single, radical clue, making sense of the complexities of the colonial condition and anti-colonial 
politics. If the last chapter tends towards a reading of texts written as late as the 1930s, it does not 
intend the 1930s to appear as the only valid closure to our story. After all, temporal politics of 
(colonial) modernity, progress, development, identity and history, remain active and hegemonic even 
today -  especially now that the militant nationalism of the Bharatiya Janata Party kind has reinvented 
politics through the polemics of ‘avenging’ the ‘historical’ past of ‘foreign’ rule and ‘desecration’. This 
nationalism, deprived of its practical link to the politics of liberation, has finalised the splitting of time 
between the cultural and the monetary. As this nation seeks to ‘liberalise’ its economy and mirror the 
trajectory of global capital, it claims the purity, autarchy and righteousness of cultural conservatism. 
As if culture remains both ‘originary’ and ‘final’, in the absurd presentism of profit and competition. In 
any case, temporal politics cannot ‘conclude’ -  conclusion is the domain of the narrative, which itself
1 The Writing of History, trans. Tom Conley, New York, 1988, pp. 342-43.
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is part of the politics of time and not its 'form’. Temporal politics can only be confronted and 
superseded by another mode of temporalisation, another beginning and another trajectory of time 
itself. So, instead of concluding the thesis through a historical ‘periodisation’ or a temporal bracket, I 
shall try to suggest three possible ‘beginnings’ that seemed imminent in 1930s colonial Bengal. 
Perhaps, these possible beginnings can be resumed in practice, precisely because they remain as yet 
unresolved.
The 1930s is a suggestive, though arbitrary, date. The last chapter shows how by this time 
history had acquired its ‘objective’ and disciplined form in Bengal, as opposed to the subjective and 
‘polemical’ uses of history in the second half of the nineteenth century. By this time, anthropology, 
too, had become a domain beyond its administrative use by colonial officials -  it seemed to become a 
knowledge which the colonised could re-deploy for the sake of the self. It was also by the 1930s, that 
aesthetics was reclaimed in colonial Bengal -  in a reaction against the late nineteenth-century 
attempts at eliminating the poetic and the imaginative from ‘objective’ knowledge. But the 1930s must 
not be historicised as a time when the colonised finalised their claim to modern disciplines -  indicating 
an end to the colonisers’ monopoly over universal and rational knowledge-forms. To say this, would 
be to partake in the temporality of modernisation and progress and to deny the unremitting post­
colonial anxiety that, in the race towards the ‘end of history’, the colonised, the late-starter, could 
never overtake the forerunner. After all, the point of progress was precisely to substantively 
homogenise yet temporally hierarchise nations -  and this realisation never left the colonised, even 
when s/he felt fully capable of knowledge, reason and history. It is therefore more fruitful to say that in 
the 1930s, the colonised, by way of reclaiming ‘modern’ knowledge from the coloniser, hinted at 
his/her own marginality and lateness in the present. While this irreversible delay that the modern 
educated Bengali confronted was generally a matter of regret, it was also a possibility seized by some 
Bengali theorisers. Rabindranath Thakur was one such thinker, who saw through the idea of the 
nation, the idea which had already been played out as Western history and which had exposed its 
own limits and its own violence. To Rabindranath, who made an advantage out of his late entry into 
the world of self-conscious modernity, the nation was not the ‘natural’ culmination of a peoples 
destiny, as the West would have him believe. History had to move, both ethically and logically, 
beyond the narrow confines of this territorialised and imprisoned subjectivity. The nation had to give 
way, not to a homogenised globalism and modernity, but to an embrace that admitted, loved and 
wondered at difference. Not only because India itself demonstrated that it was possible to embody 
difference, wonderment and openness as the defining characteristic of a society, but also because 
there was no other way. Rabindranath proposed the nation as mahamanaber sagar-tir -  the coast 
outlining the sea of humanity -  distinct from yet inviting endless waves of strangers, ‘foreigners and 
novelties, who engulfed and caressed the nation from without and seeped into and blended with the 
soil of the nation. If Rabindranath felt isolated and superfluous at the end of his life, when he 
lamented that he had failed to reach the people, it was because this hint of collective life beyond and 
irrespective of the nation became, paradoxically and perhaps more so with ‘independence’, an
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abandoned possibility. Though Rabindranath did not live to see 1947, he would perhaps have 
perceived independence not as the end of a story but as the inauguration of a history of a larger scale 
and of an as yet unimagined world-time.
Apart from Rabindranath’s critique of nationalism, the 1920s and the 1930s saw another 
possible new beginning. This was the beginning of an alternative political space that could have 
reconfigured the conventional territoriality of Bengal. As Ranabir Samaddar has shown, if one sees 
the apparently disparate and discrete ’tribal’ movements of early twentieth-century Bengal in terms of 
a single political narrative, nationalism would seem to have quite a different location and centre than 
that conventionalised by the Bengali swadeshi and civil disobedience traditions. The rebellions of 
Kurmis, Mahatos, Santals etc. stretched over all of Jungle Mahals, from Mayurbhanj in Orissa through 
Midnapur, Bankura and Birbhum in Bengal to the Rajmahals in Bihar, stretching across Barabhum, 
Manbhum etc all the way to Chota Nagpur. They stretched even to the north, into Malda and 
Dinajpur. Whether it was the 1917 Santal rebellion in Orissa against the recruitment of ‘tribes’ as 
labour-corps, whether it was the central part played by Santals of Midnapur in the 1942 Quit India 
movement, or whether it was the role of Jangal Santal and his comrades in the late 1960s Naxalbari 
movement in Daqeeling -  ‘primitives’ seemed to signify a history of anti-colonialism, different from and 
marginal to mainstream nationalism.2 The very point of this thesis has been to show that it was not 
accidental that this alternative and rebellious time of liberation was the practice of ‘primitives’ and 
'tribes’ -  for they existed in colonial modernity as that alterity, against which the ‘modern’ appeared as 
modern in the first place.
A third potential beginning can be seen hinted in works of economic historians like Sugata 
Bose. As Bose persuasively shows, by early twentieth century, debt had replaced rent as the central 
mode of surplus extraction in colonial Bengal.3 And Ranajit Guha shows, in this period, ’tribes’ like 
Kols and other peasants reinterpreted even the internal relations between gods and deities as 
relations of indebtedness and interest.4 As the chapter on money and credit has argued, there was 
more to this ‘economic fact’ than a history of increasing commercialisation, marketisation and global 
integration. For debt reconfigured temporality itself, as the past/debt began to control and possess 
the future, in a denial of modernity’s claim to be futuristic and progressive. The temporal mode of 
debt and interest, thus, irrevocably changed the nature of political practice and possibilities. It is not 
accidental that today, debt represents the foundational mode of social relationships across the world. 
While indebtedness has become a ‘normalised’ mode of everyday existence for individuals in 
‘advanced’ societies, what with credit cards and personal consumption banking, indebtedness has
2 Ranabir Samaddar, Territory and People: The Disciplining of Historical Memory’, in Texts of Power, ed. Partha Chatterjee, 
Calcutta, 1996, pp. 167-99; Ashim Adhikary and Ranajit Bhattacharya, The Extremist Movement: an Appraisal of the Naxalite 
Movement with Special Reference to its Repercussions among Tribes', in Tribal Movements in India II, ed. K. S. Singh, Delhi, 
1983, pp. 119-27.
3 The Peasantry in Debt: the Working and Rupture of Systems of Rural Credit Relations', in Credit, Markets and the Agrarian 
Economy of Colonial India, ed. Sugata Bose, Delhi, 1994, p. 248.
4 The Career of an Anti-God in Heaven and on Earth’, in Credit, Markets and the Agrarian Economy, ed. Sugata Bose, pp. 
301-28.
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also become the way in which governments of ‘backward’ countries approach governments of 
‘advanced’ ones, it is a telling commentary on the temporal politics of modernity that, as the state and 
industrial houses in India debated the budgetary implications of international and domestic loans and 
deficit financing, peasants in Andhra and Karnataka in 1997-98 committed mass suicides under the 
burden of unacquittable loans 5 The early twentieth century indicated the beginning of this time of 
universal indebtedness and futurelessness -  in which the history of subject-hood could no longer be 
written in terms of identity of one with his/her own self. After all, debt meant that the subject had to 
clear what s/he owed to another, before s/he could fully repossess and identify with his or her own 
being. This was not the unrepayable debt to ancestors, teachers and gods -  the rin in the traditional 
form -  but the debt that was given precisely for purposes of repayment, with interest. If the history of 
progress has been written as a history of the emergence of the rational and ‘possessive individual, a 
history of indebtedness and repayments underlay its temporality and teleology.
In a way, then, the conclusion of this thesis is to highlight these potential beginnings -  of a 
critique of nationalism, of an alternative political geography, of a recognition and historicisation of the 
time of the debt -  which seem like possibilities abandoned in the 1930s in colonial Bengal. These 
new beginnings become evident, however, only if modernity is reconfigured as primarily a problematic 
of time. This thesis therefore defines modernity, a category admittedly of multiple significations, as 
fundamentally a decision to judge peoples and worlds as if they are, though formally at the same time, 
really non-contemporaneous. By making peoples into non-contemporary beings, modernity seeks to 
reduce knowledge (and politics) to the re-presentation of non-modern, the absent and the 
anachronistic in the time of the present and the ‘modern’ subject. By this overdetermination of time by 
re-presentation, modernity disallows the coming together of different worlds and peoples as co-eval, 
in and at the same time. Re-presentation thus, is a very specific political act of temporalisation, which 
prohibits the coming face-to-face, in modernity, of the ‘primitive’ and the ‘progressive’, the historical 
and the contemporary, the archaic and the prophetic, and the present and the past. The temporality 
of re-presentation neutralises the temporality of encounter, and therefore the temporality of collective 
practice. In the place of practice and politics, representation offers predictive knowledge, and in the 
place of contradiction and/or solidarity, it offers an appearance of identity and historicity.
Modernity, however, cannot be problematised in terms of temporality unless one accepts 
colonialism to be its central event -  that is, unless one acknowledges that Europe imagined its own 
modernity through colonial encounters, through the imagination of the colonised as an Other without 
history and time, as a primitive or backward entity essentially non-contemporary with the modern Self. 
To see colonialism as only one of many dimensions of Western modernity is to gloss over modernity s 
own perception of itself as fundamentally a temporal concept. This thesis therefore has tried to 
foreground the colonial condition as the ground for rethinking temporality itself. For the purpose of 
problematising time, however, it is not enough to assess the ‘significance’ of colonialism in terms of
5 ‘Harvest of Death: Report by Samar Haiarnkar’, in India Today, XXIII: 23,1993, pp. 32-7.
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colonial ‘constructions’ of the Other, the ‘primitive’ and the ‘backward’. Nor is it enough, for the 
purpose of building a paradigm of post-colonial practice, to invoke the hybridisation, subversion and 
re-deployment of metropolitan concepts of progress, history and modernity by the colonised. Both 
these theoretical steps are imperative, but they do not adequately unpack the temporal politics of 
colonial modernity. Colonial construction and subversive hybridisation were common strategies which 
targetted all categories and orders of society -  caste, tribe, gender, colour, history, territory, religion, 
education, culture, knowledge, science, state, truth, self, law, violence, right, duty and sentiment. The 
problematic of time however cannot be understood simply in terms of either colonial construction or 
subversive hybridisation, not only because there seems to be an undeniable calendrical consensus 
across the world, but also because time appears in rational discourse and in common sense as that 
which is never fully thematisable. It is neither a subjectivity nor an object, neither a pure conceptual a 
priori nor merely a culture-specific ‘perception’, lending itself to construction or appropriation in the 
way that categories of thought are supposed to. Even as time became critical in modernity’s 
imagination of the Other and of difference, temporality itself appeared as an unmasterable alterity, not 
only within the colonised reality but also within European philosophy itself. It appeared as that which 
must be presumed, invoked and suggested, but which could not be fully thematised without it losing 
its temporalising function -  i.e. its function of admitting the contingent, the uncertain, the unimagined, 
the deferred and the irreversible. In other words, temporality functioned in modernity simultaneously 
as that which must be conquered, and as that which, being temporality, repeatedly slipped through 
discourse and knowledge into the realm of unmanageable practice and the uncontrollable Other.
To understand this alterity of time, the thesis uses the insight of Emmanuel Levinas, who 
conceptualises time, though in a very different context and for a very different purpose, as ‘the very 
relationship of the subject with the Other’.6 According to Levinas, since Augustine, time has been 
‘thought’ in the West in terms of an anxious, and later ironic, elaboration of the paradox of the present 
by the speaking and thinking, solitary subject. This was the paradox of the ‘now’, the ‘now’ which 
seems to pass at the very moment of its utterance, while both past and future remain pure 
negativities, inconceivable without reference to the subject’s un-graspabie present itself. It was this 
irresoluble paradox which resulted in the West in the abdication of time in favour of the always-already 
present subject or self, whose presence appeared in European philosophy as non-temporal and 
quasi-theological. Levinas rejects this tradition on the ground that it is an error to posit time as 
something which appears by virtue of the self/soul/subject, or of death of the self as Heidegger would 
have it. To Levinas, time is that which we grasp in the form of the realisation that the Other retains a 
future (and a past), despite the death (and amnesia) of the subject-self. In other words, Levinas 
shows, persuasively, that time cannot be the possession of the self and therefore cannot be 
adequately thought without thinking the Other. That time appears precisely because the world and 
the Other do not cease to be with the subject’s cessation. The question however remains about what 
or who this Other is, about how to recognise and specify this Other -  question which Levinas does not
6 Time and the Other, trans. Richard Coen, Pittsburgh, 1987, p. 39.
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quite answer. In fact, because Levinas reduces his own insight to a question of a very particular 
ethics -  he says that time can be understood only when one chooses the ethics of placing the other 
prior to the self7 - Levinas fails to ask the crucial question, why modem philosophy denies and 
disguises this need for the Other. When he places Augustine’s problematic of time in the same 
tradition as Hegelian metaphysics, he misses the difference between the two. If Augustine was able 
to explicitly ‘confess’ his inability to thematise temporality, Hegel claimed the ability to totalise time as 
world-history, wherein the Self was self-consciously modern and European, and the Other 
incontrovertibly colonised. The Other which foregrounded the subject-self as temporally advanced 
and modern, was not just any Other, but precisely the non-contemporary, backward or primitive, 
spatially configured, fixed and fully explicated. Modernity was this imperative to make time into the 
possession of the (Western) subject, time which was no longer available to the object and to the now 
politically subordinated Other. Instead of time being evident as the ungraspable Other, as Augustine 
seemed to suggest, or as the subject’s (ethical) relation with the Other, as Levinas would have it, time 
became that which the Other lacked. In this sense, it is neither accidental nor merely a philosophical 
or logical error, that Western metaphysics, and Levinas himself, fail to name colonialism.
This thesis proceeds by using Levinas’s insight about time and the Other, but by making 
colonialism as the critical condition of its enunciation. This might seem to be the wrong context for 
Levinas, but he does remind us of the sensibility that modernity must deny in order to present itself as 
universal yet temporally ahead of all others -  the sensibility that thought and knowledge necessarily 
face a limit in temporality, and in the Other. In other words, as the Santals reminded us in course of 
their rebellion, time appears as something in which the unanticipated and inconceivable may occur. 
Rational or modern knowledge, despite its ail-explanatory and predictive intention, can never fully 
apprehend what may be possible in time. In the last instance, then, one has to engage with time in 
risky and irreversible practice, precisely because knowledge may not fully equip us to deal with the 
unimaginable future, which may ‘befall’ us, to use Levinas’ term. This characteristic of time is perhaps 
also the characteristic of the Other, which never appears as a self-contained and self-evident idea or 
object, though Levinas seems to hope that the Other can be as easily identified and owned up by the 
self, as the idea of the Self itself. By definition the Other does not claim an absolute and proper 
position, fully graspable and appropriable, but becomes threateningly potent beyond the limits of the 
familiar, beyond the limits of all conceivable difference. Time and the Other thus appear as beyond 
knowledge-concepts and beyond the knowing subject. In other words, time and the Other begin to be 
critical precisely where knowledge stumbles -  where practice, including that of conceptualisation, 
becomes urgent and imperative.
Capitalist modernity made an unprecedented claim for knowledge. This was the claim of 
science and reason to be able to explain everything, including the Other, and logically predict and
7 Levinas: ‘Goodness consists in taking up a position in being such that the Other counts more than myself. Goodness thus 
involves the possibility for the I that is exposed to the alienation of its powers by death to not be for death', Totality and Infinity, 
trans. Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh, 1979, p. 247.
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capture the future. As the coloniser encountered unknown worlds and unanticipated destinies 
amongst strangers, this became a necessary ordering device. By claiming to possess time and 
history, and by claiming to subordinate the Other, the modem European self sought to neutralise the 
alterity of both. In order to conquer and exploit the world, as imperialism sought to do, both the Other 
and temporality had to be nullified -  hence the spatialisation of time and the essentialisation of the 
Other. And hence, the forgetting of the Augustinian insight that time is never fully graspable by the 
subject-self alone. As the universal claim of capital coincided with the universal claim of science and 
natural history in Europe, the world was reproduced as fully chartable, as the Other and temporality 
itself appeared to yield before money and reason. The Other and other times became particular 
derivative cases of universal and pre-given stages of history, even as they remained always backward 
and primitive in relation to the modern subject. In other words, while the colonised Other was 
represented as another time, the coloniser could claim a foreknowledge of it. In colonialism thus, 
time and the Other appeared to be always already captured in knowledge, and then, only secondarily, 
negotiated in practice. If this knowledge-claim of capitalist modernity often fell through in practice, this 
was attributed to errors in strategy rather than to the limits that knowledge faced before temporality 
and before the different and the unfamiliar.
This thesis has tried to show that behind this effecting of colonial sameness and difference, 
behind the de-contemporanisation of peoples, behind the subsumption of temporal 
incommensurabilities to universal progress, lay this foundational subordination of practice by 
knowledge. In order to demonstrate this, the thesis has had to proceed at three levels. At one level, it 
has had to argue that colonialism was not a local event in colonised societies. In both its intent and its 
effect, it was a world event. The colonial condition was central not only to the experience of the 
colonised, but to the experience of the coloniser as well. In other words, the thesis tries to remember 
that the colonial condition informed and constituted even the most self-sustaining of metropolitan 
philosophies. Not only Hegel but thinkers like Martin Heidegger and Georg Simmel depended for their 
own philosophical radicalism on affects and lessons drawn from direct, or indirect, colonial 
encounters. After all, both of them had to centrally engage with ethnology and anthropology in order 
to formulate their thoughts. This is by no means to say that modern Western thinkers were all 
Orientalist in the Said-ian sense of the term. That would make the Edward Said’s concept of 
Orientalism too general to retain its critical value. This is rather to say that modernity as a temporal 
category and as a temporal experience was possible necessarily through the invocation of the 
ethnologised - often disguisedly so - categories of the ‘primitive’ and the ‘primordial’.
At the second level, the thesis has argued that the continuing power of ideologies of progress
and development in post-colonial societies cannot be adequately explained by either naming
nationalist thought as a derivative discourse or by referring to the sheer coercive power of colonial
rule. Neither the externality of colonial discourse nor the coerciveness of the colonial state-apparatus
can be in question, nor can the hybridisation and subversion of colonial discourses by the colonised
be underestimated. However, it must be remembered that so long as nationalism appeared as the
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only possible answer to colonialism, the colonised continued to try sharing the same temporality as 
that of the coloniser, to its own disadvantage. This shared temporality was not only that of progress, 
where the colonised forever lagged behind the coloniser. It was also the temporality of chronological 
and state-centric history to which the colonised had to conform, at the cost of rejecting other ways of 
imagining the past and the future. In order to historicise itself, i.e. in order claim a smooth succession 
to its own past in a simulation of what the West claimed as its own historical continuum right from 
Greek antiquity to the modern day, the colonised actually understated the interruption that colonialism 
represented in indigenous history. It also abdicated in favour of historicism, the temporality of 
practice, which, like the Santal rebellious practices, sought to imagine a future beyond the rational and 
the plausible. This thesis has tried to show how the temporal politics sought to be shared by the 
coloniser and the colonised became the ground for the effecting of difference by the latter. The 
argument proceeds by teasing out the pervasive presence of the ‘primitive’ in the discourses of the 
colonial Bengali intelligentsia, in order to show that Bengali discourse depended upon the invocation 
of the ’primitive’ not only in its claim to a relatively advanced position, but also in its articulation of 
difference with the colonial ruler. The ’primitives’ could be invoked as the reason why Bengal was 
defeated by Muslims. They could also be invoked as the reason for India’s uniqueness as a nation -  
a nation which represented not only an identity, but represented internal difference itself as an intrinsic 
and special trait. In other words, difference, and perhaps hybridisation itself, was founded on the 
assurance of a continuous temporality which performed the non-temporal function of allowing 
differences to exist in the same time. This was the strategic spacing of time, such that differences 
could be re-presented in the present without their developing into full-blown contradictions, into 
judgemental impossibilities, or into antagonistic practices of life and labour. This spacing of time 
required temporality to be imagined as an abstract series, i.e. as chronology, which pre-existed and 
remained indifferent to temporal practice itself. That is, this required time to become analogous to 
space and to the series of accumulating numbers and money.
At a third level, therefore the thesis has had to configure itself in terms of the uneasy triangle 
made by the colonial state, the Bengali middle classes and the so-called real-life, extant ‘primitives’, 
the Santals. This triangle creates complexities and discontinuities of narrative. As the coloniser 
seeks to circumvent the educated Bengali in order to ‘privilege’ the ‘tribal’, the nation is temporally 
bifurcated. As the Bengali bhadrolok defines history and market by counterpoising the ‘primitive’ to 
himself, the nation appears schizophrenic in its own perception. As the Santal becomes indebted to 
the Bengali moneylender under the ‘protection’ of the sahib, s/he is asked to choose the enemy from 
between the English and the Bengali. As the Santals get invited as the most ‘authentic primitive’ in 
the Damin, other ‘tribes’ like Paharias get displaced by them and lose their privileged ‘primitive’ status. 
As Bengali poetics invokes the sensuous and free Santal body in a critique of disciplinary history, s/he 
gets transported as the jungli coolie to tea-gardens in Assam. And as re-presentative politics takes 
hold, the Santal becomes the site of contestation in Hindu-Muslim communal politics, as Hindus insist 
that ‘tribes’ must be enumerated as castes and therefore as part of the Hindu majority of Bengal. Out
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of this complex process, emerges the double-edged temporal resolution of colonial difference. On the 
one hand, the ‘primitive’ emerges as synonymous to the ‘practical’ and the ‘sensual’, desired by 
middle-class men yet negated as threateningly incompetent in financial and historical negotiations. 
On the other hand, the ‘primitive’ emerges as the only inappropriate site in colonial modernity, which 
the marginal Bengali poet seeks out in his critique not only of colonialism but of the limits of 
nationalism itself.
It can be concluded, therefore, that peoples like the Santals became ‘primitive’ in colonial 
modernity not only because of colonial construction and colonial strategies of othering. They became 
‘primitive’ also because the colonised themselves tried to assume the necessary theoretical and 
historical position for knowledge, by making the ‘primitive’ into the ’practical’, and by relegating the 
time of practice to a position subordinate to causality and history. In other words, the Santal acts as a 
radical clue to the unpacking of the temporal politics of difference and identity of the nation. However, 
the danger always remains that -  by appealing to the critical position of the excluded, the exploited 
and above all, the non-contemporary -  a historical thesis of this kind might fall into the trap of 
imagining an authentic and autonomous subaltern voice, which serves no other purpose than that of a 
therapy for the post-colonial authorial predicament. In order to avoid this temptation, this thesis has 
tried to accept at the very beginning the impossibility of recovering ‘uncontaminated’ Santal voices 
from historical ‘evidence’. The thesis began on the premise that since history in colonial Bengal was 
founded in opposition to the imagination of the ‘primitive’ non-Aryan, one cannot hope to find Santal 
notions of time and practice in ‘facts’ and ‘sources’. Therefore, instead of trying to glean instances of 
an ‘original’ or ‘primordial’ voice from colonial or middle-class Bengali documents, the thesis has 
sought to demonstrate the limits of historical sources themselves. For history could not have been 
imagined, without the loss of 'facts’ about the Santal and without the constitution of the Santal as anti- 
historical. In this thesis, therefore, the Santal does not appear as an authentic indigene -  mirror to the 
anxiously modernising educated Bengali -  the cultural site which remained innocently uncolonised 
even in colonial times. Rather, s/he appears as a contemporary critique of the nationalist reduction of 
time to history. This ‘primitive’ position is no more ‘authentic’ than the ‘nationalist’ position, but it 
returns today as the unmanageable excess to the nation, in south Bihar, in the north-east, in 
Chattisgarh, confronting modernity precisely at the moment when the nation abdicates confrontation 
in favour of succession to colonialism. (After all, the most recalcitrant elements in contemporary 
India, who refuse to be displaced by large dams, firing ranges and other industrial projects, are 
‘tribes’.) If both the coloniser and the Bengali bhadrolok incessantly repeated the ‘fact’ that ‘primitives’ 
had no sense of time and future, it only suggests that the so-called ‘primitive’ seemed to be a 
threatening alterity -  an alterity, like that of time itself, which could not be synchronised to the 
universal presence of the modern subject and to the generalised telos of progress and nationalism. In 
a paradoxical manner, this thesis shows, temporality itself became the domain of the ‘primitive’, as the 
‘primitive’ was identified with practice, and colonial modern subject sought to monopolise knowledge 
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